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PDR

# WOLF CREEK

NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION

O. L. Maynard  
President and Chief Executive Officer

April 30, 1997

WM 97-0056

Director, Office of Enforcement  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Reference: 1) Letter dated April 3, 1997, from E. W. Merschhoff,  
NRC, to O. L. Maynard, WCNOC  
Reference: 2) Letter WO 97-0011 dated January 31, 1997, from  
C. C. Warren to the NRC  
Subject: Docket No 50-482: Reply to Notice of Violation, EA 96-470

Gentlemen:

The attachment to this letter transmits Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation's (WCNOC) Reply to Notice of Violation, (EA) 96-470. Violations I.A, I.B, and I.C, discuss documents which allowed conflicts with our Technical Specifications, and Violation II.A discusses two instances where changes were made to procedures without an adequate 10 CFR 50.59 unreviewed safety question determination.

WCNOC is fully aware of the importance of strict compliance with our Technical Specifications. WCNOC understands that Technical Specification Clarifications should never contradict or change the wording, the meaning, or the intent of a Technical Specification requirement. WCNOC believes that the long term cultural, educational and programmatic corrective actions currently underway are commensurate with the regulatory significance of this event. WCNOC's Corrective Action Review Board, Plant Safety Review Committee, Nuclear Safety Review Committee, and Plant Management are providing rigorous and ongoing oversight and instruction to site personnel to ensure an environment of literal compliance exists.

A civil penalty of \$100,000 was assessed in the enforcement action. Enclosed is a check made payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the amount of \$100,000. If you have any questions regarding this response, please contact me at (316) 364-8831, extension 4000, or Mr. Richard D. Flannigan at extension 4500.

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PDR ADOCK 05000482  
G PDR

Very truly yours

*O. L. Maynard*  
Otto L. Maynard

OLM/jad

Enclosure  
Attachment

000006

cc: W. D. Johnson, (NRC) w/a  
E. W. Merschhoff (NRC), w/a  
J. F. Ringwald (NRC), w/a  
J. C. Stone (NRC), w/a  
Enforcement Officer, Region IV (NRC), w/a



IE 14 1/1

STATE OF KANSAS       )  
                              )  SS  
COUNTY OF COFFEY    )

Otto L. Maynard, of lawful age, being first duly sworn upon oath says that he is President and Chief Executive Officer of Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation; that he has read the foregoing document and knows the content thereof; that he has executed that same for and on behalf of said Corporation with full power and authority to do so; and that the facts therein stated are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.

By *Otto L. Maynard*  
Otto L. Maynard  
President and  
Chief Executive Officer

SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this 30<sup>th</sup> day of April, 1997.



*Carolyn E. Long*  
Notary Public

Expiration Date 1-5-99

Reply to Notice of Violation

Admission of Severity Level III Problem, Violations I.A, I.B, and I.C

WCNOC admits that a Severity Level III Problem occurred as documented in Violations I.A, I.B, and I.C when WCNOC allowed documents to exist which conflicted with our Technical Specifications.

Reason for the Severity Level III Problem, Violations I.A, I.B, and I.C

The reason for the violations is a misalignment between the organizational culture and the regulatory environment. Underlying factors included Technical Specification Clarification (TSC) procedural issues, and weaknesses in the WCNOC corrective action program which allowed for a non-conservative interpretation of the regulatory requirements.

The individual violations, background information and specific corrective actions are documented after the statement of each cited violation. Generic corrective actions relative to the Severity Level III problem and applicable to Violations I.A, I.B, and I.C, are discussed on page 10.

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Violation I.A:

"10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI requires, in part, that measures be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected.

Contrary to the above, on March 31, 1994, the licensee's corrective actions in response to Quality Assurance Audit K381 findings failed to identify and correct conflicts between Technical Specification Clarifications (TSCs) and the Technical Specifications (TS), a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, the licensee's screening of the following TSCs did not identify conflicts between the TSCs and the TS as indicated by the following examples:

(1) TSC 009-85 conflicted with TS 3/4.5.3 and TS 3/4.5.4 (applicable in Modes 4 and 5, respectively) by allowing two centrifugal charging pumps to be available while in cold shutdown. TS 3/4.5.3 and TS 3/4.5.4 allowed only one centrifugal charging pump to be available during cold shutdown.

(2) TSC 010-85 conflicted with TS 3.5.3 and 4.5.2 by allowing daily containment closeout inspections following multiple containment entries in one day. TS 3.5.3 and 4.5.2 specify a containment visual inspection for loose debris be performed following each containment entry.

(3) TSC 033-85 conflicted with TS 3.6.1.1 by allowing containment penetrations to be considered operable if dedicated operators were assigned to closed inoperable containment isolation valves. TS 3.6.1.1 requires for operability that all containment penetrations be isolable by automatic isolation valves.

(4) TSC 004-86 conflicted with TS 4.5.1 and 4.0.3 allowing cold leg accumulators to be considered operable upon receipt of level and pressure alarms if accumulator level and pressure were within prescribed limits. TS 4.5.1 and 4.0.3 require the accumulators to be considered inoperable upon receipt of these alarms.

(5) TSC 005-94 conflicted with TS 4.8.1.1.2.g.7 by allowing hot restart testing of an emergency diesel generator to be performed any time before or after the 24 hour load test as long as the hot restart test was performed within 5 minutes of a 2 hour diesel run. TS 4.8.1.1.2.g.7 specifies that a hot restart test be performed within 5 minutes following the 24 hour test except that the hot restart test may be done following a warmup run only if it previously failed the test immediately following the 24 hour test."

**Background Information:**

Based on findings from Quality Audit TE: 50140-K381, "Technical Specifications and License Condition Adherence," dated March 4, 1993, Performance Improvement Request (PIR) 93-0131 was written regarding the use of TSCs. PIR 93-0131 identified several issues including that some TSCs appear to contradict the associated Technical Specification. According to the PIR screening criteria in place in 1993, the PIR was classified as "non-significant". The PIR initiation statement did not specifically identify any violations of Technical Specifications. However, the PIR did state that certain TSCs could result in implementation of Technical Specifications or changes thereto that were not previously approved by the NRC as required by 10 CFR 50.92 and 10 CFR 50.36. This information should have raised questions on whether Technical

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Specification violations had occurred. If this question had been pursued and violations identified, the PIR would have been upgraded to significant.

The PIR recommended several corrective actions including: 1) a revision to the TSC procedure; 2) a 10 CFR 50.59 regulatory screening be performed for all open TSCs, and 3) an additional review be performed on all open TSCs to look for adequate technical basis, continued applicability, need for a license amendment, compliance with current NRC guidance, and appropriateness. The review resulted in deletion of eleven TSCs, revision of six TSCs, and initiation of one Technical Specification amendment. The TSC review and the 10 CFR 50.59 screenings were performed by qualified Operations personnel. The corrective actions were completed and the PIR was closed on April 15, 1994.

In accordance with the procedural requirements for PIRs initiated during Quality audits, an effectiveness follow-up was performed on PIR 93-0131. Procedurally, effectiveness follow-ups require verification that the stated corrective actions have been implemented and that similar problems have not occurred. Based on this, the effectiveness follow-up included a review of the changes to the TSC procedure relative to the recommendations provided as part of the Quality audit, including a sample review of the 10 CFR 50.59 screenings that were performed and verification that the indicated TSCs had indeed been deleted, revised, or a license amendment initiated. Based on the scope of the follow-up review for PIR 93-0131, it was determined at that time that the corrective actions were effective.

Performance Improvement Request 96-2610 was written on October 16, 1996, to document that TSC 009-85 was not identified and deleted during corrective action activities from the PIR 93-0131. Considering this oversight, Operations personnel performed another review of TSCs and identified several other TSCs requiring deletion.

WCNOC identified fourteen clarifications that could have potentially caused a violation of the associated Technical Specifications. Of the fourteen, a total of six Technical Specification violations were identified and Licensee Event Reports 96-011-01 through 96-016-01 were issued. Reference 2 provides the technical details and specific corrective actions for the above cited examples.

### Corrective Steps That Have Been Taken and the Results Achieved:

As a parallel effort to the Operations activities, Incident Investigation Team (IIT) 96-004 was chartered on October 24, 1996, by the Wolf Creek Chief Operating Officer. The IIT's mission was to conduct a programmatic investigation of TSC related processes and to identify root cause(s) for the issuance of TSCs that caused or allowed Technical Specifications to be violated.

As a result of IIT 96-04, the TSC procedure, AP 26C-003, "Technical Specification Clarifications," was revised:

1. Step 5.4.1.2. was revised to require that the Manager Operations assure that each TSC receives a two year relevancy review.
2. A note was added prior to step 6.1.2. to denote that a TSC may not change the intent, scope, wording or meaning of a technical specification.
3. TSC reviews by the TSC Subcommittee shall be documented on Form APF 26C-003-02, "TSC Disposition Form." The revised form captures the answers to each of the questions listed in procedure step 6.3.1.

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4. Disapproval of a TSC by the TSC subcommittee, Plant Safety Review Committee (PSRC), or Plant Manager shall be documented by written justification on Form APF 26C-003-02, "TSC Disposition Form," pursuant to steps 6.3.3.2, 6.4.1.2, and 6.5.1.1.
5. TSC two year relevancy reviews shall be documented on APF 26C-003-05, "Two Year Relevancy Review Form." These reviews shall be approved by the TSC Subcommittee Chairman and the Manager Operations as stipulated by step 6.7.3.
6. TSC deletions shall be recommended in writing and contain justification for deletion as required by step 6.8.1.

WCNOC has committed to implementing Improved Technical Specifications (ITS). During the ITS development process each of the current TSCs is being reviewed for possible incorporation into the ITS.

Corrective Steps to Prevent Recurrence

See Page 10 for further generic corrective action relevant to Violation I.A, I.B, and I.C.

Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved:

Full compliance has been achieved.



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Violation I.B:

"10 CFR 50.59 (a)(1) allows the holder a license to make changes to the facility and procedure as described in the safety analysis report without prior Commission approval unless the proposed change involves a change in the Technical Specifications or an unreviewed safety question. 10 CFR 50.59(b)(1) requires that the licensee maintain records of changes to the facility and that these records include a written safety evaluation which provides the basis for the determination that the change does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

Contrary to the above, on January 11, 1995, the licensee made a change to a procedure described in the safety analysis report that involved a change to the Technical Specifications, without prior Commission approval. Specifically, the licensee changed the frequency for scheduled surface and ultrasonic examinations of reactor coolant pump flywheels, as described by Regulatory Guide 1.14, "Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel Integrity," which is described in Chapter 3A and 5.4.1 of the Updated Safety Analysis Report. However, the licensee did not recognize that the change also involved a change to the Technical Specifications, because the Regulatory Guide's examination schedule was specified by reference in Technical Specification 4.4.10 (which was superseded by Technical Specification 6.8.5.b on October 2, 1995)."

Background Information:

WCNOC TS section 6.8.5.b specifies the following requirement for the Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel (RCP) Inspection Program: "Each reactor coolant pump flywheel shall be inspected per the recommendation of Regulatory Position C.4.b of Regulatory Guide 1.14, Revision 1, dated August 1975."

Regulatory Guide 1.14, Revision 1, Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel Integrity," Regulatory Position C.4.b states, "Inservice inspection should be performed for each flywheel as follows: (2) A surface examination of all exposed surfaces and complete ultrasonic volumetric examination at approximately 10-year intervals, during the plant shutdown coinciding with the inservice inspection schedule as required by Section XI of the ASME Code." In February, 1995, USAR Change Request 95-003 was implemented to add an exception to the commitment to Regulatory Guide 1.14, Revision 1, to address the frequency of the flywheel inspection. During the regulatory screening and 50.59 evaluation it was not identified as a change to the Technical Specifications and therefore, no prior approval from the NRC was sought.

Immediate Corrective Steps That Have Been Taken and Results Achieved:

A License Amendment was submitted under WCNOC letter ET 96-0097, dated December 3, 1996, requesting a revision to TS 6.8.5.b for inspection of the RCP Motor Flywheel. The amendment requested implementation of the alternative testing requirements previously accepted by the NRC for the Westinghouse Owners Group.

Change Request 96-02 was incorporated into WCRE-10, "Second Interval Inservice Inspection Program Plan," on January 9, 1997. This change revised the ISI Program Plan to identify that the 10-year inspection of the flywheels shall occur within the 10-year inspection interval. Additional discussion was included to help clarify the inspection requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.14.

USAR Change Request 96-137 was initiated for correcting the changes made by USAR Change Request 95-003 for inspection frequencies of the flywheel. USQD

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96-0191 was approved by the PSRC on December 11, 1996, for this change request.

A review of the TS (up to amendment 102) was performed to identify references to Regulatory Guides. Subsequently, the USAR was then reviewed to determine if changes to the USAR were made regarding the commitments to the Regulatory Guides and the impact on the TS. It was determined that those portions of the USAR that were revised included either a Technical Specification revision to reflect these changes or that the Technical Specifications were not impacted by the USAR revision at all.

Corrective Steps to Prevent Recurrence:

See Page 10 for further generic corrective action relevant to Violation I.A, I.B, and I.C.

Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved:

Full compliance has been achieved.



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Violation I.C:

"10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances.

TS 3.3.1, Table 3.3-1, Functional Unit 6.b, Action 5 specifies that with one inoperable source range channel, all operations involving positive reactivity changes be suspended.

Contrary to the above, for an activity affecting quality, a document instruction was not of a type appropriate to the circumstances in that TSC 001-94 conflicted with TS 3.3.1. Table 3.3-1, Functional Unit 6.b, Action 5 by allowing the reactor coolant system to be cooled down, an activity which involves a positive reactivity change, with one inoperable source range channel of nuclear instrumentation. This instruction remained in place after the licensee was notified by the NRC, on January 16, 1997, that it conflicted with TS, until it was canceled on March 21, 1997.

Background Information:

WCNOC understands the NRC's authority to interpret Technical Specifications and based on the NRC's conclusion that this TSC was inappropriate, acknowledges the violation as part of the Severity Level III Problem. During the editing process for a license amendment to Technical Specification 3.3-1 an ambiguity was created which affected the intent/meaning of an Action Statement. The discussion below indicates how the ambiguity was created.

Technical Specification 3.3-1 as written prior to License Amendment 96, allowed for the addition of positive reactivity until an hour after the expiration of the 48 hour period. License Amendment 96 changed the wording to the following:

With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the minimum channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE within 48 hours or open the Reactor Trip Breakers, and suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes within the next hour.

WCNOC documented in TSC 001-94 that to suspend operations involving positive reactivity changes within the "next" hour, meant that the requirement applies after the 48 hour period. The word "next" in Action Statement 5a suggested a sequence of events, with the suspension of operations involving positive reactivity changes occurring after the 48 hour period and opening of the Reactor Trip Breakers (RTBs). The order of the clauses, with the suspension provision last, also suggested that suspension of operations was required after the RTBs are open. This reading was supported by the history of the Action Statement. Prior to amendment 96, Action Statement 5A read:

With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the minimum channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE within 48 hours or open the Reactor Trip Breakers, suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes and verify valves BG-V178 and BG-V601 are closed and secured within the next hour.

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Violation 1.C:

"10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances.

TS 3.3.1, Table 3.3-1, Functional Unit 6.b, Action 5 specifies that with one inoperable source range channel, all operations involving positive reactivity changes be suspended.

Contrary to the above, for an activity affecting quality, a document instruction was not of a type appropriate to the circumstances in that TSC 001-94 conflicted with TS 3.3.1. Table 3.3-1, Functional Unit 6.b, Action 5 by allowing the reactor coolant system to be cooled down, an activity which involves a positive reactivity change, with one inoperable source range channel of nuclear instrumentation. This instruction remained in place after the licensee was notified by the NRC, on January 16, 1997, that it conflicted with TS, until it was canceled on March 21, 1997.

Background Information:

WCNOC understands the NRC's authority to interpret Technical Specifications and based on the NRC's conclusion that this TSC was inappropriate, acknowledges the violation as part of the Severity Level III Problem. During the editing process for a license amendment to Technical Specification 3.3-1 an ambiguity was created which affected the intent/meaning of an Action Statement. The discussion below indicates how the ambiguity was created.

Technical Specification 3.3-1 as written prior to License Amendment 96, allowed for the addition of positive reactivity until an hour after the expiration of the 48 hour period. License Amendment 96 changed the wording to the following:

With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the minimum channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or open the Reactor Trip Breakers, and suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes within the next hour.

WCNOC documented in TSC 001-94 that to suspend operations involving positive reactivity changes within the "next" hour, meant that the requirement applies after the 48 hour period. The word "next" in Action Statement 5a suggested a sequence of events, with the suspension of operations involving positive reactivity changes occurring after the 48 hour period and opening of the Reactor Trip Breakers (RTBs). The order of the clauses, with the suspension provision last, also suggested that suspension of operations was required after the RTBs are open. This reading was supported by the history of the Action Statement. Prior to amendment 96, Action Statement 5A read:

With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the minimum channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or open the Reactor Trip Breakers, suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes and verify valves BG-V178 and BG-V601 are closed and secured in position within the next hour.

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The clause requiring suspension of operations involving positive reactivity was one of three clauses (open RTBs, suspend operations, verify valve closure) following the conjunction "or." WCNOC's reading of this provision was that suspension of operation involving positive reactivity was one of three actions required if the inoperable channel could not be restored within 48 hours; and all three of these actions had to be completed within one hour after expiration of the 48-hour period.

The Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications (NUREG 1431, Section 3.3) supported this reading. In Table 3.3.1.1 Condition K, which applies to one inoperable source range channel in Modes 3, 4, or 5 with the RTBs closed and Control Rod Drive System (CRD) capable of rod withdrawals, required the licensee to restore the channel to operable status within 48 hours or open the RTB within 49 hours. The Bases explain that. "One additional hour is allowed to open the RTBs. Once the RTBs are open, the core is in a more stable condition and the unit enters Condition L." Condition L, which applies when the required number of operable source range neutron flux channels is not met in Modes 3, 4, or 5 with the RTBs open, requires the licensee to immediately suspend operation involving positive reactivity additions, close unborated source isolation valves within one hour and begin performing certain surveillance within one hour. Thus, the requirements to suspend operations involving positive reactivity and to close boron dilution valves is meant to apply only when the RTBs are opened.

License Amendment 96, issued March 1, 1996, deleted the requirement to verify the closure of the two boron dilution valves. This change was part of a broader amendment replacing the Technical Specification requirements associated with the boron dilution mitigation system with alarms, indicators, procedures and controls to allow proper resolution of potential boron dilution events.

The "and" that had been between the words "changes" and "verify" had to be moved forward for grammatical reasons, but this did not change the relationship between the remaining phrases or the intended meaning. It is unfortunate that in editing Technical Specification 3.3-1, one of the commas that separated the actions required if the operable channel could not be restored to operable within 48 hours, was left in the revised version. The editing resulted in the Action Statement being ambiguous as currently worded.

**Corrective Steps That Have Been Taken and the Results Achieved:**

TSC procedural improvements were taken as indicated on pages 3 and 4.

WCNOC Interoffice Correspondence Letter No. OP 97-0009, "Deletion Of Technical Specification Clarification 001-94," was issued after verbal notification was received from NRC Region IV Management stating that the OGC determined TSC 001-94 conflicted with TS.

Essential Reading Assignment 97-0011 was issued to inform all license personnel, prior to assuming watch, that TSC 001-94 was deleted because it allowed a violation of TS as interpreted by the NRC.

A license amendment request is in WCNOC's internal process, to ensure the wording of Technical Specification 3.3-1 clearly communicates the intent.

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Corrective Steps to Prevent Recurrence:

See Page 10 for further generic corrective action relevant to Violation I.A, I.B, and I.C.

Date When Full Compliance will Be Achieved:

Full compliance has been achieved.

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Corrective Steps to Prevent Recurrence for Violations I.A, I.B and I.C

Compliance Issues

On February 28, 1997, the Chief Operating Officer completed sessions with all departments communicating management expectations regarding the need for verbatim compliance with nuclear regulatory requirements.

An action plan for regulatory awareness training was completed on March 12, 1997. The purpose of the training is to effectively establish the culture of literal compliance with regulations through initial communications as well as continued re-enforcement of management expectations through the WCNOG training process.

A corporate culture survey was distributed in April 1997, to correctly assess WCNOG's literal compliance "mindset". Performance Improvement International was retained to develop and administer the survey which asked specific questions regarding knowledge of regulatory requirements and literal compliance. The results will be used to benchmark our progress and to indicate areas where further improvements are needed.

Corrective Action Program Corrective Actions

The corrective action program was modified to include the following:

1. A Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) was formed and met for the first time on November 11, 1996. CARB is chartered to take a critical and questioning approach to each significant PIR it reviews. The CARB questions whether the root cause was correctly identified, corrective actions are appropriate and address the stated root cause, and if the generic implications of the identified condition are addressed.
2. Organizational changes were implemented such that each group within the Plant Operations Organizations now have personnel (PIR Coordinators) whose primary responsibility will be to support the corrective action process.
3. Performance Improvement International has provided training for managers and PIR Coordinators on root cause analysis and human error prevention.

The leadership and selected membership changes to the Plant Safety Review Committee and the Nuclear Safety Review Committee (Offsite) were made in order to provide consistency in executing management's expectations. Both committees are taking active roles in providing leadership and instruction to site personnel in the area of literal compliance.

Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved:

The above corrective actions are broad in scope and applicable to all TSC and Technical Specification violations from EA 96-470. Full compliance has been achieved.

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II. Violations Not Assessed a Civil Penalty

"10 CFR 50.59 (a)(1) allows the holder of a license to make changes to the facility and procedures as described in the safety analysis report without prior Commission approval unless the proposed change involves a change in the Technical Specifications or an unreviewed safety question. 10 CFR 50.59(b)(1) requires that the licensee maintain records of changes to the facility and that these records include a written safety evaluation which provides the basis for the determination that the change does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

Contrary to the above, in the following examples, the licensee made change to procedures described in the safety analysis report without an adequate written safety evaluation which provided the basis for the determination that the changes did not involve an unreviewed safety question as indicated by the following examples:

- A. On December 13, 1995, the licensee's screening for revisions to Procedures STS PE-049C, "A Train Underground Essential Service Water System Piping Flow Test," and STS PE-049D, "B Train Underground Essential Service Water System Piping Flow Test," failed to indicate that Chapter 9.2 of the Updated Safety Analysis Report was affected by the change. The procedure changes reclassified the system as non-redundant whereas the Updated Safety Analysis Report described the system as redundant. As a result, the licensee failed either to submit a request for an alternative to the inservice inspection requirements or process a change to Chapter 9.2 of the Updated Safety Analysis Report and determine whether the change involved an unreviewed safety question.
- B. On March 26, 1996, the licensee performed a 10 CFR 50.59 unreviewed safety question determination regarding changing the main turbine overspeed protection test frequency as stated in Chapter 16.3.2 of the Updated Safety Analysis Report from every 7 days to every 92 days, without providing supporting documentation to conclude that an unreviewed safety question was not involved. The unreviewed safety question determination did not address the licensee's experience with the testing of these valves and did not contain any information as to the acceptability, by the turbine vendor, of the decreased surveillance frequency of the turbine valves.

This is a Severity Level IV violation."

Admission of Violation:

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (WCNOC) acknowledges that a violation of 10 CFR 50.59 occurred in that changes were made to procedures described in the safety analysis report without an adequate written 10 CFR 50.59 unreviewed safety question determination.

Reason for the Violation:

Example A:

The reason for Example A to violation II.A is personnel error. The ISI Engineer utilized his code experience and knowledge to assure that the changes were within the boundaries established by ASME Section XI. The inappropriate action occurred when the new testing method was implemented into the surveillance procedure that included comparison to the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR). During the procedure change to implement the new testing



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method, the ISI Engineer incorrectly concluded that the application of the Code requirements (e.g., considering each train of ESW as a nonredundant system) did not conflict with the USAR description.

#### Example B:

The reason for Example B of violation II.A is failure to follow the procedural requirements of Administrative Procedure AP 26A-003, "Unreviewed Safety Question Determination." AP 26A-003 discusses the need and responsibility for assuring the completeness and accuracy of the information provided in the USQD. Procedure AP 26A-003 was not followed correctly, in that information helping to justify the acceptability of making the subject change was identified but not included in the USQD.

#### Corrective Steps That Have Been Taken and Results Achieved:

##### Example A:

Other plant systems that have buried components were also reviewed to determine if changes to pressure test methodology resulted from incorrectly defining the system as redundant/nonredundant. No other examples were found.

WCGS has now committed to the 1989 Edition of ASME Section XI as required by 10CFR50.55a. As part of this commitment, the ISI Program Plan has been revised and associated pressure test procedures are being revised to the new requirements.

To implement requirements for testing redundant and isolable components, permission was requested from the NRC to utilize the 1995 Edition with 1995 Addenda such that Subsection IWA-5244 may be applied to the ESW buried portions of piping. The request to implement the 1995 Addenda requirements was made in WCNOC letter ET 97-0040 dated April 24, 1997, to the NRC.

##### Example B:

The preparer and approver of the USQD were counseled relative to the missing information in the USQD.

The content of all other USQDs performed by the preparer of USQD 59 96-0067 was reviewed for similar error. No other examples were found.

Since the occurrence of the problem identified, Engineering has implemented a Work Product Evaluation Process. This process was implemented in July, 1996. It provides for review of selected Engineering Work Products, including this example. Engineering Work Product Evaluations are used to reinforce management expectations involving complete documentation of work, attention to detail, and procedural compliance.

The Chief Operating Officer and the Plant Manager met with the Plant Safety Review Committee to reinforce expectations for thoroughness of review and review for completeness of documentation.

#### Corrective Steps That Will Be Taken to Avoid Further Violations:

##### Example A:

Testing of the Essential Service Water System underground piping is scheduled to be performed during Refueling Outage IX (RF9). Testing will be completed by October 31, 1997.

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Pressure test procedures are being revised to satisfy the new testing requirements. The update to the pressure tests essentially entails a review of all system boundaries that require pressure testing. It starts with what is presently required to test the system, independent of how it was tested in the past. This precludes continuing with any testing that may not comply with the testing requirements of the newly committed Code. Any configurations that cannot meet, or may be impractical to meet, Code requirements will require a submittal to the NRC. Updating the pressure tests is required to be completed with performance of the tests at the completion of the first 40 month inspection period in accordance with 10CFR 50.55a and ASME Section XI.

Example B:

All corrective actions completed.

Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved:

Full Compliance will be achieved by October 31, 1997.