

ENCLOSURE 2

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV

Docket Nos.: 50-498
50-499

License Nos.: NPF-76
NPF-80

Report No.: 50-498/97-15
50-499/97-15

Licensee: Houston Lighting & Power Company

Facility: South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2

Location: FM 521 - 8 miles west of Wadsworth
Wadsworth, Texas

Dates: May 5-9, 1997

Inspector: Thomas W. Dexter, Senior Physical Security Specialist
Plant Support Branch

Approved: Blaine Murray, Chief, Plant Support Branch
Division of Reactor Safety

ATTACHMENT: Supplemental Information

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2
NRC Inspection Report 50-498/97-15; 50-499/97-15

This routine, announced inspection focused upon specific areas of the licensee's physical security program. These areas included review of records and reports, testing and maintenance, detection aids - protected area, compensatory measures, access control of personnel and packages, management support, and review of previous inspection findings.

Plant Support

- Two violations were identified involving (1) the failure to secure a vital area door and (2) failure to revoke a badge following the failure of a fitness-for-duty test. The security staff was correctly reporting security events. A very good records and reports program was in place (Section S1.1).
- Security personnel had an excellent knowledge of testing procedures concerning the access control equipment. All access control equipment functioned as required (Section S2.1).
- Very good progress had been accomplished in completing the installation of their new perimeter intrusion detection system (Section S2.2).
- The compensatory measure program was effectively implemented. Security personnel were well trained on the program requirements (Section S4.1).
- A very good program for searching personnel and vehicles was maintained (Section S4.2).
- An effective security training program had been implemented. Medical examinations for security officers were thorough and well documented. Facilities and firing range were excellent (Section 5.1).
- Senior management support for the security organization was strong. The security program was implemented by a well trained and highly qualified staff. The morale of the security officers was very good (Section 6.1).

Report Details

IV. Plant Support

S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities

SI.1 Records and Reports (81700-02.01)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed safeguards event logs and security program condition reports to determine compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.21(b) and (c), 10 CFR 26.73, and the physical security plan.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspector reviewed the security event logs and security program condition reports from October 1, 1996, through April 30, 1997. The records were available for review and maintained for the time required by regulations. The inspector determined that the licensee conformed to the regulatory requirements regarding the reporting of security events. The logs and condition reports were organized in numerical sequence and easy to audit. The following two events were specifically reviewed in detail.

- Uncompensated Vital Area Door in Access Mode

Licensee Condition Report 97-6585 identified that on April 2, 1997, at approximately 6:44 a.m. an alarm station operator discovered that a vital area door had been left in the access mode (the lock alarm and the balance magnetic switch alarm were taken out-of-service) without being controlled by the security system or by an armed security officer referencing an access authorization list. The door alarm had been inactivated at 7:06 a.m. on April 1, 1997, so it could be blocked open for painting work in the vital area. A compensatory officer was posted at the door. At 5:08 p.m. the workers left the area. The compensatory officer secured the door and called the central alarm station operator to reactivate the alarm on the door. The officer claims he received an acknowledgement from the station operator, carded out from the area and waited to ensure there were no alarms on the door. When he did not hear a call for an alarm on the door he departed the area. However, it appears that the alarm station operator did not place the vital area door back in the alarm mode.

The licensee's immediate compensatory actions were to search the vital area for any foreign materials or objects and then test and secure the door alarm. However, the licensee had not developed long-term corrective actions.

South Texas Project Physical Security Plan, Revision 7A, dated January 14, 1997, Chapter 4, paragraph 4.4, "Vital Area Access - Personnel," states, in part, "Access to Vital Areas shall be controlled by the security system or by an armed security officer referencing an access authorization list. Personnel entry/exit is documented for all vital area access except the control room."

The licensee's failure to control a vital area door in the access mode, between the afternoon of April 1, 1997, and the morning of April 2, 1997, is a violation of its security plan (50-498;-499/9715-01).

- Failure to Inactivate Badge - Fitness-For-Duty Failure

Licensee Condition Report 97-0165 identified that on February 5, 1997, while a licensee fitness-for-duty department employee was inputting drug test results into a computer data when the individual noted that a contract employee, who had failed a for-cause alcohol test on February 3, 1997, had not had his badge revoked. The department employee completed a condition report and notified security to revoke the badge in the security computer.

The licensee's investigation determined that the employee's supervisor had maintained control of the employee's security badge and that the employee had not entered the protected area.

The licensee's corrective action involved the project engineering supervisor discussing the importance of the line of communication and the procedure requirements for badge transactions. However, the inspector determined that the following licensee's security plan and procedures were not implemented:

South Texas Project Physical Security Plan, Revision 7A, dated January 14, 1997, Chapter 4, paragraph 4.2, states, in part, "If a person is terminated for-cause, that individual's access is revoked and his/her assigned badge is deactivated through the security computer system prior to or simultaneously with notification of termination."

South Texas Project Procedure OPGP09-ZA-0002, "Fitness For Duty Program," Revision 7, dated October 24, 1996, paragraph 6.11, "Confirmed Positive Test Results," states, in part, "A 'Confirmed Positive' notification letter (Form 2) is delivered to the department manager, or designee, notifying them the individual is denied site access. The HL&P employee will be terminated . . . Notification of the above positive test results shall be made using the guidelines contained in OPGP03-ZX-0002, Condition Reporting Process."

South Texas Project Procedure OPGP03-ZX-0002, "Condition Reporting Process," Revision 13, dated September 12, 1996, paragraph 4.1, "Condition Identification," states, in part, "For conditions where security concerns are obvious or perceived, contact Plant Protection immediately and deliver the CR form to Plant Protection, or if database entry was made, promptly in form the Security Force Supervisor of the Condition Report number."

The failure to initiate a proper condition report and a Form 2 is a violation of the security plan and implementing procedures (50-498;-499/9715-02).

c. Conclusions

Two violations were identified concerning (1) the failure to secure a vital area door and (2) failure to revoke a badge following the failure of a fitness-for-duty test. The security staff was correctly reporting security events. A very good records and reports program was in place.

S2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment

S2.1 Testing and Maintenance (81700-02.07)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the testing program for the access control equipment.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspector observed the licensee conducted testing of the explosive and metal detectors and the x-ray machines at the east and west protected area access facilities. A security person working at each facility tested the equipment. Both personnel were knowledgeable of the testing procedures and both conducted the tests in a similar manner. All equipment tested satisfactorily.

c. Conclusions

Security personnel had an excellent knowledge of testing procedures concerning the access control equipment. All access control equipment functioned as required.

S2.2 Detection Aids - Protected Area (81700-02.04)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the protected area detection aid system.

b. Observations and Findings

The licensee was in the process of replacing the entire protected area detection aid system. The detection systems' capabilities, zoning of the alarm systems, detection system security, and types of detection aids have been changed significantly.

The inspector discussed with members of the security system engineering and installation group the estimated completion time for the perimeter microwave system. The licensee expects to have the system tested and turned over to security before the end of June 1997. The inspector observed portions of the installed system on May 7, 1997. The detection systems appeared to be well designed and should detect an intruder attempting to enter the protected area.

c. Conclusions

The licensee was making very good progress toward the completion of the installation of their new perimeter intrusion detection aids.

S4 Security and Safeguards Staff Knowledge and Performance

S4.1 Compensatory Measures (81700-02.07)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the licensee's compensatory measures program. The areas inspected included deployment of compensatory measures and the effectiveness of those measures.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspector confirmed through a review of condition reports and security event logs that the licensee deployed compensatory measures in a manner consistent with the requirements in the security plan. The inspector determined through interviews of security personnel that the security personnel available for assignment to compensatory security posts were properly trained for those duties. The inspector

also observed security personnel posted on several compensatory posts around the perimeter of the protected area. Personnel appeared to be observant and those that the inspectors interviewed were knowledgeable of their duties and responsibilities.

c. Conclusions

The compensatory measures program was effectively implemented. The observed compensatory measures met the requirements in the security plan. Security personnel were well trained on the program requirements.

S4.2 Access Control of Personnel and Vehicles (81700-02.05)

a. Inspection Scope

The access control program for personnel and vehicles was inspected.

b. Observations and Findings

Access control activities were observed at the both security building entrances and at the vehicle positive several times during the inspection. The licensee properly controlled personnel access to the protected area. The protected area access control equipment was inspected and found to be functional and well maintained.

c. Conclusions

A very good program for searching personnel and vehicles was maintained.

S5 Security and Safeguards Staff Training and Qualification

S5.1 Personnel Training and Qualification (81700-02.08)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the licensee's security training and qualification program.

b. Observations and Findings

The security organization conducted all required training in accordance with its approved security, training, and contingency plans. The inspector confirmed, by a review of the composite security training records, that the required training was conducted every 12 months.

The inspector observed security officers during the performance of their duties. All security officers displayed excellent conduct and knowledge of the procedural requirements.

- Medical Examinations

Medical examination records for 10 armed security officers were reviewed. The medical records were complete and indicated that the required annual medical examinations were thorough and conducted in a timely manner. The results of the medical examinations were properly documented.

- Training Records

Training records for 10 armed security officers were reviewed. The records were complete and all required training was current and conducted within every 12-month period.

- Training Aids and Facilities

The inspector verified that the security contractor was providing training videos covering numerous security subjects. The training facility was excellent. It was located in a permanent type building adjacent to the protected area and convenient for personnel to use. The licensee's rebuilt firing range was excellent.

c. Conclusions

An effective security training program had been implemented. Medical examinations for security officers were thorough and well documented. Facilities and firing range were excellent.

S6 Security Organization and Administration

S6.1 Management Support (81700-02.01)

a. Inspection Scope

The effectiveness and adequacy of management support was inspected to determine the degree of management support for the physical security program.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspector determined by discussions with security force personnel that the security program received strong support from senior management. The inspector determined that the security program was implemented by a well trained and highly qualified security staff. All members of the security organization had a clear understanding of their duties and responsibilities and the morale of the security officers was very good.

c. Conclusions

Senior management support for the security organization was strong. The security program was implemented by a well trained and highly qualified staff. The morale of the security officers was very good.

S8 Miscellaneous Security and Safeguards Issues (92904)

S8.1 (Closed) Unresolved Item 498;499/9616-01: Failure to Verify Criminal History of Foreign Nationals

During the access authorization inspection the inspectors identified two individuals who appeared not to have had their criminal histories checked in their countries of origin. Guidance received from the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Regulation was that it was expected that licensees would conduct criminal history checks with foreign countries. During this inspection the inspector, with the licensee determined that one of the individuals, although born in Mexico was a United States citizen. The second individual was a citizen of Mexico and was in the United States on a visa. During the background check the validity of the visa was not checked. Subsequent investigation by the licensee determined that the individual has been in the United States for 20 years and learned through the Department of Immigration and Naturalization Services that the visa was valid and current. The licensee had completed all other background screening including a FBI criminal history check prior to granting unescorted access to the individual. This unresolved item is considered closed.

V. Management Meetings

X1 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on May 9, 1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.

ATTACHMENT

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

W. Cottle, Executive Vice President and General Manager, Nuclear
J. Groth, Vice President, Nuclear Operation
P. Arrington, Assistant Licensing Specialist
J. Drymiller, Supervisor, Security
M. Hall, Senior Operations Coordinator, Security
S. Head, Licensing Supervisor
J. Hinson, Manager, Employee Relations
A. Keating, Electrical/Instrumentation and Controls Manager
T. Koser, Licensing Engineer
L. Martin, General Manager, Nuclear Assurance and Licensing
M. McBurnett, Licensing Director
J. Northrop, Security System Engineer
R. Piggott, Senior Quality Assurance Specialist
A. Rodriguez, Senior Coordinator, Security
C. Sanders, Lead Training Instructor
D. Sheesley, Security Systems Supervisor
J. Sheppard, Assistant to Executive Vice President
M. Smith, Administrator, Plant Support Quality
F. Timmons, Manager Plant Protection Department
P. Travis, System Engineer Supervisor

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

IP 81700 Physical Security Program for Power Reactors
IP 92904 Followup - Plant Support

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED

Open

50-498;499/9715-01 NOV Failure to Properly Secure Vital Area Door
50-498;499/9715-02 NOV Failure to Inactivate Badge For Fitness-For-Duty Failure

Closed

50-498;499/9616-01 URI Failure to Verify Criminal History of Foreign National

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

South Texas Project Physical Security Plan, Revision 7A, January 14, 1997

Security event logs from October 1, 1996, through April 30, 1997 condition reports for the same period.

South Texas Project Procedure OPGP09-ZA-0002, Fitness For Duty Program, Revision 7, dated October 24, 1996

South Texas Project Procedure OPGP03-ZX-0002, Condition Reporting Process, Revision 13, dated September 12, 1996

Security Officer Training Records (composite listing)

Background investigation (file) records for two individuals granted unescorted access authorization to the protected area

Medical Records for ten members of the security organization

31-Day Access Review Records for January and February 1997