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GAIL M. HARMON
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August 21, 1980

Joseph M. Felton, Director
Division of Rules and Records
Office of Administration
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT REQUEST

FOIA-80-441
rec'd 8-25-80


RE: FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUEST

Dear Mr. Felton:

Pursuant to the federal Freedom of Information Act, the Natural Resources Defense Council requests a copy of new control and accounting standards proposed by NRC Staff for strategic special nuclear materials. The proposed standards are cited in the August 21, 1980 issue of Nucleonics Week. I am enclosing a copy of the article for your reference.

NRDC requests that you waive any fee associated with complying with this request.

Very truly yours,



Ellyn R. Weiss

ERW/lc

Enclosure

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people I'd worked with 25 years before, were absolutely terrified of it. So I wanted to assuage those fears." In her work for CEA, Paturis met academicians and nuclear industry people who saw a "misperception" by the general public of the nuclear issue. "So I started a group," Paturis said, "and with all the people I'd met in publishing, I got enough names on the list to make it look good. We had a big meeting, and emphasized that I didn't want anybody to sign up who didn't understand what the group was trying to do." About half of those who attended that meeting last spring signed on, including former Sen. Eugene McCarthy, playwright Edward Albee, authors Saul Bellow and Dennis Smith, and actor Gary Merrill.

"Members of the group are kept abreast of any new developments on the energy front," Paturis said. "We are not going to proselytize, but to understand. We're not scientists and we don't pretend to be, but we're not stupid, either. We know that problems should be solved in a laboratory, not at a Central Park rock concert."

Paturis said that, aside from providing a loose sort of administration for CSNE, she also serves as the group's coordinator of communications with the energy industry. "If, for example, something happens at a nuclear plant that is generally frightening," she said, "I will go and ask the people concerned if there is an actual scientific answer to it. If there is, I type it up and send it out to the members. We are trying to educate ourselves to this thing and make sure that it is not shut down. We want the best people in the world working on it. Unfortunately, not more than about 10% of the people at our meetings are in their 30s or below. Younger people just don't seem to have the kind of curiosity you need to keep up with this sort of a group. I wonder if curiosity about new things has vanished along with Johnny's ability to read. Is Gail Sheehy now more relevant than Willa Cather? Whatever happened to the 'curious factor'?" — *Bruce Ferguson*

AS EXPECTED, THE UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS AND OTHER GROUPS HAVE FILED SUIT against NRC because of a policy statement which limits the questions intervenors may raise about post-Three Mile Island licensing requirements (NW, 19 June, 3). "We have asked the NRC commissioners to stay the effectiveness of this policy, but they have refused," UCS counsel Elyn Weiss said. "Therefore, we have no alternative but to seek review from the federal court. Otherwise several key licensing proceedings will go forward without full consideration of the facts."

The issue could become moot before it is resolved in court if the vacancy at NRC is filled by a person who opposes the policy statement along with commissioners Peter Bradford and Victor Gilinsky. Bradford has said he will push for a vote to reconsider the statement, which was approved 3-2 with Richard Kennedy — who left soon after the decision — voting in the affirmative. Under the directive, license applicants can challenge the necessity to comply with the items on the so-called near-term operating license list, but intervenors can't question whether the commission has gone far enough to protect public health and safety with the requirements added since the TMI accident.

The suit was filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Joining UCS are the Louisiana Consumers League, the Carolina Environmental Study Group, the Shoreham Opponents Coalition, the New England Coalition against Nuclear Pollution, and the Texas Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now.

ATOMIC ENERGY OF CANADA LTD. HAS BEEN STYMIED in its bid to return the troubled Douglas Point plant to full operational status. The Atomic Energy Control Board rejected AECL's proposal, saying it still is unsure of the plant's safety systems, notwithstanding recent improvements. Before the modifications, there was a 50-50 chance the emergency core cooling systems would not work properly in a crisis, according to an AECB official. For the time being, the plant will remain limited to 70% of its 220-Mw full capacity, the level to which it had been held since the AECB cracked down in 1977. The board said it had decided to request additional analyses of the ECCS "and tests to confirm the effectiveness of these during accident conditions."

Douglas Point has been shut down since February because of the ECCS and other repairs and was scheduled for restart at the end of August, when AECL wanted to go to 100% output. "Now it's too soon to tell," an AECL spokesman said, "because we don't know what tests the board wants done and how long they'll take."

IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO INCLUDE NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICES' ERWIN, TENN., nuclear fuel facility in new control and accounting standards proposed by NRC staff for strategic special nuclear materials (SSNM), a top NFS source told Nucleonics Week. The proposed standards, which are designed to thwart collusion and internal diversion of nuclear materials, would require an accounting of SSNM at least once a day. Current standards require only bimonthly reports on losses of radioactive materials.

"I don't think any standard could work to the degree stated. I don't think it's conceivable at Erwin," the source said. Erwin currently is allowed less stringent standards because it was unable to meet the standards NRC set for the industry. NRC accepted Erwin's argument that it could not keep inventory discrepancies below the mandatory 0.5% of throughput because its unique process makes such an exact accounting almost impossible. Erwin is allowed 1% of throughput for the first inventory and 1.5% for the second inventory,

NRC sources explained. However, one NRC source said the revised standards should apply to all facilities with "no exceptions." The NFS source says that's "wishful thinking."

The reporting schedules are being revised, NRC staff told the commissioners last week, because of late detection and reaction to any losses under current procedures. The loss often is not detected for up to 90 days after the occurrence, leaving "potentially hundreds of possible causes over the inventory period," a staff member said.

The proposed standards focus on the "people-related factors," an NRC source explained, to protect against the "TMI-type problems." The revised regulations add constraints and overchecks on falsification of data, duplicate efforts, and restrict access to the data. New training and competency standards would be required as safeguards against accidental and intentional diversions of the high-enriched fuels. The standards are scheduled to take effect by the end of 1981. By that time NRC anticipates the field of nine companies which handle SSNM will have dwindled to five or six as the companies phase out this type of operation for economic reasons, a source said. At least two commissioners have questioned the timetable laid out by staff. But a key staffer says that he's "personally confident we can meet the schedule. There's a lot of time built into the schedule."

The Erwin submarine fuel plant was shut down last September until January of this year when more than nine kg of high-enriched uranium was discovered unaccounted for.

AN EXPLOSIVE CHARGE DESTROYED A PYLON BUILT TO CONNECT THE ASCO STATION to the Spanish high voltage network. Police believe that radical antinuclear groups, which recently staged a protest march against Asco, were responsible for bombing the 98-foot tower. Asco is a twin 900-Mw Westinghouse PWR station scheduled to come on line by 1987.

SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT WENT THROUGH A BOMB THREAT TEST at its Rancho Seco nuclear plant, as required by NRC regulations. And, as required, the county sheriff's office was notified. Only trouble was that the Smud caller forgot to mention that it was only a test. The sheriff's department dispatched five patrol cars, including a bomb disposal team, some forced to travel more than 25 miles to reach the nuclear plant.

An angered chief of the sheriff's patrol division threatened to file criminal charges against Smud for turning in a false bomb report but later relented.

AN ASLB WILL HOLD HEARINGS ON A CONSTRUCTION PERMIT EXTENSION FOR NIPSCO'S embattled Bailly nuclear power plant, which according to NRC sources marks the first time that NRC has granted a hearing for such an extension at a nuclear plant still in the early stages of construction. Although it was granted a permit in 1974, Bailly remains less than 1% completed, and its cost has risen from \$187-million in 1970 to \$1.1-billion today, according to Northern Indiana Public Service Co.

"It's an extraordinary situation in which a facility has had a construction permit for five years and is still nothing more than a hole in the ground," an NRC source said. "We felt it was appropriate to provide the opportunity for public participation in a decision that could extend construction for another seven years." The plant, originally scheduled for completion in 1976, is now targeted for an in-service date of 1987.

In its order granting the hearing — the result of numerous petitions by opponents — NRC limited the scope of the hearing to those contentions which relate to the reasons for the delay in completion of the facility, the "reasonableness" of the requested extension, and any allegedly adverse environmental, radiological and safety effects which might result from prolonged construction.

Intervenors have long contested construction of the plant, located near Gary, Ind., on three major grounds: its proximity to Chicago, which is approximately 30 miles away; the cost of its construction; and potential damage to the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore, an 8,565-acre nature preserve. As a result of the opposition, which includes the state of Illinois, construction has been mired in federal court battles for years. An attorney for two parties opposed to the plant said, "There's no worse site in the entire country for a nuclear power plant, and we're determined that the plant will not be built."

In addition, NipSCO and NRC have been locked in a debate over the appropriate design for the foundation of the plant. In 1978, the utility put in a request with NRC to use shorter pilings than was planned at the time the original construction permit was granted. NipSCO wants to sink the pilings into dense sands beneath the site, rather than extend the pilings down on glacial till or bedrock, as originally proposed. NRC is still reviewing the request, and a decision is expected by mid-September. According to a NipSCO official, the only issue holding up construction is NRC's approval of the pile placement technique. "We believe the issues to be discussed at the hearing have been exhaustively explored previously," he contended.

The Atomic Safety & Licensing Board involved has not yet determined whether pile placement will be debated at the hearing. No date has been set for the hearing, although one NRC official expects it could take place before the end of the year.

50-3296330

NOV 03 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Len Soffer, Leader
Section B
Accident Analysis Branch, DSE

FROM: Earl H. Markee, Jr., Leader
Meteorology Section
Hydrology-Meteorology Branch, DSE

SUBJECT: SHORT-TERM (ACCIDENT) X/Q VALUES - MIDLAND UNITS 1 & 2

In reviewing the short-term (accident) X/Q values calculated for Midland Units 1 & 2 an error was discovered for the 2 hour, 8-24 hour, 1-4 day and 4-30 day values. New values have been calculated and are provided below. These values supersede the values previously provided to AAB on August 10, 1978.

Below are the relative concentration (X/Q) values for use in your evaluation of short-term (accidental) releases from the Midland Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2.

<u>Time Period</u>	<u>Controlling Direction and Distance (meters)</u>	<u>X/Q seconds/cubic meter</u>
0-2 hours	N @ 500	5.5×10^{-4}
0-8 hours	N @ 1600	6.4×10^{-5}
8-24 hours	N @ 1600	4.9×10^{-5}
1-4 days	N @ 1600	2.7×10^{-5}
4-30 days	N @ 1600	1.2×10^{-5}

We determined that the atmospheric dispersion model described in draft Regulatory Guide 1.103, "Atmospheric Dispersion Models for Potential Accident Consequence Assessments at Nuclear Power Plants", (9/23/77) in accordance with the Interim Branch Position of August 2, 1978, is appropriate to conservatively assess the atmospheric dispersion for the exclusion boundary and low population zone distances of Units 1 & 2. In our analysis we used the circular exclusion radius of 500 meters and a low population zone distance of 1600 meters.

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DATE					

L. Soffer

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NOV 03 1978

Onsite data from March 3, 1975 to February 28, 1977 were determined to be acceptable for use in calculating atmospheric dispersion in the vicinity of the plant. These data were in the form of hour-by-hour values supplied by the applicant on magnetic tape for wind speed and wind direction (measured at the 10-meter level) and atmospheric stability (defined by the vertical temperature gradient between the 50.0- and 10.0 meter levels). W. Snell and I performed this evaluation.

Original Signed by *for*
James H. Fairbent
Earl H. Markee, Jr., Leader
Meteorology Section
Hydrology-Meteorology Branch
Division of Site Safety and
Environmental Analysis

cc: R. Denise
L. Hulman
C. Ferrell
D. Wood
W. Snell
E. Markee

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OFFICE	DSE-ST: NMB	NSE-S: HMB				
SURNAME	W. Snell	E. Markee				
DATE	11/3/78	11/2/78				

OCT 26 1978

Distribution

Docket File (2)

NRR Rdg.

RSB Rdg.

Newberry Chron.

S. Newberry

Docket Nos. 50-329/330

MEMORANDUM FOR: D. B. Vassallo, Assistant Director for LWRs, DPM

FROM: Frank Schroeder, Acting Assistant Director for
Reactor Safety, DSS

SUBJECT: SUPPLEMENTAL SECOND ROUND QUESTIONS - MIDLAND PLANT
UNITS 1 AND 2

Plant Name:	Midland Units 1 and 2
Docket Numbers:	50-329 & 50-330
Milestone Number:	12-21
Licensing Stage:	OL
Responsible Branch and Project Manager:	LWR-4 D. Hood
Systems Safety Branch Involved:	Reactor Systems Branch, Analysis Branch Core Performance Branch
Description of Review:	Round Two Questions
Requested Completion Date:	11/1/78
Review Status:	Incomplete

We have reviewed the applicant's responses to First Round Questions on the Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) and have met with the applicant (September 20, 1978) to discuss the stuck rod assumptions in the Midland MSLB analysis. Our position on the stuck rod assumptions and request for additional information regarding the MSLB analysis are enclosed.

In addition, a position regarding ECCS recirculation testing in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.79 was inadvertently omitted from RSB Round Two Questions, dated September 28, 1978, and is also enclosed.

7811020451

Frank Schroeder, Acting Assistant Director
for Reactor Safety
Division of Systems Safety

Enclosure:
Supplemental Second Round Questions

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cc: S. Hanauer	D. Hood	S. Newberry
R. Mattson	T. Novak	Z. Rostoczy
F. Schroeder	S. Israel	P. Norian
S. Varga	G. Mazetis	S. Salah
		K. Kniel

See Previous Concurrence:

Contact: Scott Newberry, NRR			
OFFICE: DSS/RSB 49-27341	DSS-RSB	DSS-RSB	DSS-RS
SURNAME: S. Newberry:mf	GMazetis	T. Novak	F. Schroeder
DATE: 10/05/78	10/05/78	10/25/78	10/26/78

Distribution: Docket File
NRR Rdg.
RSB Rdg.
Newberry Chron.
S. Newberry

Docket Nos. 50-329/330

MEMORANDUM FOR: D. B. Vassallo, Assistant Director for LWRs, DPM

FROM: D. F. Ross, Jr., Assistant Director for Reactor Safety, DSS

SUBJECT: SUPPLEMENTAL SECOND ROUND QUESTIONS - MIDLAND PLANT
UNITS 1 AND 2

Plant Name: Midland Units 1 & 2
Docket Numbers: 50-329 & 50-330
Milestone Number: 12-21
Licensing Stage: OL
Responsible Branch: LWR-4
and Project Manager: D. Hood
Systems Safety Branch Involved: Reactor Systems Branch, Analysis Branch,
Core Performance Branch
Description of Review: Round Two Questions
Requested Completion Date: 11/1/78
Review Status: Incomplete

We have reviewed the applicant's responses to First Round Questions on the Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) and have met with the applicant (September 20, 1978) to discuss the stuck rod assumptions in the Midland MSLB analysis. Our position on the stuck rod assumptions and request for additional information regarding the MSLB analysis are enclosed.

In addition, a position regarding ECCS recirculation testing in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.77 was inadvertently omitted from RSB Round Two Questions, dated September 28, 1978, and is also enclosed.

D. F. Ross, Jr., Assistant Director
for Reactor Safety
Division of Systems Safety

Enclosure:
Supplemental Second Round Questions

cc: S. Hanauer D. Hood S. Newberry K. KnieI
R. Mattson T. Novak Z. Rostoczy
D. Ross S. Israeli P. Norian
S. Varga G. Mazetis S. Salah

Contact: Scott Newberry, NRR
49-27341

OFFICE	DSS:RSB	DSS:RSB	DSS:RSB	DSS:RS		
SURNAME	SNewberry:mf	Gmazetis	TNovak	DRoss		
DATE	10/05/78	10/5/78	10/10/78	10/ /78		

Distribution:

~~Docket File~~

LWR #4 File

S. Varga

D. Hood

F. Williams

M. Service

NOV 27 1978

Docket Nos: 50-329
50-330

MEMORANDUM FOR: R. DeYoung, Director, Division of Site
Safety and Environmental Analysis

R. Mattson, Director, Division of Site
Safety

FROM: S. Varga, Chief, Light Water Reactors
Branch No. 4, DPM

SUBJECT: TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REQUEST

Your assistance is requested for the following:

Plant: Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2

Applicant: Consumers Power Company

Contact: Earl S. Hood, LWR #4 (27831)

Review Branches: Geotechnical Branch
Structural Engineering Branch

Description of Request: Provide support associated
with technical resolution of
settlement of structures at the
Midland site as requested in
attached letter from transfer
of lead responsibility. Also
provide for support in hearings
for this matter.

Target Completion Date: Acceptable resolution required
prior to issuance of operating
license.

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7812010006

Original signed by:
S. A. Varga

Steven A. Varga, Chief
Light Water Reactors Branch No. 4
Division of Project Management

cc: R. Hartfield

OFFICE: D. Vassallo

SURNAME: L. Crocker

DATE: H. Berkow

DPM:LWR #4 DPM:LWR #4

DHood:tlb SVarga N

11/22/78 11/25/78

Dockets

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Docket Files
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CSB Reading

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Docket Nos. 50-329
50-330

MEMORANDUM FOR: D. Vassallo, Assistant Director for Light Water Reactors, DPM

FROM: W. Butler, Chief, Containment Systems Branch, DSS

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (Q-2) FOR THE MIDLAND PLANT, UNITS 1 & 2

Plant Name: Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2
Docket Numbers: 50-329/330
Licensing Stage: OL
NSSS Supplier: B&W
Architect Engineer: Bechtel
Containment Type: Dry
Responsible Branch: LWR-4
Project Manager: D. Hood
Requested Completion Date: December 1, 1978
Review Status: Continuing

The Containment Systems Branch has reviewed the applicable portions of the Midland FSAR as amended through Revision 15. Enclosed is a request for certain additional information (Q-2) which we will need to complete our review.

We have included questions concerning the reactor cavity subcompartment analysis, purge system, main steam line break, environmental qualification and low penetration pressurization system.

We do not believe that the applicant has conservatively calculated the containment pressure transient following an inadvertent actuation of the containment spray systems. Our calculations show that the differential pressure exceeds the external design pressure of the containment. Therefore, we plan to request assistance from the Structural Engineering Branch in this area.

Original signed by
Walter R. Butler

Walter R. Butler, Chief
Containment Systems Branch
Division of Systems Safety

Enclosure:
As Stated

cc: See page 2

Contact:

7812210481

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D. Pickett, CSB OFF 492-7711	DSS:CSB DPickett/mc	DSS:CSB JShapaker	DSS:CSB WButler	
SURNAME →				
DATE →	12/4/78	12/5/78	12/5/78	

D. Vassallo

-2-

DEC 5 1978

cc: S. Hanauer
R. Mattson
R. Boyd
W. Pike
N. Tedesco
S. Varga
D. Hood
J. Kudrick
J. Shapaker
R. Martin
D. Pickett

OFFICE →						
SURNAME →						
DATE →						

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DOCKETS
50-329
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NOTE TO: Steven A. Varga, Chief, Light Water Reactors Branch
No. 4, DPM

FROM: Darl Hood, Project Manager, Light Water Reactors Branch
No. 4, DPM

SUBJECT: MIDLAND SCHEDULE ADJUSTMENT

As stated in our August 30, 1978 letter to Consumers Power Company, several technical review branches, identified in the attached listing, have not yet issued Q-2s. Their delay is due primarily to lack of responses to several Q-1s and due to other priority work assignments. A schedule change is needed to provide for delay in issuance of Q-2s for these branches. Then too, the missing information suggests another round of questions may be needed for a few branches once the information has been provided and should be provided for. The next amendment is scheduled for October 20, 1978 and will answer many, but not all of the outstanding requests.

Consequently, the Q-2s received to date and those further expected in mid-September and late September have been and will be issued as "supplemental Q-1s." This mode preserves the option for issuance of followup questions (Q-2s) where necessary, in early November 1978. A prompt response by the applicant to any such Q-2s will be necessary; therefore, meetings at this stage, with documentation followup, must be relied upon. This tight Q-2 schedule is considered possible only because of the previous Q-1 $\frac{1}{2}$ step; it would be a serious mistake for any branch to use this as the entire Q-2 iteration.

A special schedule approach is necessary for I&CSB to avoid slipping the hearing start date significantly as a result of the delay in assignment of a reviewer to the project. In order for an initial SER input by I&CSB to be issued at the same time or other branches, some slip in the overall SER input date is necessary. I&CSB review completion of Q-1s and issuance of Q-2s is scheduled for March 1, 1979 and this is considered the earliest that an initial SER input by I&CSB can reasonably be generated.

It is recognized that the March 1, 1979 I&CSB SER input will reflect some continuing review areas. However, it is felt that the overall status of the I&CSB review at that time will be sufficient to provide for proceeding with ACRS and early hearing stages, and that the continuing review areas can be completed by supplements to the SER by December 1979.

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CS1
Darl Hood, Project Manager
Light Water Reactors Branch No. 4
Division of Project Management

OFFICE	DPM:LWR #4	DPM:LWR #4		
SURNAME	DHood:tlb	SVarga		
DATE	9/6/78	9/ /78		

782450204

Memo 4

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OCT 11 1978

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Howard Daniels, Instrumentation and Control
Systems Branch, DSS

FROM: Doug Pickett, Containment Systems Branch, DSS

THRU: James Shapaker, Section B Leader, Containment
Systems Branch, DSS

SUBJECT: IDENTIFICATION OF SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS AND
COMPONENTS FOR MIDLAND PLANT UNITS 1 & 2

In response to your two memoranda dated September 8, 1978, I have reviewed the Midland Design for identification of: (1) safety related systems identified in Section 7.1; (2) safety related mechanical and electrical equipment in Table 3.11; and (3) instrumentation to follow the course of an accident (Table 7.5-1). Based on this review, I offer the following comments:

- (1) Section 7.1 has identified all the safety related systems within the scope of CSB.
- (2) Table 3.11 has identified all the safety related mechanical and electrical equipment within the scope of CSB.
- (3) Table 7.5-1 does not include the following:
 - a. Reactor building temperature monitors;
 - b. Reactor building emergency sump water temperature monitors;
 - c. Fan cooler flow rate and associated cooling water flow rate; and
 - d. Valve position indication for all power operated (motor or solenoid operated) containment isolation valves. A listing is provided in Table 6.2-28.

D. Pickett
Containment Systems Branch
Division of Systems Safety

cc: W. Butler
J. Shapaker
J. Kudrick
File: Midland

7811020121

Timothy

OFFICE	DSS:CSB	DSS:CSB	THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS POOR QUALITY PAGES		
SURNAME	DPickett:sl	JShapaker			
DATE	10/9/78	10/11/78			

Docket File
50-329

MAR 19 1979

Docket Nos. 50-329/330

MEMORANDUM FOR: S. Varga, Chief
Light Water Reactors Branch No. 4, DPM

FROM: J. T. Collins, Chief
Effluent Treatment Systems Branch, DSE

SUBJECT: ETSB INPUT TO THE SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT FOR MIDLAND
PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2

PLANT NAME: Midland Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2
LICENSING STAGE: OL
DOCKET NUMBERS: 50-329/330
MILESTONE NUMBER: 24-3
RESPONSIBLE BRANCH: LWR-4
PROJECT MANAGER: D. Hood
DESCRIPTION OF RESPONSE: Safety Evaluation Report Input
REQUESTED COMPLETION DATE: March 9, 1979
REVIEW STATUS: Partially Complete

Enclosed are the sections concerning radioactive waste management (11.1 and 11.2), process and effluent radiological monitoring (11.3), ESF filter systems (6.5), process and sampling system (9.3.2), and liquid tank failures outside containment (15.7.3), for use in the Safety Evaluation Report for the Midland Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2.

Based on our evaluation, we conclude that the liquid and gaseous radwaste treatment systems, proposed for the Midland Plant, are capable of maintaining releases of radioactive materials in effluents to "as low as is reasonably achievable" levels in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50.34a and conform to the requirements of Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50 and the Annex to Appendix I, dated September 4, 1975. Item 4

Our evaluation is incomplete due to the applicant's delay in responding to questions and providing information in the FSAR through Amendment number 18. We have taken positions on the ECCS pump room ventilation system (6.5.2.2), the capacity of the wet solid radwaste system (11.2.3.1), and the omission of an oxygen analyzer between the compressors and the gas storage tanks. (11.2.2.5), and find these systems unacceptable.

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S. Varga

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MAR 19 1979

In addition, we can not complete our evaluation of the process and effluent continuous monitors without complete information on the instruments. Also, our evaluation is delayed due to the applicant's response to questions from the Radiological Assessment, Accident Analysis, and Hydrology/Meteorology Branches. Figures 11-1 and 11-2 are presently being drawn and will be forwarded when they are completed.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
JOHN T. COLLINS

John T. Collins, Chief
Effluent Treatment Systems Branch
Division of Site Safety and
Environmental Analysis

Enclosures:
As stated

cc: R. DeYoung
D. Muller
W. Kreger
D. Bunch
L. Crocker
D. Vassallo
S. Acharya
D. Hood
W. Houston
M. Service
R. Hartfield (w/o encl)
W. Burke
J. Boegli

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SURNAME	JSBoegli:do	WCBurke	WEKreger	JTCollins	Acting A/D, SA
DATE	03/13/79	03/15/79	03/15/79	03/19/79	03/16/79