

2000 Crystal Springs Rd. #911
San Bruno, CA 94066
January 27, 1988

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, D.C.

Gentlemen:

I read with great interest a recent article in a trade journal concerning your hold up of licensing consideration for the South Texas Nuclear Project.

Since I worked on that project at one time, I might have a few things to contribute to your deliberations.

The high point of the project probably occurred at the "topping off" ceremony for the Unit I Reactor Building, in the summer of 1983. At that time, Ebasco, the prime contractor on the project, and Bechtel, the engineer, had a close and cooperative working relationship, which resulted in great accomplishment. For instance, the Unit II turbine building was about 51 weeks ahead of schedule. There few visible quality or safety problems. The technical problems that cropped up were quickly and efficiently dealt with. The major partner in the enterprise, Houston Lighting and Power (HL&P), had nothing but praise for the personnel working on the job, and publicly expressed that praise at the aforementioned topping off ceremony. HL&P's comments were echoed by the minority partners and by Ebasco and Bechtel executives who were there.

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
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The best the NRC can hope for, in terms of plant safety, if it is planning to license the South Texas Nuclear Project,

is that the latter stages of the project was built by persons of indeterminate competence, but whose urine was free from certain substances at a certain time.

Frankly, gentlemen, unless there has been a massive change in the attitudes and policies of the management at the South Texas Project, I suggest that the NRC would be out of its collective mind to even contemplate licensing the South Texas Project at this time. The people managing the construction of the project are simply not qualified to build a nuclear power plant!

Sincerely,

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Jerry Greenberg, PE

1 007



Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, D.C.

MAR 16 1988

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The NRC is sensitive to the difficulties raised by implementation of a fitness-for-duty program. We recognize the potential adverse effects on workers' morale and that it is important for such a program to be administered in such a way as to protect the rights of individuals. However, we support utility efforts to ensure that personnel involved in the construction of safety related structures, systems and components be free of the influence of illegal drugs.

The NRC staff has also examined your letter to determine whether you provided information regarding any deficiencies in structures, systems or components. Although you allude to such potential deficiencies to illustrate your argument, you did not provide sufficient detail to suggest that the matter you refer to is anything more than a hypothetical illustration. Hence, the staff has determined that no safety-related matter is raised by your letter on which action can be taken.

On the matter of competence of personnel, we would like to assure you that the NRC staff does observe the licensee's activities for any systematic breakdown in regard to competence. Inspection staff at the site and at the regional office observe construction activities and provide their assessment in periodic reviews of the licensee's performance. The subject of integrity and competence of the South Texas Project's management was also examined in adjudicatory hearings. In addition, for many categories of work, for example, welding, specific regulations exist which require certification of proper competence for both the craft and quality control personnel. The staff has found that the South Texas Project meets the applicable regulations and that the construction at Unit 1 has been accomplished in a satisfactory manner.

Sincerely,

Thomas E. Murley

Thomas E. Murley, Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

DISTRIBUTION

Docket File
EDO # 003519
F. Miraglia
DR4A/J. Collins
SECY
P. Shea
J. Calvo
R. Brady, PMAS

NRC PDR w/cy of incoming
EDO Reading
PD4 Reading
OGC-Bethesda
V. Stello
P. Kadambi w/cy of incoming
P. Noonan
T. Rehm

Local PDR w/cy of incoming
T. Murley/J. Sniezek
D. Crutchfield
GPA/CA
D. Mossburg, PMAS (EDO#003519)
w/cy of incoming
PD4 Green Ticket File
R. Martin

*See previous concurrences:

PD4/LA*	PD4/PM*	PMAS*	PD4/D*	Tech. Ed.*	OGC*
PNoonan	PKadambi:sr		JCalvo		LCandler
03/04/88	03/04/88	03/09/88	03/09/88	03/09/88	03/10/88
DRSP:D*	ADP*				
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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

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Thomas E. Murley, Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

*DmC
Can we
discuss?*
ACTION *2/24*

EDO PRINCIPAL CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL

FROM:

JERRY GREENBERG
SAN BRUNO, CA

DATE: 03/11/88

EDO CONTROL: 003519

DOC ID: 01/27/88

FINAL REPLY:

TO:

NRC

FOR SIGNATURE OF:

** GREEN **

SECY NO:

MURLEY

DESC:

ROUTING:

CONCERNING SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT

REHM
RMARTIN

DATE: 02/24/88

ASSIGNED TO: NRR

CONTACT: MURLEY

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS:

NRR RECEIVED: FEBRUARY 24, 1988

ACTION: DRSP:CRUTCHFIELD

NRR ROUTING: MURLEY/SNIEZEK

MIRAGLIA

MARTIN

GILLESPIE

MOSSBURG

ACTION

DUE TO NRR DIRECTOR'S OFFICE

BY mart 9, 1988

2000 Crystal Springs Rd. #911
San Bruno, CA 94066
January 27, 1988

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
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ACTION *sh*

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FOR SIGNATURE OF:

** GREEN **

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CONCERNING SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT

ROUTING:

REHM
RMARTIN

DATE: 02/24/88

ASSIGNED TO: NRR

CONTACT: MURLEY

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NRR ROUTING: MURLEY/SNIEZLK
MIRAGLIA
MARTIN
GILLESPIE
MOSSBURG

<p>ACTION</p> <p>DUE TO NRR DIRECTOR'S OFFICE</p> <p>BY <u>March 9, 1988</u></p>

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January 27, 1988

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
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