



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**
REGION III
2443 WARRENVILLE ROAD, SUITE 210
LISLE, ILLINOIS 60532-4352

July 27, 2022

Mr. Michael Strobe
Site Vice President
NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC
6610 Nuclear Road
Two Rivers, WI 54241-9516

SUBJECT: POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT – INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT
05000266/2022002 AND 05000301/2022002

Dear Mr. Strobe:

On June 30, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Point Beach Nuclear Plant. On July 11, 2022, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. T. Edmonds, Operations Director, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Two of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Point Beach Nuclear Plant.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Point Beach Nuclear Plant.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,



Signed by Peterson, Hironori
on 07/27/22

Hironori Peterson for
Laura L. Kozak, Acting Chief
Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 05000266 and 05000301
License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27

Enclosure:
As stated

cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV

Letter to Michael Strope from Laura L. Kozak dated July 27, 2022.

SUBJECT: POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT – INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT
05000266/2022002 AND 05000301/2022002

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report

Docket Numbers: 05000266 and 05000301

License Numbers: DPR-24 and DPR-27

Report Numbers: 05000266/2022002 and 05000301/2022002

Enterprise Identifier: I-2022-002-0053

Licensee: NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC

Facility: Point Beach Nuclear Plant

Location: Two Rivers, WI

Inspection Dates: March 26, 2022 to June 30, 2022

Inspectors: J. Cassidy, Senior Health Physicist
T. Hartman, Senior Resident Inspector
R. Ng, Project Engineer
J. Park, Reactor Inspector
V. Petrella, Resident Inspector
J. Reed, Health Physicist

Approved By: Laura L. Kozak, Acting Chief
Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee's performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Point Beach Nuclear Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html> for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Instrument Uncertainty and the Effect of Carbon Dioxide on the Tank Solution was Not Considered in the Calculation for the Concentration of the Spray Additive Tank			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Barrier Integrity	Green NCV 05000266,05000301/2022002-01 Open/Closed	[H.11] - Challenge the Unknown	71111.22
The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria V when the licensee failed to prescribe an instruction or procedure with the appropriate qualitative or quantitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished.			

Failure to Make an Individual Knowledgeable of Dose Rates Prior to Entry into a High Radiation Area			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Occupational Radiation Safety	Green NCV 05000266/2022002-02 Open/Closed	[H.4] - Teamwork	71124.01
The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (Green) with an associated NCV of TS 5.7.1 "High Radiation Areas with Dose Rates Not Exceeding 1.0 rem/hour at 30 Centimeters from the Radiation Source or from any Surface Penetrated by the Radiation." Specifically, a worker was authorized into a high radiation area before the licensee determined the dose rates in all areas authorized for the entry.			

Additional Tracking Items

Type	Issue Number	Title	Report Section	Status
URI	05000266/2022002-03	Alpha Monitoring Program	71124.01	Open
LER	05000266/2021-001-00	LER 2021-001-00 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Main Feedwater Pump Trip Results in Manual Reactor Trip	71153	Closed

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 began the inspection period shut down for refueling outage U1R40. On April 21, 2022, Unit 1 was restarted. On April 22, 2022, the unit was synchronized to the grid, and on April 26, 2022, it achieved full power. The unit remained at or near full power throughout the remainder of the inspection period.

Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power and remained at or near full power throughout the remainder of the inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html>. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, "Plant Status," observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection

Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of seasonal hot temperatures for the following systems:
 - control room heating, ventilation, and air conditioning units on June 8, 2022
 - the switchyard and control house on June 9, 2022

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

- (1) Unit 1 train A component cooling water system on April 26, 2022
- (2) Unit 1 train A containment spray system on May 19, 2022

Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the Unit 1 residual heat removal system on April 25, 2022.

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (8 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

- (1) Fire Zone 505 on April 8, 2022
- (2) Fire Zone 511 on April 8, 2022
- (3) Fire Zone 516 on April 8, 2022
- (4) Fire Zone 520 on April 8, 2022
- (5) Fire Zone 271 on April 11, 2022
- (6) Fire Zone 272 on April 11, 2022
- (7) Fire Zone 273 on April 11, 2022
- (8) Fire Zone 274 on April 11, 2022

71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures

Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the:

- (1) cable vaults in manholes Z-65A, Z-65B, Z-65D, Z-65E, Z-65J, and Z-65P

71111.07A - Heat Exchanger/Sink Performance

Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:

- (1) Unit 1 train A containment accident recirculation heat exchanger

71111.08P - Inservice Inspection Activities (PWR)

PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, steam generator tubes, reactor vessel internals, risk-significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary are appropriately monitored for degradation, and that repairs and replacements were appropriately fabricated, examined and accepted by reviewing the following activities from March 28, 2022 to April 13, 2022:

03.01.a - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities

- ultrasonic exam of welds RC-02-LD-1001-08 & -09, category R-A, item R1.11
- ultrasonic exam of weld RC-10-SI-1001-21, category R-A, item R1.11
- liquid penetrant surface exam of weld CVC-02-AS-1001-27, augmented exam, LR related
- NDE Report No. 2020U1Ven-005 with relevant indications accepted for continued service on RCP 'A' weld attachment

- pressure boundary welds for replacement of 1CV-323A, Work Order (WO) 40664014
- pressure boundary field weld W-D-1 for replacement of 1P-011A, WO 40104554

03.01.b - Pressurized-Water Reactor Vessel Upper Head Penetration Examination Activities

- Unit 1 reactor head penetration no. 14, 37, and 41 subjected to visual exam

03.01.c – Pressurized-Water Reactor Boric Acid Corrosion Control Activities

- boric acid evaluations for RCP 1P-1A and SI pump 1P-15B
- corrective actions for boric acid leak on RCP 1P-1A

03.01.d – Pressurized-Water Reactor Steam Generator Tube Examination Activities

- eddy current examinations for Unit 1 steam generators 'A' and 'B'
- secondary side visual examinations for Unit 1 steam generators 'A' and 'B'

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Regualification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during Unit 1 reactor and plant startup on April 21, 2022.

Licensed Operator Regualification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated an operator regualification scenario on May 19, 2022

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Quality Control (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance and quality control activities to ensure the following structure, system, and component (SSC) remains capable of performing its intended function:

- (1) The inspectors reviewed six WOs covering a variety of maintenance activities to evaluate whether licensee quality control verifications are properly specified in accordance with the quality assurance program and are implemented as specified.

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

- (1) Unit 1 elevated risk due to lowered inventory on March 29, 2022
- (2) Unit 1 elevated risk due to increased heat load in the spent fuel pool on April 5, 2022
- (3) Unit 1 emergent work due to rod cluster control assembly issues in core location H-2 on April 14, 2022
- (4) Unit 1 elevated risk due to lowered inventory on April 15, 2022
- (5) Unit 1 elevated risk due to white reactor protection calibration of temperature loop on May 3, 2022
- (6) Unit 2 elevated risk due to reduced coincidence during 2ICP 02.005A, "Engineered Safety Features System Logic Train A Actuation Logic Test," on June 24, 2022

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

- (1) void found in Unit 2 residual heat removal system at 2RH-V-1
- (2) void found in Unit 2 residual heat removal system at 2RH-V-2
- (3) fuel assembly 1G16 (located in Unit 1 core location H-2) has top nozzle leaf spring pack that is lower than the other three
- (4) air leak on G-04 emergency diesel generator north bank starting air motors
- (5) audible noise and slightly elevated temperatures on the Unit 2 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump discharge line
- (6) motor control center 2B32 alternate power supply breaker found racked-in

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:

- (1) Engineering Change (EC) 294454, "Replace Rod Position Indication (RPI) in Control Room"
- (2) EC 273505, "CC Pump Replacement; Upgrades for Pump Reliability"

71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing

Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance testing activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:

- (1) IT 40, Safety Injection Valves Train B Unit 1, after maintenance on 1SI-896B on April 1, 2022
- (2) IT 280A, Main Steam Stop Valves Stroke Test (Cold Shutdown) Unit 1, after maintenance on 1MS-2017, HX-1B steam generator header main steam stop control valve on April 15, 2022

- (3) IT 280A, Main Steam Stop Valves Stroke Test (Cold Shutdown) Unit 1, after maintenance on 1MS-2018, HX-1A steam generator header main steam stop control valve on April 15, 2022
- (4) 1ICP 04.029-1, Analog Rod Position Indication Outage Calibration, after rod position indication modification on May 25, 2022
- (5) PC 29, Gas Turbine and Auxiliary Diesel Load Test, after maintenance of the G-05 gas turbine on June 2, 2022.
- (6) 2-SOP-480-B04, Unit 2 Vital Train B 480V Buses, after breaker maintenance for the Unit 2 T-001D pressurizer backup heater D group on June 8, 2022
- (7) IT 12A, CC Pumps and Valves While Aligned for RHR Operation (Cold Shutdown) Unit 1, after 1P-11A component cooling water pump modification on June 9, 2022

71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated refueling outage U1R40 activities from April 1, 2022, to April 26, 2022.

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance testing activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:

Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

- (1) ORT 3B, Safety Injection Actuation with Loss of Engineered Safeguards AC (Train B) Unit 1, on March 28, 2022
- (2) TS 82, Emergency Diesel Generator G-02 Monthly, on June 12, 2022
- (3) Unit 1 sodium hydroxide sampling surveillance, WO 40769627
- (4) Unit 2 sodium hydroxide sampling surveillance, WO 40769618

Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) IT 05 Train A, Train A Containment Spray Pump and Valves Unit 1, on May 18, 2022

Containment Isolation Valve Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) ORT 47, Instrument Air Supply Unit 1, on April 4, 2022

FLEX Testing (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) Z-2003A low pressure pump testing on June 1, 2022

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated:

- (1) a crew simulator evaluation with a drill exercise performance evaluation on May 19, 2022

RADIATION SAFETY

71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Instructions to Workers (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated instructions to workers including radiation work permits used to access high radiation areas and labeling of radioactive material in containers.

Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)

The inspectors observed/evaluated the following licensee processes for monitoring and controlling contamination and radioactive material:

- (1) licensee surveys of potentially contaminated material leaving the radiologically controlled area (RCA) and workers exiting the RCA
- (2) workers using portal monitors while leaving the site

Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP Section 03.04) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's control of radiological hazards for the following radiological work:

- (1) Unit 1 narrow range resistance temperature detector replacements
- (2) Unit 1 steam generator inspection activities
- (3) spent fuel pool equipment demobilization

High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP Section 03.05) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated licensee controls of the following High Radiation Areas and Very High Radiation Areas:

- (1) Unit 1 keyway area (in-core instrumentation pathway) field and procedural controls
- (2) Unit 1 regen heat exchanger room
- (3) Unit 1 reactor head on the head stand

Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (IP Section 03.06) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance as it pertains to radiation protection requirements.

71124.03 - In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation

Temporary Ventilation Systems (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the configuration of the following temporary ventilation systems:

- (1) Unit 1 steam generator manway high efficiency particulate air filtration unit

Use of Respiratory Protection Devices (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensee's use of respiratory protection devices.

OTHER ACTIVITIES – BASELINE

71151 - Performance Indicator Verification

The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) Sample (IP Section 02.04) (2 Samples)

- (1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2021 through March 31, 2022)
- (2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2021 through March 31, 2022)

BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (2 Samples)

- (1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2021 through March 31, 2022)
- (2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2021 through March 31, 2022)

71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

- (1) temporary modification installed inside the plant without meeting all requirements of the modification process

71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution

Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective action program from December 1, 2021 to May 31, 2022, for potential adverse trends that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.

71153 - Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

Event Report (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):

- (1) LER 05000266/2021-001-00, Main Feedwater Pump Trip Results in Manual Reactor Trip (ADAMS Accession No. ML21271A271). The inspectors determined that it was not reasonable to foresee or correct the cause discussed in the LER; therefore, no performance deficiency was identified. The inspectors did not identify a violation of NRC requirements.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Instrument Uncertainty and the Effect of Carbon Dioxide on the Tank Solution was Not Considered in the Calculation for the Concentration of the Spray Additive Tank			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Barrier Integrity	Green NCV 05000266,05000301/2022002-01 Open/Closed	[H.11] - Challenge the Unknown	71111.22
The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria V when the licensee failed to prescribe an instruction or procedure with the appropriate qualitative or quantitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished.			
<u>Description:</u> The spray additive system, supported by the containment spray system, assists in reducing the iodine fission product inventory in the containment atmosphere resulting from a design basis accident (DBA). Radioiodine in its various forms is the fission product of primary concern in the evaluation of a DBA. It is absorbed by the spray from the containment atmosphere. To enhance the iodine absorption capacity of the spray, the spray solution is adjusted to an alkaline pH that promotes iodine hydrolysis, in which iodine is converted to nonvolatile forms. Because of its stability when exposed to radiation and elevated temperature, sodium hydroxide (NaOH) is the preferred spray additive. The NaOH added to the spray also ensures a pH value in the acceptable range of 7.0 to 10.5. The minimum pH in the containment sump needed to keep iodine in the iodate form is 7.0. A pH greater than 7 assures the continued iodine removal effectiveness. The maximum pH is based on Equipment Qualification considerations to minimize the occurrence of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components and is set to 10.5. The licensee is required to determine the concentration of sodium hydroxide, NaOH, in the spray additive tank per surveillance requirement SR 3.6.7.3. This surveillance is done every 6 months and the requirement is to verify the spray additive tank NaOH solution concentration is greater than or equal to 30 percent and less than or equal to 33 percent by weight. To determine the concentration of the NaOH, the licensee used WOs 40769627 and 40769618. The work instructions are as follows:			

Sample spray add tank and analyze for % NaOH
Verify $\geq 30\%$ and $\leq 33\%$ NaOH

The WOs state the acceptance criteria as the same as the surveillance requirement in Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement 3.6.7.3.

The licensee uses CAMP 226, "Sodium Hydroxide: H_2SO_4 Titration Method," Revision 8, to determine the concentration of sodium hydroxide in the sample. In the procedure, the licensee titrates the sample from the sodium hydroxide tank using sulfuric acid. After the titration, the licensee then calculates the %NaOH. The procedure says that "[t]he 2 sigma precision and single measurement accuracy is approximately $\pm 0.3\%$ NaOH". This means that the instrument uncertainty of the titration is $\pm 0.3\%$ NaOH.

A chemical reaction will happen between aqueous sodium hydroxide and carbon dioxide to form sodium carbonate and water. In the spray additive tanks, carbon dioxide is able to get into the tanks by normal in-leakage and when the tank is opened up. Since approximately 2013, the licensee had not used a method to minimize the introduction of air into the spray additive tanks.

In CAMP 226, Revision 8, it warns about carbon dioxide and the affect it has on the sodium hydroxide. It states the following:

"Large amounts of carbonate ions from CO_2 absorption during sampling, transport, and analysis can interfere with the titration and yield an inaccurately low result. Magnetic stirring apparatus should be operated at a moderate speed. Excessive speed will increase CO_2 contamination and insufficient speed prolongs the sample's exposure to CO_2 ."

CAMP 226, Revision 8 does not account for the affect the CO_2 has on the sodium hydroxide. With the production of sodium carbonate, the titration could mask the real amount of sodium hydroxide in the tank. When a titration is done, a known substance is added to an unknown substance and an indicator is used to determine when the reaction is complete. The base assumption in a titration is that the only interaction is from the two liquids interacting. In the licensee's calculation for the amount of sodium hydroxide, the assumption is that the only substances that are interacting are the sulfuric acid (titrant) and the solution from the spray additive tank. The spray additive tank has been exposed to air in the past and the tank lacks a method to prevent introduction of carbon dioxide to the spray additive tank atmosphere. Because of this, there is an unknown amount of sodium carbonate in the tank, and this decreases the amount of sodium hydroxide in the tank.

The most recent sodium hydroxide concentration results for Units 1 and 2 are 30.5 percent and 30.5 percent respectfully. The safety concern is not an immediate safety issue because based on engineering judgment there is allowance in the results to account for the instrument uncertainty and the interaction between carbon dioxide and sodium hydroxide.

Corrective Actions: The licensee plans to update the WO to include margin for the uncertainty.

Corrective Action References: Action Request (AR) 2430785

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the failure to prescribe an instruction or procedure with the appropriate qualitative or quantitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished was a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria V, and was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the licensee did not consider the instrument uncertainty when determining the concentration of sodium hydroxide, and the licensee did not take into account the interaction of carbon dioxide with the sodium hydroxide.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the failure to not take into account the instrument uncertainty and the affect the carbon dioxide has on the spray additive tank solution could allow the licensee to believe the NaOH concentration is within the required band when it could actually be outside the allowed band and unable to meet its design function.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power." Specifically, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the inspectors answered "no" to all the questions in Exhibit 3.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.11 - Challenge the Unknown: Individuals stop when faced with uncertain conditions. Risks are evaluated and managed before proceeding. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect of Human Performance because the individuals performing the procedure had the opportunity to challenge why there were two sets of acceptance criteria. Specifically, the WOs had acceptance criteria of $\geq 30\%$ NaOH and $\leq 33\%$ NaOH and NP 3.2.2 Primary Water Chemistry Monitoring Program, Revision 29 has expected values of $\geq 30\%$ NaOH (TS), $\leq 33\%$ NaOH (TS), and $\geq 30.3\%$ NaOH (Admin.).

Enforcement:

Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," requires in part, that instructions, procedures, or drawings shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished.

Contrary to the above, on January 14, 2022, the licensee failed to prescribe an appropriate instruction or procedure with the appropriate qualitative or quantitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished. Specifically, in WOs 40769627 and 40769618, the licensee did not consider the instrument uncertainty for determining the concentration of sodium hydroxide as called out in CAMP 226, "Sodium Hydroxide: H_2SO_4 Titration Method," Revision 8. The licensee also did not consider the affect that carbon dioxide has on the concentration of sodium hydroxide in the tank because the licensee did not minimize the introduction of carbon dioxide to the tank.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Failure to Make an Individual Knowledgeable of Dose Rates Prior to Entry Into a High Radiation Area			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Occupational Radiation Safety	Green NCV 05000266/2022002-02 Open/Closed	[H.4] - Teamwork	71124.01
<p>The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (Green) with an associated NCV of TS 5.7.1 "High Radiation Areas with Dose Rates Not Exceeding 1.0 rem/hour at 30 Centimeters from the Radiation Source or from any Surface Penetrated by the Radiation." Specifically, a worker was authorized into a high radiation area before the licensee determined the dose rates in all areas authorized for the entry.</p>			
<p><u>Description:</u></p> <p>On February 15, 2022, an individual was granted access to the Unit 2 volume control tank (VCT) cubicle after receiving a high radiation area (HRA) briefing from radiation protection staff. The individual was briefed to survey maps completed the morning of February 15, 2022, with work area dose rates listed at 55 mrem per hour. The individual signed on to Radiation Work Permit #22-0205 that allowed HRA access, and had electronic dosimeter set points of 21 mrem accumulated dose and 150 mrem per hour dose rate alarms.</p> <p>While performing work in the Unit 2 VCT cubicle, the individual's electronic dosimeter alarmed. Upon receiving the alarm, the individual left the area and reported the dose rate alarm to radiation protection. Review of the electronic dosimeter showed the individual had received a dose rate alarm of 158 mrem per hour. Follow-up radiological surveys identified that the work area had dose rates of 220 to 250 mrem per hour.</p> <p>Miscommunication between the lead radiation protection technician (RPT) and the RPT performing the survey caused the radiological survey to be completed for only a portion of the work area. The individual's authorized work area also included overhead areas that were not included on the radiological survey map utilized for the HRA briefing.</p> <p>Corrective Actions: The licensee stopped work in the VCT cubicle and conducted additional radiological surveys of the area.</p> <p>Corrective Action References: AR 2418890</p>			
<p><u>Performance Assessment:</u></p> <p>Performance Deficiency: Licensee personnel did not comply with requirements for entry into an HRA or locked high radiation area (LHRA), as contained in TS 5.7.1. Specifically, the licensee did not determine the dose rates in all areas that work was authorized; and, therefore, the worker was not knowledgeable of the dose rates before initial entry in the HRA.</p> <p>Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the licensee did not determine the dose rates for all areas authorized to work; and, therefore, the worker was not made knowledgeable of current dose rates which could lead to unintended dose. As provided in Example 6.a of IMC 0612 Appendix E, "Examples of Minor Issues," the failure to determine the dose rates in all areas that work was authorized had the potential to lead to a more significant radiation safety concern because of</p>			

an ineffective radiation program barrier. Specifically, the miscommunication and incomplete radiation survey resulted in the licensee not properly informing workers of the radiation hazard. Consequently, this performance deficiency was considered to be of more-than-minor significance.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix C, "Occupational Radiation Safety SDP." The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix C, "Occupational Radiation Safety SDP." The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because: (1) it did not involve as-low-as-reasonably-achievable planning or work controls, (2) there was no overexposure, (3) there was no substantial potential for an overexposure, and (4) the ability to assess dose was not compromised.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.4 - Teamwork: Individuals and work groups communicate and coordinate their activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure nuclear safety is maintained. Specifically, miscommunication between the work groups caused a radiological survey to be completed without all requisite dose rate information.

Enforcement:

Violation: Technical Specification 5.7.1, "High Radiation Areas with Dose Rates Not Exceeding 1.0 rem/hour at 30 Centimeters from the Radiation Source or from any Surface Penetrated by the Radiation" condition e. requires, in part, that "Except for individuals qualified in radiation protection procedures, or personnel continuously escorted by such individuals, entry into such areas shall be made only after dose rates in the area have been determined and entry personnel are knowledgeable of them. These continuously escorted personnel will receive pre-job briefing prior to entry into such areas. This dose rate determination, knowledge, and pre-job briefing does not require documentation prior to initial entry."

Contrary to the above, on February 15, 2022, the licensee failed to make an entry into such areas (a HRA with dose rates not exceeding 1.0 rem/hour at 30 centimeters) by an individual, who was qualified in radiation protection procedures or continuously escorted by such individuals, or after dose rates in the area have been determined and entry personnel are knowledgeable of them. Specifically, an individual was authorized to work in the Unit 2 VCT cubicle (a HRA with actual dose rates of 220 to 250 mrem per hour); however, the licensee failed to determine the dose rates in the authorized work area, indicating to the individual that dose rates were 55 mrem per hour.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Unresolved Item (Open)	Alpha Monitoring Program URI 05000266/2022002-03	71124.01
Description:		
Alpha emitting radionuclides have a significantly lower Annual Limit on Intake than beta-gamma emitting radionuclides that might be present at a nuclear power plant. While the processes used to identify, monitor, and control alpha contamination is similar to those used for beta-gamma emitting contamination, the instrumentation used for alpha contamination is often different and the amount of time needed to measure alpha contamination is often much		

longer than the count times normally used for beta-gamma contamination. Consequently, nuclear power plants typically perform detailed evaluations of plant systems and areas and determine the ratio of beta-gamma contamination to alpha contamination. The results of this assessment identify circumstances where the controls normally used for beta-gamma contamination may no longer be effective for the contamination hazards in zones or systems with relatively low ratios of beta-gamma to alpha contamination.

The inspectors reviewed licensee technical evaluation titled "Site Alpha Characterization Update" completed by the licensee's health physics staff on April 4, 2022 (HP-100-032922). The evaluation identified that the reactor coolant system, residual heat removal system, and chemical and volume control system for both units were characterized as alpha level 2 (Significant) for both units. The safety injection system for both units and the shared systems of spent fuel and radwaste processing were characterized as alpha level 3 (Elevated). However, another section of the same evaluation report appeared to have contradictory information, summarizing the activity ratios for each unit and concluding that the most recent classification for each unit was alpha level 1 (Minimal).

While observing work activities that were in progress during the refueling outage, the inspectors identified that the licensee's work controls and exposure monitoring seemed to be more consistent with the summarized information rather than the characterization for the systems that were being worked. Specifically, the inspectors observed: (1) work activities in the Unit 1 Keyway (under vessel), (2) removal activities of the resistance temperature detector (RTD) manifold from the reactor coolant system, (3) opening the steam generator manways with diaphragm removal and (4) work in the spent fuel pool. For these activities, the inspectors observed that the licensee's radiological controls were similar to controls normally used for beta-gamma contamination (Level 1 or Minimal). Based on the inspectors' observations and discussions with the licensee, the licensee was unable to demonstrate whether the radiological controls implemented to protect workers and monitor possible internal exposure were effective for the alpha contamination hazards present in these work areas. Specifically, the licensee indicated that it needed additional time to demonstrate how its alpha characterization was consistent with its procedures, job planning, work controls, and exposure monitoring for individuals performing the work to ensure that radiological exposures were monitored and controlled in accordance with NRC requirements (10 CFR Part 20).

Planned Closure Actions: The licensee planned to evaluate its alpha monitoring implemented at the site and to clarify/define how the alpha characterization informs job planning, establishes adequate work controls, and monitors exposure for individuals performing work in areas where normal controls for beta-gamma contamination are not adequate for Significant or Elevated alpha contamination (as identified in the work activities discussed above).

Licensee Actions: The licensee entered the condition in the corrective action program and provided the inspectors with an example from 2021 that involved work with elevated alpha contamination.

Corrective Action References: AR 2424060

Observation: Semi Annual Trend Review	71152S
<p>The inspectors reviewed action requests entered into the corrective action program for the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • complete, accurate, and timely documentation of the issue identified in the corrective action program • evaluation and timely disposition of operability and reportability issues • consideration of extent of condition and cause, generic implications, common cause, and previous occurrences • classification and prioritization of the problem's resolution, commensurate with the safety significance • identification of corrective actions that are appropriately focused to correct the problem • completion of corrective actions in a timely manner, commensurate with the safety significance of the issue • identification of negative trends associated with human or equipment performance that can potentially impact nuclear safety • operating experience is adequately evaluated for applicability, and applicable lessons learned are communicated to appropriate organizations, and implemented <p>The inspectors completed the review and did not note any significant trends that were not already identified and addressed by the licensee.</p>	

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

- On July 11, 2022, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. T. Edmonds, Operations Director, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On April 8, 2022, the inspectors presented the radiation protection baseline inspection results to Mr. M. Strobe, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On April 13, 2022, the inspectors presented the inservice inspection results to Mr. M. Strobe, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71111.01	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	AR 2429534	NRC Questions During Switchyard Summer Readiness Walkdown	06/09/2022
	Drawings	M-144, Sheet 2	Heating & Ventilation Temperature Control P&ID	25
		M-214, Sheet 4	P&ID Auxiliary Steam, Heating Steam, Chilled & Hot Water Systems & Details	38
	Miscellaneous	CL 17C	Heating and Ventilation Checklist	31
		NPM 2022-0048	Seasonal Readiness - Summer 2022	05/19/2022
	Procedures	OP-AA-102-1002	Seasonal Readiness	37
71111.04	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	AR 2426014	Material on -5 FT, Unit 1 Area	04/25/2022
	Drawings	110E017, Sheet 1	P&ID Safety Injection System Point Beach N.P. Unit 1	61
		110E017, Sheet 2	P&ID Safety Injection System Point Beach N.P. Unit 1	67
		110E017, Sheet 2	P&ID Safety Injection System Point Beach N.P. Unit 1	67
		110E017, Sheet 3	P&ID Safety Injection System Point Beach N.P. Unit 1	48
		110E018, Sheet 1	P&ID Auxiliary Coolant System Point Beach N.P. Unit 1	71
		110E018, Sheet 2	P&ID Auxiliary Coolant System	22
		110E018, Sheet 3	P&ID Auxiliary Cooling System	45
		110E018, Sheet 4	P&ID Auxiliary Cooling System Point Beach N.P. Unit 1	53
		541F091, Sheet 1	P&ID Reactor Coolant System Point Beach N.P. Unit 1	59
	Miscellaneous	1-CL-CC-001	Component Cooling Unit 1	20
71111.05	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	AR 2424250	NRC Question on PFP-1-CONT-FAC	04/08/2022
		AR 2424251	PFP-1-CONT-FAC - Pre-Fire Plan Unit 1 Containment Building	04/08/2022
		AR 2424703	NRC Question: PFP-0-PAB 66	04/12/2022
	Fire Plans	PFP-0-PAB-66	Pre-Fire Plan Unit 1 & Unit 2 Auxiliary Building 66 Ft	1
		PFP-1-CONT-FAC	Pre-Fire Plan Unit 1 Containment Building/Facade	1
	Miscellaneous		Point Beach Nuclear Plant 4 Hour Fire Round Performance	04/11/2022

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
			Sheet-PAB	
71111.06	Corrective Action Documents	AR 2370216	NMH-201 Manhole Water Over Cables (WPS Power)	10/03/2020
		AR 2426379	MH-10 Alarm Did Not Come in on C-314	04/28/2022
		AR 2426894	NMH-201 (WPS Shore Power) Found with Cables Flooded	05/05/2022
	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	AR 2428215	NRC Identified Errors in Work Order	05/23/2022
	Drawings	6118 E-2	Single Line Diagram WPS/Connections Point Beach N.P. Unit 1 & 2	5
		PBE-816	Cable Vault Locations Point Beach N.P. Unit 1 & 2	1
	Work Orders	WO 40783843	Manholes: Yearly (Spring) Inspection	05/10/2022
71111.07A	Work Orders	WO 40752711	1HX-015A/Motor Cooling Coil Insp/Cleaning (GL 89-13)	04/01/2022
		WO 40752725	1HX-015 A1-A8/Remove End Bells, Flex Hoses and Pressure Test	04/01/2022
71111.08P	Corrective Action Documents	AR 2371705	1P-001A RCP Seal Injection Line Boric Acid	10/15/2020
		AR 2371713	Unit 1A RCP Welded Attachment Liquid Penetrant Indications	02/19/2021
		AR 2371850	Recordable Indication on SW Piping Support Welded Attachment	10/19/2020
		AR 2373770	Foreign Material Identified in 1CS-2188	01/25/2021
	Engineering Evaluations	20-251-E	Boric Acid Evaluation for RCP 1P-1A	1
		22-009-E	Boric Acid Evaluation for SI Pump 1P-15B	0
		LTR-SDA-20-079-P	Point Beach Unit 1 Reactor Coolant Pump Flaw Assessment for As-Found Linear Indications During Fall 2020 Refueling Outage	0
		SG-CDMP-19-8	Point Beach Unit 1 U1R38 Condition Monitoring and Operational Assessment	0
		SG-CDMP-22-2	Point Beach U1R40 Steam Generator Degradation Assessment	1
	Miscellaneous	2019-0025	ASME XI Repair/Replacement Plan	2
	NDE Reports	EMB-PT-001	Visible Liquid Penetration Examination Record for Weld No. W-D-1 under WO 40104554	04/07/2022
		PB1-PT-22-001	Liquid Penetrant Examination of Weld CVC-02-AS-1001-27	03/30/2022

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		PB1-UT-22-001	UT Calibration/Examination of Weld RC-02-LD-1001-09	04/03/2022
		PB1-UT-22-002	UT Calibration/Examination of Weld RC-02-LD-1001-08	04/03/2022
		PB1-UT-22-010	UT Calibration/Examination of Weld RC-10-SI-1001-21	04/05/2022
		PB1-VT-22-013	Visual Exam of Boric Acid (BMV) of RPV Closure Head	04/05/2022
	Procedures	FP-PE-B31-P1P1-GTSM-001	Welding Procedure Specification (WPS)	10
		MRS-GEN-1217	Rolled Mechanical Plug Installation Using the Advanced Rolling Tool and the Universal Platform Control Box	6
		MRS-GEN-1240	Position Verification Procedure	7
		MRS-GEN-1387	Steam Generator Tube Plugging Procedure Specification for Point Beach Roll-Expanded Mechanical Tube Plugs	0
		NDE-451	Visible Dye Penetrant Examination Temperature Applications 40°F to 125°F	32
		NDE-757	Visual Examination for Leakage of Pressure Vessel Penetrations	11
		PBNP WP-1	Welding Procedure for Carbon Steels Group P-1 to P-1 GTAW-SMAW	8
		PBNP WP-2	Welding Procedure for Austenitic Stainless Steels ASME Group P-8 GTAW-SMAW	7
		PDI-UT-2	Generic Procedure for the Ultrasonic Examination of Austenitic Pipe Welds	I
	Work Orders	WO 40664014-03	1CV-323A Prefab Welding	10/24/2020
		WO 40664014-06	NDE Administrative Task	11/06/2020
		WO 40664014-07	Weld Documents	11/02/2020
71111.11Q	Miscellaneous	PBN LOC 22C 001E	As Left	0
	Procedures	AD-AA-100-1006	Procedure and Work Instruction Use and Adherence	21
		OP 1B	Reactor Startup	83
		OP 1C	Startup to Power Operation Unit 1	48
		ORT 4 Unit 1	Main Turbine Overspeed Trip Device Unit 1	37
		RESP 4.1	BOL Physics Tests	32
71111.12	Corrective Action Documents	AR 2428808	1MS-2010 Capacity Incorrectly Documented in WO 40619651-01	05/31/2022

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
	Resulting from Inspection	AR 2428869	NRC Identified Paperwork Needed Clarification	06/01/2022
		AR 2428898	Work Order Missing Date on Signature Block	06/01/2022
	Work Orders	WO 40104554-09	1P-011A - 1Prep Assemble Pump & Motor/Machine Baseplate	04/20/2022
		WO 40104554-38	1P-011A - Baseplate Grout Installation Per EC273505	04/20/2022
		WO 40104554-47	1P-011A H200 Pipe Support – Temporary Remove & Restore	04/20/2022
		WO 40595754	1C-112 - Install NUS Modules	04/14/2022
		WO 40619651	1MS-02010 / Replace Relief Valve (IST Program)	04/12/2022
		WO 40736761	1PM-482A - Install NUS Module	04/14/2022
		WO 40774589	1PT-969 - Replace Transmitter	03/31/2022
		WO 40823575	B52-DB50-040; Replace Alarm Circuit Wire with SR Wire	04/18/2022
71111.13	Miscellaneous		PBNP Shutdown Safety Assessment and Fire Inspection Checklist at 0700 for U1R40	04/04/2022
			Ignition Control Permit for Work Order 40104554 on 04/04/2022	04/04/2022
			Hourly Fire Round Performance Sheet-PAB on 04/05/2022	04/05/2022
			Hourly Fire Round Performance Sheet-PAB for 04/04/2022	04/04/2022
			PBNP Shutdown Safety Assessment and Fire Inspection Checklist at 0444 for U1R40	04/14/2022
			PBNP Shutdown Safety Assessment and Fire Inspection Checklist at 1130 for U1R40	04/14/2022
			PBNP Shutdown Safety Assessment and Fire Inspection Checklist at 1906 for U1R40	04/14/2022
			1R40 Critical Path Schedule	04/14/2022
			PBNP Shutdown Safety Assessment and Fire Inspection Checklist on 04/15/2022 at 0433 for U1R40	04/15/2022
			PDC for the Unit 1 White Reactor Protection Calibration of Temperature Loop	05/03/2022
			High Risk and Short Duration TSAC Vulnerabilities for 1(2) ICP 02.005 Safeguards Logic Test - Train A(B)	06/24/2022
			1R40 Critical Path Schedule	04/13/2022
			PBNP Shutdown Safety Assessment and Fire Inspection Checklist on 03/28/2022 at 2200 for U1R40	03/28/2022

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71111.15	Calculations	2006-0035	Parametric Values	1
		6704.001-C-001	Starting Air Tank Volume and Pressure	2
		6704.001-C-085	Starting Air Tank Volume and Pressure	2
		6704.001-C-085	Starting Air Tank Volume and Pressure	0
	Corrective Action Documents	AR 2410707	Audible Noise & Slightly Elevated Temps - 2P29 Discharge Line	11/08/2021
		AR 2411221	DA-446 Isolation Valve Is Leaking	11/12/2021
		AR 2415042	2-TS-ECCS-002 Train B U2 Safeguards Void Found at 2RH-V-2	01/03/2022
		AR 2415049	2-TS-ECCS-Train A WO 40769707 Void Found at 2RH-V-1	01/03/2022
		AR 2424892	H-2 Core Location Not Pass Drag Test	04/13/2022
		AR 2425098	Continued Operation using FA 1G16	04/15/2022
		AR 2429474	Configuration: Alternate MCC Supply Breaker	06/09/2022
	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	AR 2420216	Review Calculation PBNP-994-40-M02 for Mode 6 Operation	03/01/2022
	Drawings	110E029, Sheet 1	P&ID Auxiliary Coolant System	57
		M-209, Sheet 15	P&ID Starting Air System Diesel Generator Building M-209 SH. 15 Point Beach N.P. Unit 1 & 2	13
		M-217, Sheet 1	P&ID Auxiliary Feedwater System Point Beach N.P. Unit 1 & 2	107
		M-2202, Sheet 2	P&ID Feedwater System Point Beach N.P. Unit 2	58
	Engineering Changes	EC 0000258684	CRR Cancel EDG Calcs (See Topic Notes)	0
	Miscellaneous	DBD-21	480 VAC System Design Basis Document	10
	Procedures	IT 100 G-04	Seat Leakage Test of Diesel Air Compressor Discharge Check Valves G-04	3
		PC 8 Part 2	Monthly AFW Pump Discharge Piping Temperature Checks	10
	Work Orders	WO 346921	PBTP 156, G-04 Minimum Air Start Pressure for Fast Start	11/30/2007
		WO 40769707	2-TS-ECCS-002 Train A	01/03/2022
		WO 40769708	2-TS-ECCS-002 Train B	01/03/2022
71111.18	Calculations	2005-0050	PAB and Control Building Electrical Heat Load Calculation	0

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	AR 2424958	Missing QC Initial on Completed Work Order	04/14/2022
	Engineering Changes	EC 273505	CC Pump Replacement; Upgrades for Pump Reliability	19
	Work Orders	WO 40720933	U1 RPI - Install New Rod Position Recorders in 1C04	04/06/2022
71111.19	Corrective Action Documents	AR 2424409	New Installed 1P-11A Did Not Meet Acceptance IT 12A	04/10/2022
		AR 2424410	IT 12A - CC Pumps and Valves While (in Review) (Rebaselining)	04/10/2022
		AR 2424412	(P) IT 12 Train A - 1P-11A, (SQR) (Rebaselining)	04/10/2022
	Procedures	PC 29	Gas Turbine and Auxiliary Diesel Load Test	74
	Work Orders	WO 40104554-26	1P-011A - Operations PMT - RTS	04/27/2022
		WO 40667425	1MS-2017C-S - Replace Solenoid Valve	04/14/2022
		WO 40667431	1MS-2018C-S - Replace Solenoid Valve	04/14/2022
		WO 40667432	1MS-2017D-S - Replace Solenoid Valve	04/14/2022
		WO 40667435	1MS-2018D-S - Replace Solenoid Valve	04/14/2022
		WO 40720933-04	U1 RPI - RPIR Installation PMT	04/10/2022
		WO 40724044	1MS-2018A-S - Replace Solenoid Valve	04/14/2022
		WO 40724045	1MS-2018B-S - Replace Solenoid Valve	04/14/2022
		WO 40752602	1MS-2017A-S - Replace Solenoid Valve	04/14/2022
		WO 40752642	1MS-2017B-S - Replace Solenoid Valve	04/14/2022
		WO 40752801	IT-280A, U1 MS Stop VLVS Stroke (CSD) < 200 DegF	04/15/2022
		WO 40753172	1ICP 4.29-1 - RPI Indicator Calibration and System Checks	04/11/2022
		WO 40753269	1SI-00896B-O: MOV Actuator Diagnostics & Inspections	04/20/2022
		WO 40753270	1SI-00896B-O: MOV Stem Lube/Actuat Gearbox Grease Insp	04/01/2022
		WO 40785650-02	2B52-29B; Setup and Stage Spare Breaker Per RMP 9369-1	02/15/2022
		WO 40785650-04	2B52-29B; Perform Breaker Swap Using A Prepared Spare	06/08/2022
		WO 40785650-05	2B52-29B; OPS PMT/RTS	06/08/2022
71111.20	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from	AR 2425608	NRC Identified Issues During CTMT Walk Down	04/20/2022

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
	Inspection			
	Miscellaneous		Tagout Coversheet for the Tagout of 1 CS P-28A Motor Interference	04/07/2022
			Tagout of 1 CW-3 Diving/Welding	04/12/2022
	Procedures	2RMP 9096-1	Reactor Vessel Head Removal and Installation Using BIACH Tensioning System	23
		CL 20	Post Outage Containment Closeout Inspection Unit 1	40
		CL 20A Unit 1	Unit 1 Containment Closeout Inspection	19
		OP 1C	Startup to Power Operation Unit 1	48
		OP 4D Part 3	Draining the Reactor Cavity and Reactor Coolant System	43
		OP 4E Unit 1	Reactor Coolant System Lowered Inventory Requirements Unit 1	10
71111.22	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	AR 02430785	SAT Analysis Work Order Documentation (NRC Identified)	06/27/2022
	Procedures	0-SOP-FLEX-003	FLEX Portable Diesel Low Pressure Pump Operation, Z-2003A & Z-2003B	7
		CAMP 226	Sodium Hydroxide: H2SO4 Titration Method	8
		ORT 3B	Safety Injection Actuation with Loss of Engineered Safeguards AC (Train B) Unit1	50
	Work Orders	WO 40749167-02	1IA-3047-O - Pre-Maintenance Testing - ORT 47	04/06/2022
		WO 40769618	SAT NaOH SR 3.06.07.3	01/14/2022
		WO 40769627	SAT NaOH SR 3.06.07.3	01/14/2022
		WO 40786948	IT-05 Train A	06/01/2022
		WO 40790329	TS-82, G-02 Emergency Diesel Generator Operability Test	06/22/2022
71114.06	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	AR 2428406	Typo Found on Paperwork	05/25/2022
	Miscellaneous		*Drill* NARS Form for Classification at 12:40	05/19/2022
			Drill NARS Form for Classification at 12:17	05/19/2022
			March 2022 DEP PI Data	
			April 2022 DEP PI Data	

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
			April 2022 DEP PI Data Corrected Document	
71124.01	Corrective Action Documents	AR 2418890	Unanticipated Dose Rate Alarm	02/15/2022
	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	AR 2424060	Alpha Characterization	04/07/2022
		AR 2424160	Gatehouse Portal Monitor Issues	
	Miscellaneous	HP-100-012521	Site Alpha Characterization Update	01/28/2021
		HP-100-032922	Site Alpha Characterization Update	04/04/2022
	Procedures	HP 2.14	Containment Keyway Personnel Access	21
		HP 9.2	Steam Generator Primary Channel Head Ventilation	14
		HPIP 3.52	Airborne Radioactivity Surveys	48
		NISP-RP-010	Radiological Job Coverage	1
		RP-AA-102-1000	Alpha Monitoring	6
		RP-AA-104-1000	ALARA Implementing Procedure	18
	Radiation Surveys	DXW06OY	Whole Body Count for Individual Working in the Keyway	
		JXF0VU9	Whole Body Count for Individual in Keyway	
	Radiation Work Permits (RWP's)	RWP 22-1020	Keyway Entries	0
		RWP 22-1025	Scaffolding Containment Outage Activities	0
		RWP 22-1053	Unit 1 Narrow Range RTD Replacement	0
		RWP 22-1054	S/G Handhole Cover Remove/Install	0
		RWP 22-1057	Steam Generator Eddy Current Testing, Tube Sheet Cleaning	0
		RWP 22-1058	S/G Manway/Shield Doors & Diaphragm Removal, Cleaning & Installation	0
71124.03	Procedures	HPIP 4.58	Issuance of Respiratory Equipment	29
71151	Miscellaneous		Performance Indicators; Units 1 and 2; Reactor Coolant System Leakage	04/01/2021 - 03/31/2022
			Performance Indicators; Units 1 and 2; Safety System Functional Failures	04/01/2021 - 03/31/2022
	Procedures	LI-AA-100-10003	NRC Performance Indicator	4
		NP 5.2.16	NRC Performance Indicators	23
71152A	Corrective Action	AR 2417777	PBN Staff Worked Outside of Process to Install ADV	02/02/2022

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
	Documents		Temporary	
	Procedures	EN-AA-205-1102	Temporary Configuration Changes	18
		EN-AA-205-1104	Standard Design Process	1
71152S	Miscellaneous		Trend ARs 120121-053122	06/02/2022
71153	Corrective Action Documents	AR 2399938	1P-28B (MFP) Trip on Timed Overcurrent	07/31/2021
		AR 2399939	1MS-2056 (Condenser Steam Dump Valve) Stuck Open	07/31/2021
		AR 2399940	1HC-481 ('B' FRV BYP Hand Controller) Didn't Control in Auto	07/31/2021
		AR 2399942	1FD-2516B (MSR 'A' Dump) Failed to Open on Turbine Trip	07/31/2021
		AR 2399943	1FD-2517B (MSR 'D' Dump) Failed to Open on Turbine Trip	07/31/2021
		AR 2399944	1OS-1-MOV	07/31/2021
		AR 2399946	Unit 1 Reactor Trip Due to 1P-28B MFP Trip	08/01/2021
		AR 2399947	1FD-2517A MSR Drain Didn't Open	08/01/2021
		AR 2399949	1FT-475 SG B Steam Flow Channel Indicates on Scale Post Trip	08/01/2021
	Miscellaneous	AR 2399938	Root Cause for the 1P-28B-M Main Feed Pump Motor Trip	02/14/2022
	Work Orders	WO 40787663	1MS-2056 (Condenser Steam Dump Valve) Stuck Open	08/09/2021
		WO 40787863	1OS-1-MOV/Failed to Shut Post Trip	08/09/2021