

REVIEWED BY: R. Keimig

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NRC: RI
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1-22-88
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I

Report Nos. 50-277/87-37
50-278/87-37

Docket Nos. 50-277
50-278

License Nos. DPR-44
DPR-56

Licensee: Philadelphia Electric Company
2301 Market Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Facility Name: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station,
Units 2 & 3

Inspection At: Delta & Airville, Pennsylvania

Inspection Conducted: November 16-19, 1987

Type of Inspection: Routine, Unannounced Physical Security

Date of Last Physical Security Inspection: June 28-July 2, 1987

Inspectors: R. J. Bailey
R. J. Bailey, Physical Security Inspection

1-13-88
date

W. K. Lancaster
W. K. Lancaster, Physical Security Inspector

1-14-88
date

Approved by: R. Keimig
R. R. Keimig, Chief, Safeguards Section
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

1-21-88
date

Inspection Summary: Routine, Unannounced Physical Security Inspection on
November 16-19, 1987 (Combined Report Nos. 50-277/87-37 and 50-278/87-37)

Areas Inspected: Follow-up on previous inspection finding; Physical Barriers
(Protected and Vital Areas); Response Drills; Assessment Aids (Protected Area);
Lighting; Access Control (Personnel, Packages and Vehicles); Detection Aids
(Protected Area); Alarm Stations; and Training and Qualifications.

Results: The licensee was in compliance with the NRC-approved Physical
Security Plan, except in the areas of Physical Barriers for the Protected Area,
and Lighting.

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Key Persons Contacted

a. Licensee and Contractor Personnel:

- *D. Smith - Plant Manager
- *R. Weindorfer - Corporate Director, Nuclear Plant Security
- *P. Supplee - Corporate Analyst, Nuclear Plant Security
- *J. Oddo - Nuclear Security Specialist
- *S. Tharpe - Nuclear Security Chief Coordinator
- *G. Bird - Nuclear Quality Assurance Auditor
- M. D'Angelo - District Manager, Burns International Security Service, Inc.
- *G. Mark - Assistant Security Force Supervisor, Burns International Security Services, Inc.
- *A. Miller - Security Force Coordinator, Burns International Security Services, Inc.
- *K. Krouse - Security Training Officer, Burns International Security Services, Inc.

b. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Personnel:

- *T. Johnson - Senior Resident Inspector
- *L. Myers - Resident Inspector

*Indicates those present at the Exit Interview

The inspectors also interviewed other licensee and contractor security personnel.

2. Follow-up on Previous Inspection Findings

During the previous routine physical security inspection (50-277/87-20 and 50-278/87-20) conducted on June 28 through July 2, 1987, the inspectors followed-up on several allegations relative to security force working conditions and found those conditions less than optimum due to staff shortages. During this inspection, the inspectors found that the licensee had initiated a new plant-wide program (Tell-the-Manager Program) whereby employee concerns could be brought directly to the attention of licensee management to effect expeditious resolution.

On November 19, 1987, the inspectors discussed the Tell-the-Manager Program with licensee personnel. The inspectors were informed that several concerns had been raised by security force members through the program. Licensee personnel indicated that these concerns were of the same nature as those previously reviewed by the inspectors. The licensee stated that each concern would be addressed by the Plant Manager but that none had yet been responded to. The licensee stated that additional compensatory posts were created as a result of the Regulatory Effectiveness Review (RER), as well as numerous Unit 3 outage and security equipment modifications, that

are causing man power problems for the security force contractor. The licensee further stated that the present security force staffing level was not adequate to handle the additional compensatory posts, therefore, the security force contractor was being forced to use mandatory overtime. The licensee indicated that the security contractor had been authorized to increase the staffing level, however, the contractor was experiencing difficulties in recruiting personnel from the local area because of the low unemployment rate.

The inspectors verified through a review of records that an additional thirty individuals were in the process of being hired and were scheduled for training over the next several weeks. The inspectors also determined from interviewing both licensee and contractor security personnel that the present security force staffing level had been increased approximately sixty percent since January 1, 1987.

3. Physical Barriers (Protected Area)

The inspectors conducted a physical inspection of the protected area (PA) barrier on November 17, 1987.

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The inspectors found that the PA barrier was in this dismantled state because of an upgrade being performed on the barrier. The inspectors determined that the licensee had established a compensatory post while the upgrade work was being performed during the day; however, the compensatory post was mistakenly removed by a member of the security force, who was not authorized to dismiss the post, when work was stopped at the end of the shift at approximately 5:00 p.m. The licensee was promptly informed of this finding and immediately re-established the compensatory post at the location of the dismantled barrier. The inspectors reviewed the operability of the intrusion detection system and assessment capability in this area and found them to be operable and adequate. The inspectors also found that an alarm assessment could have been made by a security force member at another compensatory post in the general vicinity, if necessary. Therefore, the security significance of the dismantled barrier was minimal. The inspectors questioned why security patrols in the area (approximately five in two hours) had failed to identify the degraded barrier and how the compensatory post could have been dismissed while the degradation still existed. The licensee's representatives, after reviewing the situation,

stated that established security procedures had not been followed and the responsible security supervisor apparently had been preoccupied with other security duties between the time the post was dismissed and when the inspectors found the problem.

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Failure of the PA barrier to conform to paragraph 3.1.2 of the security plan and failure to comply with paragraph 3.1.d of security procedure PP-36 is an apparent violation of NRC requirements. (50-277/87-37-01 and 50-278/87-37-01)

4. Security Contingency Plan Response Drills

The inspectors reviewed documentation of the security response drills that were conducted during 1986 and 1987, to date. The inspectors determined that these drills were adequate in frequency and scope to meet the commitments in the licensee's security plan.

5. Assessment Aids (Protected Area)

The inspectors observed the use of assessment aids and other security equipment in operation at both the CAS and SAS.

6. Lighting

The inspectors conducted a lighting survey of the entire protected area during the hours of darkness (6:30 p.m. - 8:30 p.m.) on November 17, 1987. The inspectors were each accompanied by a licensee representative with a calibrated light meter for direct measurement of lighting levels. The inspection revealed ten areas below the NRC's 0.2 foot-candle illumination requirement.

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The inspectors questioned why observations of lighting were not routinely conducted during security patrols of the protected area and why they were not properly compensated for when found. The licensee stated these matters would be reviewed, acknowledged the deficient lighting findings and initiated immediate compensatory and corrective action as appropriate when again brought to their attention on the night of November 18, 1987.

Failure to provide lighting level 0.2 foot-candles or greater illumination within the PA isolation zones and the PA is an apparent violation of paragraph 3.1.3 of the licensee's NRC-approved security plan and NRC requirements. (50-277/87-37-02; 50-278/87-37-02)

7. Access Control (Personnel)

The inspectors reviewed the personnel access control procedures in use at the main PA access control portal and observed the processing of personnel at this portal on several occasions during the inspection. Based upon the review of procedures and observations, the inspectors determined that the licensee was meeting the commitments in the NRC-approved security plan.

8. Access Control (Packages)

The inspectors reviewed the package search procedures in use at the main PA access control portal and observed the processing of packages at this portal on several occasion, during the inspection. Based upon the review of procedures and observations, the inspectors determined that the licensee was meeting the commitments in the NRC-approved security plan.

9. Access Control (Vehicles)

On November 6, 1987, at approximately 5:00 p.m., an NRC resident inspector observed a vehicle (soda truck) exiting the PA vehicle portal.

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The inspectors discussed this matter with the licensee and were satisfied that appropriate action was taken to prevent recurrence.

10. Detection Aids (Protected Area)

The inspectors reviewed the detection aids used around the PA barrier. The inspectors determined from a physical inspection, as well as personal observations within the CAS and SAS, that the licensee was meeting the commitments in the security plan concerning PA detection aids.

11. Physical Barriers (Vital Areas)

The inspectors conducted a physical inspection of a sampling of the vital area (VA) barriers for Units 2 and 3. The inspectors determined that the licensee was meeting the commitments in the NRC-approved security plan concerning VA barriers.

12. Alarm Stations

The inspectors observed the operation of both the CAS and SAS and found them to be operating in accordance with the NRC-approved security plan.

13. Training and Qualification - General Requirements

The inspectors visited the Burns International Administrative offices (security contractor) at Airville, Pennsylvania, and reviewed both the suitability and training records for 20 individuals. These records included armed guards, unarmed watchpersons, and supervisors. The inspectors determined that all required training had been conducted in accordance with the NRC-approved security plan and the Peach Bottom Training and Qualification (T&Q) Plan.

14. Noteworthy Events During the Inspection

On November 18, 1987, the FBI arrested six individuals who were accused of drug distribution at the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station and in the surrounding York County area. In addition, on November 18 and November 20, 1987, the licensee received multiple anonymous, non-specific bomb threats via telephone. Further details of these events are discussed in NRC Combined Inspection Report Nos. 50-277/87-24; 50-278/87-24.

15. Exit Interview

The inspectors met with the licensee representatives listed in paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on November 19, 1987. At that time, the purpose and scope of the inspection were reviewed and the findings were presented.

At no time during the inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspectors.