UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

April 9, 2021

Mr. Daniel G. Stoddard
Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer
Innsbrook Technical Center
5000 Dominion Blvd.
Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711

SUBJECT: VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1—ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. 218 TO MODIFY TECHNCIAL SPECIFCATION 3.6.4, "CONTAIMENT ISOLATION VALVES" (EPID L-2020-LLA-0092)

Dear Mr. Stoddard:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 218 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-12 for the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1. The amendment revises the technical specifications (TS) in response to your application dated April 30, 2020 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML20121A185), as supplemented by letter dated January 7, 2021 (ADAMS Accession No. ML21007A323).

The amendment revises TS 3.6.4, "Containment Isolation Valves," to replace the term "valve" with the term "barrier" to encompass all components providing the containment isolation function and to specify that the actions to address an inoperable containment isolation valve apply to the affected penetration flow path only rather than all flow paths associated with the penetration.

A copy of the related safety evaluation and notice and environmental findings are also enclosed. The Commission's monthly *Federal Register* notice will include the notice of issuance.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Vaughn V. Thomas, Project Manager
Plant Licensing Branch II-I
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-395

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 218 to NPF-12
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Notice and Environmental Findings

cc: Listserv

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

SOUTH CAROLINA PUBLIC SERVICE AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-395

VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 218
Renewed License No. NPF-12

1. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment to the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1 (the facility), Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-12, filed by the South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (the licensee), dated April 30, 2020, as supplemented by letter dated January 7, 2021, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by a page change to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-12 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 218, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. South Carolina Electric & Gas Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Michael T. Markley

Digitally signed by Michael T. Markley
Date: 2021.04.09 14:19:26 -04'00'

Michael T. Markley, Chief
Plant Licensing Branch II-1
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to Renewed Facility Operating
License and Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: April 9, 2021

VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 218

RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-12

DOCKET NO. 50-395

Replace the following pages of the renewed facility operating license with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Page	Insert Page
License Page 3	License Page 3
Technical Specifications 3/4 6-17	3/4 6-17

(3) SCE&G, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Part 70, to receive, possess and use at any time special nuclear material as reactor fuel, in accordance with the limitations for storage amounts required for reactor operation, as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report, as amended through Amendment No. 33;

(4) SCE&G, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Part 30, 40 and 70 to receive, possess and use at any time byproduct, source and special nuclear material as sealed neutron sources for reactor startup, sealed neutron sources for reactor instrumentation and radiation monitoring equipment calibration, and as fission detectors in amounts as required;

(5) SCE&G, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, and 70, to receive, possess and use in amounts as required any byproduct source or special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form, for sample analysis or instrument calibration or associated with radioactive apparatus of components; and

(6) SCE&G, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as m[a]y be produced by the operation of the facility.

C. This renewed license shall be deemed to contain, and is subject to, the conditions specified in the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations, and orders of the commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:

(1) Maximum Power Level

SCE&G is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core power levels not in excess of 2900 megawatts thermal in accordance with the conditions specified herein and in Attachment 1 to this renewed license. The preoccupation tests, startup tests and other items identified in Attachment 1 to this renewed license shall be completed as specified. Attachment 1 is hereby incorporated into this renewed license.

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plant

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 218, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the renewed license. South Carolina Electric & Gas Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3/4.6.4 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.4 Each containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE. *

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With one or more of the isolation valve(s) inoperable, maintain at least one isolation barrier OPERABLE in each affected penetration flow path and:

a. Restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours, or

b. Isolate each affected penetration flow path within 4 hours by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or

c. Isolate each affected penetration flow path within 4 hours by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange, or

d. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 do not apply.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.4.1 Each containment isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair, or replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control, or power circuit by performance of a cycling test and verification of isolation time.

4.6.4.2 Each containment isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING MODE AT LEAST ONCE PER 18 MONTHS BY:

a. Verifying that on a Phase A containment isolation test signal, each Phase A isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.

b. Verifying that on a Phase B containment isolation test signal, each Phase B isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.

c. Verifying that on a Reactor Building Purge and Exhaust isolation test signal, each Purge and Exhaust valve actuates to its isolation position.

* Locked or sealed closed valves may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 218 TO

RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-12

SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1

DOCKET NO. 50-395

Application (i.e., initial and supplements)	Safety Evaluation Date
• April 30, 2020, ADAMS Accession No. ML20121A185 • January 7, 2021, ADAMS Accession No. ML21007A323	April 9, 2021
	Principal Contributors to Safety Evaluation • Clinton Ashley • Nan Chien • Steve Jones

1.0 PROPOSED CHANGE

South Carolina Electric and Gas Company, (the licensee) requested changes to the licensing basis for Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (Summer) by license amendment request (LAR, application) dated April 30, 2020 (Reference 1), as supplemented by letter dated January 7, 2021 (Reference 2). The proposed changes would revise the licensing basis action statements associated with Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.4, “Containment Isolation Valves,” by revising the action statements associated with Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.4, “Containment Isolation Valves.” Specifically, the amendment would replace the term “valve” with the term “barrier” in the LCO Action statement and modify 3.6.4.b. and c. to specify the penetration “flow path” rather than “penetration.” This would encompass all components providing the containment isolation function and to specify that the actions to address an inoperable containment isolation valve (CIV) apply to the affected penetration flow path only rather than all flow paths associated with the penetration.

Description of the Containment Isolation Valve System

Section 6.2.4, “Containment Isolation System,” of the V.C. Summer Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) (Reference 3) describes the containment isolation system. The containment isolation system consists of specific isolation provisions included as part of each piping system that penetrates the reactor building (primary containment) boundary rather than a separate, independent system. The system is designed to limit leakage through lines that penetrate the reactor building so that the site boundary dose requirements would not be exceeded in the event of a hypothetical accident involving fuel damage. The lines that require isolation have two barriers to ensure that no single failure would prevent isolation. Each of the barriers is designed to limit the leakage of radioactivity within acceptable values over the entire range of normal and accident conditions. This section of the UFSAR described isolation barriers as either CIVs, blind flanges, or closed system boundaries. Closed systems are those that neither connect to the reactor coolant pressure boundary nor communicate with the containment atmosphere.

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

In accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) Part 50, “Domestic licensing of production and utilization facilities,” Appendix A, “General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,” requires, in part, that each line that is part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary and penetrates primary reactor containment shall be provided with containment isolation valves, unless it can be demonstrated that certain provisions are acceptable, as specified in the following criteria:

(1) General Design Criterion (GDC) 55, “Reactor coolant pressure boundary penetrating containment”

(2) GDC 56, “Primary containment isolation”

(3) GDC 57, “Closed systems isolation valves”

Section 3.1 of the UFSAR provides the Summer conformance with the GDC and the principal design features to meet each criterion and identify any exceptions. Section 6.2.4 of the Summer UFSAR describes the specific types of isolation devices for each penetration. The majority of lines penetrating the reactor building have a check valve or power-operated isolation valve inside containment and a power-operated valve outside containment. However, a closed system boundary inside containment provides one isolation boundary for GDC 57 penetrations and for the residual heat removal system, which connects to the reactor coolant pressure boundary; the closed system boundary outside containment provides the second isolation boundary. In addition, several penetrations that would connect directly to the containment atmosphere are isolated by blank flanges inside and outside containment when the reactor is operating.

2.2 Licensee’s Proposed Changes

TS LCO 3.6.4 states:

> Each containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE.*
>
> **Locked or sealed closed valves may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control.*

Current TS 3.6.4 LCO ACTION states:

> With one or more of the isolation valve(s) inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open and either:
>
> a. Restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours, or
>
> b. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or
>
> c. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange, or
>
> d. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

Revised TS LCO 3.6.4 ACTION would state (deletions are struck-out and additions are underlined):

> With one or more of the isolation valve(s) inoperable, maintain at least one isolation ~~valve~~ barrier OPERABLE in each affected penetration flow path ~~that is open~~ and ~~either~~:
>
> a. Restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours, or
>
> b. Isolate each affected penetration flow path within 4 hours by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or
>
> c. Isolate each affected penetration flow path within 4 hours by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange, or
>
> d. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

2.3 Regulatory Review

In part, 10 CFR 50.36(b) states, “The technical specifications will be derived from the analyses and evaluation in the safety analysis report, and amendments thereto, submitted pursuant to § 50.34.” As stated in 10 CFR 50.34, “Contents of applications; technical

information," the GDC states, in part, that the principal design criteria for the facility establish minimum requirements for the principal design criteria for water-cooled nuclear power plants similar in design and location to plants for which the Commission has previously issued construction permits. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.34, the facility safety analysis report includes a description of the relation of the design bases to the principal design criteria. The regulations in10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(i) states, in part, the following:

> Limiting conditions for operation are the lowest functional capability or performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. When a limiting condition for operation of a nuclear reactor is not met, the licensee shall shut down the reactor or follow any remedial action permitted by the technical specifications until the condition can be met.

Section 6.2.4.1(1) of the Summer UFSAR addresses conformance with the GDC related to containment isolation as follows:

> The design of isolation barriers for lines penetrating the reactor building follows the requirements of General Design Criteria 54 through 57 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A.

NUREG-0800, "Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition," Section 16.0, "Technical Specifications," (Reference 4) provides guidance for the NRC staff review of TS. The NRC staff has prepared Standard Technical Specifications (STS) for each of the light-water reactor nuclear steam supply systems and associated balance-of-plant equipment systems. The guidance specifies that the NRC staff review whether content and format of proposed TS are consistent with the applicable STS. Where TS provisions depart from the reference TS, the NRC staff determines whether proposed differences are justified by uniqueness in plant design or other considerations. NUREG-1431, "Standard Technical Specifications—Westinghouse Plants," Revision 4.0, issued April 2012 (Reference 5), contains the applicable current STS for Summer.

NUREG-1431, Revision 4.0, STS 3.6.3, "Containment Isolation Valves (Atmospheric, Subatmospheric, Ice Condenser, and Dual)," specifies the following Required Action for the condition of one or more penetration flow paths and one CIV inoperable and the CIV pressure boundary intact (STS 3.6.3 Condition A):

> Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, blind flange, or check valve with flow through the valve secured.

The STS 3.6.3 completion time for the above Required Action uses a risk-informed categorization of the CIVs and allows a range from 4 hours to 7 days for completion based on the categorization. If STS 3.6.3 Condition G and Required Action are not met (STS 3.6.3 Condition G), the associated Completion Time specifies that the plant be in Hot Standby within 6 hours and in Cold Shutdown within 36 hours.

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

The NRC staff compared the above STS-specified actions and the CIV design-basis information from Section 6.2.4 of the Summer UFSAR with the proposed changes to the action for Summer TS LCO 3.6.4. The STS 3.6.3 Required Actions for one inoperable CIV in a penetration flow path permit a temporary loss of redundancy in open containment penetrations and permit continued operation with one containment isolation device in its isolation position without the potential for inadvertent operation.

The proposed TS 3.6.4 ACTION with one or more CIV inoperable includes the provision to "maintain at least one isolation barrier OPERABLE in each affected penetration flow path…." Section 6.2.4 of the Summer UFSAR defines isolation barriers as either CIVs, blind flanges, or closed system boundaries. The proposed TS 3.6.4 ACTION does not apply to a loss of isolation function condition for a penetration connected to multiple branch lines because the statement specifies one operable barrier in each affected flow path. Therefore, the proposed change is consistent with the existing Summer licensing basis and the corresponding STS 3.6.3 Condition A.

In addition to the above provision, the proposed TS 3.6.4 ACTION includes a requirement to implement one of four actions to restore the capability to withstand a single failure of an active component while maintaining containment isolation capability or to place the plant in a condition where the LCO would not apply (i.e., COLD SHUTDOWN). These are:

a. Restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours, or

b. Isolate each affected penetration flow path within 4 hours by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or

c. Isolate each affected penetration flow path within 4 hours by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange, or

d. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

ACTION a. restores compliance with Summer TS LCO 3.6.4 within a 4-hour time period and remains unchanged from current TS LCO 3.6.4. The 4-hour completion time to restore operability is consistent with the most conservative of the Completion Times specified for the comparable STS 3.6.3 Condition A. This short time period for the completion of actions to restore reliable containment isolation capability provides reasonable assurance that events that would require isolation of the affected containment penetration flow path will not occur during the specified completion time.

Proposed ACTIONS b. and c. have modified the applicability statement to isolate each affected penetration flow path instead of each affected penetration. The proposed changes for these ACTIONS provide acceptable means of isolating the penetration flow path. The NRC staff determined that both are consistent with Required Action A.1 specified in STS 3.6.3 Condition A. The 4-hour proposed Completion Times within proposed options b. and c. are consistent with the most conservative of Completion Times specified for the comparable required actions for STS 3.6.3 Condition A. The change in applicability ensures that each penetration flow path will be isolated or restored to operability such that it can withstand a single failure without a loss of the containment isolation function.

Proposed ACTION d. is unchanged and is consistent with the Required Action of STS 3.6.3.

4.0 REGULATORY FINDING

The NRC staff finds the licensee's proposed changes to TS 3.6.4 consistent with NRC regulations and policies as generally reflected in the STS in NUREG-1431, Revision 4.0. The NRC staff concludes that the proposed changes would continue to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2) and that TS 3.6.4 ACTIONS a. through d. provide acceptable remedial measures if the LCO is not met. Therefore, the NRC staff has determined that the proposed changes to Summer TS 3.6.4 are acceptable.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that public health and safety will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) there is reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to public health and safety.

6.0 REFERENCES

1 Dominion Energy, South Carolina, Inc., letter to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), "Dominion Energy South Carolina (DESC), Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) Unit 1, License Amendment Request LAR-20-142, Request for Technical Specification Change, Technical Specification 3.6.4, "Containment Isolation Valves"," April 30, 2020 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML20121A185).

2 Dominion Energy South Carolina, Inc., letter to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), "Dominion Energy South Carolina (DESC), Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) Unit 1, License Amendment Request LAR-20-142, Request for Technical Specification Change, Technical Specification 3.6.4, "Containment Isolation Valves," Response to ," Request for Additional Information (RAI), January 7, 2021 (ADAMS Accession No. ML21007A323).

3 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), "Virgil C. Summer, Updated Final Safety Analysis (UFSAR), Chapter 6.0 "Engineered Safety Features"," August 2, 1984 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20094D011).

4 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), "NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR [Light-Water Reactor] Edition, Section 16.0, "Technical Specifications," Revision 3," March 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML100351425).

5 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), "NUREG-1431, Volume 1, Revision 4.0, Standard Technical Specifications - Westinghouse Plants," April 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12100A222).

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NOTICE AND ENVIRONMENTAL FINDINGS

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 218 TO

RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-12

SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1

DOCKET NO. 50-395

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated April 30, 2020 (Reference 1), as supplemented by letter dated January 7, 2021 (Reference 2), South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (the licensee) submitted a license amendment request to modify technical specifications (TS) related to the containment isolation valves for Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (Summer), Unit 1. Specifically, the licensee proposed to revise the action statements associated with TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.4, "Containment Isolation Valves," to replace the term "valve" with the term "barrier" in the LCO Action statement and modify 3.6.4.b. and c. to specify the penetration "flow path" rather than "penetration." This would encompass all components providing the containment isolation function and specify that the actions to address an inoperable containment isolation valve apply to the affected penetration flow path only rather than all flow paths associated with the penetration.

The supplemental letter provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in Volume 85 of the *Federal Register* (FR), page 39221, on June 30, 2020 (85 FR 39221).

2.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the staff notified the South Carolina State official of the proposed issuance of the amendment on March 01, 2021. On March 01, 2021 the State official confirmed the State of South Carolina had no comments.

3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement for the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) Part 20, “Standards for protection against radiation.” The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding published in the *Federal Register* (85 FR 39221; June 30, 2020). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). In accordance with 10 CFR 51.22(b), the NRC staff does not need to prepare an environmental impact statement or environmental assessment in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

4.0 REFERENCES

1 Dominion Energy, South Carolina, Inc., letter to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), "Dominion Energy South Carolina (DESC), Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) Unit 1, License Amendment Request LAR-20-142, Request for Technical Specification Change, Technical Specification 3.6.4, "Containment Isolation Valves"," April 30, 2020 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML20121A185).

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3 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), "Virgil C. Summer, Updated Final Safety Analysis (UFSAR), Chapter 6.0 "Engineered Safety Features"," August 2, 1984 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20094D011).

4 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), "NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR [Light-Water Reactor] Edition, Section 16.0, "Technical Specifications," Revision 3," March 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML100351425).

5 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), "NUREG-1431, Volume 1, Revision 4.0, Standard Technical Specifications - Westinghouse Plants," April 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12100A222).

SUBJECT: VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1—ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. 218 TO MODIFY TECHNCIAL SPECIFCATION 3.6.4, “CONTAIMENT ISOLATION VALVES” (EPID L-2020-LLA-0092) DATED APRIL 9, 2021

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