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January 29, 1988


U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

PLANT HATCH - UNIT 1
NRC DOCKET 50-321
OPERATING LICENSE DPR-57
SPECIAL REPORT 88-001
FIRE WATER STORAGE TANKS CONTAIN LESS THAN
270,000 GALLONS RESULTING IN
SPECIAL REPORT AS REQUIRED BY FIRE HAZARDS REPORT

Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of the Plant Hatch Unit 1 Technical Specifications Section 6.9.2, and the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) Appendix B, Georgia Power Company is submitting the enclosed Special Report (SR) concerning an event where the fire water storage tanks contained less than the required water volume. This event occurred at Plant Hatch - Unit 1.

Sincerely,


for L. T. Gucwa

LGB/lc

Enclosure: SR 50-321/1988-001

c: (see next page)

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c: Georgia Power Company

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ENCLOSURE

PLANT HATCH - UNIT 1
NRC DOCKET 50-321
OPERATING LICENSE DPR-57
SPECIAL REPORT 88-001
FIRE WATER STORAGE TANKS CONTAIN LESS THAN
270,000 GALLONS RESULTING IN
SPECIAL REPORT AS REQUIRED BY FIRE HAZARDS REPORT

A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT

This report is required per the Unit 1 Technical Specifications section 6.9.2. This section of the Technical Specifications states that special reports for fire protection equipment operating and surveillance requirements shall be submitted, as required, by the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) and its Appendix B requirements.

The FHA section 1.3.1 item b requires that the fire suppression water system shall be operable with at least two separate water supplies, each with a minimum contained volume of 270,000 gallons. If this requirement can not be met, a Special Report is required.

B. UNIT(s) STATUS AT TIME OF EVENTS

On 1/11/88, Unit 1 was in the run mode at an approximate power level of 2433 MWt (approximately 100 percent of rated thermal power).

On 1/11/88, Unit 2 was in the run mode at an approximate power level of 1822 MWt (approximately 75 percent of rated thermal power).

Unit 2 is involved in this event because the fire suppression water system tanks discharge into a common header which provides fire protection water to both Unit 1 and Unit 2.

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ENCLOSURE (Continued)

FIRE WATER STORAGE TANKS CONTAIN LESS THAN
270,000 GALLONS RESULTING IN
SPECIAL REPORT AS REQUIRED BY FIRE HAZARDS REPORT

C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On 1/11/88, at approximately 1400 CST, plant personnel determined that a fire protection water header had ruptured. The header is located between valves 1Y43-F308F and 1Y43-F308J, in the Unit 1 Cooling Tower yard.

The rupture of the fire protection water header caused the level in the fire water storage tanks (1Y43-A001A and 1Y43-A001B) to decrease. On 1/11/88 at approximately 1430 CST, the levels in the two tanks had decreased below the 270,000 gallon limit specified in the FHA. Plant personnel documented the rupture of the water header and the decrease in water storage tank levels on Deficiency Cards as required by the plant's administrative control procedures.

When the levels decreased below the required storage volume, plant operations personnel initiated a Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) (number 1-88-7). Plant personnel isolated the break at 1435 CST. This allowed the levels in the fire water storage tanks to be returned to their normal levels. At 1755 CST, the fire water storage tank levels were above the minimum requirements of the FHA and the LCO was terminated.

D. CAUSE OF EVENT

The event occurred as a result of a rupture in a fire protection water header. The header ruptured due to consolidation in some of the soil backfill surrounding the header.

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ENCLOSURE (Continued)

FIRE WATER STORAGE TANKS CONTAIN LESS THAN
200,000 GALLONS RESULTING IN
SPECIAL REPORT AS REQUIRED BY FIRE HAZARDS REPORT

E. ANALYSIS OF EVENT

When the ruptured fire suppression water line was isolated from the rest of the system, this resulted in the loss of all fire protection to cooling tower 1C and the fire protection for the northern half of cooling tower 1B.

However, the cooling towers are not safety related systems and serve no function during any accident condition. Were the cooling towers lost as the result of a fire, this condition would not prevent the safe shutdown of the unit or maintaining the unit in a safe shutdown condition.

The heat sink for the reactor core during shutdown conditions (normal and emergency) is through the Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) system. This system is sized such that the cooling towers are not needed to remove the decay heat.

Additionally, the cooling towers are located far enough away from any safety related structures and components, such that were a fire to occur at the cooling towers, no safety related items would be impacted.

In addition to the above information, plant engineering personnel performed an engineering evaluation of this event. The evaluation shows that the fire main loop which protects safety related areas, remained operable. This conclusion was made after reviewing the requirement contained in NUREG - 75/087 (STANDARD REVIEW PLAN - FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM), paragraph 5.b.(5).

ENCLOSURE (Continued)

FIRE WATER STORAGE TANKS CONTAIN LESS THAN
270,000 GALLONS RESULTING IN
SPECIAL REPORT AS REQUIRED BY FIRE HAZARDS REPORT

Even though each of the fire protection water storage tanks contained less than the required 270,000 gallons, the minimum combined volume they contained in this event was approximately 414,380 gallons. The NUREG requires that a minimum of 300,000 gallons be available.

Based on the above information, it is concluded this event did not adversely affect the safety related fire protection capability of the plant.

F. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The corrective actions for this event included:

1. Isolating the fire suppression header rupture.
2. Restoring the levels in fire suppression water storage tanks 1Y34-A001A and 1Y34-A001B.
3. Initiating the appropriate Limiting Condition for Operation.
4. Replacing the ruptured section of the fire suppression header. This occurred on 1/15/88. However, the repaired section has not yet been returned to service because inclement weather has prevented the excavated area from being backfilled and properly compacted. The line will be returned to service after backfilling and compaction are completed.