



# NATrIUM

## Decoupling Strategy

a TerraPower & GE-Hitachi technology

SUBJECT TO DOE COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT NO. DE-NE0009054  
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# Objectives

- Natrium™ reactor licensing overview
- Natrium reactor safety and plant overview
- Explain Decoupling Strategy within the Natrium design

# Natrium Reactor Licensing Overview

- Regulatory Engagement Plan submitted 6/8/2021
- 10 CFR 50 licensing process will be followed
  - Construction Permit Application 8/2023
  - Operating License Application 3/2026
- Numerous pre-application interactions are planned to reduce regulatory uncertainty and facilitate the NRC's understanding of Natrium technology and its safety case
- The LMP (NEI 18-04), as endorsed by RG 1.233, will support this application

# Natrium Reactor Licensing Overview


- Each pre-application interaction will build upon risk insights from prior interactions to demonstrate the Natrium reactor's safety case.
- Future Meetings and Presentations include:
  - Principal Design Criteria
  - Source Term Methodology
  - Testing Plan and Methodology

# Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program

- Demonstrate the ability to design, license, construct, startup and operate the Sodium reactor within the Congressionally mandated seven-year timeframe
- Include improvements in safety, security, economics, and environmental impacts
- Utilize a simple, robust, reliable, and proven safety profile
- Lower emissions by initiating the deployment of a fleet of Sodium reactors – Demonstrate that the plants can be built economically and that they will be attractive for future owner/operators

# Sodium Safety Features

- Pool-type Metal Fuel SFR with Molten Salt Energy Island
  - Metallic fuel and sodium have high compatibility
  - No sodium-water reaction in steam generator
  - Large thermal inertia enables simplified response to abnormal events
- Simplified Response to Abnormal Events
  - Reliable reactor shutdown
  - Transition to coolant natural circulation
  - Indefinite passive emergency decay heat removal
  - Low pressure functional containment
  - No reliance on Energy Island for safety functions
- No Safety-Related Operator Actions or AC power
- Technology Based on U.S. SFR Experience
  - EBR-I, EBR-II, FFTF, TREAT
  - SFR inherent safety characteristics demonstrated through testing in EBR-II and FFTF



## Control

- Motor-driven control rod runback
- Gravity-driven control rod scram
- Inherently stable with increased power or temperature


## Cool

- In-vessel primary sodium heat transport (limited penetrations)
- Intermediate air cooling natural draft flow
- Reactor air cooling natural draft flow – always on

## Contain

- Low primary and secondary pressure
- Sodium affinity for radionuclides
- Multiple radionuclides retention boundaries

# NATRIUM



Demin Water

Firewater

Standby Diesels

Warehouse  
& Admin

Steam Generation

Turbine Building

Salt Piping

TI Power Distribution  
Center

Rx Aux. Building

Inert Gas

Shutdown Cooling

Rx Building

Energy Storage Tanks


Control Building

Fuel Building

NI Power Distribution  
Center & Controls

Fuel Aux. Building

# Plant Overview



An aerial 3D architectural rendering of an industrial facility, likely a power plant or refinery. The site is enclosed by a fence and features a variety of structures: a large array of solar panels in the upper left, several large white cylindrical storage tanks, a long white building with a series of circular vents, a central processing area with complex piping and smaller tanks, and a cluster of blue and white buildings in the lower center. A parking lot with several vehicles is visible on the left. The surrounding landscape is green with some trees and a utility tower in the distance.


# NATRIUM

## Decoupling Strategy

# Decoupling Strategy

- Strategy documents in the Sodium design process
- Plant designed with as much *independence as practicable* between Nuclear Island and Energy Island
- “Decoupling” is used to describe this level of independence, which is enabled using molten salt thermal storage system
- Decoupling enables:
  - Operational flexibility
  - Transient separation
  - Regulatory separation

# Decoupling Strategy



- Molten salt storage tanks eliminate direct coupling of reactor power and turbine output that are inherent in PWR and BWRs

# Operational Flexibility


- NI control manages reactor power and cold salt flow to the NI via ESS cold tank pumps
- EI control manages turbine output based upon grid demand while maintaining salt tank levels within *controlled bands*
- *Alerts* notify NI and EI operators when salt tank parameters are outside of control bands
- Deviation of parameters outside of controlled band are considered AOOs and will be evaluated via safety analyses
- Requirements related to salt tank levels, controlled bands, alert levels, and response times will be verified by initial modeling and reflected throughout design process

# Operational Flexibility

- Narrows the scope of NI command and control
  - Allows NI operators to focus on safely operating the nuclear heat source
- Reactor power independent of turbine output
  - Reactor remains at full power while turbine output variations are accommodated via salt tank inventory management
- Immediate reactor plant response to changes in EI heat rejection systems are not necessary

# Transient Separation


- With operational flexibility, most events on the EI that would affect the NI in a typical nuclear power plant have no immediate impact
- EI events can lead to Postulated Initiating Events (PIEs) if resulting change to an *interface parameter* occurs
- Plant design ensures that EI SSCs are not required to perform any defense line functions other than very few selected DL2 sensors on the EI
  - Enables no safety related DL3 SSCs on the EI



# Transient Separation

## Defense-in-Depth

- Plant safety analyses only model PIEs that directly impact the NI.
- All defense line 2, 3, and 4 functions are performed by NI systems



# Regulatory Separation

- Transient separation allows performance of defense line functions by NI SSCs, except for selected DL2 sensing functions, which are NSR
  - Regulatory review of EI is significantly reduced
- Ability to adapt non-nuclear commercial technologies to the EI
- Opportunity to construct EI independently, under a non-nuclear QA program
- Physical separation of NI and EI provide opportunity for limited security to EI facilities and SSCs

# NATRIUM

A 3D architectural rendering of a large industrial facility, likely a sodium reactor power plant. The facility is situated in a green field with a road and parking lot. It features several large white cylindrical storage tanks, a long white rectangular building with a series of circular vents on its roof, and a complex of blue and white industrial buildings with various pipes and structures. In the background, there is a large array of solar panels and a line of trees.

# Questions?

# Acronym List

AOO – Anticipated Operating Occurrence  
ARCAP – Advanced Reactor Content of Application Project  
ARDC – Advanced Reactor Design Criteria  
ARDP – Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program  
CFR – Code of Federal Regulations  
DID – Defense-in-Depth  
DL – Defense Line  
EBR – Experimental Breeder Reactor  
EI – Energy Island  
ESS – Energy Storage System  
FFTF – Fast Flux Test Facility  
GDC – General Design Criteria

LBE – Licensing Basis Event  
LMP – Licensing Modernization Project  
NI – Nuclear Island  
PDC – Principal Design Criteria  
PIE – Postulated Initiating Event  
PSAR – Preliminary Safety Analysis Report  
RIPB – Risk-Informed, Performance-Based  
SFR – Sodium Fast Reactor  
SSC – Structures, systems, and components  
TICAP – Technology Inclusive Content of Application Project  
TREAT – Transient Reactor Test