

DS09


M. Chatterton  
J. Shapaker

THE  
B&W

OWNERS GROUP

62 FR 27629  
May 20, 1997

Duke Power Company W-Brook Oconee 1, 2, 3  
Entergy Operations, Inc. ANO-1  
Florida Power Corporation Crystal River 3



GPU Nuclear Corporation  
Toledo Edison Company  
Framatome Technologies, Inc.



TMI-1  
Davis-Besse

Working Together to Economically Provide Reliable and Safe Electrical Power

Suite 525 • 1700 Rockville Pike • Rockville, MD 20852 • (301) 230-2100

June 18, 1997  
OG-1660

Chief, Rules Review and Directives Branch  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Mail Stop T-6D-69  
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject: B&W Owners Group (B&WOG) Comments on Proposed NRC Bulletin Supplement Concerning Control Rod Insertion Issues Specific to B&WOG and FCF Fuel

Reference: Proposed Generic Communication  
62 Fed. Reg. 27629 - May 20, 1997

Gentlemen:

The above reference requests comments from interested parties on a proposed NRC bulletin supplement concerning the potential for incomplete control rod insertion in Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) and Westinghouse designed reactors. The bulletin supplement provides proposed actions for applicable utilities to address this concern. The B&W Owners Group (B&WOG) is aware of the importance to nuclear safety of having control rods insert fully and promptly when needed, and provides the following comments to the proposed bulletin.

The application of the actions requested by the proposed bulletin supplement to fuel assemblies manufactured by Framatome Cogema Fuel (FCF) for B&W and Westinghouse designed plants is not appropriate. The FCF fuel designs are distinctly different from those which were involved in the events leading to the proposed bulletin supplement. Information provided to the NRC by FCF and the B&WOG does not support the broad application of such actions. Analytical results, operational data, and design comparisons

RECEIVED  
JUN 19 PM 1:28  
USNRC

1/0

RD-8-2 B&W  
RD-8-26



9706230391 970618  
PDR PR  
62FR27629 PDR

have shown that FCF fuel designed for B&W and Westinghouse designed reactors does not exhibit Control Rod Assembly (CRA) or Rod Cluster Control Assembly (RCCA) insertion problems or associated root causes, and therefore should not be included in the final bulletin supplement.

### **Overview**

The following issues and items should be thoroughly considered by the NRC in a review of the applicability of the proposed bulletin supplement to B&WOG and FCF fuel. Previous B&WOG submittals should be utilized, and the evaluation should be completed prior to issuing the final bulletin supplement.

- 1) FCF fuel designs should be evaluated for susceptibility to the problems similar to those highlighted in the supplement.
- 2) FCF fuel operational history should be reviewed to ascertain whether there are indications of slow control rod trip times or stuck control rods. The FCF fuel design and performance should be evaluated for verification of compliance with the current licensing basis.
- 3) The safety significance of any requirements must be carefully assessed to determine the ramifications of any NRC proposed actions.
- 4) The environmental impact of the proposed requirements should be assessed.
- 5) The impact of the required testing on the current licensing bases should be evaluated.
- 6) The potential impact on future fuel cycle designs and the associated economies should be assessed thoroughly.
- 7) The application of the required testing as a compliance or backfit ruling should be thoroughly assessed.

These issues are described in greater detail below.

### **Design Considerations**

FCF supplies nuclear fuel to both B&W and Westinghouse designed reactors. Distinguishing FCF design features, performance data, and analyses specific to the incomplete control rod insertion issue were discussed in detail with the NRC staff in a

meeting with FCF and B&WOG representatives on December 18, 1996. At the conclusion of the meeting, the NRC requested that FCF make a formal submittal summarizing the meeting. FCF provided that submittal on January 31, 1997. The letter summarized the data and key points presented in the December 18 meeting. The analytical results and design comparisons showed that FCF fuel does not exhibit CRA/RCCA insertion problems or associated root causes and, therefore, should be excluded from the final bulletin supplement.

#### Mark-B Fuel - Used in B&W Designed Plants

The B&W designed reactors utilize the Mark-B 15x15, 12 foot fuel assembly design. The fuel in these reactors has been supplied by FCF or its predecessor, B&W Fuel Company, except for eight lead test assemblies (LTAs). As discussed with the NRC, FCF fuel has design features which preclude the occurrence of control rod insertion problems exhibited by the Westinghouse V5H fuel.

The Mark-B fuel has key design differences compared to the Westinghouse V5H fuel, which include:

- 1) Larger diameter guide tubes, which significantly increase the strength and resistance to deformation
- 2) Fuel rods seated on the lower end fitting, which substantially reduce the axial compressive load on guide tubes
- 3) Uniform diameter guide tubes with no dashpot, which provide significantly more clearance for the control rods and significantly increase the strength of the guide tube in the lower region of the fuel assembly
- 4) Intermediate (floating) grids that are not rigidly attached to the guide tubes, which minimize the operating stresses due to differential growth between the fuel rods and guide tubes and minimize local guide tube distortion
- 5) Taller intermediate and end grids, which increase the lateral stiffness of the fuel assembly and reduce guide tube bow
- 6) Significantly larger design margins which allow for more fuel assembly irradiation growth
- 7) Top and bottom end grids, which transmit loads directly to the upper and lower end fittings, respectively, instead of to the guide tubes

- 8) Lower operating temperatures, which reduce guide tube corrosion. This has been confirmed with no corrosion driven fuel assembly growth ever being observed.
- 9) Additional reduced axial compressive forces for fuel with the helical holddown spring
- 10) A control rod drive system, which fully absorbs the control rod drop energy and does not allow the control rod assembly to impact the fuel assembly, thus significantly reducing axial compressive loads on the guide tubes during a trip
- 11) Keyed grids, which permit stress free installation of the fuel rods during fabrication where the guide tubes experience minimal fabrication-induced loads

These features directly or indirectly result in significantly less compressive loading or stress on the guide tubes, less guide tube deformation, and reduced CRA insertion forces for FCF Mark-B fuel.

#### Mark-BW Fuel - Used in Westinghouse Designed Plants

FCF also supplies 17x17, 12 foot fuel, designated Mark-BW, to Westinghouse designed reactors. Duke Power McGuire Nuclear Units 1 and 2 and Catawba Nuclear Units 1 & 2, TVA Sequoyah Nuclear Units 1 and 2 (fresh batches only), and Virginia Power North Anna Unit 1 (4 LTAs) utilize FCF Mark-BW fuel. Mark-BW fuel, similar to the Mark-B fuel, has key design differences compared to the Westinghouse V5H fuel design, which are:

- 1) Shorter fuel assembly length, which significantly reduces the in-reactor axial compressive holddown forces on the guide thimbles and also allows for more fuel assembly irradiation growth
- 2) Lower preloaded holddown springs, which significantly reduce the axial compressive loads on the guide thimbles
- 3) Fuel rods seated on the bottom nozzle, which substantially reduce the axial compressive load on guide thimbles
- 4) Increased guide thimble outer and inner (upper) diameters, which provide more control rod to guide thimble clearance and increase the strength of the guide thimble

- 5) Intermediate (floating) grids that are not rigidly attached to the guide thimbles, which minimize the operating stresses due to differential growth between the fuel rods and guide thimbles and minimize the local guide thimble distortion
- 6) Taller intermediate and end grids which increase the lateral stiffness of the fuel assembly and reduce guide thimble bow
- 7) Top and bottom end grids, which transmit loads directly to the top and bottom nozzles respectively, instead of to the guide thimbles
- 8) Keyed grids which permit stress free installation of the fuel rods during fabrication where the guide thimbles experience minimal fabrication-induced loads

These features directly or indirectly result in significantly less compressive loading on the guide thimbles, less guide thimble deformation, and reduced RCCA insertion forces for FCF Mark-BW fuel.

### **Operational Considerations**

In addition to the noted design features, performance data previously provided to the NRC (which included fuel assembly growth, guide tube/thimble corrosion, fuel assembly bow, guide tube/thimble distortion, control rod trip, and control rod drag measurements) have confirmed that the Mark-B and Mark-BW fuel assemblies have shown no anomalies relative to their design bases for burnups close to the design burnup limits. Fuel assembly growth and guide tube/thimble corrosion data are as predicted, showing no indication of aberrant, accelerated rates. Fuel assembly bow and guide tube/thimble distortion have been shown to be minimal with no unusual behavior.

Full insertion of control rods in FCF fuel have been demonstrated in all cases with all trip times meeting Technical Specification requirements. Full insertion of control rods has occurred in both high and low temperature plants with challenging power histories. Over 5,000 successful insertions have been made with FCF fuel since 1990. Of these, more than 900 successful insertions have been above the proposed 35,000 MWD/mtU burnup limit. The maximum fuel assembly burnups achieved with successful control rod insertion have been greater than 53,000 and 58,000 MWD/mtU for the Mark-BW and Mark-B fuel designs, respectively. In addition to the successful control rod insertion data, over 200 Mark-BW fuel assemblies were measured for control rod drag force (all of which exhibited drag force within acceptable limits) with burnups up to ~53000 MWD/mtU.

These data, in addition to the specific FCF design features, validate that no CRA/RCCA insertion problems exist for the Mark-B and Mark-BW fuel designs for the present licensed



burnup limits. Considering the substantial design differences noted for FCF fuel, coupled with the proven performance history, it is clear that FCF fuel will perform its intended safety function. Therefore, the proposed control rod trip testing at the burnup limits and intervals provided in the draft bulletin supplement is not appropriate for FCF fuel.

FCF fuel performance and design data and analyses support continued operation to the currently licensed burnup limits without any additional control rod insertion testing.

### **Safety Assessment**

Based on the foregoing discussions and FCF fuel design and performance data provided to the NRC, the FCF fuel designs are not susceptible to the control rod insertion failures discussed in the bulletin supplement. Therefore, the current test programs have demonstrated that structures, systems, and components perform satisfactorily, and there is no safety concern or compliance issue for the current licensed burnup limits.

Contrary to the above, the proposed bulletin supplement requires additional testing as a means to address the postulated safety concern. Therefore, the safety impact of the testing regime itself must be assessed.

The proposed bulletin supplement delineates:

In order to ensure the continued operability of the control rods, all licensees of Westinghouse and Babcock and Wilcox designed plants are requested to verify the full insertability and rod drop times by testing control rods in fuel assemblies with burnups greater than 35,000 MWD/mtU for assemblies without IFMs for 12 foot cores; 40,000 MWD/mtU for assemblies with IFMs for 12 foot cores; and 25,000 MWD/mtU for assemblies in 14 foot cores, upon first reaching the limit(s), and approximately every 2,500 MWD/mtU until the end of cycle. In addition, end-of-cycle rod drop time tests and drag testing of all rodged fuel assemblies should be performed.

Such testing would result in unwarranted CRA trip time testing from hot shutdown conditions, approximately every 60 to 80 days of operation for units utilizing FCF fuel. These unnecessary trip time tests require review from a safety perspective to determine the benefit of the additional testing requirement. While planned reactor trips at hot shutdown conditions are routinely performed without complication, proposing an increase in the frequency of CRA trip time testing is undesirable for a number of reasons.

- Given the numerous operator actions required during a controlled decrease or increase in reactor power, additional CRA trip time testing increases plant operator burden. For example, operator actions during plant shutdown increase the likelihood of undesirable consequential events: loss-of-offsite power and loss-of-main feedwater. Though operators are aware of protecting the critical safety functions, the opportunity for error is greater during plant maneuvering. The proposed testing plan would systematically require the plant to enter transient operating conditions. The resulting increase in exposure to potentially adverse conditions must be thoughtfully considered.
- Increasing the frequency of trip time testing subjects the fuel to additional duty cycles and increases the possibility of fuel failures and associated fission product inventory in the reactor coolant system (RCS). Furthermore, this additional testing would exacerbate any pre-existing fuel failures.
- Increasing the frequency of CRA trip time testing subjects the physical plant to additional mechanical and thermal duty cycles, which increases the possibility of plant component and system failures.
- The additional CRA trip time testing would also challenge the primary and secondary chemistry, which is integral to system integrity and corrosion control.

The B&WOG has worked diligently to decrease unnecessary reactor trips. Although all units can successfully and safely shutdown when required, it is not prudent to propose a testing program that results in approximately five additional trip time tests per year per plant and that does not contribute to increased safety for plants utilizing fuel where no such safety issue exists.

### **Environmental Impact**

Obligating an increase in trip time testing frequency results in greater generation of liquid and gaseous radwastes. The volumes of radwaste and the subsequent impact on the environment should be considered by the NRC prior to issuing the bulletin supplement.

### **Current Licensing Basis**

While the proposed bulletin supplement makes reference to maintaining the current licensing basis with respect to ensuring that the control rods will satisfactorily perform their intended function, it does not address the effect of the proposed testing on the limited number of startup and shutdown transients contained in each plant's current licensing basis. The effect on plant systems, structure, and components due to the proposed

increase in the number of plant cooldown and heatup cycles (resulting from increased control rod trip testing) should be thoroughly analyzed by the NRC Staff prior to proceeding further with the proposed bulletin supplement, particularly as it applies to the B&WOG plants and FCF fuel.

### **Fuel Cycle Designs**

The proposed action, which requires control rod trip testing for 12 foot fuel assemblies with greater than 35,000 MWd/MtU burnup (for non-IFM designs), would result in core management restrictions for those B&WOG utilities choosing to adhere to the proposed burnup limit to preclude such testing. This unduly penalizes FCF fuel users given that the FCF fuel is not susceptible to the control rod insertion problem and any associated safety concern. Fuel cycles required to meet the restrictions result in significant cost inefficiencies and additional spent fuel storage and disposal. In order to minimize the cost, risk, and operational impact of the proposed testing, future fuel cycle designs and resulting fuel economies would be significantly altered from current designs.

In addition, the proposed control rod trip testing itself (which imposes regular mid-cycle CRA/RCCA trip test intervals) also unduly penalizes FCF fuel users. The additional costs associated with the required control rod trip testing are unwarranted when imposed to address an issue that has been demonstrated by FCF to have no applicability to B&W and Westinghouse designed plants using FCF fuel assemblies.

### **Regulatory Compliance**

In the proposed bulletin supplement, the NRC characterizes the new test requirements as justified under the compliance exception of 10 CFR 50.109. The supplement states that the objective of the requirements is to verify that licensees are in compliance with current licensing bases with respect to shutdown margin and control rod trip times. The B&WOG does not agree with the compliance exception interpretation. Control rod trip testing and shutdown margin requirements are already specified in plant technical specifications and are met by the B&WOG plants using FCF fuel. Therefore, the B&WOG plants are in compliance with their licenses. The actions of the proposed bulletin supplement should not be considered a compliance issue for FCF fuel. The actions should be addressed as a backfit issue which requires appropriate supporting analyses.

Pursuant to 10CFR 50.109(c), the NRC Staff is obligated to perform a backfit analysis, which must address the costs associated with the backfit, the potential safety impact of changes in the complexity of the operation of the plants, the potential impact of differences in facility types, etc.



## Conclusions

Extensive data have been collected by FCF and the B&WOG utilities as part of NRC Bulletin 96-01, fuel post irradiation examinations, hot cell programs, and Technical Specification required testing. This data, in conjunction with corresponding analyses and distinguishing design features, demonstrate that FCF fuel is not susceptible to incomplete control rod insertion, or suspected root causes for the currently licensed fuel assembly burnup limits.


Therefore, the proposed control rod trip test requirements are unwarranted and unnecessary for B&WOG plants and FCF fuel. Such test requirements, which increase the frequency of CRA trip time testing and the prerequisite plant maneuvering, unduly impose increased mechanical, radiological, environmental, licensing, and fuel integrity concerns in addition to fuel cycle design challenges for B&WOG plants.

Therefore, the B&WOG requests that:

- The NRC review in detail the FCF January 31, 1997 submittal and December 18, 1996 presentation package in its assessment of the applicability of the incomplete control rod insertion issue to FCF fuel prior to the final issuance of the bulletin supplement.
- If the NRC issues the final bulletin supplement with the proposed control rod assembly trip time test requirements, the B&WOG plants and FCF fuel be excluded from any such testing until review of the 1/31/97 and 12/18/96 FCF submittals is completed.
- Based on the information previously provided to the NRC, all FCF fuel operating in Westinghouse and Babcock & Wilcox designed reactors be excluded from the final bulletin supplement.
- If FCF fuel is to be included in the final bulletin supplement, the NRC provide specific cause for such determination and accommodate additional technical meetings between FCF, B&WOG, and the NRC prior to the final issue of the bulletin supplement.
- Prior to imposing any additional test requirements, the NRC re-evaluate its assessment of the compliance exception ruling and perform the necessary analyses required to implement the control rod trip test requirements pursuant to 10 CFR 50.109(c).

The B&WOG is prepared to assist the NRC to help communicate a complete understanding of the design and operational differences associated with the FCF Mark-B and Mark-BW fuel. Please contact me at 864/885-3163 if we may be of additional assistance.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "William W. Foster".

W.W. Foster, Chairman  
B&W Owners Group Steering Committee

DUKE POWER COMPANY

WWF/bcc

c: M. S. Chatterton (NRC)  
J. L. Birmingham (NRC)  
B&WOG Steering Committee Members  
B&WOG Core Performance Committee Members  
B&WOG Licensing Representatives  
R. B. Borsum (FTI/MD82)