



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report Nos.: 50-321/78-30 and 50-366/78-38

Docket Nos.: 50-321 and 50-366

Licensee Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5

Category: C

Licensee: Georgia Power Company
270 Peachtree Street, N. W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Facility Name: Hatch 1 and 2

Inspection at: Plant Hatch site, Appling County, Georgia

Inspection conducted: August 27-29, 1978

Inspectors: J. M. Fuchko
D. R. Mc Guire

Reviewed by: F. P. Gillespie, Chief
Security and Investigation Section
Safeguards Branch

Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection on August 27-29, 1978 (Report Nos. 50-321/78-30 and 50-366/78-38)

Areas Inspected: An unannounced security inspection of Hatch 1 and 2, to follow-up items identified during previous inspections. The inspection involved 32 inspector-hours on site by two NRC inspectors. The inspection was initiated during an off-shift period.

Results: Of the areas inspected, two items of noncompliance were identified. Deficiency-physical barriers (50-321/78-30-01, 50-366/78-38-01); deficiency-security organization (50-321/78-30-02, 50-366/78-38-02).

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DETAILS

Prepared by:

J. M. Fuchko, Security Inspector
Security and Investigation Section
Safeguards Branch

Date

Dates of Inspection: August 27-29, 1978

Reviewed by:

F. P. Gillespie, Chief
Security and Investigation Section
Safeguards Branch

Date

1. Persons Contacted

- *M. Manry, Plant Manager
 - *H. Nix, Assistant Plant Manager
 - *C. R. Miles, Jr., QA Field Supervisor
 - *G. E. Spell, Jr., Sr. QAFR
 - *J. Peregoy, Jr. QAFR
 - *J. M. Watson, Sr. QAFR
 - *D. J. Vaughn, Assistant Plant Security Supervisor
 - *T. C. Wilkes, Plant Security Supervisor
 - *C. E. Belflower, QA Site Supervisor
- Several members of the plant security force were also contacted.

*Denotes those present at the exit interview.

2. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(Closed) Infraction (78-10-01): Failure to indicate expiration date on nonemployee picture badges. The inspectors observed that nonemployee picture badges now have expiration dates.

(Closed) Infraction (78-10-02): Failure to conduct a vital area key inventory. The licensee has conducted and documented a key inventory which was completed April 17, 1978.

(Closed) Infraction (78-20-01): Failure to maintain an 8' perimeter barrier. The inspectors determined that the perimeter barrier is now at least 8' high.

(Closed) Infraction (78-20-02): Failure to maintain isolation zones. The licensee now maintains an isolation zone and has developed a procedure for compensatory actions (Local Order 1-H) in the event that the clear zone is not maintained.

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(Closed) Infraction (78-20-03): Failure to maintain operational perimeter lighting. On August 27, 1978, the inspectors observed that all the perimeter lighting was operational.

(Closed) Unresolved (78-20-04): Guard qualifications. A random review of records revealed that the guards were qualified in accordance with licensee commitments.

(Closed) Infraction (78-20-05): Failure to establish security procedures. A random review of procedures revealed that procedures have been established for those referenced in Report Nos. 50-321/78-20 and 50-366/78-25.

(Closed) Unresolved (78-20-06): Failure to maintain Vital Area Log. Licensee complies with current security plan.

(Closed) Infraction (78-20-07): Failure to positively control designated vehicles. The inspectors observed security patrols checking designated vehicles during their rounds. During the course of the inspection, no unattended designated vehicles were observed to be unlocked (unsecured) or with the keys in the ignition.

(Closed) Infraction (78-20-08): Failure to search hand-carried packages. Hand-carried packages were searched on all entry searches observed by the inspectors.

(Closed) Infraction (78-20-09): Failure to issue or maintain badges that only allowed access to vital areas when a need for entry was established. Such a badge system is now established.

(Closed) Infraction (78-20-10): Failure to train individuals controlling access to vital areas. The inspectors observed that access to any open vital area is now being maintained by a guard.

(Closed) Infraction (78-20-11): Failure to follow escorting requirements. The inspectors observed during the course of the inspection that escorting requirements were being followed.

(Closed) Infraction (78-20-12): Failure to secure unattended vital area doors. The inspectors observed that unattended vital area doors were secured.

(Closed) Infraction (78-20-13): Failure to maintain an access control roster. The licensee now maintains an updated roster, which is reprinted on a weekly basis.

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(Closed) Infraction (78-20-14): Failure to maintain continuous communication. All security individuals observed by the inspectors were capable of maintaining continuous communication.

3. Physical Barriers

Chapter VI, F of the licensee's approved Security Plan requires the area on both sides of the protected area fence to be kept clear of any obstructions for at least 10 feet inside and outside the protected area fence. Paragraph 73.55(g)(1) of 10 CFR Part 73 requires, in part, that the licensee employ compensatory measures to assure that the effectiveness of the security system is not reduced by failure or other contingencies affecting the operation of the security related equipment or structures. During the course of the inspection it was observed by the inspectors that the area around the protected area fence was not always being maintained clear of obstructions for at least 10 feet and compensatory measures were not always being implemented. This is a deficiency (321/78-30-01, 366/78-38-01).

On August 28, 1978, the inspectors, accompanied by licensee representatives, conducted a walking check of the protected area barrier and isolation zone. At approximately 11:40 a.m., it was observed that a guard stationed on the eastern protected area perimeter as a compensatory measure, due to dirt piles, trenches and equipment in the isolation zone, left the assigned post and went to a truck located behind a metal building. This new location blocked observation of most of the affected zone. After a short period the guard returned to the assigned post.

Continuing the inspection, the inspectors then observed at approximately 11:45 a.m., that a truck was parked outside the protected area in the isolation zone next to the southern protected area barrier. Maintenance was being performed on the barriers top guard. The inspectors questioned as to who was conducting compensatory action. A licensee management representative went to the construction access point guard house and asked the guards there, "who is performing compensatory action?" He was told that they checked outside on occasion. A guard was then stationed in the affected area.

4. Security Organization

Paragraph 73.55(b)(3) of 10 CFR Part 73 requires that the licensee establish, maintain and follow written security procedures which document the structure of the security organization and which detail the duties of guards, watchmen and other individuals responsible for

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security. During the course of the inspection, on August 27 and 28, 1978, the inspectors conducted a random review of licensee security procedures, which revealed that procedures dealing with designated vehicle control, guard training, compensatory measures, and testing and maintenance of security equipment, were not being maintained. This is a deficiency (321/78-30-02, 366/78-38-02).

a. Designated Vehicles

A review of procedures for designated vehicles indicated that there were two areas that were not covered. There was no provision for who had the authority to designate vehicles and initiate changes. The second problem was that there was no procedure set, detailing the duties of the patrol guard to check designated vehicles within the protected area to insure they are properly secured. This checking was committed to in the GPC response to inspection reports 50-321/78-20 and 50-366/78-25.

b. Guard Training

A review of guard training procedures revealed that though records are maintained, they were being maintained on the wrong forms.

c. Compensatory Measures

The procedure was not clear, as to stating that a member of the security organization would be stationed in the affected zone.

d. Testing and Maintenance

A review of procedures for actions to take in the event of various failures of the alarm annunciator, revealed that various component failures were not addressed. The procedure for testing the hand-held metal detector, was not the testing procedure being utilized in the actual testing.

The rewording of identified security procedures were discussed with licensee management representatives, and corrective action was initiated during the inspection.

5. Exit Meeting

An exit meeting was conducted with those indicated in paragraph 1. Two items of noncompliance were discussed at that time. The plant manager

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indicated some concern over what was the dividing line over what constituted an acceptable procedure. The inspectors indicated that these concerns would be brought to the attention of management in the Region.

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