

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 4 4				PAGE (3) 1 OF 13		
TITLE (4) Failure to Meet the Operability Requirements of Automatic Containment Isolation Valves During Refueling																
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)						
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)			
0 2	1 6	8 6	8 6	0 0 2	0 0 0	3 1	8 8	6					0 5 0 0 0			
THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																
OPERATING MODE (9)		20.402(b)				20.402(a)				80.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)		
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.402(a)(1)(i)				80.38(a)(1)				80.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(a)		
0 0 0		20.402(a)(1)(ii)				80.38(a)(2)				80.73(a)(2)(vi)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 305A)		
		20.402(a)(1)(iii)				80.73(a)(2)(i)				80.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)						
		20.402(a)(1)(iv)				80.73(a)(2)(ii)				80.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)						
		20.402(a)(1)(v)				80.73(a)(2)(iii)				80.73(a)(2)(ix)						
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																
NAME W.H. Backus, Technical Assistant, Operations										TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 3 1 5 5 2 4 - 4 4 4 6						
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC						
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)												NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1500 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On February 16, 1986, at approximately 0115 hours while the unit was in the Refueling mode with safeguards 480 volt Bus #14 out for a maintenance outage, the Control Room operator, while performing RF-8.2 (Fuel Handling Instruction, Pre-Loading and Periodic Valve Alignment Check), discovered that two motor operated valves that were required to be operable for the refueling mode (ie. MOV-313 Seal Water Return CV Isolation valve and MOV-813 Supply CCW to Reactor Support Cooling CV Isolation valve) were not operable due to the Bus #14 outage. Immediate corrective action by the operator was to lock closed valves 315A & C to satisfy MOV-313 inoperability and to manually close MOV-813 and lock the handwheel. The cause was a cognitive difference in the Initial Condition requirement of cold shutdown mode between the writer and user of certain plant procedures. These procedures shall be reviewed and modified before the next Refueling outage.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

On February 16, 1986, at approximately 0115 hours while the unit was in the Refueling mode with safeguards 480 volt Bus #14 out for a maintenance outage, the Control Room operator, while performing RF-8.2 (Fuel Handling Instruction, Pre-Loading and Periodic Valve Alignment Check), discovered that two (2) motor operated valves that were required to be operable for the refueling mode (ie. MOV-313 Seal Water Return CV Isolation valve and MOV-813 Supply CCW to Reactor Support Cooling CV Isolation valve) were not operable due to the Bus #14 outage.

The inoperability of these valves resulted from the loss of their electrical power source from motor control center 1C which was de-energized when 480 volt Bus #14 was de-energized for the Bus #14 outage. This resulted in not meeting the operating limits during refueling as per R.E. Ginna Technical Specifications Section 3.8.1. The two mentioned valves would not have closed automatically from a manually initiated containment isolation signal.

On February 15, 1986, at approximately 1526 hours Motor Control Center 1C and 480 volt Bus #14 were de-energized for maintenance purposes per maintenance procedures M-44.3 and M-48.2 respectively. On February 16, 1986, at approximately 0115 hours the Control Room operator was performing Refueling procedure RF-8.2 (this procedure is performed once per day during Refueling) when he discovered that AC power was not available to the above mentioned motor operated valves. The Control Room operator informed the Shift Supervisor of this discrepancy and the Shift Supervisor ordered the affected valves closed and locked or a manual in line valve closed and locked per Technical Specification 3.8.1(a).

Review of this event has determined that the two valves did not meet Technical Specification 3.8.1 from the time the MCC-1C was de-energized until the operators took compensating measures after discovering the inoperable status of the valves, ie. a total of approximately 10 hours. However, the safety significance of this event is minimal due to MOV-313 being already closed and the system that MOV-813 is associated with was a closed system that was in use. Also the updated FSAR analysis for a fuel handling

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 386A's) (17)

accident inside containment establishes acceptable offsite limiting doses following rupture of all rods of an assembly operated at peak power without taking credit for containment isolation or effluent filtration prior to the release.


The cause of this event has been determined to be a lack of clarity in plant Technical Specifications with regard to Refueling integrity requirements and applying them to plant procedures such as M-44.3. As a result, a thorough investigation was not performed by both the plant staff and operations personnel to determine the effects on the required Technical Specification requirements. The plant Technical Specifications for the cold shutdown mode were met and the applicable step was signed off. However, the plant was also simultaneously in the refueling mode with refueling operations in progress. Technical Specifications for refueling operations require the aforementioned valves to meet the refueling integrity operability requirements.

In order to meet the Technical Specifications section 3.1, for operation of the Reactor Coolant System when fuel is in the reactor and maintain reliable AC power, plant management had determined that the most appropriate time to perform the Bus 14 and Motor Control Center 1C outage from a reactor core safety standpoint, was while the refueling cavity was flooded with > 23 feet of water over the reactor vessel flange and 1 RHR train operating (Refueling operations). This provided for more than adequate margin of reactor safety.

The following corrective action to preclude this event is planned;

A proposed Technical Specification change has been submitted for clarification of integrity required for Refueling operations. This will provide the guidance necessary to prevent this type of event in the future.

In addition, plant staff and operations personnel will be instructed to be more cognizant of changing plant conditions with respect to Technical Specification requirements.



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
March 18, 1986

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Subject: LER 86-002, Failure to Meet the Operability Requirements of Automatic Containment Isolation Valves During Refueling
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant
Docket No. 50-244

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(i) which requests a report of, "any operation or condition prohibited by the Plant Technical Specifications." The attached Licensee Event Report LER 86-002 is hereby submitted.

Very truly yours,


Roger W. Kober

xc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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