

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Sequoyah, Unit 1										DOCKET NUMBER (7) 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 7										PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 8			
TITLE OF EVENT Trip Setpoints For ACBs On Shutdown Boards That Feed Control And Auxiliary Building Vent Boards Were Incorrect Due To A Design Error																							
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)													
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES					DOCKET NUMBER(S)									
									Sequoyah, Unit 2					0 5 0 0 0 3 2 8									
0	1	0	6	8	7	8	7	0	0	1	0	1	0	3	1	7	8	8	0 5 0 0 0 3 2 8				
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5. (Check one or more of the following) (11)																					
A		20.402(b)				20.405(c)				50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)									
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.405(a)(1)(i)				50.38(e)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(e)									
Q 0 0 0		20.405(a)(1)(ii)				50.38(e)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)									
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)				XX 50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)													
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)				XX 50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)													
		20.405(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(ix)													
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																							
NAME										TELEPHONE NUMBER													
Tom Rogers										AREA CODE													
J. L. Long, Plant Operations Review Staff										6 1 5 8 7 1 0 - 7 1 2 5 4													
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																							
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC				
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)													
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										XX NO													

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On January 6, 1987, at 1600 EST with units 1 and 2 in mode 5 (cold shutdown), it was discovered that the trip setpoints for continuous overcurrent were incorrect for the feeder breakers supplying power to three Control and Auxiliary Building ventilation (C&AB vent) boards. The deficiency was discovered as a result of the "SQN Auxiliary Power System Class 1 Equipment Ampacity Study." The C&AB vent boards with a unit 2 designation were temporarily corrected by increasing the breaker setpoint and removing nonessential loads from the boards before unit 2 entered mode 4 on February 6, 1988. On February 18, 1988, at 1930 EST, it was discovered that some loads on the C&AB vent boards with a unit 1 designator are required to support unit 2 operations because they powered loads common to both units. It was also identified that an additional C&AB vent board could be lost that was not previously reported.

The cause of the low breaker trip setpoint identified by the ampacity study is attributed to a failure to make an ampacity study when the original setpoints were calculated. The cause of the breaker trip setpoints below total board maximum load current subsequent to unit 2 entry into mode 4, is attributed to a failure to consider loads on the boards that are common to both units.

As immediate corrective action, the C&AB boards were declared inoperable, and the applicable technical specification action statements were entered for the loads affected. The board loading was subsequently reduced to allow the return of the boards to an operable status. As permanent corrective action, calculations will be made to determine the maximum load current, and then the breakers and/or cables will be qualified or replaced to allow unrestricted loading to support both units. To prevent recurrence, an ampacity study will be done for any loads added to the boards. A list of all distribution boards affecting both units will be compiled and training to electrical engineering personnel will be provided.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 368A's) (17)

This revision is being submitted to provide additional findings discovered subsequent to the submittal of the original report with the applicable corrective actions concerning the Control and Auxiliary Building ventilation board feeder breakers.

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On January 6, 1987, at 1600 EST with unit 1 in mode 5 (0 percent power, 0 psig, 111 degrees F) and unit 2 in mode 5 (0 percent power, 300 psig, and 126 degrees F), it was discovered that the trip setpoints for continuous overcurrent were incorrect for the feeder breakers supplying power to three Control and Auxiliary Building ventilation (C&AB vent) boards (EIIS Code ED). The three feeder breakers, trip setpoints, and total connected loads as determined by engineering calculation SQN-APS-004 are: (1) ACB 10B on 480 volt shutdown board 1A1-A has a trip setting of 392 amperes and feeds C&AB vent board 1A1-A which has a total connected load of 444 amperes; (2) ACB 10B on 480 volt shutdown board 2A1-A has a trip setting of 348 amperes and feeds C&AB vent board 2A1-A which has a total connected load of 417 amperes; and (3) ACB 10B on 480 volt shutdown board 2B1-B has a trip setting of 348 amperes and feeds C&AB vent board 2B1-B which has a total connected load of 367 amperes. This deficiency was discovered as a result of the "SQN Auxiliary Power System, Class 1 Equipment Ampacity Study" and was documented under Significant Condition Report (SCR) SQNEEB86124 RO.

Upon discovery of incorrect breaker setpoints, the loads connected to the C&AB vent boards were examined to determine if immediate operability problems existed. It was determined that the continuous current trip settings of the feeder breakers could not be exceeded, except following a safety injection (SI) and a Phase A or Phase B isolation. At that time, the automatic SI signal was blocked to preclude safety injection actuation due to existing plant conditions with both units were in mode 5. When in mode 5, insufficient energy exists in the reactor coolant systems to attain a containment pressure equal to the Phase A or Phase B isolation setpoint if a reactor coolant system (RCS) (EIIS Code AB) leak develops. Therefore, no immediate operability problems existed at that time.

Engineering Change Notice (ECN) L6883 was subsequently issued to address circuits that were identified as improperly protected, including the normal feeder breakers for the 2A1-A and 2B1-B C&AB vent boards. The 2A1-A and 2B1-B C&AB vent board feeder breakers were determined, from calculations as documented in Quality Information Report (QIR) EEB87193, to require their trip setting to be increased to 500 amps to ensure the board feeder breakers will not trip during accident loading. An additional condition was also imposed to administratively keep the fire protection distribution panel on its unit 1 power source to reduce the maximum loading on the 2A1-A C&AB vent board. These actions ensured cable protection by limiting the maximum load on the boards and ensured an inadvertent loss of the 2A1-A and 2B1-B C&AB vent boards would not

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result from continuous overcurrent during accident loading. The 1A1-A C&AB vent board normal feeder breaker was determined to have a satisfactory trip setpoint for unit 1 mode 5 loads and, therefore, was not corrected as a unit 2 restart item. The 2A1-A and 2B1-B feeder breaker continuous trip setpoints were changed on January 25, 1988, by Work Plan (WP) 12636 as required by ECN L6883.

On February 6, 1988, unit 2 entered operational mode 4. On February 18, 1988, at 1930 EST, while addressing the 1A1-A C&AB feeder breaker setpoint deficiency documented by SCR SQNEB886124, Division of Nuclear Engineering (DNE) personnel discovered that some of the loads on the 1A1-A and 1B1-B C&AB vent boards were required to support unit 1 and unit 2 operating conditions and the maximum load current on these boards exceeded the feeder breaker continuous overcurrent trip settings. This condition is documented by Condition Adverse to Quality Report (CAQR) SQP 880164. Unit 1 was in mode 5 (0 percent power, 4 psig, 125 degrees F) and unit 2 in mode 4 (0 percent power, 480 psig, 334 degrees F) when this discovery was made.

At Sequoyah, unit 1 and unit 2 share a common control room and Auxiliary Building, and therefore, some auxiliary systems are required to support both units. The 1A1-A and 1B1-B C&AB vent boards have connected loads that are also required to support unit 2 operations even though they have a unit 1 designation numbers.

As immediate corrective action, the 1A1-A and 1B1-B C&AB vent board loads were declared inoperable, and the following technical specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) action statements were entered at 0154 EST on February 19, 1988, after reviewing the loads on these boards. LCOs 3.0.5, 3.1.2.1 (unit 1 only), 3.1.2.3 (unit 1 only), 3.3.3.1 (unit 1 only), 3.3.3.10, 3.6.1.8, 3.7.3, and 3.7.7. Subsequently, the 1A1-A C&AB vent board was transferred to its alternate feeder breaker because it had a continuous current trip setting of 500 amperes, while the normal feeder breaker was set at 400 amperes.

LCO 3.0.5 addresses compensatory actions for equipment determined to be inoperable solely because its normal power source or its alternate power source is inoperable. This was determined to be the case for the control room emergency ventilation system (EIIS Code VI) and the emergency gas treatment system (EIIS Code VC).

LCO 3.1.2.1 addresses the required boron injection flow paths while in modes 5 and 6. Centrifugal charging pumps 1A-A and 1B-B (EIIS Code BQ) could not meet operability requirements because the applicable room cooler fans were declared inoperable since they could have been lost during accident loading for a postulated loss of coolant accident (LOCA).

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LCO 3.1.2.3 requires one charging pump be operable in the flow path used to satisfy LCO 3.1.2.1 while in modes 5 and 6. Centrifugal charging pumps 1A-A and 1B-B could not meet operability requirements because the applicable room cooler fans were declared inoperable since they could have been lost during accident loading for a postulated LOCA.

LCO 3.3.3.1 specifies the radiation monitoring channels required to be operable. The containment purge air exhaust, control room air intake, and upper and lower containment air radiation monitors (EIIS Code IL) could have been lost during accident loading for a postulated LOCA.

LCO 3.3.3.10 specifies the radioactive gaseous effluent monitoring instrumentation channels required to be operable. The condenser vacuum exhaust system (EIIS Code VL), the Shield Building exhaust system, the Auxiliary Building ventilation system, and the Service Building ventilation system radiation monitors could have been lost during accident loading for a postulated LOCA. The action statements entered were required for the Auxiliary Building ventilation and Service Building ventilation radiation monitors.

LCO 3.6.1.8 requires two independent emergency gas treatment system (EIIS Code BH) cleanup subsystems to be operable. The EGTS humidity control heaters, fans, and room coolers could have been lost during accident loading for a postulated LOCA.

LCO 3.7.3 requires two independent component cooling water (EIIS Code CC) loops to be operable. The component cooling water pump space cooler fans (EIIS Code VF) could have been lost during accident loading for a postulated LOCA.

LCO 3.7.7 requires two independent control room emergency ventilation systems to be operable. The Control Building emergency pressurization fans and the Control Building pressurization fans could have been lost during accident loading for a postulated LOCA.

To return the 1A1-A and 1B1-B C&AB vent boards to an operable status, it was determined by DNE personnel that the maximum load current had to be reduced to 450 amperes. This was later documented in design calculation SQN-E2-041. The board loads were reviewed to determine the equipment required to support unit 1 in mode 5 and unit 2 in mode 4. The loads determined to be nonessential were subsequently removed from these boards by opening the appropriate branch circuit breakers. The 1A1-A and 1B1-B C&AB vent boards were declared operable at approximately 0209 EST on February 19, 1988, and the action statements entered at 0154 EST were exited. The 1A1-A C&AB vent board was subsequently transferred back to its normal feeder breaker.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of the low trip setpoints of the C&AB vent board feeder breakers is attributed to inadequate design calculations performed when determining the setpoints. When the setpoints were determined, the primary concern was cable overload protection when applying accident loads. However, these boards also feed loads that may be in operation to support the nonaccident unit. These nonaccident unit loads were not considered when the setpoints were established. When nonaccident loads were considered, the revised calculations determined that the worst-case board loading (accident loads for one unit and normal loads for the nonaccident unit) would draw sufficient current to trip the board feeder breakers, resulting in the loss of the C&AB vent boards.

The 1B1-B C&AB vent board was not identified under SCR SQNEEB86124 as a condition adverse to quality because calculation on SQN-APS-004 indicated the trip setpoint and total connected load of the 1B1-B C&AB vent board breaker was 500 amperes and 433 amperes, respectively. Since adequate margin existed between the trip setpoint and the total connected load, the setpoint was considered acceptable. An investigation is currently being conducted to determine how 1B-B C&AB vent board trip setpoints and the total connected load became a condition adverse to quality as indicated by CAQR SQP880164.

The cause of the 1A1-A and 1B1-B C&AB vent board feeder breakers continuous trip setpoints not being reset before unit 2 entered mode 4 is attributed to a lack of training provided to electrical engineering personnel on boards that are required to support both units because of their connected loads. Thus, an inadequate analysis was conducted when determining the boards required for unit 2 entering mode 4.

ANALYSIS OF EVENT

This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73, paragraph a.2.i, as an operation prohibited by technical specifications and paragraph a.2.ii, as a condition outside of the design bases of the plant.

When both units were in mode 5, no immediate operability problems existed because the board overload condition was a concern only when safety injection actuated equipment was loaded coincident with a phase A or phase B containment isolation. The safety injection actuation signals are blocked in each unit while they are in mode 5, and there is insufficient energy in the RCS to cause a containment isolation if an RCS leak developed. Therefore, while both units were in mode 5, the low breaker trip setpoints were not considered to have a significant adverse effect on the health and safety of the public.

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Subsequent to unit 2 entering operational mode 4 on February 6, 1988, the 1A1-A and 1B1-B C&AB vent boards could have been lost by tripping of the board normal feeder breakers due to the maximum load current available for unit 2 accident loading coincident with unit 1 normal loads. If the 1A1-A and 1B1-B C&AB vent boards were lost, some loads that are required to be operable while in mode 4 would have been lost until the operators recognized the condition and took manual corrective actions in restoring power to the boards. Manual corrective actions would require operators to select and manually reduce connected loads by tripping the applicable branch circuit breakers, then reclose the 1A1-A and/or 1B1-B normal or alternate feeder breakers at the local station in the C&AB vent board rooms. Similar corrective actions would be required if unit 2 was in modes 3, 2, or 1. Since the Emergency Operating Instruction (E-0), "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," requires the operators to verify the emergency gas treatment system is running as part of the immediate operator actions and to establish at least one train if it is not running, there is reasonable assurance that the control room operators would have recognized the loss of the C&AB vent boards and took appropriate corrective action to reenergized the boards in the early stages of a design basis LOCA. Annunciation is also provided in the main control room on Panel 1-M-3 in the event of a loss of these boards.

The safety-related components required to support equipment used during the blowdown phase and injection phase of a LOCA that would be lost if the 1A1-A and 1B1-B C&AB vent board feeder breakers tripped include the emergency gas treatment system humidity heaters, fans, and room coolers; the Control Building pressurization fans and emergency pressurization fans; the space cooler fans for component cooling water and auxiliary feedwater pumps, centrifugal charging pumps, residual heat removal pumps, and containment spray pumps; the auxiliary dewater and boric acid transformer space cooler fan; the 480V board room 1A and 1B air handling units, air conditioner condensers and compressors, and pressurization fans; 125V vital battery rooms I and II exhaust fans; shutdown board room A pressurization fans; shutdown transformer room exhaust fans; shutdown board room elevation 734 air conditioner circulating pumps; shutdown board room compressor B-B; penetration room cooler fans at elevations 614, 669, and 690; the Containment Building upper and lower compartment air monitor; and main control room air intake radiation monitors. A momentary loss of this equipment is not considered to have an adverse affect on mitigating core damage in the event of a LOCA; however, an increased risk of operator exposure to ionizing radiation due to a loss of air cleanup systems and a loss of positive pressure in the Control Building existed.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

ECN L6883 was issued, and the 2A1-A and 2B1-B C&AB feeder breaker continuous trip setpoints were changed on January 25, 1988, by WP 12636. The unit 2 breaker feeding the fire distribution panel was tagged open by hold order 1-88-238 on January 28, 1988, to administratively control the fire loads from being placed on the 2A1-A C&AB vent board.

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TEXT: If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's (17)

As immediate corrective actions following the discovery of the 1A1-A and 1B1-B C&AB vent boards having feeder break trip setpoints low for the connected loads, the 1A1-A and 1B1-B C&AB vent board loads were declared inoperable, the affected loads and technical specification LCOs were identified, and the applicable action statements were entered on February 19, 1988, at 0151 EST. The 1A1-A C&AB vent board was also transferred to its alternate feeder breaker because it had a higher trip setpoint than the normal feeder breaker. An immediate review was then conducted to reduce the maximum load on the boards. Nonessential loads were then removed from the boards by opening the applicable branch circuit breakers. This action was completed at 0209 EST on February 19, 1988, the 1A1-A and 1B1-B C&AB vent boards were subsequently declared operable, and the LCO action statements entered at 0151 EST were exited.

The loads on the 1A1-A and 1B1-B C&AB vent boards were subsequently reviewed to optimize the loads on these board and keep the maximum load current below the feeder breaker continuous current trip setpoint to support unit 2 unrestricted operations and unit 1 in mode 5. This action was performed by DNE's Electrical Engineering and Mechanical Engineering Branches and documented by QIR SQP-SQN-88-186 (B25 880222 020). Once determined, the applicable circuit breakers were opened and tagged out by Hold Order (HO) 1-88-340. To allow Operations use of loads disconnected by HO 1-88-340, Operations must coordinate with DNE personnel for an engineering evaluation of loads to be added or swapped until permanent cable and breaker corrective actions are complete.

On February 21, 1988, the 1A1-A C&AB vent board normal feeder breaker continuous current trip settings was increased from 392 amps to 500 amps by WF 0166-01 as required by Design Change Notice (DCN) X00166. The 1B1-B C&AB vent board normal feeder breaker was already set at 500 amps; thus, no change was required.

To determine how the 1B1-B C&AB vent board feeder breaker trip setpoint/connected loads became a condition adverse to quality as indicated by CAQR SQP880164, an investigation will be conducted to determine the cause and to provide appropriate corrective actions for recurrence control. This will be complete by April 1, 1988.

To ensure other distribution boards do not have a similar overload condition, a review was made of the board loads and feeder breaker continuous overcurrent trip settings. The review determined that all the distribution boards are properly protected with the loading required to support a unit 2 design basis accident and unit 1 in mode 5. This review is documented in QIR SQP-SQN-88192.

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To prevent recurrence of overlooking unit 1 required loads on unit 2 boards and unit 2 loads on unit 1 boards, a list of class-1E board configurations will be compiled to provide a reference of required distribution boards to meet technical specification LCOs for all unit 1 and unit 2 modes of operation. From these lists, a training course will be developed. Training will subsequently be provided to DNE's Electrical Engineering Branch personnel on the common equipment required to support both units. The training will be complete by June 15, 1988.

As long-term corrective actions to allow all 1A1-A and 1B1-B C&AB vent board loads to be reconnected to their applicable board without restrictions, calculations will be performed to accurately determine the maximum load current for operation, regardless of the plant conditions in either unit. Once determined, a design change notice will be issued to requalify or replace undersized cables or feeder breakers as appropriate. This action will be complete by June 15, 1988.

When load changes are made to distribution boards, an engineering evaluation is made as required by Sequoyah Engineering Procedure (SQEP)-09, "Change Review Checklist for Electrical Calculations," to ensure board loading will be maintained within the cable ampacity limits and the board feeder breaker trip setpoints.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The ACBs are Westinghouse, Type DS-206.

0324Q

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant
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March 17, 1988

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Washington, DC 20555


Gentlemen:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - DOCKET
NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77 AND DPR-79 -
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT SQRO-50-327/87001 REVISION 1

The enclosed licensee event report revision provides additional details concerning incorrect trip setpoints for air circuit breakers on the shutdown boards that feed the Control and Auxilliary Building vent boards that have been discovered subsequent to the original submittal. This event is reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, paragraphs a.2.i and a.2.ii.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY


S. J. Smith
Plant Manager

Enclosure
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