



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

REGION I
475 ALLENDALE ROAD, SUITE 102
KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406-2713

May 27, 2022

Mr. Jerry Low, Contracting Officer
U.S. Department of the Navy
Naval Sea Systems Command
1333 Isaac Hull Avenue, SE
Washington Navy Yard 20376-0001

**SUBJECT: SURFACE SHIP SUPPORT BARGE - U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION INSPECTION REPORT NO. 99902091/2022001**

Dear Mr. Low:

In accordance with the interagency agreement (IA) between the U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), staff conducted an inspection of Surface Ship Support Barge (SSSB) activities on March 14 - 15, 2022, to review ongoing decommissioning activities. The inspection consisted of observations by the inspectors, interviews with site personnel, review of procedures and records, and plant walkdowns. The results of the inspection were discussed with Mr. Ray Duff, Assistant Program Manager and other members of your staff on April 28, 2022 and are provided in the enclosed report.

Based on the results of this inspection, a condition that would be treated as a Severity Level IV violation (NCV) under the NRC enforcement program was identified. The condition would be treated as a non-cited violation (NCV), consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. A licensee under NRC jurisdiction would have the option of contesting the violation or the significance of the violation by providing a response within 30 days of the date of this letter, with the basis for the denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001.

In accordance with 10 CFR Part 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web Site at <https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Current NRC regulations and guidance are included on the NRC's website at www.nrc.gov; select Radioactive Waste; Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities; then Regulations, Guidance and Communications. For informational purposes, the current Enforcement Policy is included on the NRC's website at www.nrc.gov; select About NRC, Organizations & Functions; Office of Enforcement; Enforcement documents; then Enforcement Policy (Under 'Related Information'). You may also obtain these documents by contacting the Government Printing Office (GPO) toll-free at 1-866-512-1800. The GPO is open from 8:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. EST, Monday through Friday (except Federal holidays).

J. Low

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No reply to this letter is required. Please contact Katherine Warner at (610) 337-5389 if you have any questions regarding this matter.

Sincerely,

Anthony Dimitriadis, Chief
Decommissioning, ISFSI, and Reactor
Health Physics Branch
Division of Radiological Safety and Security

Enclosure:
Report No. 2022001

cc w/Encl:
H. Duff, PMS 312D
S. Picard, NAVSEA 08
J. Blackburn, NAVSEA 08

J. Low

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SUBJECT: SURFACE SHIP SUPPORT BARGE - U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION INSPECTION REPORT NO. 99902091/2022001

Distribution w/encl (via email)

ADimitriadis, RI

KWarner, RI

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OFFICE	DRSS/RI		DRSS/RI				
NAME	KWarner/kw		ADimitriadis/ad				
DATE	5/9/2022		5/27/2022				

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I

INSPECTION REPORT

Inspection Visit No.	2022001
Project No.	Contract N00024-20-C-4139
Facility:	Surface Ship Support Barge (SSSB)
Location:	Alabama Shipyard 660 Dunlap Dr. Mobile, AL 36602
Inspection Dates:	March 14 - 15, 2022
Inspection Exit Date:	April 28, 2022
Inspectors/Technical Reviewers:	Katherine Warner, Senior Health Physicist Decommissioning, ISFSI and Reactor Health Physics Branch Division of Radiological Safety and Security Andrew Taverna, Health Physicist (Training) Decommissioning, ISFSI and Reactor Health Physics Branch Division of Radiological Safety and Security Gregory Chapman, Senior Health Physicist Reactor Decommissioning Branch Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery and Waste Programs
Approved By:	Anthony Dimitriadis, Chief Decommissioning, ISFSI and Reactor Health Physics Branch Division of Radiological Safety and Security

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Surface Ship Support Barge (SSSB) NRC Inspection Report No. 99902091/2022001

An announced routine decommissioning inspection was completed on March 14 - 15, 2022, by U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff at the SSSB site in Mobile, AL. The inspection included a review of programs and activities associated with the SSSB decommissioning project, including interviews with APTIM staff and APTIM contractors; a review of documents; walkdowns of the facility; performance of confirmatory surveys, observations of prepared work areas and in-progress work activities. The SSSB falls under the jurisdiction of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (NNPP) and is not an NRC licensed facility. In September 2019, NNPP and NRC entered into an interagency agreement (IA) for NRC to provide technical support for oversight of decommissioning activities of the SSSB (Agencywide Documents and Access and Management System ADAMS Accession No. ML20177A172). NNPP selected APTIM Federal Services, LLC (APTIM) to decommission the SSSB. By contract, APTIM is required to perform dismantlement and disposal in compliance with all NRC licensee-applicable regulations. The Project Manager in NRC's Reactor Decommissioning Branch, Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, & Waste Programs (DUWP), Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) is designated as the official NRC point of contact with inspection support from the NRC Region I Office.

The program for conducting NRC inspection activities at the SSSB is described in Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2565, "Regional Inspection Activities for Naval Reactors Naval Vessels Undergoing Decommissioning." IMC 2565 supports fulfillment of NRC's responsibility for providing oversight and inspection services of the SSSB as agreed in the above mentioned IA between the NRC and NNPP. IMC 2561, "Reactor Decommissioning Inspection Program" and its associated procedures are used, as appropriate.

The NRC identified an issue that would be treated as a Severity Level IV non-cited violation (NCV) under the NRC enforcement program for failure to follow the Radiation Safety Program as documented in the Decommissioning Work Plan (DWP). Specifically, the site did not properly implement 4.2.7 Control of Radiation Work – Radiological Work Permits, 4.2.11 Contamination Control procedures of the Radiation Safety Program as documented in the Decommissioning Work Plan (DWP) for controlling access to areas requiring respiratory protection. Because the issue was of very low safety significance, was not repetitive or willful, and has been entered into the site's Radiation Safety Incident Notification and Improvement Reporting program (2022-SSSB-13), the NRC would consider this issue a NCV consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

REPORT DETAILS

1.0 Introduction

The SSSB is a barge, (i.e., non-powered vessel) that was used to support refueling Navy nuclear-powered ships. The SSSB was originally the mid-section of the SS CANTIGNY, which was converted to a nuclear support facility and in 1964 was named the Prototype Waterborne Expended Fuel Container. Further repairs and alterations resulted in renaming the former mid-section to the SSSB. The SSSB was last used to support the final defueling of the Ex-Enterprise in approximately 2016. Based on NRC review and recommendation for approval of the dismantlement work plan, NNPP authorized transfer of custody of the SSSB to APTIM on June 10, 2021, to support dismantlement consistent with NRC regulations (ML21166A149). As of January 2022, the SSSB was undergoing radiological decommissioning, including dismantlement and disposal activities.

2.0 Naval Vessel Decommissioning

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed an on-site decommissioning inspection on March 14 – 15, 2022, supplemented by in-office reviews and periodic phone calls. The inspection consisted of observations by the inspectors, interviews with site personnel, a review of procedures and records, confirmatory surveys, and site walk-downs.

The inspectors evaluated the site's process for identifying and correcting issues by reviewing a representative selection of issues and audits to determine if a sufficiently low threshold for problem identification existed and if appropriate prioritization and timely resolution of issues had been conducted commensurate with the significance of the issue.

The inspectors conducted document reviews and interviews with site personnel to determine if proposed changes to the decommissioning work plan (DWP) met any of the criteria described in Chapter 14 of the DWP and would require prior NRC approval.

The inspectors observed activities and reviewed documentation associated with occupational exposure, environmental monitoring, and radioactive waste management to determine the effectiveness of site radiological programs. The inspectors toured the radiologically controlled area on board the vessel and toured inside the newly constructed Big Top containment structure (CS) to review radiological postings, general housekeeping, material conditions and observed pre-job briefings and ongoing work to remove, survey, and segment tooling from the wet pit. The inspectors toured the site to observe items, including placement and material condition of the environmental monitoring stations and radiation detectors, labeling of containers, and site access control. The inspectors reviewed program documentation including several waste shipment packages, work plans, radiation work permits, environmental monitoring, and radiological surveys.

The inspectors discussed plans for heating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) installation in the CS and walked down the portions installed at the time of the inspection. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the site fire protection program, including a review of program documents, held discussions with site personnel, and

conducted plant walkdowns to assess field conditions and storage of combustible materials.

The inspectors assessed the site safety conscious work environment to determine if the site had an adequate safety culture.

The NRC contracted Oak Ridge Associated Universities (ORAU) to perform confirmatory surveys of the areas being considered for free release as described in NRC Inspection Report 2021001. The inspectors and technical staff at NRC headquarters reviewed ORAU's report titled "Independent Confirmatory Survey Summary and Results for the U.S. Navy Surface Ship Support Barge Ballast Wing Tank 9 Port, Mobile, Alabama" and APTIM's survey results for Ballast Wing Tanks 9 Port, Centerline, and Starboard to determine if the tanks met the criteria for free release.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors noted that issues identified on the SSSB are categorized into one of three separate programs that can be generally stated as quality, safety, and radiological. Additionally, the site also bins issues through its audit process. The site implemented a tracking log to gather all issues under one document for review. The inspectors determined that issues under the three programs and the audits had been identified, entered into the appropriate programs, and evaluated commensurate with their safety significance, including low threshold issues under the Radiation Safety Incident Notification and Improvement Reporting procedure.

The inspectors reviewed an evaluation of proposed changes to the decommissioning work plan (DWP) to verify the proposed changes did not meet any of the criteria described in Chapter 14 of the DWP and did not require prior NRC approval. The changes include resequencing some of the work activities using the CS instead of the SSSB containment. The inspectors determined that the change did not meet any of the Chapter 14 criteria. The inspectors note that APTIM installed a sandbag barrier around the CS to minimize water intrusion, which was observed to be significant during a heavy rainfall during the inspection. The inspectors note that the evaluation states that "should water collect inside the CS, it will be sampled, analyzed, and dispositioned based on analytical results." This in part ensures that the Chapter 14 criteria "result in the potential for significant environmental impacts that have not been previously reviewed" is not met. At the time of inspection, the revision incorporating the proposed changes was not available for review, therefore this issue will be reviewed in subsequent inspection activities to verify that the changes were appropriately evaluated, including incorporation of water sampling in site procedures.

The inspectors reviewed the 2021 Environmental Monitoring Report and verified that effluent and environmental requirements were met. The report stated that "there have been no releases of radioactive materials or measurable external exposures to members of the project from SSSB project operations for calendar year 2021." During a tour of selected environmental monitoring stations, the inspectors did not identify any significant concerns and noted that a TLD had been added near the radioactive materials storage area. The inspectors reviewed the resolution of several sample anomalies and determined that the justification between the site and the laboratory adequately explained the results. The inspectors also reviewed the Baseline Survey Report dated March 28, 2022 and did not identify any concerns of note.

The inspectors noted that the site had incorporated procedural steps to determine when containers meet labeling requirements or an exception to labeling requirements as found in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 20.1904 and 10 CFR 20.1905. However, the inspectors noted a continued lack of survey requirements around an outside radioactive materials storage area to ensure public dose rate limits are met. While conditions outside the controlled area were not in violation of 10 CFR Part 20 limits at the time of the inspection, the practice of conducting weekly surveys of the area rather than conducting verification surveys at the time of placement of the packages have the potential to be in violation of 10 CFR 20.1501 to verify the public dose limits as listed in 10 CFR 20.1301.

The inspectors reviewed the site fire protection program and performed site tours to confirm effective control of combustible materials around ignition sources. While the inspectors noted that no fires had occurred at the time of the inspection, there were gaps in the fire protection program as required by the Accident Prevention Plan (APP). The gaps included failure to conduct field drills for each of the designated events at the start of the project and tabletop drills annually thereafter as described in APP Section 8.2.7 and required postings of call trees for fire emergencies as described in APP Figure 8-9. The inspectors noted that APTIM took prompt actions to address these gaps, and the inspectors noted a specific focus on fire protection on future inspections.

The inspectors did not identify a reluctance to report safety issues by site personnel, noted that a phone number is prominently posted in the break room for employees to call, and verified that the number was accurate.

The inspectors noted that Section 5.0 of the DWP requires HEPA-filtered ventilation to provide a negative-air enclosure in the CS during dismantlement, sizing, and loading operations. At the time of the inspection, the ventilation system was in the process of being installed so this will be verified during subsequent inspection activities.

The inspectors and NRC headquarters technical staff reviewed and discussed the 9-tank series MARSAME survey results with APTIM. The inspectors noted that one tritium smear on the Wing Tank 9 Port ($27.6 \text{ dpm}/100 \text{ cm}^2$) was reported above the laboratory's Minimum Detectable Activity (MDA), however, the value was considerably lower than the removable contamination action level of $1000 \text{ dpm}/100 \text{ cm}^2$. Comparison between the ORISE and APTIM survey results for Wing Tank 9 Port were generally consistent. The inspectors note that one wet smear sample ($3.62 \text{ pCi}/\text{sample}$) and one volumetric paint sample ($3.7 \text{ pCi}/\text{g}$) from the ORISE results were equal to or above their respective Minimum Detectable Concentrations (MDCs) for Nickel-63 (Ni-63). The NRC notes that the site's DWP describes analyzing paint samples for Cobalt-60 (Co-60) with an MDC of $3.0 \text{ pCi}/\text{g}$, which is calculated to be at 1% of the $5,000 \text{ dpm}/100 \text{ cm}^2$ release criteria in I&E Notice 81-07 and the required Co-60 analytical detection limit equivalent to $5,000 \text{ dpm}/100 \text{ cm}^2$ is $0.02 \text{ } \mu\text{Ci}$ per sample. The DWP describes sampling for Co-60 in lieu of hard-to-detect radionuclides like Ni-63, however, the NRC notes that the two Ni-63 sample values are well below the required analytical detection limit described above. Given that all three samples above MDA/MDC described are below either the action limits described in the DWP or the corresponding sensitivity criteria described in I&E Notice 81-07, the NRC considers the results to be inconsequential and of very low risk significance. The ORISE report (ML22129A117) notes that ORISE did not identify any anomalous issues that would preclude the confirmatory data from Wing Tank 9 Port from

demonstrating compliance with the unrestricted, free release criterion. NRC staff agreed with this assessment.

Violation

The inspectors identified a condition that would be treated as a Severity Level IV non-cited violation (NCV) under the NRC enforcement program based on the failure to follow the Radiation Safety Program as documented in the Decommissioning Work Plan (DWP). Specifically, the site did not properly implement 4.2.7 Control of Radiation Work – Radiological Work Permits, 4.2.11 Contamination Control procedures of the Radiation Safety Program to ensure that the work area was properly controlled per the Radiation Work Permit (RWP) for controlling access to areas requiring respiratory protection.

On March 16, 2022, APTIM planned to segment wet pit tools using the jaws of life tool in the wet pit area of the SSSB. RWP SSSB-2022-05 required individuals to don respirators and additional PPE to be in the Clean Room during the segmentation work activities. APTIM-SSSB-023, "Selection and Use of Respiratory Protection Equipment," states "Nothing shall interfere with the face to facepiece seal including facial hair. Personnel wearing respiratory protection shall be clean shaven." Contrary to this, the inspectors identified an individual in the process of dressing out to perform work wearing a respirator who was not clean shaven. After being questioned, another worker who was clean shaven elected to take his place to complete the work.

While cutting operations are in progress, access to this area is restricted per the RWP to prevent unauthorized access without respiratory protection. The RWP lists three ways in which each Clean Room door may be controlled: by door guard, by lock, or by posting the door as "Respirator Protection Required." The wet pit area has multiple access points. Before the work commenced, the inspectors performed walk downs of the areas and identified a door that should have been locked but was unlocked. APTIM informed the inspectors that the issue had been corrected prior to the start of work, however, when challenged, the inspectors found the door to be unlocked while cutting activities were ongoing.

The door intended for egress was controlled by a door guard who was assigned the responsibility of permitting or prohibiting individuals seeking access to the area. The inspectors identified that the door guard failed to prevent two individuals from accessing the wet pit area where work was actively being performed. Upon discovery, the two individuals who gained access to the wet pit area were directed to exit the area and remain at the site's control area until air samples of the wet pit area were clear of activity limits. The individuals were not authorized into the wet pit area because they were not informed of the requisite respiratory requirements to enter that area during their briefing and were on a different RWP that would not have allowed access into the area. The individuals were held at the RP control point until air samples of the wet pit area were measured and determined to be clear. No intake or radioactive material or personnel contamination events occurred. During inspector interviews of site personnel conducting the measurements of the air samples, the RP staff could not readily clarify the site limits for personnel release, which demonstrated a weakness in training.

APTIM took immediate corrective actions, including coaching the door guard and other workers, electing to use the third control allowed by the RWP by posting signs identifying the respirator protection requirement on all access points to the wet pit, and wrote a Radiological Improvement Report. AMS-710-07-PR-04000, Radiation Safety Program, is

an attachment to the Decommissioning Work Plan. Section 4.2.7 Control of Radiation Work – Radiological Work Permits require, in part, that control of work involving radioactive materials, sources and radiation-producing machines will be accomplished by establishing radiation standards and responsibilities, using first-line supervisors and radiation protection personnel to monitor performance of radiation work, and providing personnel with operating procedures and/or RWPs that establish job-specific radiation protection measures and controls necessary for safe and compliant completion of the job. Section 4.2.11 Contamination Control states, in part, that the key component of contamination control is the identification and demarcation of zones where contamination is likely. Contamination control will emphasize controlling the flow of personnel, equipment, and supplies into and out of these areas.

Contrary to the above, the site failed to implement the radiation safety program of the DWP to ensure compliance with the RWP and control flow of personnel into the Clean Room. This issue is considered more than minor because it involved degradation or failure of multiple radiological barriers per guidance listed in IMC 0612 Appendix E.

Because the issue was of very low safety significance, was not repetitive or willful, and had been entered into the site's corrective action program known as "Radiation Safety Incident Notification and Improvement Reporting program" (2022-SSSB-13), the NRC would consider this issue a NCV consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. **(NCV 99902091/2022001, Failure to Follow Radiation Safety Program).**

c. Conclusions

The NRC identified an occurrence that would be treated as a Severity Level IV non-cited violation (NCV) under the NRC enforcement program for failure to follow the Radiation Safety Program as documented in the Decommissioning Work Plan (DWP).

3.0 Exit Meeting Summary

On April 28, 2022, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Ray Duff, Assistant Program Manager for CVN Inactivation/Disposal within the Program Executive Office for Aircraft Carriers and the Contracting Officer's Representative (COR) for the SSSB (PMS 312D) and members of NNPD staff as well as APTIM representatives. No proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

R. Duff, Assistant Program Manager, COR
 B. Fox, Program Manager, APTIM
 R. Greene, Certified Health Physicist, APTIM
 J. Reust, Site Manager, APTIM
 M. Carr, Project Radiation Safety Officer, APTIM
 D. Heilman, Senior Radiation Technician
 Lieutenant J. Parker, Government On-Site Representative NAVSEA

PARTIAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Procedures

Accident Prevention Plan, Surface Ship Support Barge Dismantlement and Disposal, Revision 0
 AMS-300-05-PR-13000, "Employee Concerns Program (ECP)," Revision 0
 AMS-710-05-PR-02200, "Incident Reporting," Revision 4
 AMS-710-07-WI-04020, "Radiation Safety Incident Notification and Improvement Reporting,"
 Revision 0
 AMS-720-01-PR-00170, "Corrective and Preventative Action," Revision 0
 APTIM-SSSB-001, "Personnel Training Requirements," Revision 0
 APTIM-SSSB-002, "Emergency Response," Revision 0
 APTIM-SSSB-003, "Radiation Work Permits," Revision 0
 APTIM-SSSB-004, "Radiological Postings," Revision 0
 APTIM-SSSB-005, "Selection and Use of Personnel Protective Equipment," Revision 0
 APTIM-SSSB-006, "Personnel Frisking and Decontamination," Revision 0
 APTIM-SSSB-007, "Contamination & Airborne Radiation Control," Revision 0
 APTIM-SSSB-008, "Source Inventory and Control," Revision 0
 APTIM-SSSB-009, "Performance of Radiological Surveys," Revision 0
 APTIM-SSSB-010, "Unrestricted Release of Tools, Equipment and Materials," Revision 0
 APTIM-SSSB-023, "Selection and Use of Respiratory Protection Equipment," Revision 0
 AMS-710-07-PR-04000, Radiation Safety Program, Revision 0
 AMS-805-00-FM-00101, "Work Instruction for Wet Pit Equipment and Component Removal,"
 October 14, 2021

Radiological Improvement Reports

2021-SSSB-04
 2021-SSSB-05
 2021-SSSB-06
 2021-SSSB-07
 2021-SSSB-08
 2022-SSSB-01
 2022-SSSB-04
 2022-SSSB-05
 2022-SSSB-07
 2022-SSSB-09
 2022-SSSB-11
 2022-SSSB-13

Miscellaneous

2021 Environmental Monitoring Summary and Public Dose Evaluation

APTIM Ethics Line Poster

APTIM COVID-19 Workplace Playbook for SSSB Project, Form Number: AMS-710-01-FM-04002, Revision 1

APTIM Corrective Action Log, November 2021

Changes to Decommissioning Work Plan – Revision 2, April 2022

Containment Building Ventilation System Analysis, 501513-M-CL-0001 Revision 0

Decommissioning Work Plan, Surface Ship Support Barge Dismantlement and Disposal, Revision 1

Fire Watch Awareness PowerPoint

IMC container tracker, March 2022

Machine Shop Removal Work Package, SSSB-2021-0011 R0

Radiation Protection Plan Surface Ship Support Barge Dismantlement and Disposal, Revision 1

RWP SSSB-2022-05, Wet Pit Equipment Removals, Revision 0

SSSB Corrective Action Log, 3/9/2022

SSSB Fire Extinguisher Inspection Logs - various

SSSB Plan of the Day March 14 and 15, 2022

SSSB RP 22-01, Surface Ship Support Barge Radiation Safety Program Audit, March 30, 2022

Site-Wide Emergency Drills, March 2022

SSSB Waste Disposal Tracking Sheet 3-08-22

Welding, Cutting, and Heating PowerPoint, Module No.: 02-02300

Health Physics Survey Records

ASY-20220315-SSSB-942

ASY-AS-BZ-0478 & GA-0476 (Air Samples)

Baseline Survey Report, Surface Ship Support Barge Dismantlement and Disposal, March 28, 2022

ORISE Independent Confirmatory Survey Summary and Results For The U.S. Navy Surface Ship Support Barge Ballast Wing Tank 9 Port, 5360-SR-01-DRAFT

Survey Results – MARSAME Survey Package SSSB-002, Tank 9 Centerline, Revision 0

Survey Results – MARSAME Survey Package SSSB-004, Wing Tank 9 Port, Revision 1

Survey Results – MARSAME Survey Package SSSB-006, Wing Tank 9 Starboard, Revision 1

SSSB Wet Pit Dose Rate and Smear Graphics

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

ADAMS	Agencywide Documents and Access and Management System
APTIM	APTIM Federal Services, LLC
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
DUWP	Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, & Waste Programs
IA	Interagency Agreement
IMC	Inspection Manual Chapter
NAVSEA	U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval Sea Systems Command
NMSS	Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
NNPP	Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ORISE	Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education
SSSB	Surface Ship Support Barge