NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 4 1 3	1 OF 0 3

TITLE (4) Main Feedwater Isolation During Removal Of A Temporary Station Modification Due To A Management Deficiency

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
1 2	1 9	8 7	8 7	— 0 4 6	— 0 0	0 1	1 8	8 8	N/A	0 5 0 0 0
										0 5 0 0 0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

OPERATING MODE (9)							
5	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)	
POWER LEVEL (10)	20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)	
0 0 0	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)	X	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)	
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		50.72(b)(2)(ii)	
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)			
	20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)			

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE
Julio G. Torre, Associate Engineer - Licensing	7 1 0 1 4 — 3 7 3 1 8 1 0 1 2 9

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On December 19, 1987, at 1322:24 hours, a Main Feedwater (CF) Isolation occurred during the removal of a Temporary Station Modification (TSM) from the Solid State Protection System (SSPS). The TSM had been installed to prevent a CF Isolation when the Steam Generators were placed in wet lay-up for Chemistry control during End Of Cycle 2 Refueling Outage. The Unit was in Mode 5, Cold Shutdown, with the Decay Heat Removal System in operation during this incident.

This incident is attributed to a management deficiency. The involved Technicians were given incorrect instructions by their Supervisor to remove the TSM. They also had no previous training on the SSPS and were assigned a job on equipment they were unfamiliar with.

The TSM was removed and the CF System was returned to its previous alignment. This incident is being reviewed with all appropriate supervisors. Additionally, technicians performing maintenance on Engineered Safeguards Feature (ESF) or Reactor Protection System (RPS) equipment are to be trained on the equipment or be under the direct supervision of trained personnel as it may be appropriate.

The health and safety of the public were unaffected by this event.

IE22
1/1

NRC Form 366
(9-83)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 4 1 3	8 7	— 0 4 6	— 0 0	0 2 OF 0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

BACKGROUND:

The Solid State Protection System (EIIS:JC) (SSPS) accepts inputs from various plant components and equipment and provides outputs to ensure that the Units are operated within certain parameters and to prevent or mitigate the consequences of an accident. During certain normal plant evolutions, some of these outputs must be disabled to prevent inadvertent actuations. One of these evolutions is Steam Generator (EIIS:SG) (S/G) wet lay-up to maintain S/G chemistry during extended outages. To place the S/Gs in a wet lay-up condition, the S/G HI-HI level (P-14) Main Feedwater (EIIS:SJ) (CF) system Isolation must be disabled. This is accomplished by issuing a Temporary Station Modification (TSM) to disable P-14. When the S/G's are taken out of the wet lay-up condition and the S/G levels are returned to normal, the TSM is removed and the SSPS is returned to its normal configuration.

DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT:

On December 12,1987, Work Request 26344 OPS was issued to Instrumentation and Electric personnel (IAE) to defeat P-14 to allow Operations to place the S/Gs in wet lay-up. The TSM was installed and the work request returned to Planning and placed on hold until it could be removed. On December 19,1987, the work request was reissued to IAE to remove the P-14 TSM. An IAE Supervisor assigned two IAE Technicians to perform the removal. Neither Technician had been formally trained or qualified on the SSPS. The Supervisor instructed the Technicians to have the Operator At The Controls press the LO-Tave/Reactor Trip Reset button to reset the CF Isolation signal and prevent a CF Isolation while they removed the TSM. The Supervisor did not review the appropriate drawings prior to giving these instructions. These instructions were incorrect. The CF Isolation could have been prevented only by closing the Reactor Trip Breakers to reset the latched CF Isolation signal.

At 1322:24 hours, a CF Isolation occurred when the Technicians began to reconnect SSPS relay K620 in accordance with IP/0/A/3890/01, Controlling Procedure For Troubleshooting and Corrective Maintenance. They were unaware of this until informed of the situation by Operations. At approximately 1340 hours, the CF System was returned to previous alignment.

CONCLUSION:

This incident is attributed to a management deficiency, because the Technicians were given incorrect information to perform the TSM removal. They were untrained on the SSPS but were qualified to IP/0/A/3890/01, the procedure listed on the work request to install and remove the TSM. IP/0/A/3890/01 is a general troubleshooting procedure and is not Unit or equipment specific. The Technicians being qualified to only IP/0/A/3890/01, and being unfamiliar with the SSPS, were unaware of the need to close the Reactor Trip Breakers to clear the CF Isolation prior to connecting the relays listed on the TSM. They were also unaware that when SSPS relay K620 energized while being reconnected that a CF Isolation had occurred. Technicians trained and qualified on the SSPS should have been used to remove the TSM, or the unqualified Technicians should have been under the direct

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 4 1 3	8 7	— 0 4 6	— 0 0	0 3 OF 0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A)

supervision of personnel trained and qualified on the SSPS. Appropriate drawings should have been reviewed by the Supervisor and Technicians prior to commencement of work to ensure that the information the Technicians received was correct.

This incident occurred on a weekend when no SSPS trained personnel were on site. IAE has assigned primary responsibility for the maintenance and calibration of the SSPS to a crew that works on a five day/week schedule. For future work, IAE will ensure that only trained personnel perform maintenance on Engineered Safeguards Feature (EIIS:JE) (ESF) or Reactor Protection System (EIIS:JC) (RPS) equipment.

There have been five previous ESF actuations due to inadequate instructions being given to Technicians by Supervision. Therefore, this is considered a recurring event.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

SUBSEQUENT

(1) Operations realigned the CF System to to its previous alignment.

(2) IAE completed removal of the TSM.

(3) IAE General Supervisor reviewed this incident with the Supervisor involved.

PLANNED

(1) Incident will be reviewed with all appropriate supervisors.

(2) Appropriate supervisors will be instructed that personnel working ESF or RPS equipment under IP/0/A/3890/01 must be trained on the equipment or be under the direct supervision of a trained person.

SAFETY ANALYSIS:

The Unit was in Mode 5 at the time of the incident with the Decay Heat Removal System operable and in operation. The CF Isolation caused no adverse effects since CF was not required at the time.

This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73, Section (a)(2)(iv) and 10 CFR 50.72, Section (b)(2)(ii).

The health and safety of the public were not affected by this incident.

DUKE POWER COMPANY
P.O. BOX 33189
CHARLOTTE, N.C. 28242

HAL B. TUCKER
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR PRODUCTION

TELEPHONE
(704) 373-4531

January 18, 1988

Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject: Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1
Docket No. 50-413
LER 413/87-46

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 Section (a) (1) and (d), attached is Licensee Event Report 413/87-46 concerning a Main Feedwater Isolation due to a management deficiency. This event was considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,

Hal B. Tucker/xmc

Hal B. Tucker

JGT/1253/sbn

Attachment

xc: Dr. J. Nelson Grace
Regional Administrator, Region II
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

M&M Nuclear Consultants
1221 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10020

INPO Records Center
Suite 1500
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

American Nuclear Insurers
c/o Dottie Sherman, ANI Library
The Exchange, Suite 245
270 Farmington Avenue
Farmington, CT 06032

Mr. P. K. Van Doorn
NRC Resident Inspector
Catawba Nuclear Station

IE22
1/1