

DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY OPERATIONS
NOTIFICATION OF AN INCIDENT OR OCCURRENCE

Facility: TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY (BROWNS FERRY 2, BWR REACTOR)
DOCKET NO. 50-260

Problem: MALFUNCTION OF SAFETY RELIEF VALVE

On November 25, 1974, TVA telephoned Regulatory Operations, Region II (Atlanta) concerning the failure of one Target Rock safety relief valve to reseal on November 24, 1974. The following information was reported:

1. During the startup tests of the main steam relief valves (RV's) at 75% power, one of the eleven Target Rock RV's failed to reseal after being lifted manually. Subsequent exercising of the valve failed to cause it to reseal. The reactor was manually tripped about 10 minutes after the RV malfunctioned. The RV remained open for approximately 15 minutes and resealed automatically when the reactor coolant system pressure had decreased to approximately 580 psig.
2. The residual heat removal system (RHRS) was immediately initiated in the torus cooling mode and the torus water temperature did not exceed 104°F.
3. There was no detectable release of radioactivity associated with the incident.
4. The RV will be disassembled to determine the cause of failure and a Target Rock representative will be on site the week of December 2, 1974, to observe the disassembly. The RV in question will be replaced with a valve from Unit 3. During heatup the valve will be tested at rated temperature and pressure to verify proper lifting and closure.
5. The RV's are designed to discharge below the surface of the water in the torus. An internal and external inspection of the torus will be conducted for any signs of damage by the RV blowdown.
6. TVA expects to restart the reactor with a spare valve by November 29 or 30, 1974.
7. TVA will notify Region II, prior to restarting the reactor, concerning the status of their inspections and corrective actions.

Action Taken By Regulatory Operations:

1. Further action by RO will be based on the valve inspection results and identification of the cause of the malfunction.

2. Region II and TVA have issued a press release on this occurrence.
3. The assistants to the Commissioners, the staff of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the Office of Information Services have been notified by telephone.

Contact:

Further information concerning this occurrence can be obtained from:

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<TITLE> BLOWDOWN INCIDENT AT GERMAN BWR WUERGASSEN

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<ABSTRACT> DURING STARTUP TESTS AT WUERGASSEN, A 670 MW(E) BOILING WATER REACTOR IN WEST GERMANY, A RELIEF VALVE OPENED AND COULD NOT BE CLOSED ALLOWING STEAM BLOWDOWN TO THE SUPPRESSION CHAMBER. OPERATORS TRIED TO REDUCE THE POWER SLOWLY TO AVOID THERMAL STRESS ON THE VESSEL BUT THE TEMPERATURE INCREASED IN THE SUPPRESSION CHAMBER AND PRESSURE PULSATIONS RESULTED WHICH CREATED A LEAK IN THE CHAMBER BOTTOM. WATER ESCAPED INTO LOWER PART OF SAFETY CONTAINMENT WHEREUPON REACTOR WAS SHUT DOWN QUICKLY. REPAIRS WILL TAKE ABOUT 2 MONTHS.

<KEYWORDS> REACTOR; BWR;CONTAINMENT; PRESSURE SUPPRESSION;FAILURE; EQUIPMENT; GERMANY;INCIDENT; EQUIPMENT;PRESSURE RELIEF;REACTOR STARTUP EXPERIENCE; BLOWDOWN;LEAK;VALVES

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