

U.S. NUCLEAR ENERGY COMMISSION
DEPARTMENT OF REGULATION OPERATIONS
REGION I

Inspection Report No: 50-29/74-14 Docket No: 50-29
Licensee: Yankee Atomic Electric Company License No: DPR-3
20 Turnpike Road Priority: _____
Westboro, Massachusetts 01581 Category: C
Location: Rowe, Massachusetts Safeguards Group: _____
Type of License: PWR, 600 Mwt (W)
Type of Inspection: Routine, Unannounced
Date of Inspection: October 22-23, 1974
Date of Previous Inspection: September 18-19, 1974
Reporting Inspector: H. L. Canter, Reactor Inspector 11/14/74 Date
Assessing Inspector: D. Sternberg, Reactor Inspector 11/14/74 Date
J. F. Streeter, Reactor Inspector 11-14-74 Date

Other Accompanying Personnel: None _____ Date
Reviewed By: E. C. McC... Jr., Senior Reactor Inspector 11/18/74 Date
Nuclear Support Section, Reactor Operations Branch
A. B. Davis, Senior Reactor Inspector _____ Date
PWR Section, Reactor Operations Branch

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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Enforcement Action

- A. In violation of Criterion V, Appendix B, 10 CFR 50, corrective maintenance on Seismic Class I pipe hangers was not accomplished in accordance with an approved procedure. (Details 2.c.(1))
- B. In violation of Criterion V, Appendix B, 10 CFR 50, modification maintenance on a main coolant check valve was accomplished without any post maintenance acceptance criteria. (Details 2.c.(3))
- C. In violation of Criterion VI, Appendix B, 10 CFR 50, corrective maintenance to a main coolant pump was accomplished with a procedure containing unauthorized changes. (Details 2.c.(2))
- D. In violation of Technical Specifications, Paragraph B.2, primary coolant system chloride limit was exceeded. (Details 3.c)
- E. In violation of Criterion V, Appendix B, 10 CFR 50, operating personnel failed to document their review of active jumper and bypass requests. (Details 6.b.(2))

Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Action

- A. The licensee had taken the actions specified in his response letter with regard to the violations reported in 50-29/73-03, Details 1.b.(1), 1.b.(3), 1.g.(1)(a), 1.g.(1)(b), 1.g.(4), 1.g.(4)(c), 1.g.(5), 1.g.(5)(c), 1.g.(6), 1.h.(2)(c), 1.h.(2)(e), 1.i.(3), 2.a.(2).

Design Changes

None identified

Unusual Occurrences

None identified

Other Significant Findings

A. Current Findings

1. Non-Deficient Areas of Inspection

- a. Turbine Stop Valves (Detail 16)
- b. Cutler-Hammer Switches (Details 18)

- c. Organization and Administration (Detail 7)
- d. Reporting Requirements (Detail 5)

2. New Unresolved Items

None

3. New Open Items

- a. HPSI and LPSI Pump Testing (Detail 4.d.(3))
- b. Key Log and Maintenance Request Log (Detail 6.b.(1))
- c. Control Area Boundary (Detail 6.c.(4))

B. Status of Previous Open and Unresolved Items

- a. Plant Chemistry Routine (Detail 17)
- b. Pressurizer Safety Valves (Detail 4.d.(4))
- c. Discharge Test of Station Batteries (Detail 19)

Management Interview

At the conclusion of the inspection an exit meeting was conducted with the following personnel in attendance:

Mr. H. Autio, Plant Superintendent
Mr. W. Jones, Assistant Plant Superintendent
Mr. P. Laird, Maintenance Supervisor
Mr. J. Shippee, Instrument and Control Supervisor
Mr. J. Staub, Technical Assistant

The following summarizes items discussed.

- A. Safety Related Maintenance Review (Detail 2)
- B. Abnormal Occurrence Review (Detail 3)
- C. Surveillance Testing (Detail 4)
- D. Reporting Requirements (Detail 5)
- E. Review of Plant Operations (Detail 6)
- F. Organization and Administration (Detail 7)
- G. Resolution of 50-29/73-03 Violations and Management Item (Details 8-15)
- H. Turbine Stop Valves (Detail 16)
- I. Cutler Hammer Switches (Detail 18)
- J. Performance Discharge Test of Station Batteries (Detail 19)

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Yankee Atomic Electric Company

Mr. H. Autry, Plant Superintendent
Mr. G. Baird, Control Room Operator
Mr. W. Billings, Chemistry and Health Physics Supervisor
Mr. R. Boutwell, Engineering Assistant
Mr. L. Bozek, Quality Control and Audit Coordinator
Mr. R. Danek, Operations Supervisor
Mr. S. Durfey, Engineering Assistant
Mr. R. Eppinger, Engineering Assistant
Mr. M. Ebert, Plant Reactor Engineer
Mr. J. Flanagan, Plant Health Physicist
Mr. C. Goodwin, Control Room Operator
Mr. W. Jones, Assistant Plant Superintendent
Mr. K. Jurenkuff, Shift Supervisor
Mr. L. Laffond, Control Room Operator
Mr. J. Laird, Maintenance Supervisor
Mr. J. Shippee, Instrument and Control Supervisor
Mr. J. Staub, Technical Assistant
Mr. N. St. Laurent, Technical Assistant to the Plant Superintendent
Mr. M. J. Thayer, Engineering Assistant
Mr. M. D. Vassar, Assistant Operations Supervisor

2. Review of Safety Related Maintenance

- a. Maintenance evolutions on safety related systems were reviewed to verify that:
- (1) limiting conditions for operation were met while the system or component was removed from service;
 - (2) administrative approval was obtained prior to initiating the work;
 - (3) maintenance was accomplished with approved procedures;
 - (4) required inspections or hold points were included;
 - (5) necessary functional testing and calibration was performed;

- (6) quality control records were available for three of the items reviewed; and
 - (7) maintenance was performed by qualified personnel.
- b. The maintenance review included inspection of the Job Order Form, the Maintenance Request Forms, Departmental and Operating Procedures, and Technical Specifications. Discussions with the Technical Assistant to the Plant Superintendent, the Maintenance Foreman and the Instrument and Control Foreman were held to obtain other required information. Maintenance work reviewed is tabulated below.

<u>System</u>	<u>Component</u>	<u>Licensee Job Order Package Number</u>
Reactor Coolant System	Main Coolant Pump #1	74-70
Reactor Coolant System	Main Coolant Check Valve #1	74-70
Reactivity & Power Control	Tav Meter	74-13*
Reactivity & Power Control	Nuclear Recorder	74-34
Power Conversion	TV-411 (Atmos. Dump Valve)	74-51
Power Conversion	#1 Steam Gen. Level Trip	74-73
Auxiliary System	#1 Charging Pump Seal	74-76
Electrical System	#2 Battery Charger	74-5
Electrical System	Pressurizer Cycling Heater Relay	74-89
Emergency Power	#3 Diesel Generator	74-41
ECCS	#1 Loop Pressure Trans- mitter	74-74
ECCS	Loop Fill Pipe Hangers	74-40
ESF	Safety Injection Tank	74-36
	Level Transmitter	

* Recalibration of Tav Meter done on MR 74-13 instead of Job Order.

- c. Within the inspection scope the following deficiencies were identified.
- (1) During June, 1974 corrective maintenance to Seismic Class I pipe hangers in the Safety Injection system was accomplished

following an operation of the safety injection system. This was done as Job Order 74-40 but instead of a Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) approved procedure as required by Administrative Procedure, AP 0214, a memo from the Mechanical Engineering Group was used to perform the evolution. Failure to use an approved procedure is a violation of Criterion V, Appendix B, 10 CFR 50.

- (2) OP-5204, Main Coolant Pump 1 Inspection And Repair, including Attachment A with an issue date of April 24, 1974 was used to perform an inspection of #1 Main Coolant Pump and necessary repairs completed on June 14, 1974. The Report of Inspections form OPF-5204.1 includes the following statement: "Torque values have been changed due to Westinghouse past experience and research". This is evidenced by pen and ink changes to both torque value and clearance limits in the following paragraphs of Attachment A to OP-5204:

Paragraphs 12, 21, 32, 38, and 42.

A review of Job Order Form 74-79 indicates that the section "Plant Procedures affected" is marked "NA."

This is contrary to the requirements of AP-0001, Plant Procedures dated October 4, 1973 which states that, "...Operating and Administrative Procedures may be temporarily changed with the signed approval of two Senior Reactor Operators. Such changes shall be documented and subsequently reviewed by the PORC and approved by the plant superintendent or the Assistant Plant Superintendent..."

Unauthorized changes to a PORC approved procedure is a violation of Criterion VI, Appendix B, 10 CFR 50.

- (3) During June, 1974 modification maintenance to #1 main coolant check valve was performed on Job Order 74-70 and Plant Design Change 73-16. In this package there was not any requirement for a post maintenance test or other acceptance criteria as required by Administrative Procedure AP-0214. Performing safety related maintenance without acceptance criteria is a violation of Criterion V, Appendix B, 10 CFR 50.

3. Review of Abnormal Occurrences (AO's)

- a. Abnormal occurrence review included inspection of plant records and logs, Technical Specifications, Job Orders, Plant Operations and Review Committee minutes and correspondence to the AEC.
- b. The below listed AO's were reviewed to verify that:
 - (1) the cause was identified and details clearly reported;
 - (2) the corrective action described was taken to prevent recurrences;
 - (3) each event was reviewed and evaluated by the licensee; and
 - (4) safety limits, limiting safety settings, and limiting conditions for operations were not exceeded.

<u>AO</u>	<u>System</u>
74-4	Reactor Coolant System
74-5	Auxiliary System

c. Primary System Chloride Limits (AO-74-4)

Records indicate that the action taken by the licensee (replacing the ion exchange resin train) brought the chloride concentration within specification within 24 hours after discovery. Technical Specification, Paragraph B.2 (FMSR Paragraph 106.2) limits are less than 0.1 ppm. The reactor was in a cold shutdown condition at the time of the occurrence.

4. Surveillance Testing

- a. The inspector verified that the following surveillance procedures were properly approved;

<u>Area or System Tested</u>	<u>Procedure</u>
(1) Reactor Coolant System	OP-4220, "Primary System Water Balance"
	OP-4503, "Test of Pressurizer Code Safety Valves"
	OP-4232, "Vapor Container Inspection While Operating at Power"

(2) Reactivity and Power Control	OP-4202, "Control Rod Operability Check"
	OP-4214, "Chemical Shutdown System Check"
(3) Core and Internals	OP-4703, "Control Rods-Rod Drop Times"
	OP-4704, "Hot Channel Calculations"
(4) Power Conversion System	OP-4230, "Steam Generator Safety Valve Tests with the Plant in Hot Standby"
	OP-4502, "Determination of the Steam Generator Safety Valve Setpoints Using the Crosby Test Device"
	OP-4210, "Tire Pump Operability Test"
(5) Auxiliary System	OP-4226, "Testing of Fuel Handling Equipment with the Dummy Fuel Assembly"
	OP-5755, "Inspection and Maintenance of Safety Related ACB and/or Contactor"
(6) Electrical System	OP-4500, "Weekly Check of the Station Batteries"
	OP-4207, "Periodic Testing of Emergency Diesel Generators"
(7) Emergency Core Cooling System	OP-4203, "Weekly Valve Check"
	OP-4204, "Monthly Test of Safety Injection Pumps"
	OP-4205, "Safety Injection System Operation Check"
(8) Other Engineered Safety Feature	OP-4208, "Flow Test of Two LPSI Pumps on Normal A.C. Power"
	OP-4206, "Flow Test of Two HPSI Pumps on Normal A.C. Power"

b. The inspector examined the above listed procedures to determine if they included the following:

- (1) Prerequisites and preparations for the test.
- (2) Identification of instrumentation calibration.
- (3) Acceptance criteria.
- (4) Operational checks prior to returning equipment to service.

- c. The inspector verified that all test results examined (1) were in conformance with technical specifications and procedure requirements, and (2) were reviewed by someone other than the tester or individual directing the test.
- d. The inspector had the following comments concerning the surveillance procedures and tests reviewed:
 - (1) The inspector stated that the acceptance criteria for OP-4230 and OP-4502 would be clearer if they included numerical values rather than referencing the operator to other documents or sections of the procedure. For example, OP-4230 acceptance criteria references Section I of the ASME Code and OP-4502 state that "safety valves to be checked have been tested and their setpoints were found acceptable." The licensee stated that the procedures would be revised to include numerical acceptance criteria. The inspector had no further questions concerning these procedures.
 - (2) The inspector stated that the acceptance criteria of OP-4500 refers to vendor manuals rather than giving explicit acceptance criteria. The licensee stated that the procedure would be revised to include numerical acceptance criteria. The inspector had no further questions concerning this procedure.
 - (3) The inspector stated that while both OP-4206 and OP-4208 only include the change in shield tank cavity level in calculating the High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) and Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) pump flow rates, both procedures include a statement in the Discussion section that reads: "The amounts of water injected as indicated on the flow meters will be compared to that calculated from level changes in the shield tank cavity to determine acceptance values for pump flow." The licensee stated that the flow meter accuracy was not good enough to permit the readings to be used in determining pump flow rate acceptability and that these procedures would be revised to remove that statement in the DISCUSSION section. The licensee also stated that he would probably include the more accurate Safety Injection Tank level change data to be compared to the shield tank cavity data in the revised procedure.

The inspector stated that if the level change in the shield tank cavity had been 1/4" less for the LPSI test examined, the pump flow rate would have been unacceptable. He questioned the licensee as to the ability of the operators to read the level this precisely by a measuring device on the side of the cavity. The licensee stated that the operators were able to read the level to within 1/8" of the actual level.

The licensee informed the inspector that a recent calculation of the shield tank cavity indicated that a one inch change in level was equivalent to 403 gallons versus 440 gallons/inch used in OP-4206 and OP-4208. The licensee does not know at this time which is the correct number. However, he has determined that even by using the 403 gal./in. value that he presently exceeds the pumped ECCS flow assumed in his revised ECCS analysis (Figure 411-23C, FHSR 411:61) submitted on July 31, 1974, pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Section 50.59.

The inspector requested that the licensee bring this subject before the Plant Operations Review Committee at its next meeting. The licensee agreed to this and also stated that he would attempt to determine which of the cavity volume versus level numbers is correct. In any event, the licensee stated he intends to conduct a test during the next refueling shutdown to verify the accuracy of the volume versus level number.

- (4) The inspector verified that both the high and low set code pressurizer safety valves had been removed and reset to meet the Technical Specification limits. The procedure had also been revised to reflect Technical Specification limits. The concern identified in RI Inspection Report 50-29/74-06, Detail 4, is resolved.

5. Reporting Requirements

- a. The inspector reviewed the shutdown section of the July-December 1973 and January-June 1974 semi-annual reports to verify that the reports accurately reflect information documented in facility records. The inspector verified that the reports and records were consistent and had no further questions concerning this matter.

- b. The shutdown sections of the reports were also reviewed to identify if the information required to be reported by the technical specifications has been reported. The inspector stated that none of the ten shutdowns examined listed information on corrective action taken to prevent repetition. The licensee acknowledged the inspector's comment and stated that this matter would be reviewed with the Westboro office. The inspector had no further questions concerning this matter at this time.

The scheduled shutdowns listed were as follows:

1-11-74	7-28-73
3-16-74	10-20-73
5-10-74	11-4-73

The unscheduled shutdowns listed were as follows:

4-16-74	8-2-73
	8-10-73
	8-31-73

- c. The inspector reviewed facility records relating to the information discussed in the Primary Containment Leak Rate Test (PCLRT) report dated August 29, 1974 and verified that the reported information accurately reflects test results documented.

Two type "B" tests (VC personnel access hatch and 30" air purge out penetration) were reviewed and found to be in conformance with Technical Specification requirements. Three type "C" tests (VC heating, MC vent, AMP air particulate) were reviewed and found to be in conformance with Technical Specification requirements.

- d. The inspector reviewed the failure to open of valve CS-MOV-504 as stated in memo to file H-30 dated October 24, 1973, entitled "Scheduled Plant S/D for Rod Drop Time and Training." The cause of the problem was found to be an electrical malfunction which was repaired by electrical maintenance. The failure was not safety related. The inspector had no further questions concerning this matter.

6. Review of Plant Operations

- a. The inspector reviewed the following logs and operating records:

Shift Supervisor Log	6/15/74 - 10/23/74
Control Room Log Sheets	10/1/74 - 10/23/74
Primary Plant Log Sheets	10/4/74 - 10/14/74
Key Log	3/8/74 - 10/25/74
Maintenance Request Log	5/9/74 - 10/23/74
Shutdown and Refueling Log	5/1/74 - 8/25/74
Electrical Switching Log Book	10/21/74 - 10/24/74
Bypass of Safety Functions and Jump - Control Requests	Nos. 74-4 through 74-39
Plant Information Reports	Nos. 20 through 23

The above records were reviewed to determine if:

- (1) Control Room Log Sheets were filled out and signed.
 - (2) Auxiliary (primary plant) log sheets were filled out and signed.
 - (3) Shift Supervisor Log contained sufficient details to communicate equipment status, lockout status, correction and restoration.
 - (4) Log book reviews were being conducted by the plant staff.
 - (5) Jumpers or bypasses did not contain bypassing discrepancies with Technical Specification requirements.
 - (6) Plant Information Reports confirm that reported problems do not involve violations of Technical Specifications.
- b. The inspector had the following comments on the above listed logs and records:
- (1) The Key Log and Maintenance Request Log both had several entries made in pencil and several MR Log entries were scratched out and made illegible. The licensee stated that this matter would be corrected by assuring that operators are reminded of the necessity to keep neat logs. This item is open.

- (2) Administrative Procedure AP-0018 states in part "...To insure that all day Shift Supervisors and control room operators are cognizant of all blocked or bypassed safety functions, they shall review and initial all Active 'Bypass of Safety Functions and Jumper Control Requests,' APF-0018.2, prior to relieving the off-going shift." Contrary to the procedure requirements, individuals failed to document their review of the following requests:

<u>Request</u>	<u>Missing Initial</u>
74-4	Shift 1 SS
74-15	Shift 2 SS
74-27	Shift 3 CRO
74-31	Shift 2 CRO

The inspector stated that this failure to follow an approved procedure for a quality affecting activity was in violation of Criterion V, Appendix B, 10 CFR 50.

- c. The inspectors conducted tours of the general plant accessible areas on October 22, 24, and 25 and toured the Vapor Containment on October 25. Observations included:
- (1) Monitoring instrumentation confirmed that power level, reactor coolant system pressure, main coolant flow, and pressurizer level were within Technical Specification limits.
 - (2) Control room operators demonstrated their understanding of all control room annunciators.
 - (3) The number of on duty shift personnel was consistent with the Technical Specification requirements.
 - (4) Radiation controls were properly established; however, a general control area that the licensee had established as a supplemental radiation and contamination control measure was not adequately posted and the rope barrier was down in two separate areas. The licensee stated that, although the area was not required to be established by 10 CFR 20, he would correct this problem. This item is open.
 - (5) Plant housekeeping conditions were acceptable. The inspector stated that tools were left near the bottom of a ladder inside the vapor containment. The licensee stated that these would be properly stored.

- (6) No fluid leaks were observed; however, the closed shear valve in the inciner instrumentation system had a buildup of barf on it and the valve was not tagged. The licensee acknowledged the inspector's comments and stated that the valve would be tagged.
- (7) No unusual piping vibrations were noted.
- (8) A pipe hanger observed showed no evidence of oil leakage.
- (9) Valves MOV-4, MOV-533, and MOV-534 in the safety injection system were confirmed to be in the proper position and the physical position (open/close) agreed with the control room board position selected and board indication.
- (10) Dates and authorizations were examined for tags on the teleflex motor breaker, the Vapor Containment personnel hatch motor breaker, and the waste gas surge drum sample valve. The tagging was consistent with the plant tagging system.
- (11) Control room operators demonstrated a knowledge of the facility training program including how they are informed of and scheduled for upcoming sessions.
- (12) The inspector verified that the Assistant Plant Superintendent had toured the general plant areas on October 25 and that the duty Shift Supervisor toured the areas on October 24.

7. Organization and Administration

- a. The inspector verified that the licensee's onsite organization structure for key supervisory personnel is essentially the same as the structure described in Figure 1 of the Technical Specifications. The organization is supplemented by a Technical Assistant to the Superintendent and a Quality Control and Audit Coordinator.
- b. The inspector verified through the review of Plant Operations Review Committee meeting minutes that the onsite safety review committee is meeting with a quorum present.

- c. The inspector verified through the review of Nuclear Safety Audit & Review 6. See meeting minutes that the offsite safety review committee is functioning as required by Technical Specification D.1.
- d. The inspector verified that changes in key supervisory and technical personnel have been reported in accordance with Technical Specification E.1.a.7.
- e. The inspector noted that personnel performing nondestructive testing had satisfactorily completed training set forth in the standard SNT-TC-1A, "Nondestructive Testing Personnel Qualification and Certification."

8. Submission of Immediate Reports

- References: (1) RO Inspection Report 50-29/73-03, Details 1.b.(3) 1.g.(4)(c).
(2) Licensee letter to DRO dated September 4, 1974.

The inspector confirmed that the licensee's action was as stated in licensee's letter of September 4, 1974. These items are resolved.

9. Welder Qualification

- References: (1) RO Inspection Report 50-29/73-03, Detail 1.b.(1).
(2) Licensee letter to DRO dated September 4, 1974.

The inspector confirmed that the licensee's action was as stated in licensee's letter of September 4, 1974. Additionally, the inspector verified that procedure AP-5005, "Standard Welding Procedure," had been issued on February 28, 1974, and this procedure provides for welder qualifications as a prerequisite and requires a weld data sheet for each weld made on a safety classified system of components. This item is resolved.

10. Unprepared Procedures

- References: (1) RO Inspection Report 50-29/73-03, Details 1.g.(1)(a), 1.g.(1)(b), and 1.h.(2)(c).
(2) Licensee letter to DRO dated September 4, 1974.

The inspector confirmed that the licensee's action was as stated in licensee's letter of September 4, 1974. The inspector verified that all of the subject procedures had final licensee approval as of October 25. These items are resolved.

11. Review of Procedures

- References: (1) RO Inspection Report 50-29/73-03, Details 1.g.(4), 1.g.(6), and 1.h.(2)(c).
(2) Licensee letter to DRO dated September 4, 1974.

The inspector confirmed that the licensee's action was as stated in licensee's letter of September 4, 1974. The licensee stated that his entire facilities procedures program has been under revision for some time and the completion of the revision effort is scheduled for March 1, 1975. The licensee plans to have all Operating Memos reviewed and reissued, as necessary, by December 1, 1974. These items are resolved.

12. Updating of Procedures

- References: (1) RO Inspection Report 50-29/73-03, Detail 1.g.(5).
(2) Licensee letter to DRO dated September 4, 1974.

The inspector confirmed that the licensee's action was as stated in licensee's letter of September 4, 1974. These items are resolved.

13. Operating Reactor Contrary to Reactor Operating Limits

- References: (1) RO Inspection Report 50-29/73-03, Detail 2.a.(2).
(2) Licensee letter to DRO dated September 4, 1974.
(3) DRO letter to licensee dated September 18, 1974.

The inspector confirmed that the licensee's action was as stated in licensee's letter of September 4, 1974. This item is resolved.

14. Approval of Non-Conformance Reports

- References: (1) RO Inspection Report 50-29/73-03, Detail 1.i.(3).
(2) Licensee letter to DRO dated September 4, 1974.

The inspector confirmed that the licensee's action was as stated in licensee's letter of September 4, 1974. This item is resolved.

15. Management Control - Operation and Administrative Aspects

- References: (1) RO Inspection Report 50-29/73-03.
(2) Licensee letter to RO:I dated September 4, 1974.

The inspector confirmed that the licensee's action was as stated in licensee's letter of September 4, 1974. This item is resolved.

16. Turbine Stop Valves

The inspector stated that two other facilities recently noted that some of their turbine stop valves did not close as expected when they were called upon to do so. The licensee stated that he had not experienced any such problem at this facility. The inspector had no further questions concerning this matter.

17. Plant Chemistry Routine

References: (1) RO Inspection Report 50-29/73-04, Detail 5.b.
(2) RO Inspection Report 50-29/74-06, Detail 7.

The licensee provided the inspector with the following procedures which describe frequencies and specifications for primary and secondary chemistry surveillance tests:

AP-9001, "Primary Chemistry Test Frequencies and Specifications," issued 9/17/74

AP-9002, "Secondary Chemistry Test Frequencies and Specifications," issued 5/14/74

AP-9011, "Chemistry Test Frequencies and Specifications for Extended Shutdown," issued 4/30/74

CP-4900, "Chemistry Surveillance Tests," issued 9/17/74.

The concern documented in the above referenced reports is resolved.

18. Cutler-Hammer Switch Model No. 10250T4023

The inspector informed the licensee of a recent occurrence involving the failure of an emergency diesel generator to start upon receiving an auto-start signal. The inspector stated that the cause was traced to a Cutler-Hammer Switch Model No. 10250T4023 used as control switch on the diesel generator control panel. The inspector asked the licensee if this model switch was used in a safety-related system at Yankee Rowe. The licensee stated that he did not have this Cutler-Hammer switch installed in a safety-related system. The inspector had no further comments concerning this matter.

19. Performance Discharge Test of Station Batteries

The licensee stated that his current procedures provide for conducting performance (rated load) discharge tests of station batteries

every five years in accordance with IEEE Paper No. 71 TP-2-PWR, "Proposed Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing and Replacement Large Stationary Type Power Plant and Substation Load Storage Batteries," published February 19, 1971. The licensee also stated that he is in the process of revising his procedures to change the test interval to every third refueling but not to exceed three years. The inspector noted that the three year interval is consistent with the provisions of IEEE Std 450-1972, "IEEE Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Large Stationary Type Power Plant and Substation Load Storage Batteries," published December 1, 1972, but inconsistent with the one year interval recommended in IEEE Std 308-1971, "IEEE Standard Criteria for Class IE Electric Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," published September 16, 1971. The inspector also noted that the licensee's Technical Specifications and proposed Technical Specification do not require periodic rated load discharge tests of the batteries. This item, identified in RO Inspection Report 50-29/4-C6, Detail 5, remains open pending the licensee's revision of his procedures and RO:I review of the three year surveillance interval.