

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant
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March 11, 1988

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Gentlemen:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET NO.
50-327 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77 - SPECIAL REPORT 88-04

The enclosed special report provides details concerning a fire barrier being nonfunctional for greater than seven days. This event is reported in accordance with action statement (a) of Limiting Conditions for Operation 3.7.12.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY


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Plant Manager

Enclosure
cc (Enclosure):

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SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT
UNIT 1
SPECIAL REPORT 88-04

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On February 13, 1988, with unit 1 in mode 5 (0 percent power, 4 psig, 124 degrees F), a fire barrier (Door A-62, Auxiliary Building elevation 690, penetration room) was nonfunctional for an interval greater than seven days. On February 6, 1988, the active leaf of the door was found not closing properly, and a breach (Permit No. 5902) was issued as the door was determined to be a nonfunctional fire barrier. Although the door is capable of being closed and latched, the top half of the active leaf would leave approximately 3/4-inch mismatch with the door frame and would not meet acceptance criteria of Surveillance Instruction (SI)-261 for functional fire door. A roving fire watch was established, and a work request (WR) was issued to repair/replace the door. Maintenance determined that the door needed to be replaced, and the replacement door could not be procured within seven days which requires a special report in accordance with technical specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.12

CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of this event is inadvertent pressurization of Auxiliary Building elevation 690 penetration room as described below. The fire door is a double-leaf door and opens outside to the penetration room.

At the time of the event, unit 1 containment equipment hatch and blast doors on elevation 734 were closed, and the containment purge system was tagged out of service to determine Auxiliary Building gas treatment system (ABGTS) operability (refer to LER 327/88007). The containment pressure slowly started increasing due to control air and service air leakage into the containment. The lower containment access air lock area (elevation 690 Auxiliary Building) was also pressurized through the containment personnel access air lock door. When the access area entrance door A-64 was opened, air rushed through the door opening and pressurized the elevation 690 penetration room which resulted in bending the top part of the active leaf on the door.

ANALYSIS OF EVENT

This event is being reported in accordance with the requirements of action statement (a) of LCO 3.7.12.

A roving fire watch was established to inspect the penetration room on an hourly basis as required by the action statement of LCO 3.7.12. The existing fire detection and fire suppression system for the affected area are operable and would activate in the event of a fire. Therefore, there is no danger to safety-related equipment.

During modes 1 through 4, containment integrity is ensured as required by the TS, and service air to the containment is isolated. Therefore, this event is less likely to occur during modes 1 through 4.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

As immediate action, service air supply to the containment was isolated.

A roving fire watch at a regular interval of one hour was established and will be maintained until the fire door is replaced and functional. A procurement request has been issued, and the delivery of the door is anticipated by June 30, 1988. WR R292433 will be used to document the installation of the door.

The control air and service air leakage into the containment was repaired on February 15, 1988.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Refer to LER 327/88007, "Opening of Unit 1 Containment Results in Secondary Containment Envelope Outside the Boundary Set for Surveillance Testing of Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System."

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