TABLE 3.3-15 (CONTINUED)

ACTION STATEMENTS

ACTION 16 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or reduce reactor power to less than 25 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 6 hours. 45

ACTION 17 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours.

ACTION 18 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and POWER OPERATION may proceed provided both of the following conditions are satisfied:

a) The control rod drive trip breaker associated with the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within one hour.

b) The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, one additional control rod drive trip breaker associated with another channel may be tripped for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.3, after reclosing the control rod drive trip breaker opened in a) above.

The pressurizer code safety valves must be set such that the peak Reactor Coolant System pressure does not exceed 110% of design system pressure (2500 psig) or, 2750 psig. The control rod group withdrawal accident will result in the most limiting high pressure in the RCS. The analysis assumes RPS high pressure trip at ~~2300~~ 2355 psig and the code safety valves open at 2500 psig. The tolerance on the RPS instrument accuracy is 30 psi and, it is +1% for the code safety valve settings. The pressurizer electromatic relief valve was assumed not to open for this transient. The resulting system peak pressure was calculated to be ~~2716~~ 2700 psig. Therefore, the code safety valve setpoint is conservatively set at $\leq$ 2525 psig which is the maximum pressure of 2500 psig +1% for tolerance.

The pressurizer electromatic relief valve should be set such that it will open before the code safety valves are opened. However, it should not open on any anticipated transients. ~~A Loss of Feedwater (LOFW) was identified as the limiting anticipated transient for RCS pressure. The analysis assumes RPS high pressure trip at 2300 psig; with 30 psig for instrument errors, the resulting peak RCS pressure is calculated to be 2380 psig. This includes a 50 psig pressure overshoot on a LOFW transient.~~

BAW-1893, October 1985 identified that the turbine trip from full power would cause the largest overpressure transient. This report demonstrated that with a RPS high pressure trip setpoint of 2355 psig the resulting overshoot in RCS pressure would be limited to 50 psi. Consequently, the minimum PORV setpoint needs to accomodate both the RCS pressure overshoot and the RPS instrument string error of 30 psi.