
Rulemaking:
Alternative Physical
Security
Requirements for
Advanced Reactors

Public Meeting/Workshop

October 19, 2021



# Agenda



<i>Time</i> 12:30 PM - 12:45 PM	<i>Topic</i> Meeting Logistics and Opening Remarks	<b>Speaker</b> NRC
12:45 PM - 2:00 PM	Discussion on Latest Preliminary Proposed Rule Language (NRC to kick-off discussions)	NRC, NEI, Public
2:00 PM – 2:15 PM	BREAK	ALL
2:15 PM – 3:45 PM	Discussion on Possible Changes to Eligibility Criteria	NRC, NEI, Public
3:45 PM – 4:00 PM	Final Questions & Answers and Closing Remarks	NRC, NEI, Public

## Background



#### Rulemaking

- NRC is currently developing Alternative Physical Security Requirements for Advanced Reactors – proposed rule
- More information about this rulemaking and its supporting guidance can be found:
  - www.regulations,gov under docket
     ID: NRC-2017-0227

#### Supporting Guidance

- Implementation guidance for this proposed rulemaking will consist of DG-5071, DG-1365, and may endorse NEI 20-05.
- The NRC staff is developing DG-1365
   which focuses on the physical security
   alternatives and will serve as the vehicle
   for endorsing any external implementing
   guidance for this rulemaking.
- The NRC staff is developing DG-5071 (a revision to RG 5.81) which focuses on target sets.
- NEI is developing NEI 20-05 which focuses on the eligibility criteria contained in the proposed rulemaking

#### Schedule Extension



#### Commission has approved a 9-month extension

New Proposed Rule Dates:

To the Commission: **06/28/2022** 

• New Final Rule Dates:

To the Commission: 10/19/2023





## DISCUSSIONS





10 CFR 73.55(b)(3)

#### Potential conforming change to:

- give advanced reactors an alternative
- house the offsite reference dose values





- Proposed Eligibility Criteria have been condensed into a single applicability statement
- (s) Alternative physical security requirements.
- (1) General requirements.
  - (i) Applicability. A licensee of a small modular reactor, as defined in § 171.5, or non-light water reactor that is licensed under the provisions of part 50 of this chapter or a holder of a combined license for a small modular reactor or non-light water reactor under the provisions of part 52 of this chapter, may elect to meet one or more of the alternatives to certain security requirements as specified in § 73.55(s)(2), if doing so meets the performance objectives under § 73.55(b)(3).



- Proposed Eligibility Criteria have been condensed into a single applicability statement
- (s) Alternative physical security requirements.
- (1) General requirements.
  - (ii) *Identification*. The licensee must identify the specific alternative physical security requirement(s) it intends to implement as part of its physical protection program.






- Proposed Eligibility Criteria have been condensed into a single applicability statement
- (s) Alternative physical security requirements.
- (1) General requirements.
  - (iii) Analysis. A site-specific analysis must be performed to evaluate the potential offsite radiological consequences and demonstrate how the licensee meets the requirements set forth in § 73.55(b). Each licensee must maintain the analysis required by paragraph (s)(1) of this section until the permanent cessation of operations under § 50.82 or § 52.110(a) of this chapter.



## Revised Process Flowchart








#### **NOTES**

- APSR = Alternative Physical Security Requirements
- Consequence analysis determines the time offsite release greater than reference values occurs, assuming target set is lost at t=0.

#### **LEGEND**

GREEN Boxes → APSR can be implemented BLUE Boxes → Process and/or analysis RED Boxes → Cannot implement APSR

- \* At a bounding time
- \*\* After a bounding time and before offsite release greater than reference values occurs.



- APSR = Alternative Physical Security Requirements
- Analysis is specific to the ability of the credited features of a facility design to: (1) prevent the DBT from compromising a full target set within a bounding time or, (2) identify a time to compromise full target set.
- Mitigative measures occur after a bounding time and before an offsite release greater than reference values occurs.
- Time when an offsite release occurs for mitigation measures = time identified in target set for offsite release + time identified to compromise the full target set.

#### Focus Areas



- Finalize proposed rule language
- Complete Draft Guidance
  - DG-5071
  - DG-1365 & NEI 20-05
    - Path forward to refine eligibility criteria guidance and establish guidance to assess design basis threat impact on potential release (i.e., determine release fraction)



### **Thank You!**

Dennis Andrukat

Project Manager –NMSS/REFS email: Dennis.Andrukat@nrc.gov

Regulations.gov docket ID: NRC-2017-0227

Please provide feedback on this public meeting using this link: <a href="https://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/public-meetings/contactus.html">https://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/public-meetings/contactus.html</a>

