



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION V  
SUITE 202, WALNUT CREEK PLAZA  
1990 N. CALIFORNIA BOULEVARD  
WALNUT CREEK, CALIFORNIA 94596

DEC 1 1979

Docket No. 50-344

Portland General Electric Company  
121 S. W. Salmon Street  
Portland, Oregon 97204

Attention: Mr. Charles Goodwin, Jr.  
Assistant Vice President

Gentlemen:

SUBJECT: TROJAN PLANT INSPECTION REPORT No. 50-344/78-19

Please replace Page 7 of the subject report with the attached page which corrects a typographical error in the first paragraph (1979 instead of 1978).

Sincerely,

J. L. Crews, Chief  
Reactor Operations and Nuclear  
Support Branch

Enclosure:  
Corrected Page 7 to IE  
Inspection Report 50-344/78-19

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environment, possible submergence of components, qualification of design life, and requirements for cumulative testing of components. Licensee representatives stated that these conditions/situations would be included in the review program and subsequent evaluations. Licensee representatives also stated that (1) the evaluations would be completed by the middle of March, 1979; (2) spot checks of electrical components in containment would be completed during the current outage (and possibly the next refueling outage) to verify that installed electrical equipment of concern meets design requirements; and (3) that corrective measures would be on a case-by-case basis if deficiencies are identified with appropriate schedules developed for remedial action. This circular will remain open pending completion of the licensee's review program. This was discussed at the exit interview. (Open)

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

9. Safety Injection Reset/Block Switch

The inspector examined the licensee's procedures which require a reset/block of safety injection (SI) after an initial safety injection occurs. After reviewing the licensee's electrical drawings and discussing the reset/block function with members of the licensee's staff, the inspector determined that an automatic SI would be blocked following actuation of the SI reset/block switch. This could occur after a spurious SI, and in any case, after the 70 second time delay had taken place thereby allowing the operator to actuate the SI reset/block. The licensee's procedures did not caution the operator to manually actuate SI equipment if a subsequent SI actuation signal should occur. This was discussed at the exit interview.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

10. Exit Interview

The inspectors met with licensee representatives on September 13, 1978 at the corporate headquarters, and again at the plant site at the conclusion of the inspection on September 14, 1978. During the exit interviews, the inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection, including the items discussed in Paragraphs 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9.

The licensee representatives made the following comments or commitments in response to the items discussed by the inspectors: