



**UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**  
REGION IV  
1600 EAST LAMAR BOULEVARD  
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-4511

February 3, 2021

Mr. John Dinelli, Site Vice President  
Arkansas Nuclear One  
Entergy Operations, Inc.  
N-TSB-58  
1448 S.R. 333  
Russellville, AR 72802-0967

**SUBJECT: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE, UNITS 1 AND 2 – INTEGRATED INSPECTION  
REPORT 05000313/2020004 AND 05000368/2020004**

Dear Mr. Dinelli:

On December 31, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2. On January 14, 2021, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding did not involve a violation of NRC requirements.

On September 23, 2020, the NRC issued NOTICE OF VIOLATION; NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000313/2020404 and 05000368/2020404; and NRC Investigation Report 4-2019-009 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML20267A403), which documented the results of NRC Office of Investigations Report 4-2019-009 and included a Severity Level III Notice of Violation for willful misconduct related to the control of prohibited items in the protected area. Region IV staff reviewed the corrective actions associated with the violation and determined that no additional follow-up actions are planned or necessary as delineated by Inspection Procedure 92702. The basis for this determination is documented in the enclosed report.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Arkansas Nuclear One.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,

John L. Dixon, Jr., Chief  
Reactor Projects Branch D  
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 05000313 and 05000368  
License Nos. DPR-51 and NPF-6

Enclosure:  
As stated

cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV®

ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE, UNITS 1 AND 2 – INTEGRATED INSPECTION  
 REPORT 05000313/2020004 AND 05000368/2020004 – DATED FEBRUARY 3, 2021

**DISTRIBUTION:**

SMorris, RA  
 JMonninger, DRA  
 AVegel, DRP  
 MHay, DRP  
 RLantz, DRS  
 GMiller, DRS  
 DCylkowski, RC  
 RSkokowski, RIV/OEDO  
 VDricks, ORA  
 LWilkins, OCA  
 TWengert, NRR  
 AMoreno, RIV/OCA  
 BMaier, RSLO  
 JDixon, DRP  
 PVossmar, DRP  
 ADonley, DRP  
 RBywater, DRP  
 TDebey, DRP  
 NBrown, DRP  
 AElam, DRP  
 AAgrawal, IPAT  
 BCorrell, IPAT  
 LFlores, IPAT  
 RGrover, IPAT  
 R4Enforcement

ADAMS ACCESSION NUMBER: ML21034A418

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SUNSI Review PVossmar		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Non-Sensitive <input type="checkbox"/> Sensitive		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Publicly Available <input type="checkbox"/> Non-Publicly Available	
OFFICE	SRI:DRP/D	ASRI:DRP/D	RI:DRP/D	RI:DRP/D	RI:DRP/D
NAME	RBywater RLB	JMelfi	TDeBey TMD	NBrown NLB	TSullivan TMS
DATE	2/1/2021	1/29/21	1/29/21	2/1/2021	2/1/2021
OFFICE	BC:DRS/EB1	ABC:DRS/EB2	BC:DRS/OB	BC:DRS/RCB	TL:DRS/IPAT
NAME	VGaddyvgg	CYoung chy	GWerner / GEW	MHaire	AAgrawal ANA
DATE	1/29/2021	1/29/2021	01/29/2021	01/29/2021	1/29/21
OFFICE	BC:DNMS/RxIB	BC:DRS/PSB1	SPE:DRP/D	BC:DRP/D	
NAME	GWarnick GGW	RKellar RLK	PVossmar PJV	JDixon JLDJ	
DATE	2/1/2021	1/29/21	1/29/21	2/1/2021	

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

**U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**  
**Inspection Report**

Docket Numbers: 05000313 and 05000368

License Numbers: DPR-51 and NPF-6

Report Numbers: 05000313/2020004 and 05000368/2020004

Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-004-0003

Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.

Facility: Arkansas Nuclear One

Location: Russellville, AR

Inspection Dates: October 1, 2020 to December 31, 2020

Inspectors: N. Brown, Resident Inspector  
R. Bywater, Senior Resident Inspector  
T. DeBey, Resident Inspector  
J. Melfi, Acting Senior Resident Inspector  
T. Sullivan, Senior Reactor Technology Instructor

Approved By: John L. Dixon, Jr., Chief  
Reactor Projects Branch D  
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

## SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee's performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html> for more information.

### List of Findings and Violations

Incorrect Gasket Installed on High-Pressure Feedwater Heater 2E-2B Results in Forced Shutdown			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Initiating Events	Green FIN 05000368/2020004-01 Open/Closed	[H.5] - Work Management	71153
A self-revealed, Green finding was identified for the licensee's failure to follow Work Order 52770426 and associated Procedure EN-WM-102, "Work Implementation and Closeout," Revision 12, which states that coordination and control of work activities will be performed by the implementing work group supervisors/team leaders or designees in accordance with Procedure EN-MA-101, "Conduct of Maintenance." Specifically, during the fall 2018 refueling outage, supplemental maintenance workers installed the wrong gaskets on the Unit 2 high-pressure feedwater heaters (2E-1B and 2E-2B) contrary to work order requirements. This failure resulted in a leak in the 2E-2B feedwater heater and required a rapid unit shutdown and forced outage on November 1, 2020, to replace the gaskets.			

### Additional Tracking Items

None.

## **PLANT STATUS**

Unit 1 began the inspection period at full power and remained at full power until November 19, 2020, when operators reduced power to 85 percent power to perform turbine valve testing. The unit was returned to full power the same day, where it remained for the rest of the reporting period except for minor reductions in power to support scheduled surveillances.

Unit 2 began the inspection period at full power and remained at full power until November 1, 2020, when operators performed a rapid power reduction and shut down the reactor due to a leaking feedwater heater manway gasket on feedwater heater 2E-2B. Following repairs, the reactor was made critical on November 3, 2020, and the unit was returned to full power on November 5, 2020. On December 10, 2020, Unit 2 automatically tripped from 100 percent power following a failure involving the main feedwater pump A control system. After repairs, the reactor was made critical on December 13, 2020, and the unit was returned to full power on December 14, 2020. Unit 2 remained at full power for the rest of the reporting period except for minor reductions in power to support scheduled surveillances.

## **INSPECTION SCOPES**

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html>. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time, the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week; conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, "Plant Status;" observed risk-significant activities; and completed on-site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portions of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on-site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.

## **REACTOR SAFETY**

### 71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection

#### Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of seasonal cold temperatures for the following systems:
  - Unit 2 auxiliary building ventilation equipment room on October 8, 2020
  - Unit 2 turbine building switchgear area ventilation systems on October 8, 2020

### 71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

#### Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

- (1) Unit 2 service water system intake structure for both trains on November 13, 2020
- (2) Unit 2 emergency feedwater train A on December 1, 2020
- (3) Unit 1 service water pump A and pump B on December 9, 2020

### 71111.05 - Fire Protection

#### Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

- (1) Unit 2 high-pressure safety injection pump C room, Fire Zone 2010, on November 13, 2020
- (2) Unit 1 vital switchgear Room A3, Fire Zone 100-N, on December 16, 2020

### 71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Regualification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

#### Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during Unit 2 startup after the feedwater heater 2E-2B leak forced outage on November 3, 2020.
- (2) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during Unit 2 startup after the main feedwater control system forced outage on December 13, 2020.

#### Licensed Operator Regualification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a Unit 2 simulator scenario for the loss of main feedwater pump abnormal operating procedure on November 13, 2020.

## 71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

### Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:

- (1) Unit 1 emergency feedwater initiation and control, Channel C, PS-2 failure on November 9, 2020

### Aging Management (IP Section 03.03)

- (1) There were no inspections or tests of passive long-lived SSCs that did not pass their acceptance criteria on Unit 1 or Unit 2.

## 71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

### Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

- (1) Unit 2 control room ventilation damper 2UCD-8683 failure on November 13, 2020
- (2) Unit 1 service water P-4C pump/bay after bay outage on December 17, 2020
- (3) Unit 2 service water 2P-4B after motor replacement on December 22, 2020

## 71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing

### Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:

- (1) Unit 1 post-repair testing of 125 V safety-related battery charger D04A on October 12, 2020
- (2) Unit 2 post-repair testing of control room ventilation damper 2UCD-8683 on November 20, 2020
- (3) Unit 2 post-maintenance testing of service water B shutdown cooling heat exchanger inlet valve 2CV-1426-2 on November 17, 2020

## 71111.22 - Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:

### Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) Unit 1 emergency feedwater initiation and control, Channel D, surveillance on December 23, 2020



#### Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) Inservice testing of Unit 2 valves 2CV-1039-1 (emergency feedwater motor-operated valve), 2CV-5612-1 (containment spray check valve), and 2CV-5613-2 (containment spray check valve), on November 12, 2020

#### FLEX Testing (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) FLEX diesel-driven pump surveillance activities on December 9, 2020

### **OTHER ACTIVITIES – BASELINE**

#### 71151 - Performance Indicator Verification

The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

#### MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08) (2 Samples)

- (1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2019, through September 30, 2020)
- (2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2019, through September 30, 2020)

#### MS10: Cooling Water Support Systems (IP Section 02.09) (2 Samples)

- (1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2019, through September 30, 2020)
- (2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2019, through September 30, 2020)

#### 71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution

#### Semiannual Trend Review (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective action program for potential adverse trends in maintenance that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.

#### 71153 - Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

#### Event Followup (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated the unplanned shutdown of Unit 2 for the feedwater heater 2E-2B leak and the licensee's response on November 6, 2020.
- (2) The inspectors evaluated the trip of Unit 2 due to the loss of main feed pump A and the licensee's response on December 10, 2020.

### **OTHER ACTIVITIES – ADDITIONAL REVIEWS**

On September 23, 2020, the NRC issued ANO Inspection Report 05000313/2020404 and 05000368/2020404 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20267A403), which documented the results of NRC Office of Investigations Report 4-2019-009 and included a Notice of Violation (NOV) for willful misconduct related to the control of prohibited items in the protected area. Region IV staff reviewed the licensee's corrective actions associated with the NOV. The staff determined that the licensee took appropriate corrective actions once they learned of the issue, including investigation of the issue, taking disciplinary actions against the individuals involved, and

implementing additional corrective actions to inform contract personnel of the impact of any willful actions on their part. Additionally, the staff considered that the willful actions taken by the contractor staff occurred while the licensee was in the process of implementing a Confirmatory Order issued to Entergy to correct willful actions. The Agency has stated that, “the NRC has confidence that the corrective actions taken or planned by Entergy will correct the problems and there has been substantial NRC involvement to ensure that Entergy adequately implements those actions.” Therefore, based on the corrective actions taken by Entergy to address willful action across the fleet, and specifically the corrective actions taken by the licensee for this specific incident, Region IV staff have determined that no additional follow-up actions are planned or necessary as delineated by Inspection Procedure 92702 for this escalated enforcement action.

## INSPECTION RESULTS

Incorrect Gasket Installed on High-Pressure Feedwater Heater 2E-2B Results in Forced Shutdown			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Initiating Events	Green FIN 05000368/2020004-01 Open/Closed	[H.5] - Work Management	71153
<p>A self-revealed, Green finding was identified for the licensee’s failure to follow Work Order 52770426 and associated Procedure EN-WM-102, “Work Implementation and Closeout,” Revision 12, which states that coordination and control of work activities will be performed by the implementing work group supervisors/team leaders or designees in accordance with Procedure EN-MA-101, “Conduct of Maintenance.” Specifically, during the fall 2018 refueling outage, supplemental maintenance workers installed the wrong gaskets on the Unit 2 high-pressure feedwater heaters (2E-1B and 2E-2B) contrary to work order requirements. This failure resulted in a leak in the 2E-2B feedwater heater and required a rapid unit shutdown and forced outage on November 1, 2020, to replace the gaskets.</p> <p><u>Description:</u> On November 1, 2020, site personnel observed high temperature water/steam spraying from the 2E-2B feedwater heater in the Unit 2 turbine building. The degrading conditions of the leak and safety concerns for personnel and nearby equipment led the site to shut down the reactor on that same day, November 1, 2020, by use of their Abnormal Operating Procedure 2203.053, for Rapid Power Reduction. The site wrote Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2020-03546 and performed an investigation of the event. The investigation revealed that supplemental maintenance workers had failed to install the correct gasket during maintenance on the 2E-2B feedwater heater. During an extent of condition review of the other high-pressure feedwater heaters, the licensee identified that the 2E-1B feedwater heater also had an incorrect gasket installed.</p> <p>The site’s causal analysis concluded that the maintenance workers likely switched gaskets between high-pressure heaters and low-pressure heaters that were opened during the same maintenance window in 2018. During that maintenance window, three high-pressure feedwater heaters and four low-pressure feedwater heaters were opened, providing the opportunity for gasket mix-up. Additionally, the 2E-2A gasket was replaced at the end of the 2018 outage due to leakage during system pressurization. At the time of this inspection, the site had not yet verified that the low-pressure heaters contained gaskets designated for high-pressure heaters because that condition would result in stronger gaskets than necessary for the application and would not represent a failure vulnerability. The site did verify that sufficient amounts of the proper type and number of heater gaskets were provided to</p>			

maintenance workers for the feedwater heater maintenance window. Although there are similarities between the low-pressure gaskets and high-pressure gaskets, the gaskets were labeled with part numbers and there were also differences that should have been apparent to skilled workers.

The site missed an opportunity for early detection of the gasket mix-up when a gasket leak occurred on the 2E-2A high-pressure feedwater heater as it was being pressurized after the maintenance window in November 2018. That gasket was replaced without documenting whether the leaking gasket was the correct material. The condition report (CR) written in 2018 recommended checking the manway covers on the other feedwater heaters that had been worked on, but there was no documentation for those checks. The causal analysis stated that the addition of a gasket verification step in the work order would have prevented the installation of the incorrect gaskets.

Corrective Actions: Unit 2 high-pressure feedwater heater gaskets (2E-1B and 2E-2B) were replaced during the forced outage.

Corrective Action References: Condition Reports CR-ANO-2-2020-03546 and CR-ANO-2-2020-03556

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The licensee's failure to follow instructions in Work Order 52770426 and Procedure EN-WM-102 when installing gaskets on the Unit 2 high-pressure feedwater heater manway covers during the fall 2018 refueling outage was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the installation errors caused a feedwater heater gasket failure and required an emergent, unplanned plant shutdown in order to replace the gaskets.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power." The inspectors determined that the finding had very low safety significance (Green) because it did not cause a reactor trip AND the loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a stable shutdown condition (Exhibit 1, Section B).

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.5 - Work Management: The organization implements a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding priority. The work process includes the identification and management of risk commensurate to the work and the need for coordination with different groups or job activities. Specifically, the licensee did not implement a process for appropriate control and execution of work activities performed by the supplemental workers. As a result, the wrong gasket material was used for two (and potentially three) high-pressure feedwater heater covers.

Enforcement: Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.

## **EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS**

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

- On January 14, 2021, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. J. Dinelli, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

## DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71111.01	Corrective Action Documents	CR-ANO-	2-2020-03330, 2-2020-03331	
	Procedures	2106.032	Unit 2 Freeze Protection Guide	29
		EN-FAP-WM-016	Seasonal Reliability	2
71111.04	Corrective Action Documents	CR-ANO-	1-2020-00123, 1-2020-00958, 1-2020-00961, 1-2020-01346, 1-2020-01347, 2-2020-00287, 2-2020-01307, 2-2020-01684, 2-2020-03099, 2-2020-03660, 2-2020-03664	
	Procedures	OP-1104.029	Service Water and Auxiliary Cooling System	121
		OP-1104.050	Turbine Building, Intake Structure and Miscellaneous Ventilation	9
		OP-2106.006	Emergency Feedwater System Operations	104
		STM 2-42	SW and ACW Systems	38
		ULD-2-SYS-10	Unit-2 Service Water System	14
	Work Orders	WO	52767294, 52879593, 52895491, 52928200	
	Calculations	CALC-85-E-0053-18	Combustible Loading Calc for Fire Area E	4
71111.05	Fire Plans		Unit 1 Pre-Fire Plan	21
			Unit 2 Pre-Fire Plan	17
	Miscellaneous	FHA	Fire Hazard Analysis Arkansas Nuclear One – Unit 1 and Unit 2	19
	Procedures	OP-2203.049	Fires in Areas Affecting Safe Shutdown	20
	Miscellaneous	A2SPGLOR210302	Unannounced Causalities 2	0
71111.11Q	Procedures	EN-RE-302	PWR Reactivity Maneuver	5
		OP-2102.004	Power Operation	68, 69
		OP-2102.016	Reactor Startup	28
		OP-2106.006	Emergency Feedwater System Operation	104
		OP-2106.007	Main Feedwater Pump and FWCS Operation	64
		OP-2106.010	Condenser Vacuum System	35
		OP-2203.027	Loss of Main Feedwater Pump	18
71111.12	Corrective Action Documents	CR-ANO-	1-2010-03755, 1-2011-01554, 1-2012-01677, 1-2015-03742, 1-2016-02847, 1-2016-05281, 1-2017-00143, 1-2017-01565, 1-2017-02543, 1-2019-00292, 1-2019-04637,	

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
	Drawings		1-2020-00260, 1-2020-00445, 1-2020-00462, 1-2020-00571, 1-2020-00598, 1-2020-01124, 1-2020-01317, 1-2020-01479, 1-2020-01663, 1-2020-01667,	
		58526-083	Power Supply Assembly	0
		E-22	Engineered Safeguards and 125 Volt DC Distribution Panels	74
	Miscellaneous	E-258	EFIC Wiring Diagram	0
		IEEE 308	Standard Criteria for Class 1E Power Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations	1971
	Procedures	STM 1-66	Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control	12
71111.15		ULD-1-SYS-08	Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control System	7
	Corrective Action Documents	CR-ANO-	2-2020-02854, 2-2020-02865, 2-2020-03480, 2-2020-03487, 2-2020-03488, 2-2020-03489, 2-2020-03498, 2-2020-03502, 2-2020-03759, C-2020-02837	
	Procedures	OP-1104.029	Service Water and Auxiliary Cooling System	120
		OP-1403.191	Motor Testing Using MCE/EMAX	15
		OP-1411.084	Unit 1 Sluice Gate and SW Bay Cleaning and Inspection	17
		OP-2403.004	Unit 2 – 2P-4A, B & C Service Water Pump Motor Maintenance and Testing	29
		OP-6030.211	Motor Run Test	3
71111.19	Work Orders	WO	552610, 552944, 50237135, 52652306, 52830108, 52875953	
	Corrective Action Documents	CR-ANO-	1-2020-01690, 1-2020-01691, 2-2020-03686, 2-2020-03717, 2-2020-03502	
	Drawings	A5-E-17, Sheet 1A	Green Train Vital AC and 125VDC Single Line and Distribution	20
		E-18-59, Sheet 1	Schematic 500A Battery Charger 125VDC, 480VAC, 3PH, 60Hz	0
	Miscellaneous	481292	Work Request	
		ECR-24917	Engineering Change Request	
		Regulatory Guide 1.152	Design, Inspection, and Testing Criteria for Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Post-Accident Engineered-Safety-Feature Atmosphere Cleanup Systems in Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants	06/1973

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		Regulatory Guide 1.197	Demonstrating Control Room Envelope Integrity at Nuclear Power Reactors	05/2003
	Procedures	EN-MA-148	Use of VIPER or VOTES Infinity Motor Operated Valve Diagnostics	5
		OP-1000.120	Fire Impairment Program	26
		OP-2104.007	Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning and Ventilation System	79
		OP-5120.523	Control Room Envelope Habitability Program	3
	Work Orders	WO	472838-01, 548443-02, 552232-01, 552610, 52874668-01	
71111.22	Corrective Action Documents	CR-ANO-	1-2020-02057, 2-2020-01305, 2-2020-01307, 2-2020-01410, 2-2020-01459, 2-2020-01462, 2-2020-01463, 2-2020-01591, 2-2020-01871, 2-2020-01991, 2-2020-02232, 2-2020-02451, 2-2020-02467, 2-2020-02668, 2-2020-03067, C-2020-00902, C-2020-01030	
	Procedures	OP-1101.008	Surveillance Frequency Control Program	3
		OP-1304.208	Unit 1 EFIC Channel D Monthly Test, ST Pressure Greater Than 750 PSIG	28
		OP-2104.005	Containment Spray	87
	Work Orders	WO	506581, 525675, 544751, 545045, 555551, 52864675, 52885796, 52913133, 52915211	
71151	Miscellaneous		4Q19 MSPI T-Sheets RHR-CWS	
			1Q20 MSPI T-Sheets RHR-CWS	
			2Q20 MSPI T-Sheets RHR-CWS	
			3Q20 MSPI T-Sheets RHR-CWS	
71152	Corrective Action Documents	CR-ANO-	1-2020-01492, 1-2020-01624, 1-2020-01690, 1-2020-01691, 2-2018-02328, 2-2020-02968, 2-2020-03061, 2-2020-03456, 2-2020-03629, C-2020-02247, C-2020-02663	
	Miscellaneous	Audit	Nuclear Independent Oversight Functional Area Performance Report	10/30/2020
		QA Audit Report NQ-2019-020	2019 QA Audit of Operations and Technical Specifications at Arkansas Nuclear One	07/19/2019
		QA Audit Report NQ-2020- 027	ANO Maintenance Audit Report QA-10-2020-ANO-1	07/17/2020
		QA Audit Report	2020 QA Audit of Maintenance Program at Arkansas	07/14/2020

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		QA-10-2020-ANO-1	Nuclear One (ANO)	
		System Health Report Q2-2020	ANO   Unit 1   CS, HD - Condensate, Heater Drains	
		System Health Report Q2-2020	ANO   Unit 1   FW - Main Feed Water	
		System Health report Q2-2020	ANO   Unit 2   FW - Main Feed Water	
		System Health Report Q2-2020	ANO   Unit 2   SWC - Stator Water Cooling (Mechanical)	
71153	Corrective Action Documents	CR-ANO-	2-2020-03546, 2-2020-03547, 2-2020-03553, 2-2020-03554, 2-2020-03555, 2-2020-03556, 2-2020-03570, 2-2020-03672, 2-2020-03840, 2-2020-03841, 2-2020-03842, 2-2020-03843, 2-2020-03844, 2-2020-03845	
	Miscellaneous		EN-LI-118 Recollection Forms	12/10/2020
	Work Orders	WO	333180, 553180	