

APPENDIX B

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-498/86-02
50-499/86-02

CP: CPPR-128 and 129

Dockets: 50-498 and 50-499

Licensee: Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P)
P. O. Box 1700
Houston, Texas 77001

Facility Name: South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2

Inspection At: South Texas Project, Matagorda County, Texas

Inspection Conducted: January 6 - February 14, 1986

Inspectors:

R. E. Johnson
for C. E. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector
Project Section C, Reactor Projects Branch

3/18/86
Date

D. L. Garrison
for D. L. Garrison, Resident Inspector, Project
Section C, Reactor Projects Branch

3/18/86
Date

Other NRC
personnel: J. F. Lara, CO-OP Student

Approved:

G. L. Constable
G. L. Constable, Chief, Project Section C
Reactor Projects Branch

3/18/86
Date

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Inspection Summary

Inspection Conducted January 6 through February 14, 1986 (Report 50-498/86-02;
50-499/86-02)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of licensee action on previous inspection findings, IE Information Notices, concrete activities, structural steel activities, and piping activities. The inspection involved 256 inspection hours onsite by two NRC inspectors and a coop-student trainee.

Results:

Within the scope of this inspection, one violation was identified and is discussed in paragraph 7.

DETAILS1. Persons ContactedPrincipal Licensee Employees

- *J. T. Westermeier, Project Manager
- *S. M. Dew, Deputy Project Manager
- *D. L. Dujka, Site Engineer
- *E. B. Miller, Deputy Project QA Manager
- *K. M. O'Gara, Project Compliance Engineer
- *J. J. Nesrsta, (Representative for INPO)
- *S. Head, Lead Project Compliance Engineer
- *W. Evans, Project Compliance Engineer
- *C. McIntyre, Site Project Engineer
- R. C. Arthurs, Project QA General Supervisor
- *G. Shukla, Project Compliance Engineer
- *T. Logan, PQC Supervisor
- T. McGriff, QA Engineer
- *T. Jordan, Project QA Manager
- *J. Geiger, Nuclear Assurance Manager

Other PersonnelBechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)

- *J. B. Gatewood, Lead QA Engineer
- *R. H. Medina, Lead QA Engineer
- *R. Schulman, Site Civil Engineer
- S. Oliver, Piping Engineer
- *R. W. Miller, Deputy Project QA Manager

Ebasco Service, Inc. (Ebasco)

- *J. R. Parks, QC Manager
- *A. M. Cutrona, QA Manager
- *J. J. Assenza, Senior QA Engineer
- *R. C. Peck, Deputy Project QA Manager
- *F. G. Miller, Welding Superintendent
- *J. R. Martin, Senior Resident Engineer
- *K. W. Silverthorne, ESI Welding
- J. Mulkey, QC Inspector (Piping)
- R. Blentlinger, Civil QC Supervisor (Structural)
- R. West, Civil QC Supervisor (Concrete)
- P. Phelan, QC (Civil)
- W. White, QC (Civil)
- J. Blas, QC (Civil)

Authorized Nuclear Inspector (Kemper)

D. Braman, ANI-Kemper

*Denotes those individuals attending the exit interview conducted on February 14, 1986.

2. Site Tour

The NRC inspectors made several site tours in order to assess construction in progress, general cleanliness and housekeeping activities, condition of equipment, and plant status. The following areas of the plants were inspected: mechanical-electrical auxiliary buildings, containment buildings, Interneck fabrication shop (HVAC), pipe fabrication shop, weld test shop, pipe laydown yard A, paint storage warehouse, warehouses A, B, and C, fire pump house, fuel building, and essential cooling water structure.

No violations or deviations were identified.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(Closed) Violation (50-498-8506-01):

This item concerns a Class 7 (II/I) HVAC support which had been accepted by EBASCO field engineering; however, during a reinspection by NRC, it was found that the bolts were not torqued as required. Review of the licensee response and corrective action revealed that procedures have been revised for Class 7 components to include requirements for control of the removal and/or modification of items that have been inspected and accepted by field engineering. The Ebasco construction supervisors and engineers were reinstructed on these requirements as outlined in ASP-22 prior to modifying or removing any item that has been final-accepted. Craft personnel have been reinstructed not to perform any unauthorized work on accepted items. This was accomplished by distribution of a "check stuffer" to each employee at the site.

This item is considered closed.

4. Licensee Action on IE Information Notices

(Closed) IE Notice 79-08

This item concerned the innerconnection of contaminated service air systems into the breathing air system. The breathing air system used at STP is separate and independent of any other system.

The NRC inspector reviewed specification 5Q129MD1007, Revision 0, and Piping and Instrument Diagram 5Q129F05044 concerning breathing air and concluded that the response is adequate.

(Closed) IE Notice 79-14

This notice concerned the classification of electrical supports and the application of pertinent quality assurance requirements as defined in Appendix B to 10 CFR 50.

The electrical support systems at STP are designated as seismic Category I as referenced in the FSAR Chapter 3. The quality requirements are classed as "B" and meet the requirements of Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1, IV.B.7.

(Closed) IE Notice 79-17

This notice concerned source holder assembly damage due to misfit in reactors using 15X15 fuel assemblies. STP uses 17X17 fuel configuration. Therefore, this should not occur. The limitation on secondary source location in a 17X17 core is that they not be placed beneath a control assembly.

(Closed) IE Notice 79-20

This notice expanded the subject of NRC enforcement policy in regard to NRC licensed individuals and summarized sanctions available for NRC to use when violations occur. Ample correspondence was reviewed which indicates that the licensee has reviewed and understands the notice.

(Closed) IE Notice 79-23

This notice concerned leaky oil coolers manufactured by Young Radiator and used on GM diesels. STP uses Cooper diesels with American-Standard oil coolers.

(Closed) IE Notice 79-32

This notice is applicable to BWRs only and, therefore, does not affect the STP.

(Closed) IE Notice 79-30

Proper reporting of defects and noncompliance in accordance with Part 21 of Title 10, Chapter 1 of the CFR is addressed in this notice.

The NRC inspector reviewed the procedures concerning this area (PLP-02) and determined that the method used by the licensee is adequate.

(Closed) IE Notice 80-08

This notice concerned electrical terminal links manufactured by States Company which fracture easily.

In reviewing documentation it was ascertained that these items are not used at the site. They are included in the STP restricted items list.

(Closed) IE Notice 79-34

The topic of this notice was containment spray heat exchangers manufactured by Industrial Process Engineers Inc. which were defective in design. STP does not use this make of heat exchangers.

(Closed) IE Notice 79-27

This notice concerned the rupture of steam generator tubes at two PWRs. Review of the licensee correspondence indicates that the root causes were understood and appropriately considered by the licensee.

(Closed) IE Notice 79-24

This item concerned a deficiency in the original analysis of containment pressurization as a result of a main steam line break. The licensee has addressed this issue in Section 6.2.1.4 of the FSAR.

(Closed) IE Notice 82-05

This notice addressed the increasing frequency of drug-related incidents.

HL&P has established a comprehensive drug program. The licensee started using dogs to search for drugs in 1985; this program has now escalated to the point where drug use is strongly condemned and as a condition of employment, employees are expected to be drug free. A urinalysis is being performed for all employees.

(Closed) IE Notice 81-26

The subjects of this notice are: Self Contained Breathing Apparatus, Chemicals, Monitoring Devices, Inert Environments and Survey Instruments; all revolving around the health physics area. The licensee has addressed each item in separate operating procedures.

(Closed) IE Notice 80-18

This item of concern is a weapons smuggling pouch. The licensee has addressed these concerns in the Physical Security Plan.

(Closed) IE Notice 82-07

This item concerns inadequate personnel screening programs and lack of audit programs in this area. The licensee has included the concerns of this notice in plant procedures.

(Closed) IE Notice 82-09

This notice addressed fracturing in the makeup coolant lines in B&W plants due to thermal cyclic fatigue. These lines in Westinghouse plants are of different design and are not subjected to the cyclic conditions in B&W plants. This item was jointly investigated by the licensee's engineer and Westinghouse.

(Closed) IE Notice 82-27

This notice concerns fuel damage in reactors with down flow coolant movement in the reactor. The notice is not applicable to STP in that the STP design uses an up flow path for coolant.

(Closed) IE Notice 82-25

This item concerns Hiller brand actuators used on fail-safe closure of air operated valves. These items are not used at the STP plant.

(Closed) IE Notice 82-12

This notice concerns a high failure rate of Bergen Patterson hydraulic snubbers. STP does not use these particular units. STP uses mainly Paul-Monroe snubbers for the steam generator laterals, Pacific Scientific for acceleration limiting and Anchor Darling for velocity limiting. The snubber design and testing requirements are included in the FSAR, Section 3.9.

(Closed) IE Notice 82-40

This notice concerned poor workmanship in Bunker-Ramo electrical penetration assemblies. STP uses Westinghouse assemblies.

(Closed) IE Notice 82-38

This notice concerns the change in distribution of circulars, notices, and bulletins and has been noted by the licensee.

(Closed) IE Notice 82-31

This notice concerned overexposure to divers in the fuel pool due to poor work habits. Underwater work is not planned for this project but in the event the situation arises, appropriate procedures will be developed.

(Closed) IE Notice 82-56

Robertshaw Thermostatic Flow Control Valves - this brand of valves is not used at STP.

(Closed) IE Notice 82-48

Failure of Agastat CR0095 Relay Sockets - This particular model of relay socket is not incorporated into the STP design.

(Closed) IE Notice 82-46

Defective and obsolete Combination Padlocks - STP is using approved locks to lock safeguards cabinets.

(Closed) IE Notice 82-42

Defects in Panasonic Model 801 and 802 thermoluminescence dosimeters - The licensee has noted this item and it is explained in HL&P procedure OPRP01-ZX-0016.

5. Concrete (Structural)a. Procedure/Specification Review

The NRC inspector reviewed procedures and specifications related to the concrete activities at the STP. Review of these procedures and specifications indicate that they contain adequate inspection requirements, reference code and standards, tolerances, tests required, control of specific materials, and control of specific processes and activities related to concrete activities.

Procedures/Specifications Reviewed:

- . QCP-10.2, "Preplacement Concrete Inspection," Revision 6, dated November 27, 1985
- . QCP-10.3, "Concrete Placement Inspection," Revision 6, dated November 22, 1985
- . CSP-4, "Concrete Placement," Revision 5, dated June 28, 1985
- . Specification 2A010CS1004, "Specification for Forming Placing, Finishing, and Curing Concrete," Revision 4, dated March 28, 1985

b. NRC Field Inspection

The NRC inspectors performed inspections associated with Unit 2 containment dome placement No. 2-RC-W-168-019 and MEAB Unit 2 placements 2-ME-W-033-025, 2-ME-W-03-021A, 2-ME-W-033-023, 2-ME-W-043-003, and 2-ME-W-033-001.

Reinforcing Steel and Embedments

The NRC inspectors verified the size and location of reinforcing steel and checked structural plates for dimensional tolerances, azimuth and

location for placement 2-RC-W-168-019. The NRC inspectors also checked clearances between reinforcing steel and form work. Observation indicated that reinforcing steel, embedments, and form-work were controlled and positioned in accordance with specifications, codes, drawings and procedures.

The NRC inspectors also observed and examined tendon trumplets and sheathing that were within placement 2-RC-W-169-019. Trumplets and sheathing were installed within specified tolerances and were clean. Tendon sheathing joints appeared to be tight. No apparent discrepancies were observed.

Cadwelding operations were observed on three buttresses within and above placement 2-RC-W-168-019. Proper workmanship and installation of the cadweld was evident. No discrepancies were observed.

Placement

The NRC inspectors witnessed preplacement inspections performed by QC prior to placement. Preplacement activities were performed in accordance with the specification and procedures. Interviews and discussions with QC inspectors indicated that they were very knowledgeable of what was required for the preplacement inspection. The NRC inspectors examination of preplacement activities indicated that forms were properly set, construction joints properly prepared and the placement cleaned.

The NRC inspectors observed the actual placement of concrete in placements 2-RC-W-168-019, 2-ME-W-033-025, 2-ME-W-03-021A, 2-ME-W-033-023, 2-ME-W-043-033, and 2-ME-W-033-001 in Unit 2. During these placements the following activities were observed:

- . Proper drop distance from trunk of pump line.
- . Proper spacing, depth and insertion of vibrators.
- . Proper consolidation for avoidance of voids and honeycombs in congested areas.
- . No segregation of aggregate due to improper use of vibrators.
- . Batch tickets; these were reviewed for verification of proper mix, location, and amount of water being added at the truck delivery point.
- . The equipment used to deliver concrete from the ready-mix truck to the actual placement such as conveyors, lines, pumps and buckets.
- . Records indicating mix, location, time placed, water additions, and temperature of concrete mix and ambient conditions.

- . Inspection by QC during placement.

There were no violations or deviations observed in any of the preceding activities.

The NRC inspectors observed in-process testing of concrete for placements 2-RC-W-168-019, 2-ME-W-033-025, 2-ME-W-033-023, 2-ME-W-033-021A, 2-ME-W-043-003, and 2-ME-W-033-001. The following items were verified in the review of the testing program conducted during the placement:

- . Concrete temperature, slump, air content, and unit weight are being determined at the proper location and frequency.
- . Taking of the sample and testing techniques conform to the procedures specified in the ASTM standards.
- . Test specimens for concrete strength determination are sampled at the required location and frequency and are molded in accordance with specified requirements.

The testing observed by the NRC inspectors was performed in accordance with project procedures and specifications.

c. Records Inspection

The NRC inspectors reviewed records of concrete placements in the RCB and MEAB. The licensee system for preparing, reviewing, and maintaining records is functioning properly. The selected records reflect work accomplishment consistent with specifications and procedures. The records did not indicate any potentially generic problems, management control inadequacies, or other weaknesses that could have safety significance. Curing and post-placement inspection reports were not reviewed.

Documents reviewed were:

Drawing No.

- | | |
|-----------------------------|------------------------------|
| . 2C23-9-C-1020, Revision 4 | . 2C22-9-C-1039, Revision 5 |
| . 2C23-9-C-1021, Revision 1 | . 2C22-9-C-1046, Revision 5 |
| . 2C02-9-C-1031, Revision 1 | . 2C22-9-S-1012, Revision 1 |
| . 2C02-9-C-1032, Revision 1 | . 2C22-9-S-1013, Revision 0 |
| . 2C22-9-C-1033, Revision 5 | . 2C26-9-S-1004, Revision 2 |
| . 2C22-9-C-1034, Revision 2 | . 2C22-9-C-1035, Revision 4 |
| . 2C22-9-C-1036, Revision 0 | . 3A01-0-C-0001, Revision 20 |
| | . 3C01-2-C-1555, Revision 9 |

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Structural Steel and Supports

a. Procedures/Specifications Review

The NRC inspector reviewed procedures and specifications to determine whether these documents conform to appropriate reference codes and standards as well as the licensee's commitment to quality standards. The NRC inspector reviewed the Standard Site Procedure Manual and the structural and miscellaneous steel specification.

Review of the steel specification by the NRC inspector indicated that the technical requirements for the fabrication, assembly, erection, and inspection of structural and miscellaneous steel expressed in the specification conform to the licensee's QA program as described in the FSAR. There were no apparent deviations of the specification from reference codes and industry standards.

The NRC inspector reviewed the Standard Site Procedure Manual, SSP-11, "Fabrication, Erection and Bolt-Up of Structural Steel," to ascertain whether the manual conforms to the structural steel specification as well as the licensee's QA program. It was noted by the NRC inspector that the procedure established appropriate methods and requirements for the fabrication, assembly, erection, and inspection of structural and miscellaneous steel.

Procedures and Specification reviewed were:

- SSP-11, "Fabrication, Erection and Bolt-Up of Structural Steel," Revision 1, effective date January 23, 1986
- Specification No. 3A010SS0030, "Erection of Structural Steel and Miscellaneous Steel," Revision 6

b. Field Observation

The NRC inspectors performed an inspection of the installation and erection of structural members and connections for the floor plan at elevation 69'-6", MEAB Unit 2 (Rm#327). Welding was not observed during this inspection.

Prior to start of the inspection the NRC inspectors witnessed the QC calibration of the torque wrenches used in checking the required torque values.

The NRC inspectors randomly selected structural steel members to determine if piece mark numbers stamped into the members matched the drawing location/orientation as specified. Structural members selected did match the installation drawing as required and no apparent discrepancies were observed in the configuration/orientation of the structural member examined. The NRC inspectors checked for minimum torque values on 22 structural connections that had been QC

accepted. One of the structural connections inspected had one bolt which was loose. The licensee performed additional inspections in the same area and found no loose bolts. Additionally, the licensee used a statistical sampling plan to determine at a 95/95 confidence level that all connections were satisfactorily inspected. The NRC inspector reviewed the results and was satisfied. The above mentioned loose bolt is considered to be an isolated case.

Drawings used were:

- . USS American Bridge

K7G3U-X5, sheet E702

- . Bechtel

3M01-9-S-4043, Revision 4
3M01-9-S-4044, Revision 4
3M01-9-S-4045, Revision 1
3M01-9-S-4001, Revision 6
3M01-9-S-4090, Revision 4

- c. Records Inspection

The NRC inspectors reviewed inspection reports related to the structural members and bolted connections examined. The records were legible and easily retrievable. Records indicated that work accomplishments were consistent with specification and procedure requirements.

Records reviewed were:

EBASCO Inspection Report (IR) No.

- . 3167B2
- . 3117B2
- . 3158B2
- . 3133B2
- . 3125B2

- 7. Review of Nonconformance Reporting

The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's commitment to nonconformance reporting in the "Quality Assurance Program Description," Section 15, which requires that the licensee and prime contractors Quality Assurance Program include a system which is documented by written procedures for the identification, segregation and disposition of nonconforming materials, parts and components. The procedures are to specify the preparation and

handling of nonconformance documents, segregation requirements and which groups are responsible for review and disposition of the items. Documentation is required to: (a) identify the nonconforming item; (b) describe the nonconformance; (c) the disposition of the nonconformance; (d) inspection requirements; (e) include signature approval of the disposition and final closeout.

Procedure SSP-19 of the licensee's Standard Site Procedure (SSP), paragraph 5.1.5, states that "NCRs are not to be used to report procedural violations, design conflicts or other system QA problems unless the quality of the hardware is affected." Also, the contractor's procedure for Nonconformance Reporting QCP 15.1 states, "NCRs are not to be used to report procedural violations or other system QA problems unless it affects quality of hardware. Procedural violations may be reported to QA for appropriate action."

For reporting "Hold Point" or other procedural violations, the QC inspectors have been orally instructed to notify the QA group by memo, telephone, verbal or any other available means. At this point the QA group may initiate a Site Deficiency Report (SDR) for processing. No written project procedure exists which requires inspectors to report "Hold Points" or other procedural deviations, etc. Such deviations constitute a failure to follow procedures. This is an apparent violation of Criterion X and XVI of Appendix B. (86-02-1)

8. Piping (Safety-Related)

The purpose of this piping inspection was to assure that the design basis as described in the FSAR is transcribed into applicable specifications and procedures and that these methods are adequately performed, inspected and documented.

a. Procedures Review

The FSAR in Section 3 describes the programmatic requirements and classifies safety-related piping in various tables. The components/systems are classed by safety class, standard or code applicability, code class, quality assurance class and seismic design group in the tables in Section 3.2. The piping program is in accordance with ASME Section III.

The classifications are further delineated in the Bechtel Specification 5L019PS004, Revision 8, "Criteria for Piping Design." This document includes a service index which describes piping system, item code, quality class, design base reference, pressure, temperature, material and specification code. The appended specification sheets detail the materials and sizes for each service and design code. This specification appears to be adequate.

The specification for "Fabrication of ASME Section III Piping 2 1/2 and Larger," specification 4L020PS0100, Revision 5, outlines the methods and procedures for conformance to ASME codes including materials, welding, nondestructive examination cleaning, coating, heat treating and workmanship. In reviewing this specification, it appears that it is thorough and adequate in content.

Specification 5A010PS002, Revision 7, "Piping Erection and Field Fabrication," delineates the parameters and sets forth the guidelines and inspection requirements from fabrication thru cleaning.

Procedure SSP-10, Revision 1, "Installation and Field Fabrication of Piping," was reviewed for adequacy from requisition of materials until final inspection of completed assemblies. The procedure was thorough in the instruction for installation of assemblies, rework or modification. Fabrication, bolting and final inspection checklists were adequate and had sign-offs for the major steps and hold points and provision for ANI or supervisory review.

Procedure SSP-12, Revision 1, "On-Site Shop Fabrication," details the fabrication steps, from raw materials to completion of piping assemblies at the fab shop. The procedure is inclusive of the necessary steps and controls to assure proper workmanship, inspection and ANI or supervisory review.

Other procedures reviewed which were relative to the functions of this inspection were:

- . The Project Quality Assurance Plan, Revision 8 - this document describes the basic assignments of responsibility for each particular phase of activity.
- . QCP 9.1, Revision 6, "Weld Inspection" - Ebasco - details the work process thru final inspection for the associated welding effort.
- . STP-PQPM Section 4, "Purchasing," Revision 4, - this procedure requires the inclusion of specification requirements into the purchase order.
- . STP-PQPM Section 18, "Audits," Revision 7.
- . SSP-13, Revision 1, "Materials Control/Storage and Handling."
- . SSP-22, Revision 1, "Piping System Cleanliness."

b. Control of Fabricated Piping Spool Pieces

Fifteen fabricated spool pieces in pipe yard A were selected at random for verification of dimensions to the fabrication isometric drawing. Ten of the spools were fabricated under the direction of the present

engineer (Bochtel) and five under the previous engineer (B&R). All of the pieces were fabricated in the Southwest Fabricating Company shops in Houston. Each assembly was inspected for damage, arc strikes, size, protection and dimensions i.e., weld to weld, configuration, flange to welds, angles and code markings and workmanship of welds.

The yard foreman was asked to locate the spools in the yard according to the existing program used in controlling and locating each piece. The 15 pieces were correctly spotted in the yard. It was also noted that the materials in the yard were resting on wooden dunnage and the yard was well drained and laid out by row and section. The pieces examined were:

Auxiliary Feedwater	Q2660-AF-38
Main Steam	Q2659-MS-2
Reactor Coolant	Q2660-RC-25
Reactor Coolant	Q2660-RC-41
Reactor Coolant	Q2660-RC-14
Safety Injection	Q2660-SIR-29
Safety Injection	Q2660-SI-61
Safety Injection	Q2660-SI-31
Residual Heat Removal	Q2660-RH-24
Residual Heat Removal	Q6184-RH-109
Essential Cooling Water	Q2661-EW-197
Essential Cooling Water	Q2661-EW-260
Containment Spray	Q6184-CS-40
Containment Spray	Q6184-CS-27
Containment Spray	Q6184-CS-127

No discrepancies were noted during the inspection of the fabricated pre-installed piping spools.

c. System Walkdown and Inspection

An inspection of the major lines of the fabricated piping in the High Head Safety Injection, Low Head Safety Injection and Containment Spray System in Bays A, B, and C in the Fuel Handling Building at elevations -2' to -30' was performed with the following results:

The suction side header consisted of 16" main pipe reducing to 12" for the Low Head, 10" for the High Head and 12" for the Containment Spray. The three trains in each bay were examined from the containment penetration to the second motor operated valve on the header and to the pump. Approximately 125 linear feet of piping in each bay was inspected to the following drawings:

2F369PSI572 sheets 3, 4, & 6
5F369PCS515 sheets 1, 2, & 3

The discharge side of the High Head was 6" piping, the Low Head 8" and the Containment Spray 8". The three trains in each bay were examined to the details of the drawings which were:

5F369PSI572 sheets 1, 2, & 7
 2F369PSI572 sheet 5
 5F369PCS515 sheets 1, 2, & 3

The examination included the piping from the pump to the containment penetration. The piping inspected consisted of approximately 300 linear feet in each bay.

No deficiencies were observed in the inspection of the three systems in each of three bays.

Also observed in the inspection was the cutting, cleaning, and replacement of the Low Head suction pipe in Bay A. The cutting, weld prep and weld out appeared satisfactory. The NRC inspector also witnessed the flushing of part of the Low Head system in the Fuel Building and Containment Building.

d. Records Review

Qualification records for welders were reviewed in the Weld Test Shop for five welders who were qualified to weld stainless steel in addition to other types. The record of Welder Qualification Test (ASME), Welder Qualification Test Record (AWS) and associated documentation were reviewed for completeness, accuracy, adequacy, and testing. These records were noted to be complete. Additionally, the test shop facility was found to be clean and in order.

Training records for mechanical-piping inspectors were reviewed in the Ebasco training office for seven inspectors who were qualified to different levels and types of inspection. The following records were reviewed for completeness and included the Individual Quality Assurance Training Summary, Summary of Qualification, procedure certification, test scores and grades, training assignments, and sign offs and examinations and scores. Also reviewed were work and experience history, education and training. No deficiencies were noted in this area.

Nonconformance reporting concerning the safety injection system was reviewed in order to assess the effectiveness of the program. Ten NCRs were reviewed for legibility, completeness and review cycle or processing and resolution. The following nonconformance reports were reviewed and found to be satisfactory:

C-M-00266-R2	C-P-00542-R0	C-P-03198-R0
F-M-03122-R0	C-P-00730-R0	C-P-03300-R0
B-N-03013-R0	C-P-00880-R0	C-P-03800-R2
C-P-00192-R2		

The HL&P audit schedule was reviewed and noted to indicate sufficient audits in the piping area.

Fifteen packages of data for field welding in the safety injection and containment spray system were tracked through the review cycle and into the records management system vault. The specific item reviewed was the Process Data Checklist which is a record of all of the steps involved in the weld. The following were reviewed and found to be satisfactory.

Low Head suction	A - SI-1101-FW0012 & FW0023
Low Head suction	B - SI-1201-FW0006 & FW0017
Low Head suction	C - SI-1301-FW0006 & FW0017
Containment Spray suction	C - CS-1101-FW0001
Low Head discharge	A - SI-1105-FW0002
Low Head discharge	A - SI-1102-FW0002
Low Head discharge	B - SI-1205-FW0002
Low Head discharge	B - SI-1202-FW0002
Low Head discharge	C - SI-1305-FW0002
Low Head discharge	C - SI-1302-FW0002
High Head discharge	A - SI-1106-FW0097
High Head discharge	B - SI-1206-FW0001
High Head discharge	C - SI-1306-FW0039

In general, it was observed by the NRC inspector that the records are properly identified and stored and are readily retrievable from the work stations and records vault.

9. Exit Interview

The NRC inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) on February 14, 1986, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.