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1	UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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3	CATEGORY 1 PUBLIC MEETING
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5	FRIDAY
6	JUNE 12, 2020
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10	The Public Meeting met via
11	Teleconference, at 1:00 p.m. EDT, Robert Gladney and
12	Carla Roque-Cruz, Facilitators, presiding.
13	NRC STAFF PRESENT
14	ROBERT GLADNEY, Facilitator
15	CARLA ROQUE-CRUZ, Facilitator
16	STEVEN ARNDT
17	PERRY BUCKBERG
18	ROB CARPENTER
19	CRAIG ERLANGER
20	JONATHAN EVANS
21	KIMBERLY GREEN
22	ANDREW HON
23	LISA JARRIEL
24	NATREON JORDAN
25	MOLLY KEEFE-FORSYTH

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1	ANDREA RUSSELL	
2	MOHAMED SHAMS	
3	UNDINE SHOOP	
4	TOM STEPHENS	
5	GREGORY SUBER	
6	MICHAEL WENTZEL	
7	DORI WILLIS	
8		
9	PETITIONERS PRESENT	
10	BILLIE GARDE, Clifford & Garde	
11	MELODY BABB	
12	FRANK BAUSMER	
13	DEANNA FULTS	
14	DAVID LOCHBAUM	
15	MARK RICHERSON	
16		
17	LICENSEE PRESENT	
18	TONY WILLIAMS	
19		
20	ALSO PRESENT	
21	GEOFF COOK	
22		
23		
24		
25		

1	P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
2	1:00 p.m.
3	MR. GLADNEY: Good morning, everyone.
4	It is now 1:00 p.m. I'd like to thank everyone for
5	attending this meeting.
6	I, Robert Gladney, and Ms. Carla Roque-
7	Cruz, will be facilitating today's meeting. We are
8	both certified meeting facilitators and work with
9	the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
10	Neither of us have been directly
11	involved in the processing of this petition.
12	The purpose of today's meeting is to
13	provide the petitioner, Ms. Billie Garde, an
14	opportunity to address the Petitioner Review Board,
15	or PRB, regarding the petition to take enforcement
16	action against the Tennessee Valley Authority, or
17	TVA, for its approach in the restructuring of its
18	employee concerns program.
19	This is a Category 1 meeting. The
20	public is invited to observe this meeting and will
21	have an opportunity to communicate with the NRC
22	after the business portion, but before the meeting
23	is adjourned.
24	As part of the Petitioner Review Board,
25	or PRB's review of this petition, Ms. Garde has

requested this opportunity to address the PRB. 1 2 Andy Hon is the Petition Manager for 3 this petition and Craig Erlanger is the PRB Chairman 4 for this petition. 5 This meeting has been scheduled to begin at 1:00 p.m. Eastern time. And after introductory 6 7 remarks, Ms. Garde will address the Board. 8 After the Petitioner's presentation, we 9 will enter a brief question and answer phase where the Licensee may ask the PRB questions related to 10 11 the issues raised in the petition, and the 12 Petitioner and the Licensee may ask the PRB questions related to the 2.206 petition process. 13 14 The meeting is being recorded by the NRC Operation Center and will be transcribed by a court 15 The transcript will become a supplement 16 reporter. 17 to the petition. The transcript will also be made publicly available. 18 19 I'd like to open this meeting with To facilitate a smoother 20 introductions. 21 introduction over the phone, I have a list of people 22 registered for today's meeting. 23 I will read each person's name on the 24 When you hear your name, please acknowledge

that you are on the phone and clearly state your

1	position and the organization you work for, so we
2	have the information for the record.
3	Again, my name is Robert Gladney and I
4	am a Facilitator for today's meeting. I am a
5	project manager in the Division of Decommissioning
6	Uranium Recovery and Waste Program in the Office of
7	Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards. I have not
8	been involved with the processing of this petition.
9	Next, our co-Facilitator, Carla Roque-
LO	Cruz, will introduce herself.
11	MS. ROQUE-CRUZ: Good afternoon. My
12	name is Carla Roque-Cruz and I am also a Facilitator
13	for today's meeting.
14	I am an executive technical assistant in
15	the Office of Executive Director for Operations.
16	And I also have not been involved with the
L7	processing of this petition.
18	MR. GLADNEY: Thank you, Carla. Next
19	let us introduce the PRB members on the list. Andy
20	Hon?
21	MR. HON: Hello, this is Andy Hon. I'm
22	the Petition Manager. I work with the Office of
23	Nuclear Reactor Regulations, Division of Operator
24	Licensing.
25	MR. GLADNEY: Craig Erlanger?
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1	MR. ERLANGER: Good afternoon, everyone,
2	this is Craig Erlanger. I'm the Director of the
3	Division of Operating Reactor Licensing in NRR and I
4	am the PRB Chair.
5	MR. GLADNEY: Perry Buckberg?
6	MR. BUCKBERG: Good afternoon,
7	everybody. My name is Perry Buckberg. I'm a Senior
8	Project Manager in the Office of Nuclear Reactor
9	Regulations.
10	I'm also the NRC's Agency 2.206 petition
11	coordinator. Thank you.
12	MR. GLADNEY: Nate Jordan? Okay. Molly
13	Keefe-Forsyth?
14	MS. KEEFE-FORSYTH: Good afternoon,
15	everyone, this is Molly Keefe-Forsyth. I am a human
16	factors and safety culture specialist in the Office
17	of Nuclear Reactor Regulations on rotation to the
18	Office of Enforcement.
19	MR. GLADNEY: Lisa Jarriel?
20	MS. JARRIEL: Good afternoon, this is
21	Lisa Jarriel. I am in the Office of Enforcement.
22	MR. GLADNEY: Rob Carpenter?
23	MR. CARPENTER: Hi, Rob Carpenter here,
24	NRC, Office of General Counsel.
25	MR. GLADNEY: Tom Stephens?

1	MR. STEPHENS: Tom Stephens, I'm a
2	Branch Chief in NRC Region II with direct oversight
3	of resident inspector activities at the three TVA
4	Sites.
5	MR. GLADNEY: Undine Shoop?
6	MS. SHOOP: Good afternoon, this Undine
7	Shoop, I'm the Branch Chief for Licensing that has
8	the TVA plans in it. And I work in the Office of
9	Nuclear Reactor Regulations.
10	MR. GLADNEY: Dori Willis?
11	MS. WILLIS: Good afternoon, this is
12	Dori Willis, I'm in the Office of Enforcement.
13	MR. GLADNEY: Okay. Next, the other NRC
14	Participants on the list. Wesley Deschaine? Okay,
15	Karen Bursa?
16	MS. BURSA: Hi, this is Karen Bursa, the
17	Deputy Director of the Division of Reactor projects
18	in Region II.
19	MR. GLADNEY: Andrea Russell?
20	MS. RUSSELL: Hi, this is Andrea Russell
21	in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations.
22	MR. GLADNEY: Mohamed Shams?
23	MR. SHAMS: Hi, this is Mohamed Shams,
24	I'm the Deputy Director for the Division of
25	Operating Reactor Licensing in NRR.

1	MR. GLADNEY: Gregory Suber?
2	MR. SUBER: Yes, this is Gregory Suber.
3	I'm also a Deputy Director in the Division of
4	Operating Reactor Licensing in NRR.
5	MR. GLADNEY: Steve Arndt?
6	MR. ARNDT: This is Stephen Arndt. I'm
7	a Senior Advisor in NRR.
8	MR. GLADNEY: Kimberly Green?
9	MS. GREEN: Yes, this is Kimberly Green.
10	I'm the NRC Project Manager for the Watts Bar
11	Nuclear Plant.
12	MR. GLADNEY: Mike Wentzel?
13	MR. WENTZEL: This is Mike Wentzel. I'm
14	the Project Manager for the Browns Ferry and
15	Sequoyah Nuclear Plants.
16	MR. GLADNEY: Sandra Jimenez?
17	MS. JIMENEZ: Hi, this is Sandra
18	Jimenez, I'm in Region II.
19	MR. GLADNEY: Edwin Lea? Jonathan
20	Evans?
21	MR. EVANS: Hello, I'm Jonathan Evans,
22	Reliability and Risk Analyst in the Office of
23	Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
24	MR. GLADNEY: Now, next our Petitioner.
25	Ms. Billie Garde?

1	MS. GARDE: This is Billie Garde, I'm
2	with the Office of Clifford & Garde. I represent
3	the three former TVA employees, but I petition as a
4	concerned citizen with expertise in safety culture
5	and concerns about the TVA reactors.
6	MR. GLADNEY: Thank you. Also my
7	understanding is David Lochbaum is also
8	MR. LOCHBAUM: Yes. Good afternoon,
9	this is David Lochbaum, I'm serving as an advisor to
10	the Petitioners.
11	MR. GLADNEY: Thank you. Frank Bausmer?
12	MR. BAUSMER: Good afternoon, this is
13	Frank Bausmer. I am retired TVA Senior QC
14	Inspector. I was assigned to Sequoyah Nuclear.
15	MR. GLADNEY: Melody Babb?
16	MS. BABB: Hi, this is Melody Babb, I'm
17	a Senior Program Manager in Quality Assurance at
18	Sequoyah. I was a former Employee Concerns Program
19	Manager at Sequoyah.
20	MR. GLADNEY: Deanna Fults?
21	MS. FULTS: Yes, this is Deanna Fults.
22	I am currently a Senior Consultant in the Generation
23	Construction and Facility Services Group at the
24	Tennessee Valley Authority. And I was previously
25	the ECP Senior Program Manager for Corporate.

1	MR. GLADNEY: Mark Richerson?
2	MR. RICHERSON: Good afternoon, this is
3	Mark Richerson. I'm currently a Program Manager in
4	the Engineering Department at Browns Ferry.
5	Previously for approximately nine to ten years I was
6	the ECP Program Manager, Senior Program Manager, at
7	Browns Ferry. Thank you.
8	MR. GLADNEY: Thank you. Is there
9	anyone else for the Petitioner?
10	PARTICIPANT: I'm, I'm Day Hidson
11	(phonetic) I'm with the, I work at TVA in work
12	management, but I am, I'm with the Engineering
13	Association, which is the union that represents
14	juniors and scientists and technicians at TVA.
15	MR. GLADNEY: Thank you. I have a
16	number of licensees registered. I will now read
17	that list. Tim Rausch?
18	MR. RAUSCH: Hi, this is Tim Rausch.
19	MR. GLADNEY: Oh sorry, thank you. Tim
20	Rausch. Okay, thank you.
21	MR. RAUSCH: Yes, I'm present. Thank
22	you.
23	MR. GLADNEY: Okay, thank you. Tony
24	Williams?
25	MR. WILLIAMS: Good afternoon, my name
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1	is Tony Williams. I am the Site Vice President of
2	Watts Bar.
3	MR. GLADNEY: Gina Hall?
4	MS. HALL: Hi, this is Gina Hall with
5	TVA Watts Bar. I'm the Advisor to Tony Williams.
6	MR. GLADNEY: Tom Marshall? Beth
7	Jenkins? Larry James?
8	MR. JAMES: Larry James, Senior Manager,
9	Employee Concerns.
10	MR. GLADNEY: Thank you. Shane Kirk?
11	MR. KIRK: I'm Shane Kirk, I'm the
12	Employee Concerns Program Manager at Watts Bar.
13	MR. GLADNEY: William Crunk?
14	MR. CRUNK: I'm William Crunk. I'm the
15	Browns Ferry Employee Concern Representative.
16	MR. GLADNEY: Ashley Johnson?
17	MR. JOHNSON. Ashley Johnson, Sequoyah
18	Employee Concerns Representative.
19	MR. GLADNEY: Chris Chandler?
20	MR. CHANDLER: This is Christopher
21	Chandler, I'm in the TVA's Office of the General
22	Counsel.
23	MR. GLADNEY: Michael Bernier?
24	MR. BERNIER: This is Michael Bernier,
25	I'm with the TVA Office of General Counsel.

1	MR. GLADNEY: Thank you. Tim Walsh?
2	MR. WALSH: Yes, Tim Walsh. I'm with
3	the Law Firm of Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman and
4	I am outside counsel for TVA.
5	MR. GLADNEY: Kim, Kimberly Hulvey?
6	MS. HULVEY: Hi, this is Kim Hulvey, TVA
7	Regulatory Affairs.
8	MR. GLADNEY: Jim Barstow?
9	MR. BARSTOW: Good afternoon, Jim
10	Barstow, I'm the Vice President of Nuclear
11	Regulatory Affairs and Support Service.
12	MR. GLADNEY: Jon Johnson? Jamie Paul?
13	Bill Sitton?
14	MR. SITTON: This is Bill Sitton, I work
15	in TVA Corporate Communications and Nuclear
16	Communications.
17	MR. GLADNEY: Malinda Hunter?
18	MS. HUNTER: Malinda Hunter, TVA Public
19	Relations.
20	MR. GLADNEY: David Fountain? Okay, did
21	I miss anyone from TVA?
22	MR. MEYERHALL: Justin Meyerhall for TVA
23	External Relations.
24	MR. GLADNEY: We have one other person
25	who registered

1	PARTICIPANT: This is
2	MR. GLADNEY: Oh, go ahead.
3	PARTICIPANT: This is Day Hidson. I may
4	have weighed in at the wrong time a minute ago. I'm
5	here to observe. I weighed in, I think, when you
6	were talking about the petitioner.
7	MR. GLADNEY: Okay, thank you. Yes,
8	we'll have you
9	PARTICIPANT: Thank you.
10	MR. GLADNEY: Thank you. I appreciate
11	that. Thank you for the clarity as well. Anyone
12	else for TVA?
13	MS. MACKENZIE: I'm not with TVA but I'm
14	with the Engineering Association. This is Renee
15	MacKenzie, Labor Relations for the Engineering
16	Association.
17	MR. GLADNEY: Okay. We have one other
18	person who also registered, and his name is Paul J.
19	Zaffuts.
20	MR. ZAFFUTS: Yes, Paul Zaffuts, I'm an
21	independent nuclear Attorney.
22	MR. GLADNEY: Okay.
23	MR. JORDAN: Also, this is Nate Jordan,
24	NRC. Good afternoon. I apologize, I actually
25	missed the initial introductions. I'm the backup

1	2.206 process coordinator for NRC. Thank you.
2	MR. GLADNEY: Thank you. And as Nate
3	alluded to, we have him also listed as a PRB Member.
4	I just want to point that out as well.
5	Is there anyone else? Please note that
6	it is not required for members of the public to
7	introduce themselves for this call. However, if
8	there are any members of the public on the phone
9	that wish to do so at this time, please state your
10	name for the record.
11	MR. COOK: This is Geoff Cook, I'm
12	retired from TVA. I was previously the manager of
13	corporate licensing responsible for ECP for a four
14	period from 2012 to 2016.
15	MS. HAGINE-DYER: This is Inza Hagine-
16	Dyer, currently a retiree, former Senior Manager of
17	Nuclear Employee Concern.
18	MR. GLADNEY: Thank you. Anyone else
19	that would like to introduce themselves? If not, we
20	will proceed forward.
21	I like to emphasize that we each need to
22	speak clearly and loudly to make sure that the court
23	reporter can accurately transcribe this meeting. If
24	you do have something that you would like to say,
25	please first state your name for the record.

For those dialing into the meeting, 1 2 please remember to mute your phones to minimize any 3 back-line noise or distractions. If you do not have 4 a mute button, this can be done by pressing the keys 5 *6. To unmute, press the *6 key again. The agenda for today's meeting, after 6 7 the introduction, is for the Petitioner to provide new information to the PRB in an hour and 40 8 9 minutes. This time includes question and answers 10 11 after the Petitioner's presentation for 12 consideration in a final acceptance review. Please reserve your questions for after the Petitioner's 13 14 presentation has been completed. 15 At this time, I'll turn the meeting over 16 to Mr. Andy Hon, the Petitioner manager. 17 MR. HON: Thank you, Robert, for the introduction. First of all, again, I want to thank 18 19 everyone for attending today's meeting. I would like to first, to share some 2.0 21 background on our process and the ground rules that 22 we'll be following today. The second 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code 23 24 of Federal Regulations describes the petition 25 It is a primary mechanism for the public process.

1 to request enforcement action by the NRC in a public 2 process. 3 This process permits anyone to petition 4 the NRC, to take enforcement by action related to 5 NRC licensees or licensed activities. Depending on the results of this violation, NRC could modify, 6 7 suspend or revoke an NRC issued licensed. any other appropriate enforcement actions. 8 9 The NRC Staff quidance for this petition 10 of 2.206 petition request is contained in main 11 Directive ND8.1. Which is publicly available. 12 The purpose of today's meeting is to give the Petitioner an opportunity to provide 13 14 relevant additional explanation in support for the petition after having received the PRB's initial 15 16 assessment. 17 This meeting is not a hearing nor is it an opportunity for the Petitioner or any other 18 19 members of the public to question or examine the PRB 20 on the merit or the issues presented in the petition 21 request. No decision regarding the merits of this 22 petition will be made to this meeting. 23 Following this meeting, the Petition Review Board will conduct its internal deliberation. 24 25 The outcome of this internal meeting will be

1	provided to the Petitioner in writing.
2	The PRB typically consists of a
3	chairman, usually a manager at the senior executive
4	level for the NRC. There is a petition manager and
5	a petition coordinator.
6	Other members of the Board are
7	determined by the NRR staff based on the contents of
8	the information of the petition request. The
9	members have already introduced themselves, just
LO	now.
11	As described in the process, the NRC
12	Staff may ask clarification questions in order to
13	better understand the Petitioner's presentation and
L4	to reach a reasoned decision on whether or not to
15	accept Petitioner's request for review under the
16	2.206 process.
L7	So now I will turn it over to the
18	Chairman of the PRB, Mr. Craig Erlanger.
19	MR. ERLANGER: Good afternoon, everyone,
20	this is Craig Erlanger and welcome to this meeting
21	regarding the 2.206 petition submitted by Ms. Garde.
22	I would like to briefly summarize the
23	scope of the petition under consideration and the
24	NRC activities to date.
25	On June 4th and June 10th, 2019 you
	I

submitted a petition to the NRC under 10 CFR 2.206 regarding concerns about the employee concerns program restructuring at TVA that requested the NRC, one, immediately issue an announcement to all TVA employees reiterating their rights and responsibilities to raise any safety related concerns that doing so is a legally protective activity and that promptly provides the NRC telephone number and email address to all employees. If there is a significant safety related concern or complaint of retaliation, employees must know that there is a viable alternative avenue to raise it instead of remaining silent. Number two. Immediately require TVA to

stop its ECP program conversion until it can demonstrate to the NRC a management of change process that ensures any program change maintains the necessary independence of any process to honestly, without interference by TVA management, report the truth of any findings.

Number three, demand that TVA present its alleged new program to the NRC and the public for review, hold the public meeting and then provide feedback to TVA on whether its proposal is consistent with the expectations that have been

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established by the confirmatory orders and the ECP best practices.

On April 9th, 2020 the Petition manager contacted you to inform you of the PRBs initial assessment that your petition does not meet management directive 8.11, Section 3.C.1, criteria for petition evaluation because the issue raised in the petition have been the subject of a facility specific or generic NRC Staff review.

At the time that the petition was submitted to the NRC, the agency was also processing multiple actions concerning TVA, including enforcement, inspection, assessment and allegations.

In order to coordinate their response to the 2.206 petition, with the completion of the other actions, we determined that a delay of petition response was warranted. The NRC Staff has, and continues to evaluate, the safety conscious work environment at NRC regulated facilities, including TVA.

More specifically, since the changes to TVA's ECP described in your petition, the NRC Staff has completed safety conscious work environment inspections at the TVA operating reactors in the spring and summer of 2019.

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1 The NRC conducted inspections and 2 interviews at all three of TVA's nuclear power 3 plants and its corporate headquarters to gauge the 4 safety conscious work environment and perception 5 that TVA employees had regarding the ECP changes. The interviews indicated that changes 6 7 TVA had made to the ECP did not have a discernible 8 impact on employee's inclination to raise nuclear 9 safety concerns or to use the ECP to raise such 10 concerns. 11 During annual PINR inspections, the NRC 12 will continue to inspect the safety conscious work The petition manager offered 13 environment at TVA. 14 you an opportunity to address the PRB, to clarify or 15 supplement your petition in response to this 16 assessment and you requested to address the PRB. 17 As a reminder for the phone participants, please identify yourself if you make 18 19 any remarks as this will help us in the preparation 20 of the meeting transcript that will be made publicly 21 Thank you for your participation during available. 22 this meeting. And I would like to now turn it over to 23 24 Ms. Garde and allow you the opportunity to provide

any new information you believe the PRB should

consider as part of this petition. Ms. Garde. 1 2 MR. GLADNEY: As a quick reminder to 3 everyone, if you're not speaking please remember to 4 mute your phones to minimize any background noise or 5 distraction. If you do not have a mute button, this can be done by pressing the keys *6, and to unmute, 6 7 *6 again. 8 Thank you. And Ms. Garde, please 9 proceed. 10 MS. GARDE: Thank you very much for the 11 opportunity to address the Board. And I appreciate 12 the attendance by all the people that have taken time this afternoon to attend this meeting. 13 14 As a preliminary note, I just want to tell you that my office location is across from a 15 fire department so if all a sudden there is fire 16 17 department noise I apologize ahead of time. I have submitted a PowerPoint 18 19 presentation to be considered by the Board, and which I assume the Board has available to it. I 20 21 don't intend to read from that but I would like 22 confirmation from the Panel that they have received 23 my PowerPoint presentation. 24 MR. ERLANGER: Ms. Garde, this is Craiq 25 I will confirm that we have received the Erlanger.

22 1 presentation. 2 Okay, so I appreciate that. MS. GARDE: And I submit that in consideration as you consider 3 4 this. 5 I would like to make a couple of other comments and then allow Mr. Lochbaum to present his 6 7 analysis. As a way of introduction, although some 8 9 of you may know me personally, I would like to just reiterate that I have been involved in the NRC 10 11 processes since 1983.

In 1983 I was a participant in the, one of the original 2.206 petitions regarding the then Zimmer Nuclear Power Plant under construction on the basis of information which resulted in that 2.206 being granted, significant changes being made to Zimmer, although Zimmer did not survive to completion. So I am familiar with the process.

I would note that since that time the administration of 2.206 petition has become incredibly regulated. And I'm a little bit concerned that the processes, instead of facilitating 2.206 for full consideration by the Board, has become almost bound by the regulations to avoid being able to be considered fully.

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1 And I hope that in this supplementation 2 of the record that you will consider this from the broader perspective of the concerns at TVA. 3 4 To be clear, the NRC Staffs normal and 5 escalated enforcement process has failed to ensure that TVA has the requisite safety conscious work 6 7 environment. The NRC's maze of processes has often 8 Blinded the Staff from the obvious 9 been blinded. conclusion that TVA has been unable or unwilling to 10 11 change its safety culture. 12 And this 2.206 petition request, which has been pending for a year now, be granted to 13 14 provide a narrowly focused modification of the license to require that TVA be mandated to have an 15 independent safety conscious work environment 16 17 oversight perspective to assist TVA in getting to where it needs to be in the context of having a 18 19 safety conscious work environment. 2.0 The evidence that has been presented so 21 far, and that will be supplemented today, should be 22 taken under full consideration that TVA is facing a 23 significant culture problem that runs deep and long. 24 And that without the kind of independent

oversight, including public oversight, such as was

done at Millstone, I fear and believe that TVA will not be able to change its culture, that it is too embedded in a culture of avoidance of the disclosure of truth and the type of actions that management has taken over the years has contributed to an inability to change this culture without public oversight and accountability.

My initial request, for Item Number 1, was because the actions taken to remove the ECP department in total, was a significant event that was so badly handled by TVA management that it had an impact. That impact has been confirmed by the Oak Ridge surveys.

It has been confirmed by the NRC's actions, in terms of looking at allegations. But it is much deeper than is reported in those reports.

And some of that information will be shared with you today, which I do not believe was considered by the Staff.

The Staff actions, although significant in the context of escalated enforcing actions since at least 2016, have not resulted in a change in the culture. And that is evidence by the fact that the OI investigations and enforcement actions that have recently been revealed.

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And I do not believe were considered by the PRB in its initial consideration, has significant implications for the cultural defects at TVA. Because no additional actions were taken that modified the license, TVA continues to operate and manage in a way that ensures that TVA employees and contractors are not actually provided with the, an alternative avenue to raise concerns that is free from fear of retaliation and, almost more importantly, have disregarded or now believe that no action will be taken by employee concerns that are raised any way.

The new ECP program has had one effectiveness review internally. That effectiveness review confirmed that the new program is still woefully deficient in terms of providing the kind of curiosity and independence that will allow full access to ECP investigations that would allow employees to raise those concerns.

Some of the examples you'll be given today confirm that. And again, I don't want to read my slides, however, the NRC's decision to take no additional action last year after the ECP people were removed, have in fact resulted in a long-term impact.

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The NRC's Office of Enforcement letter dated April 29th, 2020 reference a nuclear safety culture assessment that was done in the Fall of 2019, which confirmed, at least at Browns Ferry, a decline in worker perceptions of safety conscious work environment compared to the results from 2018 when the old ECP was in place.

The Oak Ridge assessment did not find a improving safety conscious work environment and confirmed that the removal of all ECP representatives had a significant effect on the workforce's perception of retaliation for raising concerns. The normal and escalated enforcement processes has failed to change the TVA culture.

From 2009 and 2017 consent orders, the 2016 chilling effect letter has still all failed to change the cultures. And because of that, this petition is being, I think, modified, if you will, to request that the PRB consider a modification to the license that puts in place, at least on a temporary basis, until certain performance indicators can be matched, that the culture assessment is done by an independent team of experts accountable and reportable to the public in an effort to really make a change in the culture.

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As most of you know, I was a member of an independent safety culture assessment team at Millstone. A plant that had similar serious deep culture problems that had gone for a long time.

And I believe that without that independent assessment Millstone's culture would not have changed. But with the independent assessment, which included public accountability, that culture changed in about 18 months.

And I believe that unless, and until TVA is required to have that type of oversight, which the NRC has done before and can do again, that TVA will not make the necessary safety culture changes to effect real change in an order to ensure that the safety conscious work environment at all the plants that TVA manages, operates in a way consistent with the NRC's expectations.

I don't think, I'm seeking in this modification a narrowly focused independent oversight. I don't think it's necessary to have the type of, the broad Millstone approach, much more narrowly focused through safety conscious work environment elements and attributes and the requirements necessary for managers, who think things, who apparently think things are great, but

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1 employees do not. 2 And so, I'm going to see in my time to either answer your questions or allow you to hear 3 4 from Mr. Lochbaum, who has completed an analysis of 5 what the NRC PRB relied upon in denying the initial 2.206 petition, and some of the employees so you 6 7 have a different perspective than my own. I think that the rest of my presentation 8 9 pretty much speaks for itself in the slides that I 10 presented, but I would like to answer any questions 11 that people may have either at this time or at the 12 So I'll stop now and, again, rely upon the end. PowerPoint presentation that I submitted for your 13 14 consideration. 15 Is there any questions? This is Craiq Erlanger. 16 MR. ERLANGER: 17 Members of the PRB, do you have any questions at this time? 18 19 Ms. Garde, we are planning questions, 20 offering that to the PRB at the end, so we will 21 definitely being doing that as well. 22 Members have any questions or statements they would like to make? 23

back to you for your next presentation.

Hearing none, Ms. Garde, I'll turn it

24

1 MS. GARDE: All right. There is one 2 other point I wanted to make with respect to the new 3 ECP program. 4 The ECP Program, at the TVA plants, has 5 often been confused with also performing and providing the safety culture and safety conscious 6 7 work environment assessments for TVA management. One of the significant problems here is 8 9 that the new ECP program decided that they are not 10 yet trained. The new ECP program still is confusing 11 who is identifying whether or not particular 12 departments or particular managers have problems in terms of their behaviors and attitudes in terms of 13 14 creating a chilling effect within particular 15 departments. And there are still particular 16 17 departments that need assessments and services that ECP people cannot necessarily provide. ECP programs 18 19 should have investigators and accompany, 2.0 particularly the problems that TVA has. 21 Should have safety culture, professional 22 and experts in that area in order to ensure that the 23 management corrective actions are actually taken 24 after their prescribed with performance indicators

that indicate success is being made in terms of

changing culture. That has not happened. 1 2 TVA continues to operate in a way that 3 is primarily to deny that issues need to be 4 resolved, and then when issues are identified for 5 resolution and added to by management toward the people who raised those concerns or confirm that 6 7 those concerns exist, continue to be negative. 8 Until that changes, nothing at TVA is going to 9 change. 10 And I do not believe that can happen 11 unless they have trained expert independent 12 assistance in getting there. I have seen cultures change with that. 13 14 I think TVA's culture can change with the right 15 attributes, performance indicators and plan to improve. I don't see that happening, and I don't 16 17 see it will happen, unless the NRC takes special, unique, narrowly focused enforcement action to 18 19 ensure that it happens. 20 So, thank you very much. And I would 21 like to now introduce David Lochbaum, who will speak 22 on behalf of having done an analysis of the work 23 that the PRB relied upon to deny the original

MR. LOCHBAUM: Good afternoon.

petition.

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My name

1 is David Lochbaum. I'd like to highlight some of 2 the material I provided to Andy Hon in a memo dated 3 June 3rd, 2020. 4 Figures 1 and 2 in my memo provided 5 histograms of the number of allegations and the number of allegations involving discrimination 6 7 received by the NRC over the past 30 years for all 8 U.S. nuclear plants and from the TVA plants. 9 Over each year in the past decade plus, and nearly two-thirds of this three period, three 10 11 decade period, the NRC received more allegations 12 involving discrimination from TVA's plants than from non-TVA plants. 13 14 Figures 1 and 2 tell me that TVA's 15 safety culture problems are not due to a bad 16 manager, or managers. They span multiple CNO's, 17 site vice presidents, plant managers and such. The figures strongly suggest that either 18 19 TVA does not want a proper safety culture, does not 20 know what a proper safety culture is and therefore 21 cannot provide one. 22 On Page 3 of my memo I discuss a March 23 2020 NRC report, included findings by the Office of 24 Investigations. 25 All of the apparent violations

1 documented in this report occurred after the March 2 2016 chilled work environment letter to Watts Bar 3 and after the July 27th, 2017 confirmatory order 4 issued to TVA for Browns Ferry, Sequoyah and Watts 5 Bar and before TVA restructured the ECPs in May of The NRC OI report faulted TVA corporate 6 7 management, not the ECPs. In light of recurring safety conscious 8 9 work environment problems at TVA, its nuclear 10 workers need to know their freedom to raise safety concerns is really and truly protected and not just 11 12 an empty promise. Petition Request Number 1 will not, by 13 14 itself, convince workers of this regulatory right 15 but is a much needed step in the right direction and 16 in rebuilding trust. 17 The NRC's proposal to reject this petition from April of 2020 did not cite this OI 18 19 report or attempt to reconcile its factual findings 20 with the notion that sufficient improvements had 21 been made in safety conscious work environments and 22 the associated employee concerns programs at TVA, so 23 as to preclude the need for Petition Request Number 24 1.

On Page 4 I cited a TVA submittal to the

1 NRC dated October 3rd, 2019 where TVA wrote, "our 2 initial assessment is that there has been no impact 3 on this change, on the employees' willingness to 4 raise concerns or to use the employee's concerns 5 program as an alternate process to raising concerns." 6 7 They're referring to the ECP 8 restructuring. 9 However, the NRC's inspection report 10 issued July 23rd, 2019 reported an internal survey 11 that was done at TVA that said, "31 percent of those 12 interviewees were concerned that the proposed structure of the ECP would not provide independence 13 14 from management." That report did cite that the 15 survey showed that "most would still be willing to use the ECP." 16 17 Many plants with safety culture problems, like Davis-Besse and Millstone, et cetera, 18 19 have shown that that's not a relevant question. 20 Workers have to say that they'd raise safety 21 concerns. 22 But when the question is whether their 23 co-workers would be willing to raise safety concerns 24 or use the ECP, the negative response rates soar

dramatically.

1 MR. GLADNEY: I'm sorry, do we have 2 audio? 3 MR. LOCHBAUM: To report safety issues. 4 So answering a question without their own 5 willingness equates to their propensity to breaking the law. 6 7 Furthermore, the Oak Ridge Associate University's report that came out in November of 8 9 2019 said that, "participants also indicated they were more hesitant to raise concerns because of the 10 11 recent changes to the ECP." 12 Further down the report states, "participants also felt that the changes to ECP 13 14 removed their avenue to report safety concerns 15 without repercussions." 16 On Page 6 of my memo I refer to the 17 annual report issued by the NRC's Office of The allegations trends report. 18 Enforcement. 19 is for the Year 2019. 2.0 That report states for Watts Bar, and a 21 number of allegations received by the NRC, "the rate 22 of receipt was high in the first two quarters of the 23 year corresponding to the licensee's decision to 24 restructure its employee concerns program, ECP. 25 Including replacing the ECP personnel at each site

1 in the fleet and the program manager at TVA 2 headquarters." That same report talks about the 3 4 situation at Browns Ferry. "The rate of receipt 5 spiked in the second quarter of the year corresponding to the licensee's decision to 6 7 restructure its ECP." And yet TVA claimed, in writing to the 8 9 NRC, presumably under the 50.9 regulation, that 10 there was no impact from this change. Or not one 11 that they could see. 12 Page 7 of my memo, again referring to the NRC allegations report for 2019, that report 13 14 stated "it is too early to determine whether the new 15 ECP program will benefit TVA's SCWE. Safety conscious work environment." 16 17 And yet the PRB wishes us to believe that it's all good. Where's the beef? Where is the 18 19 Where's the evidence? Where in the heck is 20 anything that would lead anybody to conclude that 21 that's anywhere close to the truth. TVA also stated in their October letter 22 23 to the NRC that the ECP provides "an alternative 24 process for raising concerns." They also go on to

explain that for none -- for concerns raised to ECP

1 do not involve harassment intimidation, the ECP is 2 simply going to forward those back to line 3 management. 4 So it basically becomes, ECP becomes an 5 alternative means of silencing workers with safety And the Oak Ridge report that came out in 6 concerns. 7 November of 2019 basically confirms that sorry condition. 8 9 Page 9 of my memo I quote from that Oak Ridge associated university's report from November 10 11 "No survey participants from any of the data 2019. 12 sources who mentions communication of these changes thought it was handled appropriately." 13 14 In other words, 100 percent of the participants cited fraud communications. A 15 shortcoming that Petition Request Number 3 would 16 remedy if only it were implemented. 17 Publicly available documents do not 18 19 describe the flaws or the shortcomings in the old 2.0 ECP, that the restructured ECP purportedly fixed. 21 That lack of transparency explains why the Oak Ridge 22 Associated university survey found skepticism at best among the workforce regarding the reasons for 23 24 the efficacy of the ECP changes.

That lack of transparency also explains

1 why the NRC is unable to yet determine whether the 2 new ECP benefits the safety conscious work 3 environment. 4 Petition requests Number 3 seeks to 5 flesh out the real or perceived weaknesses in the former ECP, that the revised ECP seeks to fix. 6 7 not doing that leaves everybody literally in the Or figuratively in the dark. It's one of 8 9 those. Page 14, I expressed -- belatedly 10 11 relying on subsequent NRC reviews, the NRC now 12 proposes not to accept the petition even though its reviews are explicitly stated to be too early to 13 14 judge the effect of the restructured ECP on TVA's 15 safety conscious work environments. A key core component of petition itself. 16 17 10 CFR 50.7 prohibits licensees from discriminating or retaliating against workers who 18 19 raise safety concerns while engaged in protected 20 activities. TVA violates that regulation over and 21 over and over and over. 22 And the NRC is aiding and abetting TVA's 23 unlawful behavior by issuing mere slaps on the writs

That's all I got, thanks.

The NRC must stop the chronic law breaking

by TVA.

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1	MR. GLADNEY: Thank you, Mr. Lochbaum.
2	Do you want to proceed forward with the next
3	presentation, skip question and answers to the end
4	or do you want to proceed forward with another
5	presentation first? So, Ms. Garde.
6	MS. GARDE: This is Ms. Garde and I
7	would like to introduce Frank Bausmer, a recently
8	retired QC inspector to give his experience and
9	perspective as recent, over the last several years.
10	Frank, would you please provide your
11	presentation? Thank you.
12	MR. BAUSMER: Yes, I will.
13	Good afternoon, everyone. This is Frank
14	Bausmer.
15	I have a prepared statement here that
16	I'm going to read to you but I'm going to I'd
17	like to also add something that's not in my
18	statement but definitely needs to be considered.
19	And I appreciate the fact that Ms. Garde
20	called out contractors in her opening statement.
21	Contractors aren't really represented in issues like
22	this with TVA, but they're a large part of the
23	workforce. And especially, as I said earlier, I'm
24	part of the QC Department, and they're an especially
25	large part of our workforce.

And it's pretty common knowledge amongst the contractors, if you raise concerns with regards to SCWE or anything like that, initiate corrective action reports, enforce the corrective action program as it applies to your, whatever you're doing out in the field, you won't be called back to participate in any other outages. That's pretty common knowledge.

As far as changes, whenever there's a change with the ECP program, it's kind of, kind of like a standing joke among everybody. We'll get an email and it will identify the changes that -- the TVA employees will get an email, contractors won't get the email. And the email that we'll get will describe what the change is. And the email asks us, the TVA employees, to please share the information with those on site who don't have access to email.

And the standing joke there is, Oh, here we go, you know, there's going to be a half a dozen new signs printed on the walkway on the way in. And that pretty much ends up being the end of it and the impact that we see from any of those changes.

I just want to reiterate the fact that with QC contractors and most other contractors that I interact with, or interacted with, there's an

1 unspoken understanding that if you raise issues you 2 won't be asked to come back to the TVA site again to 3 do any, any work. 4 So, that being said, I'll go ahead and read my statement. And I'd be more than happy to 5 answer any questions that anybody has. 6 7 My name's Frank Bausmer. I'm a 8 recently-retired employee of the Tennessee Valley 9 Authority where I was a lead quality control 10 inspector at Sequoyah. I started there in 2011. 11 Before becoming a TVA employee, from 12 2005 to 2011 I did work as a contractor. And then I was invited, of course, to be one of the direct TVA 13 14 employees. I was asked to provide this information 15 to Billie Garde in support of the work that she's 16 17 doing to improve the safety-conscious work environment at TVA, and ensure that TVA employees 18 19 and contractors are free to raise concerns without 20 fear of reprisal. Unfortunately, my experience is -21 - at TVA has been that retaliation for raising 22 safety concerns remains a serious problem with the TVA culture. 23 24 In fact, my TVA, my experience with TVA 25 is that the atmosphere of fear and intimidation is

so deeply ingrained in the management behaviors and 1 2 style that few, if any, employees would be willing 3 to speak up about serious concerns. There's an 4 underlying management attitude of always trying to 5 push the envelope on safety issues that might impact plant operations, pushing beyond conservative 6 7 decision-making. That -- I'm going to re-read that last 8 9 little statement because that's very, that's very 10 important and it exists to this day. 11 There's an underlying management 12 attitude of always trying to push the envelope on safety concerns that might impact plant operations, 13 14 pushing beyond conservative decision-making, and 15 taking risks and shortcuts to erode the margin of 16 safety. 17 This mindset pervades the site culture. And anyone who tries to operate in a different 18 19 mindset (telephone interference) putting rigor into 20 safety expectations is beaten down by management 21 actions and attitudes that force conformance, or the 22 employee faces termination, or is removed in some 23 other way. 24 These management attitudes erode the

commitment to safety first and make a mockery of the

safety cultures.

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I don't know what it will take to change the culture but I got -- this hits home a little bit -- I got tired of continually fighting it and retired earlier this year. My statement today deals with my experience and with the ECP program and why I have no confidence that the new program will make any difference in the culture or provide any independent avenue for employees to raise safety concerns.

After my interactions with the new program I would not advise anyone to bother with it as it's just a part of the same management culture of covering up the bad news and blaming the messenger for raising concerns.

As a long-term nuclear worker, I'm mindful of the fact that there are redundancies in our safety systems and processes, but those redundancies, they have limits. I fear that as the culture at TVA continues to erode personal commitment to safety so much that it will erode those redundancies. It only takes two mistakes to breach that safety barrier. And I'm afraid that TVA is primed to do just that.

On June 2nd, 2020, I was contacted by

one of the new ECP representatives about a concern I 1 2 had raised some time ago. The reason for the call, 3 apparently, was to advise me of the details of my 4 closed concern -- of my closed concern. 5 Unfortunately, all it did was raise even more concerns that the ECP program had simply been an arm 6 7 of management to cover up the original concern that I'd raised. And this dealt with falsification of 8 9 records. To summarize my original concern, 10 11 several months before I retired I had identified a 12 clear situation of a falsified record of qualifications of contract inspector for the 2015 13 I know it was a falsified 14 outage at Sequoyah. 15 document because I was the Level 2 that performed the QC inspection and signed the disqualification 16 17 record. That was Assessment Report SQN2015-001, dated 3/13/15. 18 The contractor that I had assessed 19 2.0 failed five of the eight performance attributes for 21 a qualified inspector, including material, ID, 22 sensitivity to details, his knowledge and technique. 23 And I wrote the following assessment report. 24 I won't repeat all of those things.

I then filled out the logbook indicating

and signing that the contract inspector had failed his assessment. When I reported this to my supervisor I was told not to include that inspector's assessment in the outage logbook and to not do any more QC assessments on any other contract inspectors.

However, I did log it in, and I did do more assessments -- a few more anyway.

Notwithstanding my unsatisfactory assessment of the inspector's capability, the inspector continued to be employed throughout that outage and at the next Browns Ferry outage, which was the next one in line, performing safety-related well inspections.

In the following months I -- this inspector was also ultimately fired and he's never been back -- in the following months I discovered that the quality control assessment report SQN2015-001 that I had previously put in the logbook had been removed from the logbook that contained the records for that outage. In fact, I discovered that the entry and the report that I'd made had been entirely removed, and someone else had signed my name to other qualification reviews conducted at the time.

I was flabbergasted that anybody would

be so careless with a document that had been 1 2 falsified and just leave it laying around. 3 immediately reported this concern to my site lead. 4 Nothing happened. 5 Later, I reported this issue to the TVA Office of the Inspector General, providing them with 6 7 all the supporting documentation. And to my 8 knowledge no follow-up investigation was conducted 9 by the OIG either. 10 Years later, April 21st, 2020, I 11 received an email and a phone message from an ECP 12 investigator asking that I contact him, which I did. He told me during a recent interview -- I lost my 13 14 place -- with another TVA QC inspector, my name had 15 come up. The investigator told me he'd like to 16 17 ask me some questions and that it would only take about a half an hour. I accepted his request. 18 19 it was during this interview that I told him about the environment of harassment, intimidation, 20 21 retaliation, and discrimination that exists at TVA. 22 And I gave him several examples, including the 23 falsified QC welder assessment. 24 He requested that I send him -- there's 25 a cover page in that logbook and you log in the

1 assessment, and that had been falsified -- he 2 requested that I send him a copy of the cover page 3 of the assessment log showing the falsification. 4 And I did provide this for him. 5 Last week I was contacted by the new ECP investigator, who debriefed me on the alleged 6 7 investigation of my concern. But instead of providing me the results of any investigation into 8 9 the falsification of the assessment report, and how 10 and why management engaged in the falsification of 11 the records, he tried to persuade me that the 12 inspector's work on the specific weld had been verified as okay, so there really was no problem for 13 14 me to be concerned about. 15 When I pushed what happened to the issue that I actually raised, which was falsification of 16 17 records, he said I was not entitled to know the outcome of that investigation. 18 19 I further asked him, well, how would 2.0 anybody know enough to ask for a different 21 investigation than the one he was briefing me on? 22 And he referred obliquely to the report as ECP Case 23 File ECC02020005-1. He wouldn't tell me anything

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He told me that the current disposition

about what was contained in that report.

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1 of this five-year-old issue apparently was to only 2 now document the situation on the corrective action report that had, at the time of my briefing, not yet 3 4 been screened or gone through management review. 5 That is to say, for those of you that aren't familiar with it, if it's not screened or gone 6 7 through management review it wasn't even an official 8 report. All of that has to happen before it can be submitted for resolution. 9 10 Of course, that is important, as an 11 unqualified inspector who was allowed to continue 12 working raises significant issues about the quality of the work he inspected and reviewed. 13 14 Now, I'll add to that, this inspector worked multiple outages for TVA doing weld 15 inspection. 16 17 But my real concern was the intentional actions of management to falsify the documents 18 19 originally, and the inaction or action of my 20 management to cover up my findings and push through 21 the outage. The ECP briefing only convinced me that 22 the new ECP program was fostering exactly the type 23 of cover-up of the bad news behaviors of TVA 24 management that's at the heart of this problem. 25

Another example is -- the second example

I want to discuss is, again, from an outage some years ago but reflects the same management attitude that permeates the TVA site. It again indicates that the schedules pressure trumps conservative decision-making and conformance with procedural requirements.

This example was provided to the Oak
Ridge assessment team as an example of how the
hostility towards the truth is wielded in a way that
undermines employee commitment to safety and
supports an attitude where employees just go along
with management pressures to schedule, no matter
what.

In this case I was scheduled to complete a cleanliness inspection of the reactor cavity during an outage. The cavity inspection is a critical path inspection that impacts further work activity and outage completion.

When I arrived to do the inspection I found that the contractors had bypassed the hold point by applying -- there's a protective coating that they apply in the reactor before they pull the head, and that keeps debris and things from getting in there, and they did this before I did my, my inspection. I was able to do the cleanliness and I

1 -- wait a minute -- before I was able to do the 2 cleanliness inspection. The inspection was supposed 3 to take place before the coating was laid down. 4 I wrote the violation up on a service 5 request, which is a non-conformance report, in accordance with the corrective action program. 6 7 Nonetheless, management attempted to blame me for the situation by incorrectly stating in the site 8 newsletter that a QC inspector had caused a 3-hour 9 10 delay in the outage. 11 The actions of management towards my 12 compliance with the procedure was intimidating and 13 humiliating. Although an independent investigation 14 into the event and follow-up report proved that the 15 issue was not a 3-hour delay caused by a QC inspector, the damage had already been done. 16 17 again, management's reaction to the identification of safety-related findings was hostility, anger, 18 19 shaming and blaming the person who identified the issue, and ultimately dispositioning the violation 20 21 as acceptable by once again falsifying --22 (Telephone interference.) 23 MR. BAUSMER: I'm sorry, was somebody 24 else --25 MR. GLADNEY: I'd like to ask anyone who

has not muted their phone and is not a speaker, 1 2 please mute your phone as we spoke about earlier. 3 MR. BAUSMER: All right, I'll start that 4 sentence over. 5 Once again management's reaction to the identification of a safety-related finding was 6 7 hostility, anger, blame, shaming, and blaming the person who identified the issue, and ultimately 8 9 dispositioning the violation as acceptable by once again falsifying the inspection documentation 10 11 contained in the work order. 12 There is no question that the outage management team absolutely approved and tolerated 13 14 bypassing a hold point in the outage schedule, and 15 allowed the contractors to apply the coating to the cavity before it was inspected after the clean-up. 16 17 Bypassing a hold point would not have happened without direction from the outage 18 19 management team. But no investigation was ever done into who ordered or tolerated that action. 2.0 21 Schedule is routine at TVA. Unless 22 there are any meaningful consequences for safety 23 being the primary driver, nothing will change. 24 The new ECP team is designed to be 25 accountable to the line management, not to any

independent avenue which will protect actions and document (telephone interference). The new ECP team is designed to be accountable to the line management, not to any independent avenue which will protect actions and documenting employees' concerns that expose the same management. Nothing is going to change until this is a truly independent avenue that puts safety and the truth at the highest priority, not just blaming the person who identified the issue.

I hope the NRC understands that the margin of safety is being eroded by this TVA management culture and takes actions to insist the TVA management change its culture before it's too late.

I'm providing this information freely and without inducement to do so. Since I am now retired, I do not fear intimidation by TVA. But I have no doubt that its reaction to my statement will be to attack the messenger. It's the only way TVA responds to any concern.

Its second action will be to try to undermine the concern and change the facts. These behaviors are not consistent with a safety-conscious work environment.

1 Thank you for hearing me. I'm finished. 2 MR. GLADNEY: Thank you for your presentation. 3 4 MR. BAUSMER: You're welcome. 5 MR. GLADNEY: Next presenter, Ms. Garde. I'd like to call on 6 MS. GARDE: Yes. 7 Melody Babb to make her presentation to the Board. 8 Thank you. MS. BABB: Good afternoon. 9 This is 10 Melody Babb. I've provided a written statement to 11 you already, so I will not read the whole thing. 12 Basically, my statement is a list of examples that show that the safety culture continues 13 14 to be a problem at TVA sites. And these are things 15 that have either been said to me or I've experienced, and they've all been within the past 16 17 year. So, the first one is after, in ECP after 18 we received our no fault termination notices we were 19 still in our positions for a number of weeks. 20 21 during that time period I had three employees come 22 And they had concerns that they did not want 23 new ECP employees handling this. They didn't know 24 who those people were going to be, didn't know if 25 they could trust them.

So, I asked them if they were okay with me reporting those concerns to the NRC on their behalf. All these people were from different departments and they had different concerns. And I think they were also under one allegation number, so I don't have separate allegation numbers for those. But I'll just go over those briefly.

The first one was an employee -- and I'm not going to use department names just to protect the individuals. So, the first one was an employee that reported that other employees in their department were discussing between themselves, and they were trying to decide if they wanted to report on the Oak Ridge surveys that they were all chilled because they had experienced nepotism, favoritism, and retaliation, and had witnessed these things in their department and from people outside of their department.

The second one was employees that reported they would feel fearful of harassment, intimidation, retaliation, and discrimination from an employee who was coming to their department, and that employee had a history of intimidating a couple of them and other employees in different departments in the past.

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1 The third one was an employee that asked 2 if his name could be removed from the ECP files because he had reported things to ECP and he feared 3 4 retaliation from a new incoming ECP employee. 5 he was afraid that they would gain access to his files. 6 7 The next example was three other Sequoyah employees that had contacted me. And these 8 9 have been more recent. They were asking what 10 alternate avenues were available to them to report 11 They said they feared retaliation if they concerns. 12 reported their concerns to the new ECP program. those were -- and these are all different 13 14 departments and employees, too. 15 The first one, an employee that feared 16 retaliation by management because they felt like 17 they were misusing the Fitness for Duty Program against them. 18 19 The second one, an employee that 20 falsified a signature on a procedure revision. 21 And the third one, an employee that 22 received reports from another organization, and on 23 those reports that employee noticed that employees 24 performing the work were people that were not

qualified. And so, other employees were signing off

the reports for them so that it wouldn't be noticed that the people performing the work were not qualified.

And another example is if you look at the daily CR reports, there are a lot of anonymous condition reports that continue to be reported. And all of these are at different sites, and they state that they're general work environment concerns. Of course, you know, we don't see the details of those, so, but the statement that they're general work environment concerns indicate that there may be some safety culture issue going on.

Next was here in the recent outage at Sequoyah. We had the COVID-19 restriction, so everyone that could was trying to work offsite when it was available. And in QA we were told that we could observe plant employees working, and we could do that remotely by use of cameras and things that we could do on our computer. But we were also told that we could not have access to log into those cameras and do observations in the Management Outage Control Center, which was the OCC.

And when we asked why we could not have access to log into those, because we had always observed the OCC during outages, we were told that

1 QA or any other department observing the OCC 2 remotely could have a chilling effect on the managers or employees in there. 3 4 So, we were told to report to the sites 5 and sit in a designated spot if we had to observe. So, the problem with that was we were 6 7 trying to work remotely as much as we could, and it was very much of a discouragement for us not to 8 observe, kind of making it hard for us to observe. 9 10 The next one, there is one department at 11 Sequoyah -- I won't call out which one it is just to 12 protect the employees, but we can talk offline later 13 if we need to -- and that department has been 14 stating that if anyone from outside comes in and asks them questions, such as the NRC, the OIG, other 15 16 avenues, that management doesn't have to worry, 17 because they know the right answers to give them. So, basically they're saying they're 18 19 talking about things between themselves, but they 20 know what to say when people come in so that 21 management doesn't discriminate against them. 22 Okay, hold on. I've got to go off. 23 (Pause.) 24 MS. BABB: Okay. I think I'm on speaker 25 now.

The next one is personally since I've left ECP I've received harassing comments and different things myself. And it's all related to the previous ECP position I was in. I reported those to a senior management, a department manager, the EEOC.

And even though those people have talked to the employees that are making those comments, the harassment continues.

And then one other example that shows that management is trying to avoid the obvious signs that safety culture is still a problem. Last week during our Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel, or our NSCMP meeting, when everyone was talking about safety culture one of the managers stated that even though there were currently two department managers offsite working on the response to the apparent violations that were issued by the NRC, that that was old news. Employees have forgotten about that. And that because of that we still have a strength in safety culture at the site.

So, there's kind of the assumption that those issues with safety culture go away quickly.

But really, at TVA people hold onto those things.

And that's why it's so difficult to change the

1 culture in any organization. 2 And so it should be apparent to the 3 employees because the two departments have had 4 temporary managers. And one of those that's been 5 over a month. And so I had to ask myself why do employees not know why they have a temporary 6 7 manager? And it brings to mind the fact that, you 8 9 know, maybe management is misleading employees about what the temporary assignments are. 10 11 And then one thing I didn't include in 12 my statement that I wanted to talk about is, you 13 know, all these things have been going on, and we've 14 talked about, like, interviews and follow-up surveys 15 and inspections, but no one from the NRC has come to any of us former ECP employees and interviewed, 16 17 asked us about our insights or concerns with the new program and the culture at TVA. So, I think that's 18 19 very important to note also. 20 And that's the end of my statement. 21 Thank you. 22 MR. GLADNEY: Thank you for your 23 statement. 24 Ms. Garde, do we have a next 25 presentation?

1 MS. GARDE: Yes. I would like to ask 2 Deanna Fults to make her statement as well. 3 you very much. 4 MS. FULTS: Thank you, Ms. Garde. 5 My name is Deanna Fults. Prior to May 13th, 2019, I was one of the TVA Employee Concerns 6 7 Senior Program Managers. For almost six years I 8 worked in the Nuclear ECP Program, first at Watts 9 Bar, beginning in 2013 when I was the Unit 1 ECP 10 specialist, then later in 2015 I was transferred to 11 Sequoyah. And then, finally, in November of that 12 same year I was again moved to be the corporate roving ECP program manager, working directly with 13 14 our senior manager of ECP, and as an additional 15 support to the three site representatives. I have worked for over 15 years for the 16 17 Tennessee Valley Authority in various departments. Because I have worked as the site rep for ECP at 18 19 three of the four sites with nuclear employees' 2.0 views, and because I am still employed by TVA in a 21 department outside of nuclear, I continue hearing 22 complaints from nuclear employees about the current 23 ECP program and lack of a safety-conscious work 24 environment.

I've talked to employees privately who

1 have expressed fear that they, too, will experience 2 retaliation and public ridicule like my co-workers 3 and I have endured if they report any issues, 4 nuclear safety-related or otherwise. 5 Prior to my removal from the ECP staff it was my job to encourage employees who did not 6 7 feel comfortable raising issues to their chain of 8 command, or to me, that they could always go 9 directly to the NRC with their allegations, and 10 their issues would be handled appropriately. 11 However, my personal experience with the 12 way in which allegations have been handled by TVA and the NRC since May 13th, 2019, has shaken that 13 14 faith I once had in the reactor oversight process. 15 When our attorney Ms. Garde filed the 2.206 petition 16 on June 4th, 2019, no one expected to wait a year 17 for our concerns to be addressed in this particular 18 process. 19 Today, June 12th, 2020, is the very 20 first time that I have been asked to speak to anyone 21 at the NRC regarding our petition. 22 Further, I do not believe that my 23 concerns have been fully addressed by any of the

inspection reports or allegation responses I've received to date. Yet, countless inspections have

24

occurred that, according to the Commission, have addressed my stated concerns. I believe that this hearing is long overdue according to your own procedures.

I fully understand that increasing oversight of a licensee is serious business. But I also understand now from personal experience that reporting a concern involving nuclear safety at TVA, even when the concerns came from other individuals, will be rewarded with scorn, ridicule, and at a great personal cost.

At each turn in this process we have been told that as ECP professionals we are must-haves but not a requirement under statute.

Therefore, the NRC has readily dismissed our claims for relief as a department of former ECP employees and stated that we must seek individual relief in the allegation process, or have our allegations treated generically within the inspection process and, therefore, not addressed specifically.

It's unfathomable to me that if we in ECP were the advocates for nuclear safety at each of our sites, then why wouldn't NRC listen to us and see this as an ongoing threat to workers and the safety of the valley?

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It's my understanding that any person can file an allegation, and also that any person can file a 2.206 petition. However, not every person will be treated the same. And they most certainly are not given the same consideration at TVA as a licensee has enjoyed over the years. Delays in process do not benefit petitioners or promote the public safety, they only benefit wrongdoers and drive down confidence in the programs you administer.

In our case, the NRC has overlooked acts of overt deception from members of TVA nuclear management, some of which I've personally brought to the attention of the NRC years earlier, all while I told anyone who would listen at the time that TVA was going to do away with our program along with the people in it.

I have been asked to tell you today what I have observed since our filing of this petition, and to provide you with any new insights without disclosing personally identifiable information of individuals still working in the nuclear fleet. I can confirm that I have been asked by TVA nuclear employees, whose concerns I have previously handled, if they can trust in the ECP.

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My answer has not been positive.

I've received multiple emails and had conversations with concerned individuals who stated they wish they'd never reported any issues at TVA because of what they knew ECP staff members might say to management. Those employees will think twice now about reporting a concern for fear of retaliation.

While it may be technically true that the structure of an ECP program is not a requirement that the NRC would typically weigh in on, the NRC still has a duty to ensure nuclear safety in each plant that it regulates. The actions taken by TVA to remove the ECP so publicly has been a message to employees across the fleet that no one is safe to voice their concerns.

What was once viewed as an independent avenue whose effectiveness was admittedly only a function of management's receptivity to our feedback, is now viewed by employees as a landing spot for craft supervisors who can't go back to the field and whose loyalty is still tied to the organization's budget from which they are paid.

They cannot provide the type of independent oversight that TVA needs because they

are beholden to the site vice presidents who recommended them for their jobs. Even if they want to do a good job, as I believe most everyone wants to do, they can't because they weren't set up to be anything more than a conduit for nuclear management to look good and fix issues in name only.

Further, the current ECP program does not have a clearly-defined strategy in place that employees can have confidence that it will handle serious investigations, like the work environment claims our ECP program once examined. Perhaps they don't have a plan because TVA Nuclear's intent was to shut down any investigations that they couldn't control.

Last summer, when the new ECP program was announced, their stated plan was to refer those cases to the TVA Office of General Counsel. Later, last fall, the program's position became one of contracting outside investigators with serious investigations. Their use of outside contract investigators is viewed by most observant workers I've talked to as a way for TVA to surreptitiously remove unwanted employees.

It's seen that way because it is a way some of the more vocal employees are terminated by

the company.

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I should note that outside contract investigators repeatedly interviewed us in ECP before we were all let go, too.

I've been personally involved with other outside investigations where known nuclear whistleblowers were terminated at every nuclear site I have worked at, all while TVA complied on its face with the ERB Adverse Action process that the NRC laid out for them in each successive amendment to the confirmatory order.

The ERB process itself, even with the NRC's intervention, has not presented findings of TVA retaliating against terminated employees as publicized multiple times since last fall. And all employees know about that.

If ever there was a time to intercede on behalf of the employees who remain in the TVA nuclear fleet, the time is now. And the 2.206 petition process is the appropriate venue.

So, when employees ask me about the viability of the NRC handling their concerns, I tell them I don't have confidence that matters affecting nuclear safety will be treated with a sense of urgency or fairness. That's because of the

1 high number of concerns being referred back to TVA 2 for it to investigate, most recently with some of 3 our own allegations in ECP being sent back from the 4 NRC to TVA. 5 First, in June 2019, TVA was going to use an attorney from OGC to investigate our 6 7 allegations of a chilled work environment. 8 anonymous condition report, or CR, was generated 9 questioning the independence of the investigator. 10 Finally, a little over a month later, 11 TVA decided upon a team from the Oak Ridge 12 Associated University to conduct the investigation of our allegation. When I questioned their 13 14 independence because of their existing surveying contact with TVA's safety culture analysis, a survey 15 whose data was used to remove us from our holes in 16 17 ECP, again through a condition report, that condition report was closed, no further action. 18 19 Giving me a definition of the term "independent" 20 pulled from TVA's own procedures. 21 It's as if TVA is the proverbial fox 22 guarding the hen's house. 23 Even more troubling, the delay we have 24 experienced has given TVA Nuclear ample time to get

its own house in order long enough for an inspection

1 to occur, but not long enough -- excuse me -whoever is on the phone, could you put your phone on 2 3 mute, please. 4 MR. GLADNEY: Yes. Please, anyone who is 5 not speaking, please mute your phone. And, again, if your phone does not have a mute button, please 6 7 press star six to mute and star six again to unmute. 8 MS. FULTS: As I was saying, it is very 9 troubling that the delays we have experienced have given TVA Nuclear ample time to get its own house in 10 11 order long enough for an inspection to occur but not 12 long enough for lasting change to permeate the organization. 13 14 Let's use an analogy of finding out that 15 company's coming over to your house at the last minute but your house is a wreck. What do you do? 16 17 Stuff everything in a closet and hope they don't open the door or look under your bed? That's what's 18 19 happened countless times at TVA. And that's 20 happened again, even after we filed our petition. 21 I can confirm that the investigation 22 into at least one of the allegations I personally 23 brought forward did not address the concerns as 24 stated. Due to the nature of the concerns, I will

be more than happy to discuss those issues privately

1	with the PRB should you have any questions.
2	While I now work within a different
3	business unit for TVA outside of nuclear, I live in
4	constant fear of what could happen at any of our
5	nuclear sites because our employees now have to pick
6	and choose which issues they decide to report.
7	To quote the current Sequoyah plant
8	manager after Unit 2 tripped last month, "Let's not
9	make anything worse."
10	I have reason to believe that things
11	will get worse. It's only a matter of time before
12	irreparable harm will occur.
13	Thank you for your time and
14	consideration. End of statement.
15	MR. GLADNEY: Thank you for your
16	statement.
17	Ms. Garde, do we have our next presenter
18	come?
19	MS. GARDE: I believe we have Mr.
20	Richerson. He's traveling. So maybe I'm not sure
21	if he's able to call in. If he is, I would ask that
22	Mark go over his statement.
23	MR. RICHERSON: Thank you, Billie.
24	Let me ask how many minutes do I have.
25	I know we're quitting in 25 minutes; right?
	I and the second se

1	MR. GLADNEY: I would like to, I would
2	like to offer that, based on the time, we will be
3	flexible with the time to the extent that we can.
4	So, please just proceed forward and we will amend
5	the schedule as needed.
6	MS. GARDE: Yeah, Mark, try to keep it to
7	about Mark, try to keep it to about 10 minutes.
8	MR. RICHERSON: Okay. I can do that.
9	Thank you.
10	I have a rather lengthy statement, so I
11	won't read the whole thing. It's my understanding
12	that it will be filed at the NRC after the meeting.
13	So I will just hit the highlights.
14	MR. GLADNEY: Thank you.
15	MR. RICHERSON: Bear with me, please.
16	I've got to get back to my statement here.
17	All right. Again, my name is Mark
18	Richerson. I was a former ECP manager at Browns
19	Ferry. I had that position for quite a significant
20	time. Previously worked in QA. Engineering, I
21	worked in engineering also.
22	After my removal from the ECP I was put
23	back in QA for a few months. Currently I'm a
24	program manager in engineering.
25	First I'll say that SCWE at TVA is not

1 well, and the NRC needs to take action to enforce 2 improvements by granting the subject petition. 3 NRC needs to do so because TVA has failed to improve 4 the broken SCWE on its own report. The simple truth 5 is that TVA management does not understand the value If they did, it would not be reliving the 6 of SCWE. 7 past today. I thought about this like Bill Murray in 8 9 Groundhog Day, repeating the same thing year after The only difference is Bill Murray's day gets 10 11 better, ours stays the same or gets worse. 12 TVA talks a good show. But the reality Every time TVA gets called on the 13 is different. 14 carpet for an event from SCWE, management begs for forgiveness, makes excuses, and vows to take 15 numerous actions that result in no improvements. 16 17 TVA management tells the NRC and the public whatever they want to hear so they stay out 18 19 of trouble and continue to operate their low-20 performing plants. We only have to look at the 21 recent 16 NRC apparent violations for confirmation 22 of TVA's poor behavior. 23 And this is important: if TVA (telephone 24 interference) pertinent information regarding the

Watts Bar chilled work environment to the NRC, how

1 can the NRC believe what they are providing now 2 accurately (telephone interference) about the ECP? 3 My statement is I don't think you can. 4 The same management proxy that has 5 resulted in some of the lowest plant rankings in this country is the same management proxy that is 6 7 hurting the SCWE and the ECP program. 8 I've got three topics I want to discuss. 9 And I think they're new topics from what we're 10 talking about. 11 This is the first one. That there's a 12 disconnect between TVA management's public display of current ECP and SCWE performance and reality. 13 14 As part of the Employee Concerns Program 15 changes through a national (telephone interference) review, there ought to be changes. However a valid, 16 17 honest assessment review is not performed, instead there's only a check-the-box effort. A single 18 19 individual, a long-time TVA contractor that was 20 involved in previous Employee Concerns Program 21 changes, it's for (telephone interference) check-22 the-box review. 23 Those surveys (telephone interference) 24 employees were completed to support the task. 25 (Telephone interference) predestined to tell

management what they wanted to hear.

And I want to be sure we understand that point, that the person who did the technical review was involved in the changes to the program. So, of course, he came up with the answer management wanted.

If they really wanted an honest answer they would have brought somebody in that was negative on the program before and see if they were not so negative. There were plenty of people who could do this. There was a group that did a really good job in OIG a few years ago. They would have been the perfect people to bring back in, not somebody who was completely under management's control.

The review failed to address key items from numerous condition reports raising concerns about the current ECP. There have been several negative anonymous condition reports written by employees during the last year. The anonymous condition reports references to ECP incompetence are alarming.

During my tenure in ECP I don't recall any condition reports written disparaging the ECP program. This is a new trend, and verifies a

downturn in the faith in the Employee Concerns

Program by employees.

Nor did the review consider other

inputs, other key inputs, such that the number or nature of the NRC allegations, or input from the NRC and allegations (telephone interference). This lack of inclusion points to further incompetence for TVA not wanting the truth.

TVA leadership was so focused on declaring mission accomplished they had declared SCWE a strength at Browns Ferry and Sequoyah. This is not a realistic conclusion. TVA has 16 NRC open apparent violations related to chilled work environment and SCWE. This is the worst performing plant in the country and leads the industry in NRC allegations.

It is inconceivable and insincere that management can declare SCWE and ECP a strength.

This conclusion can only be reached by the use of inefficient group thinking and self-deception.

Further, the Nuclear Safety Review Committee is operating in an environment where people are afraid to speak the truth.

It is time for NRC to wake people up so they can see the truth. The NRC should demand a

true independent review of SCWE and the ECP. 1 2 this review cannot be provided by someone like OREU, 3 as previously done, because they had a conflict of 4 interest. 5 That was topic one. Topic two is TVA's SCWE is inadequate 6 7 and getting worse. And I just have a couple 8 examples I want to cover. And these are recent 9 examples. 10 As a former senior ECP program manager 11 at Browns Ferry, employees have continued to 12 approach me in regard to how to handle and raise issues or problems. Many of these employees do not 13 14 have faith in their management's protective action 15 programs of the revised ECP. 16 The changes in the ECP eliminated the 17 last internal route to raise issues since they all treat their programs independent. Instead, the 18 19 management informed employees as a decision of 20 This defeats the entire concept of an management. 21 alternate process for raising concerns. 22 For example, recently a management-level 23 employee suddenly had no place to raise an issue 24 because he wanted to keep his job. He refused to go

the NRC because he believed the NRC would simply

1 refer the item back to TVA for investigation where 2 he would be identified and retaliated against. 3 In the past I've reported numerous 4 issues to the NRC on behalf of employees. Unfortunately, these concerns raised by certain 5 employees were locked into one basket (telephone 6 7 interference) concern. The NRC is (telephone interference) TVA plant from reviewing the data. 8 9 Even if accounting methods at TVA plants are considered, TVA still leads in NRC allegations. 10 11 This reflects a poor SCWE for TVA, plus an 12 ineffective revised Employee Concerns Program. Since employees do not receive any feedback from 13 14 concerns raised to NRC, employees have simply 15 stopped raising some issues to the NRC. This is one 16 of the worst things that could happen to TVA and the 17 NRC. The following provides some examples of 18 a recent retaliation to enforce SCWE at TVA. 19 20 leaving out significant details to protect those 21 However, I can provide additional detail involved. 22 to the NRC in a private meeting. 23 In a recent quality assurance audit 24 employees identified an issue that met the criteria 25

of a finding reportable to the NRC. All the

employees in the audit team and other quality
assurance employees agreed the issue and problems
are serious. However, the audit team was
overridden.

The employees were concerned that the issue would not be classified as a finding. Part of the justification for not classifying an issue as a finding was even if it was a finding, it would only result in a low-level NRC non-significant violation.

The audit team employees do not agree with this perspective but did not raise the issue further out of fear of retaliation. The employees do not have faith in any TVA reporting path in which to raise issues. The audit team said specifically they were not taking concerns to the Employee Concerns Program because it was now a management program and they lacked the trust of those involved.

Later, in a group meeting some audit
team members stated they believed they were being
subject to harassment and intimidation for trying to
raise the issue as a finding. Other employees
stated they would not raise the issue or other
issues further due to favoritism and a chilled work
environment on the part of management.

Employees stated that they do not --

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1 those that do what management wants get rewarded, 2 and those that do not get punished. It should be 3 noted, in January 2019 an independent reviewer 4 working for a corporate ECP identified issues of 5 favoritism on the part of quality assurance management. But no action was taken to correct the 6 7 situation (telephone interference) favoritism. 8 There was an effort (telephone interference) change 9 the work environment. Since favoritism is a form of 10 11 harassment, per intimidation, retaliation, 12 discrimination, the SCWE has a zero policy against But policy --13 14 MR. GLADNEY: I'm sorry. It must have 15 been a -- I'm hearing some noise on the phone. 16 Whoever, just please remember that we have a speaker 17 and so if you're not speaking, please mute your 18 phone. And if you don't have a button on your 19 phone, please use star 6. Thank you. 20 proceed forward. 21 MR. RICHERSON: Thank you. Members of 22 quality assurance have already discussed a chilled 23 work environment over recent years. Some quality 24 assurance employees believe the commission did this,

and have lost faith in all A1 tiers, including the

NRC, that anyone will improve this keeling in the organization.

I'm going to stop there and skip then to

I'm going to stop there and skip then to

Item 3 to save time. Basically, three is TVA

maintains its process for systematic harassment,

intimidation, retaliation in the demonstration, in

discrimination for its failure to follow policies to

eliminate her.

It is well-known and documented that TVA has a poor record related for safety culture. This is a given. There's no need to rehash some lengthy history here. But it's also well-known that TVA has taken inadequate action to remedy the situation. This is confirmed by the recent chilled work environment in operations and our appeal thus far, the recent BOL retaliation timing and the recent 16 SKU related NRC apparent violations.

What's more all applied to a systematic culture that TVA has not been able to or is unwilling to change. This culture is a plague on employees and contributes to lower plant performance and danger to the health and safety of the public.

This is not a condition that the NRC can allow to continue. TVA asked an ineffective and incoming action and procedure proceed through

1 policy. TVA procedure and policy clearly states that there's a zero tolerance for any type of hurt. 2 3 While TVA policy is tied to low level 4 employees and contractors, it should get some 5 attention or should it be applied to managers and 6 payment managers. 7 Members and managers are often kept in place, passed to other lateral positions or 8 9 promoted (simultaneous speaking) for a confirming 10 instance. 11 This double standard is noticed by 12 employees and has created an environment that allows 13 management to engage and work with impunity while at 14 the same time preventing employees from raising 15 concerns. Employees will pay the price for raising 16 17 unpopular issues and voicing unpopular concerns. The (telephone interference) communications does not 18 exist as noticed in the previous example involving 19 20 QA. 21 Now nobody get off scot-free for 22 engaging in hurt. They only need to look at the 23 situation involving Watts Bar in order to confirm this. 24 25 It may look to be a situation regarding

the information of annual performance reviews raise 1 2 this in employee performance. 3 Employees have been rated lower after raising issues. Some have been rated in the lowest 4 5 tiers of performance with no explanation or reason identified in their performance reviews. 6 7 This is clearly against TVA policy. 8 When brought to the manager's attention, the 9 situation is ignored. This contributes to the 10 culture of systematic hurt. 11 And note I can provide specific examples 12 of this situation and a pile of names to the NRC. The intentional inadequate explanation of scaling 13 14 procedures and policies as well as human resource 15 and resource procedures are creating this culture of systematic hurt and the NRC must take action to 16 17 break these obvious ingrained horrible cultures. In conclusion, I would just like to 18 19 request the NRC enforcement action, with the 20 conditions outlined in the petition, and exemplified 21 by our statements and input. 22 I'm going to leave the rest of it out. 23 I thank you for your time and your effort. 24 want to make the statement that I am sending in fear

I've been subject to retaliation prior to

of hurt.

1 my removal from ECP. I've been subject to 2 retaliation after my removal from ECP. And I've 3 continued to have been subject to retaliation 4 recently. Thank you. 5 MR. GLADNEY: Thank you for your Ms. Garde, do we have another presenter? 6 statement. 7 MS. GARDE: Just a couple of points to 8 conclude our presentation. It's been made by a 9 number of the speakers, but I want to reiterate it here in that I'm not sure if the PRB knows this, and 10 11 I'm sure that Lisa Jarriel can explain this, but 12 it's important to understand that the NRC inspections relied upon did not include interviews 13 14 of the former ECP representatives, the people with 15 the best perspective on the issues at the site on 16 the issues at the site. 17 They were interviewed regarding their specific allegations of retaliation, which is now at 18 19 OI, but they were not interviewed about the 20 perspectives or insights on the safety culture work 21 environment. 22 It's also important to know that the NRC 23 allegation numbers that have been discussed and 24 relied upon are somewhat deceptive because 25 allegations actually refers to persons. That is the

number of persons who raise concerns. So a specific person who raises concerns still shows up in the NRC database as one number.

And therefore in the case of the ECP representatives, when they were trying to serve as a conduit for other people at the site, they still all show up as one concern except in one particular case where we persuaded the NRC to give these individual allegations a number.

All the rest of the concerns reported still show up as only three, one for each of the ECP representatives, which is entirely deceptive in terms of the number of concerns that are actually being raised and have been raised through these ECP representatives to the agency. And so relying on those deceptive numbers in the database is really inappropriate. And so it needs to be modified.

I really appreciate the time and attention that you have given to the presenters today. I realize it's taken quite a bit of the time. So I'm glad Andy was able to get them an additional hour.

That concludes our presentation. I realize it doesn't leave a lot more time. But thank you very much. And any of us will entertain any

1 questions that you may have. 2 MR. ERLANGER: Thank you, Ms. Garde. 3 This is Craiq Erlanger, the PRB Chair. I would like 4 to take a moment and thank you and the other 5 presenters for your time today and for providing the NRC staff with clarifying information on the 6 7 petition you submitted. As we stated in the opening, we are 8 9 going to enter a question and answer phase of the meeting. And at this time, I'd like to ask if any 10 11 of the PRB members have any questions for the 12 Petitioner? This is Tom Stevens, 13 MR. STEVENS: Yes. Acting Branch Chief for the TVA sites. Ms. Garde, 14 15 thank you and your other presenters. That was a 16 good presentation to us. I appreciate the time that 17 you took to prepare that for us. I did have one question. Can you or one 18 19 of your fellow presenters describe for us the 20 differences in the daily activities of an ECP 21 coordinator between the previous program and the new 22 program. Thank you. 23 I'm not sure that any of our MS. GARDE: 24 folks would be able to do that. But I'm going to

ask Mark to try to answer that because obviously the

1 new -- we are not the new ECP people or the old ECP 2 people. But they have that perspective and I think 3 Mark, could you answer that question as best you 4 can? 5 MR. RICHERSON: Yes. I'll try my best. And I'll ask Melody and Deanna to pop in if I'm off 6 7 But basically as ECPs we acted as conduits 8 for concerns from employees. Employees brought us 9 concerns, all types of concerns, from the mundane, I 10 mean, really parking lot issues about the parking 11 lot, all other safety issues or safety issues by the 12 plant. 13 As appropriate, we investigated those 14 issues and resolved those issues. We went out and 15 we sought issues. We talked to employees. We built 16 relationships. We were independent aligned 17 management. We did not report to the site VPs. The 18 new employees were at least in part respected by the 19 site VPs and approved by site management. We were not. We were subject to an 20 21 interview process. Because we are independent, we 22 have certain backgrounds, and we knew people in the 23 plant and could get out and do the job. 24 And for all my years at ECP, we were all 25 rated as good employees. Never as poor performers.

As a matter of fact when we were removed from our 1 2 positions on May the 13th last year, we were told I hope that wasn't 3 it's not because of our points. 4 (simultaneous speaking). 5 MS. GARDE: Deanna or Melody, do you have anything to add to that? 6 7 MS. FULTS: (Simultaneous speaking.) 8 MS. BABB: I have something to add. 9 MS. FULTS: Oh, go ahead, Melody. 10 just going to point out what I do know is what I 11 have observed from the condition reports that I have 12 read based on some of the effectiveness reviews, if you can call them that, that were conducted by, I 13 14 believe it was Tom Kozak as an outside consultant. 15 And so, you know, there are some 16 fundamental flaws with the program as it currently 17 exists that it's just not industry standard. You know, there's the notion that they 18 19 actually may be doing a little bit less work than we 20 would have done because we surveyed employees. 21 you know, prior to the chilled work environment 22 recovery plan relied heavily on those things that 23 management had refused to do or not allowed ECP to 24 then fully do prior to the chilled work environment

letter being issued in operations.

1 So, you know, we spent a large amount of 2 time doing that. Only in the last few months has 3 the program began to look at what those things are, 4 and they're certainly not as thorough or voluminous 5 from what we've been able to hear from employees. So it's certainly not the same caliber 6 7 of work or the same level of intensity and focus 8 that had been applied on a daily basis to the work 9 that we were doing. 10 Melody, did you want to go ahead and add 11 something? 12 I had something that's MS. BABB: No. kind of in support of what you said. When we did 13 14 surveys and pulsings, we did those so that employees 15 could report things anonymously. From what I've been told, which, you 16 17 know, I don't know for sure because I'm not running the program now, but the current ECP, most of the 18 19 pulsings are the ECP employees going around and 2.0 talking to people one-on-one. So they can be 21 confidential, but they're not anonymous. And so 22 that's a big difference for employees that want to 23 report things and really don't want anybody to know 24 who they are. 25 And another comment I wanted to make is

1 that we were qualified to do our own interviews and 2 investigations. And I believe we had more extensive 3 training on the skills that we needed to perform 4 these and to be ECP professionals. 5 So I think that -- again, I don't know exactly what kind of training has been done, but I 6 7 believe we were more highly qualified. 8 MR. ERLANGER: This is Craig Erlanger. 9 Thank you for your response. Do any other PRB members have questions for the Petitioner? Okay. 10 11 Does the licensee have any questions for the NRC, 12 PRB related to the issues raised in the Petition? MR. WILLIAMS: Yes. Good afternoon. 13 Му 14 name is Tony Williams. And I'm the site Vice President at Watts Bar. I do have a statement on 15 the ECP that may get into some of the guestions that 16 17 were asked about the differences between the 18 previous ECP program and the current ECP program. 19 But, you know, a little bit, as you're 20 aware, you know, TVA Nuclear significantly changed 21 its model associated with the Employee Concern 22 Program. 23 This was made in order to improve and 24 strengthen our overall nuclear safety culture. 25 just want to share with you some of my experiences

from somebody who has been in -- I mean, I've been in the industry for 30 years. I've been at different locations. I've seen ECP programs from three different utilities and five different stations.

First of all, there were some statements. It wasn't really made in this format, but it's been made in the past that I just want to clear things up that we've heard repeatedly about the ECP program and the TVA employees who were the ECP representatives.

They were not fired or dismissed from TVA as you guys know. They remain TVA employees. The positions were re-scoped. They were changed to a new different job description, different skill set to fit in a new ECP model, different work experiences, different attributes that will allow a different way to interact with our site employees to find those core issues at a much lower level before they get to larger safety conscious work environment or safety culture issues.

As we identified individuals who better fit for these new ECP roles, the previous representatives were provided equivalent or sometimes even higher positions within TVA. These

1 were permanent positions. They still are employed 2 with us today. 3 To get to my experience under the old 4 TVA ECP model, the employees had to speak out to ECP 5 personnel to raise issues. They did a lot of pulsings, and they were not as much in the field. 6 7 They did stop by in the shops. But they didn't 8 interact as much one-on-one as were mentioned. 9 This led to some of the issues being 10 higher level issues, issues that built up within the 11 employee until they felt they had no other issues 12 but then to go to ECP and then raise them up to a higher level of management instead of being resolved 13 14 at lower levels more efficiently with the engagement 15 of the supervisors, foreman or the shop to address some of their initial concerns at a much lower, 16 17 earlier proactive level. Issues often took longer to build up to 18 19 the ECP awareness in the previous process. 20 went through a cumbersome process to get resolved. 21 Employees often would not take issues to ECP because 22 they did not view it as an effective route to get 23 those resolved. 24 Today our ECP is different. Based upon

my observation by monitoring of the data, I do talk

to our employees all the time and the feedback that 1 2 I am receiving from them is feedback from outside 3 assessments, including those conducted by the NRC. 4 Our ECP representatives, they're in the 5 field. They're inside the RCA. They're proactively talking to the employees. They have backgrounds 6 7 that are in those craft positions that they can relate to the individuals, engage with them more 8 9 fluently. And they bring up issues that are lower 10 11 level issues. They address them right to the 12 individuals responsible. They've been in those positions in supervisory roles. They know where to 13 14 go to get the resolution at the right level. So the resolution gets done faster. 15 We do have issues that raise up that 16 17 maybe don't get resolved at the first level. ECP representatives continue addressing the issues 18 19 and following back with the individuals to ensure 20 that they feel comfortable with the resolution of 21 the issues. If not, they continue to address and 22 work at higher and higher levels in the organization 23 to get them resolved. 24 The employees are engaged with our ECP

representatives in the field. As I mentioned, they

1 know what the work environment is supposed to be 2 like with the work in the field. And they do a lot 3 of their interactions in the field where they can 4 get good information at very low levels. 5 The ECP helps enhance our nuclear safety culture at all levels, which I can say is stronger 6 7 now than it has been in the past couple years. We did have external assessments that 8 9 have noted these same improvements. We did talk 10 about the nuclear safety culture and the employment 11 and engagement improvements. Both internal and 12 external assessments continue to be placed not only on our ECP program but our work environment issues, 13 14 our nuclear safety culture and our safe conscious 15 work environment as well are being improved 16 positively. 17 The NRC is also monitoring TVA's nuclear safety culture. 18 In October 2019 at Watts Bar, you 19 determined that we are continuing to make progress 2.0 in our safety conscious work environment. 21 Your review of recent allegations at 22 that time did not identify any significant trends in 23 these allegations involving a chilling effect or a

discrimination concern. And we at Watts Bar have

improved our identification of work environment

24

changes via our safety culture monitoring tool.

2.0

So as we mentioned, ECP is just one of the tools and processes that we did change to get better results of our safety culture than what we had seen in the past.

While the cross-cutting issue in chilled work environment letters remained open at Watts Bar, the NRC is using these inspections to provide input into the decision-making progress of their closure.

The NRC continues to monitor TVA activities and maintain safety conscious work environments through the reactor oversight process.

It's been my experience in the industry, my conversations with my employees and the feedback that we receive from external observers, I would not want the TVA ECP program to step backwards to the older model.

It is something that I've seen utilized in the industry effectively. I do believe the ECP representatives that we currently have have the background that I've seen effective in this new type of model to get those low level issues addressed at a much, much proactive level, much earlier in the process and don't allow things to build up before they become safety culture issues.

1	Today we have a better and more
2	effective path that has shown positive results
3	within our ECP and our employee engagement and
4	morale, which is improving our overall nuclear
5	safety culture at Watts Bar and across TVA.
6	Thank you for your time.
7	MR. ERLANGER: Thank you for your
8	statement. This is Craig Erlanger. Does the
9	licensee have any other questions for the NRC PRB?
10	MR. COOK: Craig, can you hear me?
11	MR. ERLANGER: Yes. Can you identify
12	yourself for the record?
13	MR. COOK: This Geoff Cook in Phoenix,
14	Arizona. I'm a member of the public, and I've got
15	some comments I'd like to pass on.
16	MR. ERLANGER: Geoff, we will have a
17	portion coming up here in the next couple minutes
18	where we are going to open it up to the members of
19	the public. Would you mind waiting for that time?
20	MR. COOK: Thank you. Absolutely.
21	MR. ERLANGER: We will come back to you.
22	MR. COOK: Okay.
23	MR. ERLANGER: Okay. Thank you. Does
24	the Petitioner have any questions about the 2.206
25	process?

1	MS. GARDE: I don't think I have any
2	more questions about the 2.206 process. I
3	understand the TVA statement was not really a
4	question. It was a statement. I'm not going to
5	rebut it. But, please, don't take my silence as
6	acceptance.
7	MR. ERLANGER: Thank you, Ms. Garde.
8	Does the licensee have any questions for the NRC PRB
9	about the 2.206 petition process?
LO	MR. WILLIAMS: We do not.
l1	MR. ERLANGER: Thank you. Before I
12	conclude the meeting, members of the public may
13	provide comments regarding the petition and ask
L4	questions about the 2.206 petition process.
15	However, as stated in the opening, the
16	purpose of this meeting is not to provide an
L7	opportunity for the Petitioner or the public to
18	question or examine the PRB regarding the merits of
19	the Petition request.
20	And with that, I believe we have a
21	question from a member of the public. Sir, the
22	floor is yours.
23	MR. COOK: Thanks, Craig. I appreciate
24	that. I can't make comment without going, like a
25	number of have, through our backgrounds because it's

relevant to where we're at.

2.0

I started in the commercial nuclear industry at Cooper Station back in the 80s. They had their share of operational issues and challenges with Region 4, and I had a lot of experience with that.

In 1989, I went to Fort Calhoun. Fort Calhoun brought me I because they were on the watch list. And at that time I was manager of licensing and I was also manager of the safety enhancement program, the \$36 million program that did, I believe, 73 different items of improvement across the station.

From that point in 1996, I went to San Onofre, where I was for 14 years, another interesting experience in terms of safety conscious work environment improvement.

And you can ask them if you ever see them, but now Dr. Chuck Caster would tell you that we were driving him crazy because in his mind, and maybe some of the folks at NRC Region 4, the performance of San Onofre was such that Chuck believed that we should have had the event that would put San Onofre in Column 4.

And on several occasions he commented to

1 me that we were undermining the very premise of the 2 reactor oversight program, that we should have had 3 that event that put us in Column 4, but we hadn't. 4 We did a lot of work in terms of 5 performance improvement up that station. And at one point we were writing, I believe 6,000 CRs a month. 6 7 It was absolute lunacy. It was coming so fast at us 8 that dealing with it was -- it was just bearing down 9 on the station. And Region 4 kind of went the other 10 way and said, my gosh, how are you dealing with all 11 of this? We were identifying everything. 12 Ultimately, in terms of our performance improvement plan, and this is the important piece 13 14 that I want to pass on. We had a series of meetings 15 in Washington and at the station to discuss our 16 performance improvement plan. 17 And at one point Kristine Svinicki, then on the Commission, commented and said, your plan is 18 19 extremely complex. But I understand that this is 20 San Onofre and this is California and what might 21 work elsewhere isn't going to work here so you've 22 got a plan tailored specifically to the environment 23 you're in. 24 And I think that's key to this 2.206 25 petition and why I want to speak about this.

1 San Onofre in 2010. But I spent three years -- a lot of people don't know this, Southern California 2 3 Edison owns 15.8 percent of Palo Verde. 4 So when Palo Verde got into regulatory 5 trouble and went into Column 4, I think it was 2004-6 05, Edison tapped me on the shoulder because of my 7 licensing background and said we'd like you to go 8 over there. 9 And I wrote some white papers of what 10 their performance was and where I thought they were 11 headed. And sure enough, they went right into 12 Column 4. And I spent three years at that station 13 14 watching their performance improvement program that was being run by Maria Lacal, and she did a fabulous 15 16 And I watched the change in culture at that 17 station, knowing full well that what was done at Palo Verde wouldn't have worked with San Onofre. 18 Ιt 19 just wouldn't have. It's such a different 2.0 environment. 21 So subsequently in 2010, I left San 22 Onofre, and I went to TVA. And I went in as manager 23 of licensing at Sequoyah, not knowing kind of the 24 environment I was walking into or what the issues

were.

1 Now, look, I wanted to tell you that my 2 first day onsite at Sequoyah, I was called into the 3 site VP's office. At that time, someone was manager 4 of licensing at that site who later on, a number of 5 years later, went into corporate licensing and subsequently was terminated and did a DOL filing. 6 7 And I believe they found in her favor. 8 But the shock to me was the day I showed 9 up on site, and no one knew I was coming, no one, 10 except, I believe the site VP and the plant manager. 11 And I was called into a meeting with the 12 And his comment was I want that woman out site VP. of here. And I want that woman out of here now. 13 14 And that was the first I knew that this wasn't a 15 plant change at Sequoyah. This was a hostile 16 takeover. And I was right in the middle of it and 17 hadn't been told any of it. Fine. So I soldiered on. 18 We changed. 19 I took over as site licensing manager. 20 following few months we ended up in an outage on 21 Unit 1, a refueling outage. 22 And we were getting to go into Mode 4 23 and there was an issue MLV valve packages. QA had 24 found 76 valve packages that weren't appropriately

The paperwork wasn't all in place.

signed off.

1 And my phone rang. And it was the site 2 VP who told me to get down to the OCC in not very 3 pleasant terms. And I went down and he said, as 4 site licensing manager, it's your job to make this 5 issue go away and make it go away now. That's the first I had ever been told 6 7 that by anybody at any site I had been at. I engaged the QA manager who had that 8 concern, and I basically proffered up a deal and 9 said what if we sample 25 percent of the packages? 10 11 Okay, fine. 12 Well, they went and did a sampling. Everything seemed okay. Eight months later I was in 13 14 an offsite meeting with the Safety Review Board. 15 Carl Terry was the chair at that point. And Carl looked at us and said I have no idea how 16 17 you ever started up Unit 1 in the condition you were For the life of me, I never would have started 18 in. 19 up the unit in this condition. 2.0 The next thing I knew the QA manager was 21 in my face saying I will never compromise my 22 standards again. I had done my job. I had talked 23 her into something she didn't believe in, and she 24 went with the program that was unacceptable.

ended up paying the price by getting redressed in

1 front of the Offsite Review Board. 2 I left Sequoyah, oh, I think it was 3 2014, and I went to corporate licensing. And I was 4 there for maybe two months, and we had the 95003 5 inspection coming at Browns Ferry. And I was told by my licensing VP to go 6 7 down to Browns Ferry and do an assessment of what 8 the ECP program looked like, what safety culture 9 issues were. 10 And the following Monday I came back to 11 corporate with my VP and said I'm the new manager of 12 ECP effective now. I'm done with licensing. was enough issues to deal with in prepping for the 13 14 inspection that we simply couldn't afford to say, 15 okay, it's a licensing part-time duty. 16 And it had gotten that way because they 17 had had a manager of ECP that they had taken that position and downgraded that position to a program 18 19 And that individual who was in that manager. 2.0 position didn't like that downgrading and basically 21 walked off and said I'm done. I'm retiring. 22 All of it, looking back now, guite 23 honestly with the improvements that San Onofre made, 24 I couldn't come close to comparing programs between

the two sites.

1 We were hired over on one side and TVA 2 was kind of hired over on the other side. didn't see it. 3 I didn't understand. The cultures 4 were so different because San Onofre had worked so 5 hard to get where they were. 6 One other aspect to me that was shocking 7 at some level, I retired in October of 2016 and now 8 it's been maybe two years ago. There was an 9 individual who had gone in as licensing manager at 10 Sequoyah, someone I knew very well. Someone I had 11 hired at San Onofre who had worked for me for 12 12 years, someone very competent. 13 And I hadn't heard much from him in a 14 few months. And I got a call out of nowhere and he 15 said, Geoff, sorry I haven't called you. I haven't been able to. And I said, what do you mean? 16 17 I've been on suspension. What? Yes, I got 18 suspended. 19 Wait a second. Hold it. I've been 2.0 involved with a number of filings with the NRC, 21 challenges of 50.9 issues out of Region 4. 22 weathered those storms. I was floored. 23 But I came to find something out. 24 that was that the individual was suspended with pay

and the intent in my mind was very clear.

1 adverse action procedure that TVA has says if a 2 person is getting paid even though they have been 3 suspended, we can work around the process. We don't 4 have to do anything. 5 So that additionally became an allegation filed with Region 2 and was something 6 7 else the NRC had to deal with. My point in all of these comments is 8 It's what Kristine Svinicki said. 9 this. Because it 10 worked elsewhere doesn't mean anything relative to 11 its ability to work at TVA because what happens at 12 Susquehanna aren't going to work at San Onofre. Today it doesn't matter. They're not operating. 13 14 But it's not going to work at Palo Verde 15 because you have to understand the culture. have to have a real world view of it before you go 16 17 making changes like that. And it just seemed to me that it was a snap decision. 18 19 And I have to say because I was the team 20 lead for ECP at Browns Ferry, yes, we did a lot of 21 dancing. We really did. We put a smiley face on 22 all of it, and we made it look good. 23 And I would sit there and tell you that 24 I looked at management and the attitudes of

management and how they were operating themselves

and told myself, hold on. This isn't a culture that says bring me your problems.

And we saw multiple examples of that after the ALTRI (phonetic) inspection left where people were taking actions that weren't acceptable under a safety conscious work environment.

So all I would tell the Board is this. Whatever decision you make under 2.206, you better consider the facts of what the environment is at TVA, who they are. You better have a clear mental picture because -- and Lisa Jarriel is going to sit there and say, I know.

When I was at San Onofre, we had an engineering vice president and a coordinator who both had come from TVA that were the biggest abusers of safety conscious work environment I ever saw in my whole career. There were just -- and we had to when we went to recovery at San Onofre, we had to work around those individuals and eventually that vice president got terminated because it just wasn't going to work as long as he was onsite.

So consider what you've got in front of you and understand. And I would say if we got through the ALTRI (phonetic) inspection of Browns Ferry in I believe 2012, '13 somewhere around there,

1 how did we manage to do that? 2 Did we just straight up lie about what 3 No, we did an honest program assessment, 4 looked at where we were at and said, yes, we've got 5 our challenges, but we think this is working. So I'm just going to say what Kristine 6 7 Svinicki said. Be careful what you do and think in terms of who TVA is and how they operate and tell 8 9 yourself that plan works for this utility because it 10 may not. 11 Thank you for giving me the time to make 12 comments. 13 MR. ERLANGER: Thank you for your 14 statement, sir. Do any other members of the public 15 have any comments they'd like to share with the PRB 16 Board? 17 MS. HAGINE-DYER: Yes. This is Inza. have a few comments, if I may. I would like to do 18 19 so, and I'll try to be brief. I know this is late 20 in the day. 21 Just a couple of things. I think that, 22 you know, as many of you know, I was the former 23 manager of nuclear employee concerns. And it was 24 the last of my job, a long career centered around 25 providing a voice for those who need help

1 expressing their perspectives about their job. 2 And in that job, one of the things that 3 I was strong in, I thought, was the objective, 4 looking at the facts or the truth. 5 And truthfully, the one thing that I have not heard so much of -- I heard a little bit of 6 7 -- and it's that there were needed improvements in We had been proactively seeking feedback with 8 9 self-assessments, participated in numerous work 10 actions. 11 And in the end, we all asked the team 12 before renewal that I recognized, and that's one of the things in the end that all in all that there 13 14 were opportunities that we needed to take for 15 improvement. So we took the initiative to draft a 16 17 number of initiatives and presented them to management. However, you know, it became clear that 18 19 the decision had already been made to make the 20 changes that are on issue. 21 So I think that we could probably spend 22 all night and all day going back and forth on the merits of the new model versus the old model. 23 24 What I would challenge all of us to 25 remember, and this is especially for the NRC, is

that one of the most important things that we learned, that I learned, is the role that perception plays in the assessment of the work environment.

And so with any change, including the changes that remain to the model, et cetera, I would ask to take a look at whether or not the appropriate steps were taken to ensure that perceptions were managed so that employees would continue to feel confident enough to raise concerns.

And, again, I understand that a number of efforts are going forth now to take a look at that. But perception is very key. And one of the things that I heard early on was that we were going to a new model and that the new model was not a statement or condemnation of the comments of the former staff.

Yet some employees outside of the ECP questioned whether that was true because of a number of factors. You know, one, if it's a new model, why not give these employees the opportunity to test that new model out, you know, and, of course, what I had shared with one of the chairs of TVA is that we were looking also with background with the site and with the craft so that they could communicate along those lines.

1 And that may be well a great movement. 2 But I don't think that was communicated in the 3 beginning well enough to the employees. And so I think that's where a lot of what we were dealing 4 5 with here -- it is coming from -- it's not -- we're getting stuck in the auspices of, you know, what 6 7 program is better, what should not, when the overall question should be how did this training come about 8 9 and in such a way that it has the utmost respect for 10 perceptions that employees might have? 11 And other employees that, you know, came 12 to me and said, well, we know that there are issues with a number of avenues for relaying their 13 14 The Corrective Action Program was also concerns. 15 one that was often in need of a new opportunity for 16 improvement. Yet we don't see any personnel changes 17 in that organization. And so, you know, it's hard to argue with that. But then, again, it's all about 18 19 the perception. 2.0 But the only thing that I really 21 encourage all of us to do from all sides of this is 22 to really focus on what that perception has done to our work environment. 23 24 The thing that kept me awake day in and

day out in my role there and still keeps me awake

day in and day out is whether or not we have 1 2 conducted ourselves in a way so that every single 3 person feels that they can raise issues without any 4 hesitancy because it only takes one person to 5 hesitate for us to have something disastrous that could impact the health and safety of the public. 6 7 So when I heard that there had been a notice of unusual event at the TVA site, I sat up 8 9 half the night so worried about the safety of the 10 public and hoping that whatever that was -- I didn't 11 know the details -- that it had nothing to do with 12 someone's unwillingness to speak out for whatever 13 reason. 14 So with all of that, you know, I just 15 want to remind us that we are not, I quess, with 16 everything else going on in the world. 17 for us all to be self-introspective, for us to come together and to hopefully put all of this behind us 18 19 so that we can begin to really focus -- continue our 20 focus on this great company, TVA which has done so 21 much for people, and to make sure that they're all, 22 you know, everybody is safe. 23 So for what it's worth, that's what I 24 have to say. And thank you for your time.

MR. ERLANGER: Okay. Thank you.

25

This

1	is Craig Erlanger, the PRB chair. Do any other
2	members of the public have a question? We have time
3	for one more. Thank you.
4	Hearing none, I'm going to turn it over
5	to Mr. Robert Gladney, today's facilitator.
6	MR. GLADNEY: Thank you, Craig. I want
7	to add if you have any other questions, please send
8	them in as provided in the information by Andy Hon.
9	But for now, due to the time, we will go ahead and
10	conclude the main portion of the meeting.
11	Before we close, does the court reporter
12	need any additional information for the meeting
13	transcript?
14	COURT REPORTER: If I can have the list
15	of names that you used for roll call at the
16	beginning provided to me? It hasn't been sent to me
17	or my office yet.
18	MR. GLADNEY: Okay. Thank you. I'll
19	have between Andy and myself, he will send it to you
20	or I will send it to you. But thank you for that.
21	Also anything else? Is that all?
22	COURT REPORTER: No. That's all for
23	now.
24	MR. GLADNEY: Okay. Thank you. Okay.
25	We want to encourage the participants outside the
l	I and the second

1	NRC to provide public meeting feedback to the NRC
2	staff via the NRC public meeting website. With
3	that, this meeting is adjourned.
4	(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter
5	went off the record at 3:29 p.m.)
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