

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)																				Form Rev. 2.0							
Facility Name (1) Quad Cities Unit One										Docket Number (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 5 4										Page (3) 1 of 0 4							
Title (4) A visual examination, (VT-2), was not performed due to procedural deficiencies following a High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System valve replacement, as required by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section XI and Technical Specification (TS) Section 4.0.E.																											
Event Date (5)						LER Number (6)						Report Date (7)						Other Facilities Involved (8)									
Month		Day		Year		Year		Sequential Number		Revision Number		Month		Day		Year		Facility Names		Docket Number(s)							
0	4	2	9	9	7	9	7	0	0	3	0	0	0	5	2	9	9	7		0	5	0	0	0			
OPERATING MODE (9)						THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11)																					
POWER LEVEL (10)		1		0		0		20.402(b)		20.405(c)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)													
								20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		X 50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)													
								20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		Other (Specify in abstract below and in text)													
								20.405(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)															
								20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(viii)(B)															
								20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)															
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																											
Name Charles Peterson, Regulatory Affairs Manager, ext. 3609										TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 3 0 9 6 5 4 - 2 2 4 1																	
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																											
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORT-ABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORT-ABLE TO NPRDS																		
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										Expected Submission Date (15)																	
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No										Month Day Year 																	
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)																											

ABSTRACT:

On 042997 at 1800 hours the Station identified a visual examination (VT-2) was not performed following a replacement of the 1-2301-45 valve in the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System. This is contrary to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section XI 1989 Edition, Subsection IWA, Paragraph IWA-5214 and Technical Specification (TS) Section 4.0.E. U-1 HPCI was subsequently declared inoperable at 1930 on 050197 following an operability screening of the event.

The root cause of the event is inadequate procedures (QCAP 0307-20, QCAP 2200-04, and QCAP 2200-09), which failed to provide clear instructions for ensuring ASME Section XI Repair/Replacement (R/R) Program requirements are included in the Work Request packages, and also entered in the Post Maintenance Testing (PMT) matrix.

Corrective actions included an immediate VT-2 examination of the 1-2301-45 valve, a review of other R/R programs for similar occurrences, and the planned revision of the administrative procedures responsible for the generation of ASME Section XI R/R Programs, Work Requests and assignment of PMT requirements.

The Safety Analysis concluded that despite the lack of a VT-2 examination, the health and safety of on-site personnel and the public was not affected. Although certified VT Examination personnel were not present during the initial HPCI Test and the ASME Code required VT-2 examination was not performed, the valve was verified to be leak tight by the HPCI system engineer. The valve would have been able to perform its function in case of an accident and subsequent HPCI initiation.

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<small>TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as (XX)</small>																			

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor - 2511 MWt rated core thermal power.

EVENT IDENTIFICATION: A visual examination, (VT-2), was not performed due to procedural deficiencies following a High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System valve replacement, as required by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section XI and Technical Specification (TS) Section 4.0.E.

A. CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT:

Unit: 1	Event Date: 42997	Event Time: 1800
Reactor Mode: 1	Mode Name: Run	Power Level: 100%

This report was initiated by Licensee Event Report 254\97\003.

Power Operation - Mode switch in the RUN position with average reactor coolant temperature at any temperature.

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

On 042697 the Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI)[BJ] Turbine Exhaust Check Valve (1-2301-45) was replaced. Following the valve's replacement, a pressure test was required by the American Society Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section XI Code and the requirement was documented on the ASME Repair/Replacement (R/R) Program that was inserted into the work request package. However, the R/R Program did not explicitly state a VT-2 was required although it was implied by the pressure testing requirement. Subsequently, a VT-2 was not added electronically to the Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) Matrix. On 042997, following the testing of Unit 1 HPCI, a station Level III VT Examiner inquired if a VT-2 was performed on the HPCI Turbine Exhaust Check Valve (1-2301-45) and discovered that it had not been performed. A Problem Identification Form was then generated and an Operability Screening was requested to determine the Operability Status of Unit 1 HPCI. On 050197, the Operability Screening determined that Unit 1 HPCI was inoperable due to the missed test.

Technical Specification (TS) 4.0.E.1 states: "Inservice Inspection of ASME Code Class 1,2 and 3 components and Inservice Testing (IST) of ASME Code Class 1,2, and 3 pumps and valves shall be performed in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda.

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C. CAUSE OF EVENT:

The root cause of the event is due to inadequate procedures QCAP 0307-20, "ASME Section XI Repair And Replacement Program Preparation", QCAP 2200-04, "Preparation And Control Of Work Packages", and QCAP 2200-09, Post Maintenance Testing Guide. These procedures failed to provide clear instruction for ensuring ASME Section XI R/R Program requirements that are included in Work Request packages, are also entered electronically into the Work Request's PMT matrix.

QCAP 0307-20 Attachment A, "Section XI Repair/Replacement Program" that was generated for the work package did not mark the VT-2 requirement in the Pre-Service exam section, however a Functional pressure test was specified in the pressure testing requirements that implied that VT-2 exam was required. This contradictory information created confusion and contributed to the missed test.

QCAP 2200-04 and QCAP 2200-09 requires the Work Analyst to include any testing requirements specified on the R/R Program into the PMT matrix in the electronic work package. Discussions with the Work Analysts indicated that they may not necessarily see the R/R program especially when the R/R program is generated during the course of work. In this case, any testing requirements specified on the R/R program may not be included into the PMT matrix.

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS OF EVENT:

The Safety Analysis of the event was minimal and the health and safety of on-site personnel and the public was not affected. Although certified VT Examination personnel were not present during the initial HPCI Test and the ASME Code required VT-2 examination was not performed, the valve was verified to be leak tight by the HPCI system engineer. The valve would have been able to perform its function in case of an accident and subsequent HPCI initiation.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS COMPLETED:

1. The HPCI system was placed in operation and the valve was examined by a certified VT-2 examiner on 050197. No leaks were noted by the examiner and the VT exam was acceptable.
2. ASME R/R programs from other work packages were reviewed and no further instances of missed tests were found.

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TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]

- PMT requirements for VT-2 (Pressure Test) have been entered electronically into the PMT matrix by ISI personnel.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO BE COMPLETED:

- Procedure QCAP 0307-20, "ASME Section XI Repair And Replacement Program Preparation", Attachment A "Section XI Repair/Replacement Program," will be revised to provide clear instructions of when a VT-2 is required. This procedure revision will be completed by 062797. (NTS # 2541809700301; Engineering).

F. PREVIOUS EVENTS:

- LER 1-96-008**, Testing performed on the CAM check valves does not meet Tech Spec requirements due to an inadequate procedure.

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:

No Component Failures occurred that resulted in this report.