

FORM 1 LER SCSS DATA 00-00-85
 BUCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1981 001 0 8102060421 163459 01/01/81

DOCKET: 250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE: PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSC: WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: IPL

ABSTRACT
 WHILE TESTING THE B EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR (EDG) A LOSS OF VOLTAGE CONTROL WAS EXPERIENCED. THE EDG WAS MANUALLY SHUTDOWN. AN INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT TWO FUSES ASSOCIATED WITH THE 120 VAC SUPPLY AND VOLTAGE REGULATOR TRANSFORMER HAD FAILED TO OPEN. THE FUSES WERE REPLACED, AND THE EDG TESTED AND RETURNED TO SERVICE. THE CAUSE OF THE FUSE FAILURE COULD NOT BE DETERMINED, HOWEVER, THE CONTACT DAMPS WERE FOUND TO BE LOOSE ON THE FUSE BODY. THE 2-21X AMPERE FUSES WERE REPLACED. THE ANNUAL MAINTENANCE ASSOCIATED WITH THE EDGS TO INCLUDE CHECKING FUSE 3 ASSOCIATED WITH THE EDGS

FORM 2 LER SCSS DATA 00-00-85
 BUCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1981 002 0 8102030543 163517 01/03/81

DOCKET: 250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE: PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSC: WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: IPL

REFERENCE LERS:
 1 251/74-008 2 251/77-011 3 251/77-012 4 251/79-001

ABSTRACT
 WHILE PERFORMING A PLANNED UNIT SHUTDOWN, THE BORIC ACID FLOWPATH FROM THE BORIC ACID TANKS WAS FOUND TO BE OBSTRUCTED. SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: AO 251-74-08, AND LERS 251-77-11, 251-77-12, AND 251-77-1. THE APPARENT CAUSE OF THE OBSTRUCTION WAS REDUCED TEMPERATURE RESULTING FROM FAILURE OF ONE CHANNEL OF HEAT TRACING CIRCUIT NO. 21. THE CIRCUIT WAS FOUND TO HAVE 4 OPEN SECTIONS AND A PARTIAL GROUND. THE ROOT CAUSE COULD NOT BE DETERMINED. THE TEMPERATURE SET POINT OF THE REMAINING CHANNEL WAS INCREASED TO RE-ESTABLISH FLOW. DAMAGED CHANNEL WAS REPAIRED.

FORM 3 LER SCSS DATA 00-00-85
 BUCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1981 003 1 810700400 163494 01/05/81

DOCKET: 250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE: PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSC: WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.

DCS

B/I

B/I

SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS

GENERIC PROBLEM OF CRACKS IN COIL SPOOLS OF GENERAL ELECTRIC HFA RELAYS. RE: 10 CFR 11.

WATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

931 REPORTS ASSOCIATED WITH PART 21

REFERENCE LERS:

1 251/75-008

ABSTRACT

IN THE COURSE OF INVESTIGATING POTENTIAL CRACKS OBSERVED IN THE LEXAN COIL SPOOLS OF GENERAL ELECTRIC CG TYPE HFA RELAYS, A NEW COIL ASSEMBLY IN SPARE PARTS STORAGE WAS CONFIRMED TO HAVE A CRACK IN THE SPOOL END PLATE. THE CONCERN IS THAT A CRACKED SPOOL COULD RESULT IN A BROKEN PIECE WHICH COULD PREVENT DESIRED CONTACT ACTION. A COIL INSPECTION PROGRAM WAS ESTABLISHED AND IMPLEMENTED. A SIMILAR HFA RELAY PROBLEM WAS REPORTED AS AO 251-75-8. NO OPERATIONAL FAILURE OF THIS TYPE RELAY DUE TO COIL SPOOL CRACKS HAS BEEN EXPERIENCED. ONE COIL IN SERVICE WAS FOUND CRACKED AND WAS REPLACED. INSPECTION RESULTS REVEALED POSSIBLE INDICATIONS ON 39 OF THE 184 RELAYS.

FORM 4 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1981 000 1 8105270314 164695 01/20/81

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

REFERENCE LERS:

1 250/80-018 2 251/80-006

ABSTRACT

THE "A" AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP FAILED TO MEET THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA OF THE SURVEILLANCE OF TECH. SPECS. THE MOST RECENT OCCURRENCES RELATING TO THE AFW SYSTEM WERE REPORTED AS LER 250-80-18 AND LER 251-80-6. THE VALVE PLUG IN CV-3705 ("A" AFW STEAM TURBINE PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE) WAS DAMAGED. THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE COULD NOT BE DETERMINED. THE STEM AND PLUG WERE REPLACED.

FAILED
AFW
SUAV.

FORM 5 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1981 000 0 8104130394 165421 03/10/81

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: IECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS

WATER BACKED UP INTO AREA CONTAINING COMPONENT COOLING WATER

NOTICE: LER DOES FOR THIS LER ARE:
 1. FAILURE THAT COULD EASILY ESCAPE DETECTION

ABSTRACT

WHILE IN THE PROCESS OF TRANSFERRING LAUNDRY WATER TO A MONITOR TANK, THE MONITOR TANK OVERFLOOED. SOME OF THE OVERFLOW WATER BACKED UP THE DRAIN HEADER TO THE FLOOR OF THE COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP AND HEAT EXCHANGER ROOM. SOME OF THIS WATER POTENTIALLY COULD HAVE ENTERED THE STORM DRAIN SYSTEM FROM OTHER NORMAL DRAINS IN THIS ROOM. THE POTENTIAL FOR THIS UNINTENDED FLOW PATH DOES EXIST AND ALTERATIONS ARE BEING EVALUATED.

FORM 7-85
 Docket: 250 TURKEY POINT 3
 REGION: 1
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: F/L

ER SCSS DATA
 Docket: 250 TURKEY POINT 3
 REGION: 1
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: F/L

COMMENTS

EVENT OCCURRED IN MAY 1980. ON 12/2/81, NRC INSPECTOR REQUIRED AN LER.
 (SEE INSP. REPTS. 250/81-05 AND 251/81-05)

ABSTRACT

DURING A FOLLOWUP OF OUR ITV CONTROL SURVEILLANCES BY THE USRY RESIDENT INSPECTORS, IT WAS NOTED THAT A REPORT WAS NOT SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO TECH. SPECS. WHEN THE ACTION MODE OF TECH. SPECS. WAS ENTERED, THIS FINDING 1) DOCUMENTED IN 1 & E INSPECTION REPORTS 50-250/81-05 AND 50-251/81-05. THE FAILURE TO REPORT ENTRY INTO AN ACTION MODE WAS DUE TO A MISINTERPRETATION OF THE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH TECH. SPECS. THE FLANT IS IN THE PROCESS OF OBTAINING INTERPRETATIONS OF REGULATORY GUIDE 1.1A) MADE BY BOTH THE COMMISSION AND GENERAL COUNSEL.

FORM 7-85
 Docket: 250 TURKEY POINT 3
 REGION: 1
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: F/L

ER SCSS DATA
 Docket: 250 TURKEY POINT 3
 REGION: 1
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: F/L

REFERENCE LERs:

1 250/79-031 2 251/80-007

ABSTRACT

THE DISC STUD NUT WAS DISCOVERED TO BE MISSING NUT. THE PIVOT PINS WERE FOUND TO BE MISSING FROM THE 3A FEEDWATER BYPASS CHECK VALVE. PREVIOUS LERS WERE 250-79-31 AND 251-80-07. THE CAUSE OF STUD NUT DISLODGING FROM THE DISC STUD WAS FAILURE OF THE ASSOCIATED LOCKING

DEVICE. THE CAUSE OF THE MISSING PIVOT PINS COULD NOT BE DETERMINED. BOTH VALVES WERE RETURNED TO ORIGINAL DESIGN. A PLANT CHANGE/MODIFICATION IS BEING PROCESSED TO INSTALL AN IMPROVED LOCKING DEVICE ON THE MAIN FEEDWATER CHECK VALVES DURING THE NEXT EXTENDED OUTAGE.

FORM 8 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1981 000 0 8105190387 166128 04/16/81

BUCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSC:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: IECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

ABSTRACT

THE CRACK WAS LOCATED IN A DRAIN LINE FROM THE CHARGING SYSTEM DOWNSTREAM OF THE REGENERATIVE HEAT EXCHANGER. THE CRACK OCCURRED IN THE WELD AREA BETWEEN THE 1/2 INCH PIPE NIPPLE ASSOCIATED WITH DRAIN VALVE 1206 AND THE REDUCING ELBOW TAPPED FROM THE THREE-INCH CHARGING LINE. THE DEFECTIVE AREA WAS CUT OUT, AND THE NIPPLE WAS SHORTENED AND REWELDED TO THE ELBOW SOCKET. THE CAUSE OF THE CRACK COULD NOT POSITIVELY BE DETERMINED, HOWEVER, IT WAS MOST PROBABLY CAUSED BY STRESS DUE TO LINE VIBRATION. A PLANT CHANGE/MODIFICATION WILL BE IMPLEMENTED TO CHANGE THE DESIGN OF VENT AND DRAIN ASSEMBLIES. THE VALVES TO BE USED IN THE NEW DESIGN ARE LONG LEAD PROCUREMENT ITEMS (APPROXIMATELY 8 MONTHS).

FORM 9 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1981 000 0 8106010396 166538 04/20/81

BUCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSC:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: IECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

ABSTRACT

WHILE PERFORMING LOW POWER PHYSICS TESTING FOLLOWING A REFUELING OUTAGE, IT WAS OBSERVED THAT ALL REACTOR PROTECTION BISTABLES ASSOCIATED WITH N-43 WERE NOT IN THE TRIP MODE WHILE THE INSTRUMENT WAS USED AS INPUT INTO THE REACTIVITY COMPUTER. PROCEDURAL INADEQUACY, IN THE INITIAL CRITICALITY AFTER REFUELING PROCEDURE, RESULTED IN THE INCOMPLETE TRIPPING OF ALL BISTABLES ASSOCIATED WITH A NUCLEAR INSTRUMENT POWER RANGE CHANNEL. INSTRUMENT POWER WAS BLOCKED CORRECTING THE INADEQUACY. A PROCEDURE CHANGE WAS SUBMITTED TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE.

FORM 10 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1981 010 0 8106080387 166558 05/01/81

NAME: J. J. INT 3 TYPE: PWR
 REGION: 2 NSS: WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

REFERENCE LER: 1 250/72-004 2 250/73-002 3 250/74-002 4 250/76-010

ABSTRACT

THE 3A COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW) PUMP DID NOT START DURING ROUTINE EQUIPMENT ROTATION. THE 3B AND 3C COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMPS REMAINED IN SERVICE. THIS FAILURE RESULTED IN 2 CCW PUMPS OPERABLE. TECH. SPECS. REQUIRES 3 PUMPS TO BE OPERABLE. SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: LERS 250-72-4, 250-73-2, 250-74-2, AND 250-76-10. OPERATIONS PERSONNEL FOUND THE 3A CCW PUMP CIRCUIT BREAKER IN THE TRIP MODE. THE CLOSING LATCH SPRING IN THE GE MAGNET-BLAST TYPE BREAKER HAD DETACHED ON ONE END WHICH PREVENTED THE CHARGING OF THE CLOSING SPRING. THE BREAKER WAS REPAIRED AND THE PUMP WAS THEN STARTED.

FORM 11 LER SCSS DATA 06-02-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1981 011 0 810620061 166260 05/06/81

DOCKET: 250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE: PWR
 REGION: 2 NSS: WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

REFERENCE LER: 1 250/30-007

ABSTRACT

TWO ELECTRICAL PENETRATION FIRE BARRIERS WERE FOUND TO BE NON-FUNCTIONAL. A FIRE WATCH PATROL WAS ESTABLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF TECH. SPECS. WHILE REPAIRS WERE COMPLETED, A SIMILAR OCCURRENCE WAS REPORTED AS LER NO. 250-30-007. THE CAUSE OF THE NON-INTACT ELECTRICAL PENETRATION FIRE BARRIERS WAS INCOMPLETE INSTALLATION WORK. ALL ELECTRICAL PENETRATION FIRE BARRIERS DEFINED BY TECH. SPECS. ARE NOW FUNCTIONAL. BOTH PLANT AND CONTRACT MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL WILL BE RE-INSTRUCTED IN THE NECESSITY FOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE FIRE STOP AND CABLE TRAY FIREPROOFING MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE.

FORM 12 LER SCSS DATA 06-02-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1981 012 0 8111050696 16924 10/20/81

DOCKET: 250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE: PWR
 REGION: 2 NSS: WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

CURRENTS
 10CFR21

DATCH LIST CODES FOR THE LER ARE:
 001 REPORTS ASSOCIATED WITH PART 21
 013 UPDATE NEEDED

REFERENCE LER:
 1 250/81-003

ABSTRACT

A WESTINGHOUSE INVESTIGATION OF TRIPPED RELAYS INDICATED THAT THE VOLTAGE SPICE, GENERATED THROUGH CURRENT INTERRUPTION TO THE RELAY COIL, COULD CAUSE ARC-OVER AND A SUBSEQUENT OPEN CIRCUIT AT THE JUNCTION BETWEEN THE COIL WINDING AND THE LEAD WIRE. THE CONCERN IS THE POSSIBILITY OF THIS FAILURE MECHANISM OCCURRING IN BOTH REACTOR SIP AND SAFEGUARDS APPLICATIONS WHENEVER THE RELAY COIL CURRENT IS INTERRUPTED. A SIMILAR LER WAS REPORTED AS LER 250-81-2. THE POOR CARE OF THE PROBLEM CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO DESIGN DEFICIENCY. THE AFFECTED COILS WILL BE REPLACED DURING THIS CURRENT OUTAGE. PENDING RECEIPT OF NEW COILS. IF THE EVENT THAT NEW COILS ARE NOT AVAILABLE BEFORE STARTUP, AN UPDATE REPORT WILL BE ISSUED DESCRIBING ALTERNATIVE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS. ST. LUCIE 1 DOES NOT HAVE THESE RELAYS. ST. LUCIE 2 IS INVESTIGATING.

FORM 13 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85
 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1981 013 2 8212090371 179720 07/10/81

DOCKET:250 SURVEY POINT 3 TYPE:PMR
 REGION: 2 NSS:TIME
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYND 4: FPL

CURRENTS
 STEP 2: EFFECT DX - CONTAINED A VOID.

ABSTRACT
 WHILE MAKING ALTERATION TO UNIT 3'S EQUIPMENT HATCH RAMP, THE CONSTRUCTION CREW DISCOVERED A SMALL VOID IN THE CONCRETE IMMEDIATELY BELOW THE EQUIPMENT HATCH BARREL. THIS WAS DETERMINED TO BE REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 6.9.2.4(9). BECAUSE OF THE SIMILARITY IN CONSTRUCTION OF UNITS 3 AND 4, UNIT 4 WAS INSPECTED FOR THE SAME DEFECT DURING ITS STEAM GENERATOR REPAIR OUTAGE. THE PRESENCE OF A SIMILAR VOID WAS CONFIRMED ON 10/11/82. DURING CONCRETE POUR AROUND THE EQUIPMENT HATCH BARREL, A SMALL VOID FORMED DIRECTLY UNDER THE HATCH BARREL. AN ENGINEERING EVALUATION PERFORMED SHORTLY AFTER THE DISCOVERY CONCLUDED THAT THE PRESENCE OF THE VOID DID NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE INTEGRITY OF THE CONTAINMENT BUILDINGS. THE VOIDS WERE REPAIRED DURING EACH UNIT'S STEAM GENERATOR REPAIR PROJECT.

FORM 14 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85
 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1981 013 6 811240861 171057 10/14/81

DOCKET:250 SURVEY POINT 3 TYPE:PMR
 REGION: 2 NSS:TIME
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH

FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS

4160V SWITCH GEAR ROOM EFFECTED.

REFERENCE LERS:

1 250/80-007 2 250/81-011

ABSTRACT

DURING A ROUTINE VISUAL INSPECTION, AN ELECTRICAL PENETRATION FIRE BARRIER ON THE WEST WALL OF THE 3A 4160V SWITCHGEAR ROOM WAS FOUND TO BE NON-FUNCTIONAL. A FIRE WATCH PATROL WAS ESTABLISHED. SIMILAR LERS WERE REPORTED AS LER 250-81-011 AND LER 250-80-007. THE CAUSE OF THE NON-INTEGRAL ELECTRICAL PENETRATION FIRE BARRIER WAS INCOMPLETE INSTALLATION WORK. ALL ELECTRICAL PENETRATION FIRE BARRIERS ARE NOW FUNCTIONAL. BOTH PLANT AND CONTRACT MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL WILL BE RE-INSTRUCTED IN THE NECESSITY FOR COMPLIANCE WITH MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE 0725, FIRE STOP AND CABLE TRAY FIREPROOFING.

FORM 15 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1981 015 0 8112140210 171202 11/12/81

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS

STEP 4: EFFECT KX - INABILITY TO DISENGAGE.

ABSTRACT

WHILE PERFORMING MAINTENANCE ON THE B EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR (EDG) THE "A" EDG WAS STARTED AND SUBSEQUENTLY STOPPED BECAUSE OF THE INABILITY OF ITS START MOTOR TO DISENGAGE. THIS CONDITION RENDERED BOTH EDGS INOPERABLE FOR A PERIOD OF APPROXIMATELY 30 MINUTES. THE CAUSE WAS A BROKEN DIAPHRAGM IN THE STARTING AIR SOLENOID. THE SOLENOID WAS REPLACED AND THE A EDG WAS TESTED AND RETURNED TO SERVICE.

FORM 16 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1981 015 1 8311280418 187707 11/12/81

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

REFERENCE LERS:

1 250/79-009 2 250/80-026

ABSTRACT

DURING A ROUTINE SURVEILLANCE TEST PURSUANT TO TECH SPEC 4.8.2.B, THE

3A LER IN BATTERY FAILED TO HEAD A CHARGE. BOTH UNITS WERE IN A COLD
 COLDSTART CONDITION WITH ME DELIVER. HIS IS REPORTABLE PERTINENT TO
 TECH SPEC 3.2.2.2. SIMILAR LERS WERE REPORTED AS LER 250-70-009
 AND LER 250-80-023. THE ENTIRE 3A BATTERY WAS REPLACED, TESTED, AND
 RETURNED TO SERVICE WITH SUFFICIENT FROM A CONSIDERABLE TIME. AN
 EVALUATION WAS MADE TO DETERMINE THE REASON FOR THE FAILURE. ALTHOUGH
 THE ROOT CAUSE WAS NOT IDENTIFIED, THE MANUFACTURER HAS MADE SEVERAL
 RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH THE PLANT WILL IMPLEMENT IN ORDER TO AVOID
 FUTURE BATTERY FAILURES.

FORM 1 LER 3A DATA 09-09-85

 Docket YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DC'S NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1 81 017 0 8112290455 171851 11/22/81

BUCKET: 250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE: PWR
 REGION: 2 NSS: WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS
 STEP 1: BATTERY 3A - OUT FOR MAINTENANCE LONGER THAN ANTICIPATED.

ABSTRACT
 CONTINGENCY TO TECH. SPEC. 4.5.2.6. THE PERIODIC TEST OF THE 3A AND 4B
 HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION (HAFIS) PUMPS WAS NOT COMPLETED WITHIN THE
 REQUIRED TIME INTERVAL. THE PUMPS WERE OUT FOR MAINTENANCE FOR LONGER
 THAN ANTICIPATED. THIS RESULTED IN EXCEEDING THE TECH. SPEC.
 INTERVAL (31 DAYS +/- 2) BY 1 DAYS AND 14 DAYS FOR THE 3A AND 4B
 HAFIS PUMPS RESPECTIVELY. THE SURVEILLANCE WAS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED
 ON NOVEMBER 29, 1981 FOR THE 3A HAFIS PUMP AND ON DECEMBER 6, 1981 ON
 THE 4B HAFIS PUMP. THIS WAS PRIOR TO THE TIME EITHER PUMP WAS REQUIRED
 TO FULFILL TECH. SPEC. LIMITS. TECH. SPEC. 3.4.1.A.4).

FORM 10 LER 3C'S DATA 09-09-85

 Docket YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DC'S NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1 82 061 0 820250008 172040 01/03/82

BUCKET: 250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE: PWR
 REGION: 2 NSS: WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS
 FIRE WATCH PATROL FAILED TO INSPECT AN INOPERABLE FIRE BARRIER.

REFERENCE LERS:
 1 250/81-014

ABSTRACT
 WHILE REPAIRS WERE BEING MADE TO A PENETRATION FIRE BARRIER, A FIRE
 WATCH PATROL FAILED TO INSPECT THE INOPERABLE "ONE FOR THREE"
 CONSECUTIVE HOURS (AM 0 10AM) AS REQUIRED BY TECH. SPEC. 3.14.4.A.
 PRIOR TO THIS TIME AND IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING, THE INSPECTIONS WERE
 PERFORMED PROPERLY. A SIMILAR OCCURRENCE WAS REPORTED AS LER NO.
 250-81-014. THE BREAK IN SURVEILLANCE OF THE INOPERABLE BARRIER WAS

CAUSED BY A MISUNDERSTANDING BY CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL THAT AN AGREEMENT HAD BEEN MADE FOR PLANT SECURITY PERSONNEL TO MAINTAIN THE INSPECTIONS DURING THE HOLIDAYS. CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL WERE INSTRUCTED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPLYING WITH TECH. SPEC. 3.14.4.A.

FORM 19 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1982 00 0 8204020221 172570 02/16/82

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: ECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

ABSTRACT

WHILE PERFORMING A PERIODIC TEST OF THE FIRE PUMPS, THE WEST PUMP FAILED TO AUTOMATICALLY START AT ITS MINIMUM ACCEPTED STARTING PRESSURE. THE EAST PUMP WAS FULLY OPERATIONAL. THIS IS REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH. SPEC. 6.9.2.B.2 AND TECH. SPEC. 3.14.2.B.1. THE FAILURE OF THE AUTOMATIC START FEATURE TO INITIATE PUMP OPERATION AS REQUIRED RESULTED FROM THE TRIP SWITCH AND GAUGE BEING OUT OF CALIBRATION. A RECALIBRATION WAS PERFORMED AND THE PUMP WAS TESTED SUCCESSFULLY ON MARCH 12, 1982.

FORM 20 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1982 00 6 820416050A 173409 03/01/82

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: ECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS

STEP 3: ISYS SW = UNKNOWN STRUCTURES.

REFERENCE LERS:

1 251/80-012 2 251/81-003

ABSTRACT

WHILE PERFORMING A HOT FUNCTIONAL TEST, A HIGH POINT VENT IN THE NORMAL CHARGING LINE TO THE RCS LOOP A COLD LEG WAS FOUND WITH A CRACKED WELD. THE LINE WAS ISOLATED AND REPAIRED. THIS IS REPORTABLE PURSUANT TO TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B. SIMILAR EVENTS WERE REPORTED AS LER 251-80-12 AND LER 251-81-03. THE CAUSE OF THE WELD CRACK COULD NOT BE DETERMINED BUT IT IS SUSPECTED THAT THE CAUSE WAS DUE TO STRESS FROM LINE VIBRATION. THE CRACK WAS REPAIRED BY CUTTING THE VENT LINE AND PLUGGING IT. REMOVAL OF THIS REDUNDANT VENT LINE PRESENTS NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION AND AFFECTS NO COMMITMENT CONTAINED IN THE PSAR OR TECH SPECS.

FORM 21 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE

BUCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
 REGION: 2 NSS:WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS

FLUX PROFILES WERE NOT TAKEN AT THE REQUIRED TIME INTERVALS. STEP 2:
 CAUSE AX - NOT RESET.

ABSTRACT

WHILE PERFORMING A ROUTINE REACTOR STARTUP, AUGMENTED SURVEILLANCE OF
 HOT CHANNEL FACTORS WAS NOT MAINTAINED AS REQUIRED. FLUX PROFILES
 WERE RECORDED AT 10:30 AM WHEN THRESHOLD POWER (98%) WAS REACHED AND 2
 HOURS LATER AT 12:30 PM. THESE READINGS INDICATED NORMAL CONDITIONS.
 THE FOUR AND EIGHT HOUR READINGS SCHEDULED FOR 2:30 PM AND 6:30 PM
 WERE MISSED. THIS IS REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 3.2.6.A.
 THE REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE WAS MISSED BECAUSE THE COMPUTER WAS TAKEN
 OUT OF SERVICE WITH THE SURVEILLANCE SEQUENCE IN PROGRESS. UPON
 RETURNING TO SERVICE, THE COMPUTER WAS NOT RE-INITIALIZED TO THE
 PROPER SEQUENCE. APPROPRIATE PERSONNEL WERE RE-INSTRUCTED ON THE
 IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING PROPER SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS.

FORM 22 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

| BUCKET | YEAR | LER NUMBER | REVISION | DCS NUMBER | NSIC | EVENT DATE |
|--------|------|------------|----------|------------|--------|------------|
| 250 | 1982 | 001 | 0 | 8206220342 | 173014 | 05/17/82 |

BUCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
 REGION: 2 NSS:WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

REFERENCE LERS:

1 250/82-004

ABSTRACT

WHILE PERFORMING A ROUTINE REACTOR STARTUP, AUGMENTED SURVEILLANCE OF
 HOT CHANNEL FACTORS WAS NOT INITIATED WHEN THRESHOLD POWER (98%) WAS
 PASSED. THIS IS REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 3.2.6.A. A
 SIMILAR EVENT WAS REPORTED AS LER 250-82-004. THE FLUX MAPPER HAD
 BEEN TURNED OFF SO MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL COULD MAKE A CONTAINMENT
 ENTRY. THEN, A REACTOR TRIP OCCURRED. SHIFT CHANGE TOOK PLACE WHILE
 PREPARATIONS WERE BEING MADE FOR REACTOR STARTUP. THE FLUX MAPPER WAS
 NOT TURNED BACK ON. WITH THE UNIT AT FULL POWER THE FOLLOWING
 MORNING, 24 HOUR SURVEILLANCE WAS RESUMED.

FORM 23 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

| BUCKET | YEAR | LER NUMBER | REVISION | DCS NUMBER | NSIC | EVENT DATE |
|--------|------|------------|----------|------------|--------|------------|
| 250 | 1982 | 001 | 0 | 8207060257 | 174150 | 05/27/82 |

BUCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
 REGION: 2 NSS:WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH

FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

ABSTRACT

WHILE TESTING EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR A ACCORDING TO OPERATING PROCEDURE 4004.1, PERIODIC TEST LOAD ON 4KV BUS, THE DIESEL GENERATOR TRIPPED WHEN 2500 KW WAS REACHED. THIS IS REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 3.7.1.D. LOW FUEL OIL PRESSURE WAS NOTED BEFORE THE TRIP OCCURRED. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS DETERMINED TO BE A MALFUNCTIONING RELIEF VALVE IN THE FUEL OIL SUPPLY AND RETURN VALVE ASSEMBLY. THE VALVE WAS REPLACED AND EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR A WAS SUCCESSFULLY RETESTED.

FORM 24 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1982 007 0 82070A0038 174151 05/29/82

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE

ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

ABSTRACT

WHILE PERFORMING A LEAK INSPECTION INSIDE UNIT 3 CONTAINMENT, SEVERAL BROKEN HANGERS AND A BROKEN SNUBBER (#37) WERE DISCOVERED ON 3C STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN LINES. CLOSER INSPECTION FOUND EVIDENCE OF APPROXIMATELY 12 INCHES OF LINE MOVEMENT. THIS IS REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 3.13.1. THE CAUSE WAS DETERMINED TO BE HYDRAULIC SHOCK OF THE BLOWDOWN LINES WHEN THE BLOWDOWN ISOLATION VALVE IS OPENED. THIS NEW BLOWDOWN SYSTEM WAS INSTALLED DURING THE RECENT STEAM GENERATOR REPAIR OUTAGE. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR BLOWDOWN SYSTEM OPERATION HAVE BEEN ISSUED. BY FOLLOWING THE SEQUENCE FOR VALVE LINEUP AND OPERATION, THE HYDRAULIC SHOCKING IS AVOIDED.

FORM 25 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1982 000 0 8207150483 174292 06/09/82

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE

ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

ABSTRACT

DURING POWER OPERATION, THE 3A HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION (HHSI) PUMP FAILED TO START FROM MANUAL OPERATION OF THE NORMAL UNIT 3 CONTROL SWITCH. THE OTHER HHSI PUMPS WERE AVAILABLE AND UNIT 4 WAS IN A COLD SHUTDOWN CONDITION AT THE TIME. THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC WAS NOT AFFECTED. THIS IS REPORTABLE PURSUANT TO TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B.2. THE BREAKER CONTROL PANEL FUSES WERE REPLACED AND THE BREAKER WAS RACKED OUT AND BACK IN. THE PUMP WAS THEN SUCCESSFULLY STARTED. THE PUMP AND CONTROL CIRCUITS WERE INSPECTED AND BREAKER 3AA13 WAS CHECKED WITH NO UNUSUAL INDICATION. THE ROOT CAUSE COULD NOT BE DETERMINED. THIS PROBLEM HAS NOT REOCCURRED.

FORM 26 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1982 010 0 8207260467 174497 06/17/82

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: ECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

ABSTRACT

A NON-FUNCTIONAL VERTICAL PIPE SUPPORT WAS DISCOVERED ON THE SUCTION LINE OF 3A COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP. THIS IS REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B.2. THE PIPE SUPPORT WAS NO LONGER CONTACTING THE GROUND BECAUSE THE GROUT UNDER THE PLATE HAD CRACKED. THE SUPPORT WAS REGROUTED AND PROPERLY ADJUSTED BY 6/29/82.

FORM 27 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1982 011 0 8208200125 175455 07/13/82

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: ECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS

STEP 1 CAUSE SX - CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT BLOCKING ACCESS

REFERENCE LERS:

1 251/82-009

ABSTRACT

THE QUARTERLY SURVEILLANCE TEST OF THE SEISMOGRAPH WAS COMPLETED THREE DAYS AFTER THE LAST ALLOWABLE DATE DEFINED IN TECH SPEC 4.0.1 AND TABLE 4.1.-1. THIS IS REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B.3. A SIMILAR EVENT WAS REPORTED AS LER 251-82-009. THE TEST COULD NOT BE PERFORMED UNTIL CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT THAT WAS BLOCKING ACCESS TO THE SEISMOGRAPH WAS REMOVED. THE DUE DATE AND EXTENDED GRACE PERIOD DATE OF 7/13/82 PASSED BEFORE THE SEISMOGRAPH COULD BE ACCESSED. THE SURVEILLANCE TEST WAS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED ON 7/16/82.

FORM 28 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1982 012 0 8210080257 177384 09/17/82

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: ECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS

FAILURE TO PROPERLY DOCUMENT A CHANGE IN AN ELECTRICAL PENETRATION
COULD HAVE LEAD TO A FAILURE OF THE CONT. ISOL. TESTING OF PEN.
REVEALED NO LEAKS. PENETRATION DID NOT MEET DOUBLE BARRIER CRITERIA.

ABSTRACT

AN INSPECTION REVEALED THAT AN ELECTRICAL PENETRATION DID NOT MEET THE
DOUBLE BARRIER CRITERIA FOR 10CFR50 AND THE TESTABILITY REQUIREMENTS
OF 10CFR50 APPENDIX J. ALSO, THIS PENETRATION HAS NOT BEEN PREVIOUSLY
LOCAL-LEAK-RATE TESTED. HOWEVER, IT HAS SUCCESSFULLY PASSED PREVIOUS
ILRTS. THIS CONDITION IS LESS CONSERVATIVE THAN ASSUMED IN THE FSAR
AND THUS IS REPORTABLE PURSUANT TO TECH SPEC 6.9.2.A.9. DOCUMENTATION
COULD NOT BE FOUND FOR THIS IMPROPERLY-DESIGNED MODIFICATION WHICH
CHANGED THE CONFIGURATION OF A SPARE PENETRATION. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS
THE FAILURE TO PROPERLY DOCUMENT PLANT CHANGES. A WELL DOCUMENTED AND
APPROVED PLANT CHANGE WAS IMPLEMENTED TO CORRECT THE DEFICIENCY.

FORM 29 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1982 011 1 8308050368 184561 09/17/82

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: EICH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

REFERENCE LERS:
1 250/81-004 2 250/79-036 3 250/79-028 4 250/79-034
5 250/79-017 6 250/74-007

ABSTRACT

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INSERVICE INSPECTION AND TESTING PROGRAMS, A
TEST WAS BEING PERFORMED ON AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS A & C. C
AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP FAILED TO RUN FOR THE REQUIRED 15 MINUTES. A
AND B PUMPS WERE IN SATISFACTORY WORKING ORDER. THIS IS REPORTABLE IN
ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B.2. SIMILAR EVENTS WERE REPORTED AS
LERS 250-81-4, 250-79-34, 250-79-28, 250-79-34, 250-79-17 AND
250-74-7. THE STEAM TURBINE PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE CV-3707 DID NOT
CLOSE COMPLETELY. THIS RESULTED IN POOR CONTROL OF THE STEAM
PRESSURE, CAUSING THE SAFETY RELIEF VALVE TO LIFT AND THE TRIP VALVE
TO CLOSE. DISASSEMBLY OF CV-3707 REVEALED TWO PIECES OF FOREIGN METAL
UNDER THE VALVE SEAT. THE VALVE WAS REPAIRED AND ITS CONTROLS
ADJUSTED. THE PUMP WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE IN 44 HOURS.

FAILURE
OF AFW PUMPS

FORM 30 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1982 014 0 8211290695 179493 11/06/82

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: EICH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

REFERENCE LERS:
1 250/81-005

ABSTRACT

WHILE IN THE PROCESS OF TRANSFERRING LAUNDRY WATER TO A MONITOR TANK, THE MONITOR TANK OVERFLOWED. SOME OF THE OVERFLOW WATER BACKED UP THE DRAIN HEADER TO THE COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP AREA AND MAY HAVE ENTERED THE AREA VIA A FLOOR CLEANOUT OPENING. SOME OF THIS WATER COULD HAVE ENTERED THE STORM DRAIN SYSTEM FROM OTHER NORMAL DRAINS IN THIS ROOM. THIS IS REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 6.9.2.A.6.A. A SIMILAR LER WAS REPORTED AS LER 250-81-05. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS PROCEDURAL VIOLATION BY PLANT PERSONNEL WHILE PERFORMING THE TRANSFER OF WATER. THE EVOLUTION WAS IMMEDIATELY TERMINATED. THE MONITOR TANK WAS TAKEN OUT OF SERVICE FOR A LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION CHANNEL CHECK. THE FLOOR OPENING WAS CAPPED. ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ARE BEING TAKEN.

FORM 31 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1982 015 0 8212100220 179722 11/04/82

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: TPL

REFERENCE LERS:
 1 250/82-008

ABSTRACT

THE 3A HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION PUMP WOULD NOT START FROM MANUAL OPERATION OF EITHER THE UNIT 3 OR UNIT 4 CONTROL SWITCH. THIS IS REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B.2. A SIMILAR EVENT WAS REPORTED AS LER 250-82-008. THE 3A HHSI PUMP BREAKER WAS RACKED OUT AND BACK IN. THE PUMP WAS THEN SUCCESSFULLY STARTED. THE BREAKER AND CONTROL CIRCUITRY WERE THOROUGHLY CHECKED, BUT A SPECIFIC FAILURE MODE COULD NOT BE IDENTIFIED. AFTER TWO REPAIRS WERE MADE TO THE BREAKER, A SPECIAL TEST WAS PERFORMED WHICH CYCLED BREAKER 3AA13 FIFTY TIMES. A FAILURE DID NOT OCCUR, AND THE PUMP WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE.

FORM 32 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1982 015 0 8212280175 179973 11/19/82

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: TPL

ABSTRACT

DURING A ROUTINE INSPECTION OF THE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM, A FIRE BARRIER PENETRATION, WHICH IS COMPOSED OF THE LAUNDRY ROOM WEST DOORS, WAS FOUND TO BE NON-FUNCTIONAL. THIS PENETRATION WAS NOT RETURNED TO FUNCTIONAL STATUS WITHIN 7 DAYS, AND THE PLANT MANAGER WAS ADVISED. THIS IS REPORTABLE PURSUANT TO TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B.2. DUE TO THE LENGTH OF TIME INVOLVED WITH THE PURCHASING OF NEW DOORS AND PARTS, IT

NECESSITATED THAT THE FIRE BARRIER PENETRATION BE OUT LONGER THAN 7 DAYS. WHILE THE PATCH AND NEW DOORS ARE RECEIVED, REPAIRS WILL TAKE PLACE.

FORM 33 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

BUCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1982 01 0 8212200167 179074 11/19/82

BUCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PW
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS
FIRE BARRIERS NOT RETURNED TO SERVICE WITHIN 7 DAYS

ABSTRACT
WHILE ALTERATIONS WERE BEING MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH CONTROL ROOM MODIFICATION PROJECT, TWO FIRE BARRIER PENETRATIONS WERE INTENTIONALLY DISABLED AS PLANNED. DUE TO THE TIME FRAME REQUIRED FOR THE MODIFICATION, THE TWO FIRE BARRIER PENETRATIONS, CONTROL ROOM DOOR AND FLOOR OPENING, WERE NOT RETURNED TO FUNCTIONAL STATUS WITHIN 7 DAYS, AND THE PLANT MANAGER WAS ADVISED. THIS IS REPORTABLE CONSIDERED WITH TECH SPEC 9.9.2.1.2. DUE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF APPROVED DESIGN MODIFICATIONS TO THE CONTROL ROOM, IT NECESSITATED THE FIRE BARRIER PENETRATIONS TO BE NON-FUNCTIONAL LONGER THAN 7 DAYS. ADDITIONAL STEPS WERE TAKEN IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 3.14.5.B.

FORM 34 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

BUCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1982 013 0 8212210207 180006 12/01/82

BUCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PW
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

REFERENCE LERS:
1 251/82-001

ABSTRACT
THE 3A LOAD CENTER WAS DE-ENERGIZED FOLLOWING A TRIP OF THE ASSOCIATED 4KV BREAKER, 3A008. THIS RESULTED IN THE LOSS OF THE 3A MOTOR CONTROL CENTER, WHICH IS REPORTABLE UNDER TECH SPEC 6.2.2.0.2. THE BREAKER WAS CLOSED FIVE MINUTES LATER AND POWER WAS RESTORED. A SIMILAR EVENT WAS REPORTED AS LER-251-82-001. THE ROOT CAUSE COULD NOT BE DETERMINED. AN INSPECTION OF THE BREAKER AND CIRCUITRY FOUND NO APPARENT SIGNS OF EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION. DURING THE NEXT OUTAGE OF SUFFICIENT DURATION, THE BREAKER'S PROTECTIVE RELAYS WILL BE TESTED FOR PROPER OPERATION TO VERIFY THAT EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION DID NOT PLAY A PART IN THIS EVENT.

FORM 35 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

BUCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1982 01 0 8402010130 181511 12/23/82

DOCKET: 250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE: PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: FECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS
CONTROL ROD FAILED TO INSERT WHEN REACTOR TRIP OCCURRED.

WATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
775 POSSIBLE SIGNIFICANT EVENT

REFERENCE LERS:
1 250/73-008 2 251/73-006

ABSTRACT
WHILE PERFORMING THE FULL LENGTH RCC PERIODIC EXERCISE ON 12/23/82, RCC J3 OF SHUTDOWN BANK A FAILED TO SHOW INDICATION OF PROPER MOVEMENT. IT WAS VERIFIED THAT J3 HAD REMAINED IN THE FULLY WITHDRAWN POSITION AND THE ROD WAS DECLARED INOPERABLE. ON 12/26/82, AN UNRELATED REACTOR TRIP OCCURRED. J3 REMAINED FULLY WITHDRAWN. INSUFFICIENT SHUTDOWN MARGIN WAS AVAILABLE. THIS IS REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B.2. SIMILAR LERS WERE 250-73-0 & 251-73-5. THE ROOT CAUSE HAS NOT BEEN DETERMINED. ON 12/31/82, WHILE CONDUCTING A ROD EXERCISE TEST AND ATTEMPTING TO OBTAIN VISICORDER TRACES OF J3 AS REQUESTED BY WESTINGHOUSE, INOPERABLE RCC J3 BEGAN TO FUNCTION NORMALLY. J3 WAS STILL LISTED AS OUT OF SERVICE UNTIL AN OUTAGE OCCURRED ON 1/19/83. THE NEXT DAY, J3 PASSED A ROD DROP TIME AND STEPPING TEST AND WAS DECLARED OPERABLE.

FURN 36 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

BUCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1982 020 0 8407270355 190647 05/11/82

DOCKET: 250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE: PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: FECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

REFERENCE LERS:
1 250/82-021

ABSTRACT
INADEQUATE SURVEILLANCE TESTING OF THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS (EDG) WAS PERFORMED BETWEEN 5/11/82 AND 6/7/84 FOR TESTS REQUIRED BY TECH SPECS 4.8.1.A.6 AND 4.8.1.C.6(C), 14 DAY AND 18 MONTH TESTS, RESPECTIVELY, IN THAT INSUFFICIENT DATA WERE RECORDED TO VERIFY SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE OF THE EDG COOLING SYSTEM. DURING THIS TIME INTERVAL, THE EDG DID NOT EXHIBIT INADEQUATE FUNCTIONING OF THE COOLING SYSTEM. THIS IS REPORTABLE PURSUANT TO TECH SPEC 6.9.2.6.3. THE ROOT CAUSE STEMS FROM AN INADEQUATE REVIEW OF OPERATING PROCEDURE 4304.1. EDG PERIODIC TEST LOAD ON 4IV BUS & 4304.3, EDG-EIGHT HOUR FULL LOAD TEST AND LOAD REJECTION WITH REGARD TO IMPLEMENTATION OF TECH SPEC AMENDMENTS 82 76 ISSUED 4/5/82, WHICH UPGRADED EDG SURVEILLANCE TEST REQUIREMENTS TO VERIFY SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE OF

THE EDG LOADING SYSTEM. THE PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN REVISED.

FORM 37 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1982 021 0 8408080230 190648 05/11/82

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: FECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

REFERENCE LERS:
1 250/82-020

ABSTRACT
SELF INITIATED AUDITS REVEALED INADEQUATE SURVEILLANCE TESTING OF THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS (EDG) FOR TESTS REQUIRED BY TECH SPEC 4.8.1.A.5. IN THAT THE EDGS WERE NOT LOADED TO \geq OR \approx 2500 KW WITHIN 10 MINUTES OF BEING STARTED DURING PERFORMANCE OF OPERATING PROCEDURE 4304.1. THIS IS REPORTABLE PURSUANT TO TECH SPEC 4.9.2.B.3. THE ROOT CAUSE STEMS FROM AN INADEQUATE REVIEW OF OPERATING PROCEDURE 4304.1. EDG PERIODIC TEST LOAD ON 4KV BUS WITH REGARDS TO IMPLEMENTATION OF TECH SPEC AMENDMENTS 82/76, WHICH UPGRADED EDG SURVEILLANCE TEST REQUIREMENTS TO VERIFY THAT THE EDG WAS LOADED TO \geq OR \approx 2500 KW WITHIN 10 MINUTES OF STARTING THE EDG. THE PROCEDURE HAS BEEN REVISED TO CLEARLY REFLECT THE TECH SPEC REQUIREMENTS AND TESTING HAS BEEN COMPLETED.

FORM 38 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1983 001 0 8302150070 181168 01/07/83

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: FECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

REFERENCE LERS:
1 250/82-003

ABSTRACT
DURING NORMAL OPERATION, 3C CHARGING PUMP WAS DECLARED OUT OF SERVICE WHEN CLOSE INSPECTION OF A LEAK REVEALED A CRACKED WELD ON THE JUNCTION OF THE PUMP'S DISCHARGE LINE AND THE LINE LEADING TO THE PUMP'S SAFETY RELIEF VALVE 3-293C. THIS IS REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 4.9.2.B.1. A SIMILAR EVENT WAS DESCRIBED IN LER 250-82-3. REPAIRS WERE MADE TO THE WELD AND A PRESSURE TEST WAS SATISFACTORILY PERFORMED. THE EXACT CAUSE OF THE FAILURE HAS NOT BEEN DETERMINED. VIBRATIONAL STRESS IS SUSPECTED. A SPECIAL TEST IS PLANNED TO INVESTIGATE AND ANALYZE CHARGING SYSTEM PIPE VIBRATION.

FORM 39 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE

250 1983 002 0 8302280351 181975 01/18/83

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

ABSTRACT

DURING THE THIRD AND FOURTH QUARTERS OF 1982, THE TESTING OF DIESEL FUEL STORAGE TANK SAMPLES FOR VISCOSITY, WATER, AND SEDIMENT LEVELS WAS MISSED. THE ANALYSIS IS REQUIRED BY TECH SPEC 4.8.1.B. THIS IS REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B.3. UPON DISCOVERY OF THE OVERSIGHT, A SAMPLE WAS TAKEN ON 1/18/83 AND ANALYZED. WATER, SEDIMENT AND VISCOSITY LEVELS WERE ALL WITHIN THE ACCEPTABLE LIMITS. THIS WILL BE COUNTED AS THE FIRST QUARTER SAMPLE FOR 1983. THE NEXT SAMPLE (SECOND QUARTER 1983) IS SCHEDULED TO BE TAKEN IN APRIL.

FORM 40 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1983 003 0 8303210557 182701 01/28/83

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

ABSTRACT

DURING NORMAL FULL POWER OPERATION, AN OPERATOR NOTED THAT THE LOCAL INDICATION OF B EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR SHOWED A LOW STARTING AIR PRESSURE OF 150 PSIG. APPARENTLY, THE STARTING AIR COMPRESSOR WAS INOPERABLE. THE CONTROL ROOM, HOWEVER, NEVER RECEIVED ANY INDICATION OF DIESEL GENERATOR TROUBLE. THIS IS REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B.1. THE TENSION SPRING NUT ON THE LOW STARTING AIR PRESSURE ALARM SENSING SWITCH WAS FOUND LOOSE ALLOWING THE ALARM SETPOINT TO DRIFT DOWN TO APPROXIMATELY 125 PSIG. THE SETPOINT WAS ADJUSTED TO THE PROPER VALUE OF 180 PSIG. THE AIR COMPRESSOR WAS REPAIRED AND RETURNED TO SERVICE.

FORM 41 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1983 004 0 8304220447 182383 02/27/83

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

REFERENCE LERS:

1 251/73-007 2 210/74-007

ABSTRACT

DURING NORMAL OPERATION, THE CONTENTS OF WASTE GAS DECAY TANK #2 WERE INADVERTENTLY RELEASED TO THE AUXILIARY BUILDING EXHAUST FAN AND THEN

TO THE ATMOSPHERE VIA THE PLANT VENT. THIS IS REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B.4. PLANT RADIATION MONITORING EQUIPMENT PRINTOUTS AND LAB ANALYSES OF SAMPLES TAKEN FROM THE TANK AFTER THE EVENT SHOW THAT THE ACTIVITY LEVELS SPECIFIED IN TECH SPEC 3.9.2 WERE NOT EXCEEDED. THE TWO NORMALLY CLOSED VALVES (4638B AND RCV-014) ON THE LINE FROM THE #2 WASTE GAS DECAY TANK TO THE WASTE GAS RELEASE HEADER WERE INSPECTED. APPARENTLY, 4638B HAD NOT SEATED PROPERLY THE LAST TIME IT WAS CLOSED. ALSO, RCV-014 WAS FOUND SLIGHTLY OPEN. IN THE FUTURE, RCV-014 WILL BE FAILED CLOSED AFTER EACH CONTROLLED RELEASE TO PREVENT ACCIDENTAL OPENING.

FORM 42 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1983 005 0 8400000000 190400 03/09/83

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: DECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

ABSTRACT

ON 3/9/83, ROD CONTROL CLUSTERS D8 AND M3 OF CONTROL BANK D SIMULTANEOUSLY DROPPED WHILE UNIT 3 WAS OPERATING AT 100% POWER. AS PER TECH SPEC 3.2.4.A, SUSTAINED POWER OPERATION OF THE UNIT SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED WITH MORE THAN ONE INOPERABLE CONTROL ROD. THIS IS REPORTABLE UNDER TECH SPEC 6.9.A.2. THIS IS THE FIRST OCCURRENCE OF THIS TYPE. APPROX 15 MINS AFTER THE AUTOMATIC TURBINE RUNBACK AND MANUAL POWER REDUCTION TO HOT SHUTDOWN WAS INITIATED, THE 2 DROPPED RODS WERE RETRIEVED. A FLUX MAP VERIFIED PROPER POSITION OF THE RODS. THE CAUSE WAS A MOMENTARY SHORT IN THE LEAD TO THE STATIONARY COILS DUE TO WATER THAT WAS GETTING INSIDE THE CONTROL ROD POWER CABINET. THE WATER LEAKAGE WAS STOPPED THE CABINET WAS DRIED, AND THE UNIT WAS RETURNED TO FULL POWER. WESTINGHOUSE WAS CONSULTED AND IT WAS DETERMINED THAT NO SAFETY LIMITS WERE ENCROACHED UPON DURING THIS INCIDENT.

FORM 43 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1983 005 1 8306280168 184701 04/05/83

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: DECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS

STEP 2: MSC = REINFORCING STEEL AND INTERNAL GROUT

ABSTRACT

ON 4-5-83, THE LICENSEE WAS NOTIFIED BY THE ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT THAT SOME MASONRY WALLS IN THE CONTROL BUILDING DO NOT COMPLY WITH ORIGINAL DESIGNS. DURING THE CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES RELATED TO THE CONTROL ROOM MODIFICATIONS AND COMPUTER ROOM ADDITION, SOME WALLS WERE FOUND TO HAVE NO INTERNAL GROUT AND NO REINFORCING STEEL AS CALLED FOR BY THE DESIGN DRAWINGS. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THIS DEFICIENCY IS

LIMITED TO THE CONTROL BUILDING. THIS IS REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 6.9.2.A. INSPECTIONS ON WALLS WITHIN THE CONTROL BUILDING HAVE BEEN COMPLETED. ADDITIONAL DEFICIENCIES WERE IDENTIFIED AND ARE DESCRIBED IN THE ATTACHMENT. CORRESPONDING REPAIRS HAVE BEEN SCHEDULED. IN ADDITION, THE SCOPE OF THE WALL INSPECTIONS HAVE BEEN EXPANDED TO INCLUDE ADDITIONAL WALLS OUTSIDE OF THE CONTROL BUILDING.

FORM 44 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85
 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1983 007 0 8305110496 18209 04/12/83

BUCKET: 250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE: PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: IPL

REFERENCE LERS:
 1 251/73-007 2 250/74-007

ABSTRACT

WHILE UNIT 3 WAS OPERATING AT FULL POWER, AN OPERATOR NOTICED THAT PRINCIPAL VALVES 3-084A AND 3-084B ON THE UNIT 3 STEAM SUPPLY LINES TO P AND C AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP TURBINES, RESPECTIVELY, WERE CLOSED. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP A WAS OUT OF SERVICE. UNIT 4 WAS REFUELING. THIS IS REPORTABLE UNDER TECH SPEC 6.9.2.A.6. SIMILAR EVENTS WERE REPORTED AS LERS 251-73-007 AND 250-74-007. THE CAUSE OF THE EVENT WAS DETERMINED TO BE PERSONNEL ERROR IN REOPENING THE TAGS AND THE LACK OF INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF THE TAG LOCATIONS AND VALVE POSITIONS. VALVES 3-084A AND 3-084B WERE IMMEDIATELY LOCKED OPEN. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS B AND C WERE SATISFACTORILY TESTED WITHIN THE HOUR.

FORM 45 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85
 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1983 003 0 8307220473 18409 06/14/83

BUCKET: 250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE: PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: IPL

REFERENCE LERS:
 1 251/77-014

ABSTRACT

WHILE ATTEMPTING TO INSTALL FOUR NEW CONDUITS FOR THE FUTURE SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM, CONSTRUCTION PERSONNEL REPORTED TO THE CONTROL ROOM THAT A CONDUIT HAD ACCIDENTALLY BEEN DAMAGED. AN INITIAL VISUAL INSPECTION INDICATED THAT ONE OF THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMPS WAS INVOLVED. FURTHER INVESTIGATION DETERMINED THAT THE OR CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP WAS AFFECTED. THIS IS REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B. A SIMILAR EVENT WAS REPORTED AS LER 251-77-14. THE ACTUAL POSITIONS OF THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP CONDUITS WERE DIFFERENT FROM THE LOCATIONS SHOWN ON THE DRAWING USED FOR REFERENCE WHEN THE DRILLING ACTIVITIES WERE PLANNED. ALL WORK WAS

OUT OF POSITION
 AFTER VALUES

IMMEDIATELY TERMINATED. THE AFFECTED PUMP WAS IDENTIFIED. REPAIRS WERE INITIATED, AND THE PUMP RETURNED TO SERVICE WITHIN 24 HOURS.

FORM 46 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DUCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1983 007 0 8307150266 184093 06/10/83

DUCKET: 250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE: PWR
REGION: 2 NSSG: WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

REFERENCE LERS:
1 251/300-006

ABSTRACT

WHEN CONDUCTING AN OPERABILITY TEST OF THE A AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP FOLLOWING MAINTENANCE, THE PUMP FAILED TO COME UP TO SPEED AND NO FLOW WAS DELIVERED. THIS IS REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B.7. A SIMILAR EVENT WAS REPORTED AS LER 251-80-006. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS DETERMINED TO BE A FAILED DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE TRANSMITTER (DPT). RELIABILITY OF THE PUMP ITSELF WAS VERIFIED BY BYPASSING THE DPT. THE DPT WAS REPLACED AND THE PUMP WAS SATISFACTORILY TESTED AND RETURNED TO SERVICE WITHIN 72 HOURS. PFM 83-49 HAS BEEN INITIATED TO SIMPLIFY THE NEW FPL TURBINE GOVERNOR CONTROL SCHEME TO A CONSTANT SPEED SCHEME.

DP XMTRE
FAILED AFW

FORM 47 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DUCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1983 010 0 8308180391 184700 07/11/83

DUCKET: 250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE: PWR
REGION: 2 NSSG: WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

ABSTRACT

DURING NORMAL FULL POWER OPERATION ON 07/11/83, IT WAS NOTED THAT THE MONTHLY UPDATE OF THE TARGET FLUX DIFFERENCE, OPERATIONS PROCEDURE 12304.6 - POWER RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION CALCULATION OF TARGET FLUX DIFFERENCE, HAD NOT BEEN PERFORMED WITHIN THE INTERVAL REQUIRED BY TECH SPEC 3.2.6.C. THE PREVIOUS CALCULATION HAD BEEN PERFORMED ON 06/01/83, MAKING THE UPDATED CALCULATION 10 DAYS PAST DUE. THIS IS REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 6.9.2.3. A SIMILAR EVENT WAS REPORTED AS LER 250-82-11. THE OVERSIGHT WAS CORRECTED BY PERFORMING THE REQUIRED CALCULATION LATER THE SAME DAY. NEW REACTOR ENGINEERING PERSONNEL ARE BEING INSTRUCTED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPLETING TECH SPEC REQUIRED PROCEDURE ON TIME, AND EXISTING PERSONNEL ARE BEING REINSTRUCTED ON THIS ISUE. THE REACTOR ENGINEERING GROUP WILL ALSO IMPLEMENT A TRACKING SYSTEM TO ENSURE THAT THEIR SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURES ARE PERFORMED AS REQUIRED.

FORM 48 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1283 011 0 8308010450 184759 06/24/83

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

REFERENCE LERS:
1 251/80-011 2 251/80-013

ABSTRACT

DURING NORMAL OPERATION, A MALFUNCTION OF THE FIRE IONIZATION DETECTOR
-10 REQUIRED THE UNIT 3 INSIDE CONTAINMENT FIRE DETECTION ZONE 3 TO
BE DISABLED FOR LONGER THAN 14 DAYS. THIS IS REPORTABLE PURSUANT WITH
TECH SPEC 3.14.1.B.2 AND TECH SPEC 4.9.2.B.2. SIMILAR LERS WERE
REPORTED AS 251-80-11 AND 251-80-13. THE ROOT CAUSE HAS NOT BEEN
DETERMINED. COMPENSATORY MEASURES ARE: 1) MONITORING THE CONTAINMENT
AIR TEMPERATURE AS PER TECH SPEC 3.14.1.B.1 AND 2) SCHEDULING OF
REPAIRS TO BE PERFORMED DURING THE NEXT UNIT 3 REFUELING OUTAGE.

FORM 49 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1283 012 0 8309130019 185422 08/04/83

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

REFERENCE LERS:
1 251/80-006 2 250/83-009

ABSTRACT

WHILE CONDUCTING A ROUTINE OPERABILITY TEST ON THE A (TURBINE-DRIVEN)
AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP, THE PUMP FAILED TO DEVELOP THE REQUIRED RPM
AND NO FLOW WAS DELIVERED TO THE STEAM GENERATORS. THIS IS REPORTABLE
PURSUANT WITH TECH SPEC 4.9.2.B.2. SIMILAR LERS WERE REPORTED AS
251-80-006 AND 250-83-009. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS DETERMINED TO BE A
FAILED DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE TRANSMITTER (DPT-2401). OPERABILITY OF
THE PUMP ITSELF WAS VERIFIED BY BYPASSING THE DPT. THE DPT WAS
REPLACED AND THE PUMP WAS SATISFACTORILY TESTED AND RETURNED TO
SERVICE WITHIN 72 HOURS.

FAILED AFW
DPT XMTR

FORM 50 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1283 013 0 8309090348 185423 08/02/83

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

WATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
113 UPDATE NEEDED

REFERENCE LERS:
1 250/83-004

ABSTRACT

DURING NORMAL OPERATION WHILE SAMPLING GAS CONTENTS FROM THE UNIT 3 VOLUME CONTROL TANK (VCT), AN UNPLANNED GAS RELEASE OCCURRED TO THE AUXILIARY BUILDING AND THEN TO THE ATMOSPHERE VIA THE PLANT VENT. THE CALCULATED RELEASE WAS 25.1% OF THE MAXIMUM RELEASE RATE AND 0.063% OF THE QUARTERLY GASEOUS RELEASE LIMIT SPECIFIED IN TECH SPEC 3.9.2. THIS IS REPORTABLE PURSUANT TO TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B.4. A SIMILAR LER WAS REPORTED AS 250-83-004. THE RELEASE WAS TERMINATED IN APPROXIMATELY 1 HOUR AND 10 MINUTES BY ISOLATING THE VCT FROM THE GAS ANALYZER.

FORM 51 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1983 014 0 8309230372 185923 08/16/83

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS

STEP 5: GASEOUS RELEASE TO AUX. BLDG.

REFERENCE LERS:
1 250/83-004 2 250/83-013

ABSTRACT

DURING NORMAL OPERATION WHILE SAMPLING GAS CONTENTS FROM THE UNIT 3 VOLUME CONTROL TANK (VCT), AN UNPLANNED GAS RELEASE OCCURRED TO THE AUXILIARY BUILDING AND THEN TO THE ATMOSPHERE VIA THE PLANT VENT. THE CALCULATED RELEASE WAS 12.3% OF THE MAXIMUM RELEASE RATE AND 0.055% OF THE QUARTERLY GASEOUS RELEASE LIMIT SPECIFIED IN TECH SPEC 3.9.2. THIS IS REPORTABLE PURSUANT TO TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B.4. SIMILAR LERS WERE REPORTED AS 250-83-004 AND 250-83-013. THE RELEASE WAS TERMINATED WITHIN 3 HOURS BY ISOLATING THE VCT FROM THE GAS ANALYZER. AT THE TIME OF THIS INCIDENT, A SIMILAR OCCURRENCE (LER 250-83-013) WAS BEING EVALUATED TO DEVELOP CORRECTIVE ACTIONS. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS WAS BASED ON BOTH INCIDENTS.

FORM 52 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1983 015 0 8400000000 188338 09/11/83

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

REFERENCE LERS:
1 251/82-014

ABSTRACT

DURING NORMAL FULL POWER OPERATION, CRITICAL HEAT TRACING CIRCUIT #20 WAS DECLARED INOPERABLE. THIS CIRCUIT PROVIDES HEAT TRACING ON THE LINE FROM UNIT 3 BORIC ACID FILTER TO THE UNIT 3 CHARGING PUMPS. IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 3.6.C.5, LOAD REDUCTION WAS COMMENCED AND THE UNIT WAS BROUGHT TO HOT SHUTDOWN. A SHORT CIRCUIT WAS IDENTIFIED ON TRAIN A AND AN OPEN CIRCUIT WAS FOUND ON TRAIN B. THIS IS REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 6.9.2.E.2. NO BLOCKAGE OCCURRED IN THE AFFECTED LINES. A SIMILAR EVENT WAS REPORTED AS LER 251-82-014. THE LAGGING WAS REMOVED FROM THE LINE NEAR MOV-350 (EMERGENCY DORATION VALVE) AND INSPECTION REVEALED THAT TRAIN B HEAT TRACING WAS CUT. AN INVESTIGATION WAS UNSUCCESSFUL IN DETERMINING THE CAUSE. A FAULTY POWER SUPPLY CONNECTION AND A FAULTY SPlice IN THE HEAT TRACING WERE LOCATED ON TRAIN A. TRAIN B WAS STILL FUNCTIONING BETWEEN MOV 350 AND ITS POWER SUPPLY. REPAIRS WERE COMPLETED WITHIN 20 HOURS.

FORM 53 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1983 016 0 8311070222 184938 10/02/83

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: IECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

REFERENCE LERS:
 1 251/82-015

ABSTRACT

WHILE BRINGING UNIT 3 TO COLD SHUTDOWN FOR REFUELING AND ATTEMPTING TO PLACE THE RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM IN SERVICE, LETDOWN ISOLATION VALVE CV-3-204 FAILED TO CLOSE WHEN THE CONTROL SWITCH WAS STROKED. CV-3-204 IS A CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE THAT IS REQUIRED BY TECH SPEC 3.3.3 TO BE OPERABLE OR CLOSED. ORIFICE VALVES 200A, B, AND C WHICH FUNCTION TO ISOLATE THIS LINE INSIDE CONTAINMENT, WERE OPERABLE AS REQUIRED. THIS IS REPORTABLE PER TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B.2. A SIMILAR EVENT WAS REPORTED AS LER 251-82-015. THE VALVE WAS CLOSED BY ISOLATING THE AIR TO THE SOLENOID. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS DETERMINED TO BE FAILURE OF THE SOLENOID VALVE TO CV-3-204. THE SOLENOID VALVE WAS REPLACED. THE OPERABILITY OF CV-3-204 WAS DEMONSTRATED AND THE VALVE WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE.

FORM 54 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1983 017 0 8311020087 184592 05/08/83

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: IECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

ABSTRACT

DURING THE COURSE OF A SELF INITIATED AUDIT ON RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS,

IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT ON 5-6-83, WHILE UNIT 3 WAS AT 100% POWER, PRMS R-15 WAS INOPERABLE AND NO GRAB SAMPLES WERE TAKEN EVEN THOUGH THERE WAS INDICATION OF SECONDARY ACTIVITY. THIS IS IN CONFLICT WITH TECH SPEC 3.9.2.H.3. PRMS R-15 WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE ON 5-9-83. THIS IS REPORTABLE PURSUANT TO TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B.2. THIS IS THE FIRST OCCURRENCE OF THIS TYPE. ON 9-26-83, WHILE EVALUATING THE AUDIT FINDINGS, THE PLANT MANAGER-N WAS ADVISED OF THE OCCURRENCE. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS DETERMINED TO BE LACK OF PROCEDURE ADHERENCE BY CHEMISTRY LAB PERSONNEL. STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO INCREASE AWARENESS OF OPERATIONS AND LAB PERSONNEL ON REQUIREMENTS WHEN PRMS R-15 IS DECLARED OUT OF SERVICE. CALCULATIONS, BASED ON AIR EJECTOR SAMPLES TAKEN ON 5/2/83 AND 5/9/83, SHOW THAT UNMONITORED ACTIVITY RELEASED ONLY ACCOUNTED FOR 0.0004% OF TECH SPEC LIMITS.

FORM 55 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1983 010 0 8311010104 186443 10/07/83

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: TPL

COMMENTS

STEP 2 EFFECT DX - EXCESS FREE PLAY

ABSTRACT

WHILE UNIT 3 WAS AT COLD SHUTDOWN, AN UNANTICIPATED TEMPERATURE INCREASE WAS OBSERVED IN THE RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SYSTEM. THE MAXIMUM AVERAGE TEMPERATURE REACHED WAS APPROXIMATELY 210 F. THE TOTAL TIME RHR AVERAGE TEMPERATURE EXCEEDED 200 F WAS ABOUT 20 MINUTES. IT IS LIKELY THAT AVERAGE REACTOR COOLANT TEMPERATURE EXCEEDED 200 F FOR A VERY BRIEF PERIOD OF TIME; THIS IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 3.3.1. THIS IS REPORTABLE PURSUANT TO TECH SPEC 6.9.2.A.2. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS DETERMINED TO BE FLOW RESTRICTION THROUGH VALVE 3-748B (COMPONENT COOLING WATER OUTLET VALVE ON THE "B" RHR HEAT EXCHANGER). SUFFICIENT FLOW THROUGH THE VALVE WAS ESTABLISHED AND IMMEDIATE RHR SYSTEM COOLDOWN TO BELOW 200 F WAS INITIATED. VALVE 3-748B IS A MANUALLY OPERATED BUTTERFLY VALVE NORMALLY SET IN A THROTTLED POSITION AT ABOUT 30% OPEN.

FORM 56 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1983 017 0 8311210210 187392 10/08/83

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: TPL

ABSTRACT

WHILE PERFORMING A HYDROSTATIC TEST ON UNIT 3 "A" HOT LEG SAMPLE LINE, PRESSURE TRANSMITTER (PT-3-405) WAS EXPOSED TO A HYDROSTATIC TEST PRESSURE OF APPROXIMATELY 3100 PSIG. THIS ACTIVATED THE INTERLOCK BETWEEN PT-3-405 AND MOV-3-751 (RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL RETURN FROM LOOP

(HOT LEG) THUS ISOLATING RHR FLOW FOR APPROXIMATELY 6 MINUTES. UNIT 3 WAS AT REFUELING SHUTDOWN WITH THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM DRAINED AT THE TIME OF THIS EVENT. THIS IS REPORTABLE PURSUANT TO TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B.2. THIS IS THE FIRST OCCURRENCE OF THIS KIND. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS DETERMINED TO BE AN UNCLEAR DRAWING CONFIGURATION OF THE LOOP "A" SAMPLE LINE. THIS LED PERSONNEL PERFORMING THE HYDRO TEST TO BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS DOUBLE ISOLATION BETWEEN THE ISI TEST BOUNDARY AND INSTRUMENTATION COMING OFF THE SAMPLE LINE.

FORM 57 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1983 020 0 8311210382 187527 10/11/83

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: DECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: TPL

REFERENCE LERS:
 1 250/81-009

ABSTRACT

WHILE REVIEWING THE OFF-NORMAL PROCEDURE FOR LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING FLOW AS PART OF THE PLANT PROCEDURE REVIEW PROJECT, A DEFICIENCY WAS IDENTIFIED WHICH COULD HAVE LED OPERATORS TO INCORRECTLY ALIGN SEAL COOLING WATER TO RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMPS WHILE SWAPPING HEADERS. THERE WAS NO IMMEDIATE SAFETY CONCERN SINCE THE COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM WAS CORRECTLY ALIGNED AT THE TIME OF THE DISCOVERY. THIS IS REPORTABLE PER TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B.3. SIMILAR LER WAS REPORTED UNDER 250-41-09. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS DETERMINED TO BE :PROCEDURE INADEQUACY IN THAT CERTAIN VALVE NUMBERS WERE INTERCHANGED BETWEEN THE A AND B HEADERS. A PROCEDURE CHANGE WAS MADE TO CORRECT THE DEFICIENCY. IN ADDITION, A DETAILED WALKDOWN AND REVIEW OF PROCEDURES AND DRAWINGS IS BEING UNDERTAKEN TO IDENTIFY, IF ANY, OTHER POSSIBLE INADEQUACIES IN THE COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM.

FORM 58 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1983 021 0 8312160083 187504 11/09/83

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: DECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: TPL

ABSTRACT

DURING THE REPLACEMENT OF THE THREE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER STEAM SUPPLY STOP CHECK VALVES ON UNIT 3 (IN REFUELING SHUTDOWN), A 4-INCH PIPE SECTION BETWEEN THE MAIN STEAM LINE FROM A STEAM GENERATOR TO VALVE 3-119 AND A 4-INCH PIPE SECTION BETWEEN B'S MAIN STEAM LINE AND VALVE 3-219 WERE FOUND TO BE SCHEDULE 40 PIPING INSTEAD OF SCHEDULE 80. THIS IS REPORTABLE UNDER TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B.3. ULTRASONIC INSPECTION OF THE SAME PIPING ON UNIT 4 WAS INITIATED. A SECTION OF SCHEDULE 40 PIPING BETWEEN A MAIN STEAM LINE AND VALVE 4-119 WAS FOUND. AN ENGINEERING EVALUATION DETERMINED THAT THE LINES, AS FOUND, MEET THE

INCORRECT PIPE
 INSTALLED IN AFW
 SYSTEM

FUNCTIONALITY AND IS A CERTAIN CRITERIA. THE TWO 4-INCH SECTIONS OF PIPING ON UNIT 3 WERE REPLACED WITH THE REQUIRED SCHEDULE 80 PIPING. THE REMAINING 4-INCH SECTION OF PIPING ON UNIT 4 WILL BE REPLACED DURING THE NEXT OUTAGE OF SUFFICIENT DURATION.

FORM 57 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85
 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1983 023 0 831280282 18783 10/02/83

DOCKET: 250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE: PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSG: WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

ABSTRACT
 ON 10/2/83, WITH PCS TEMPERATURE LESS THAN 200 DEGREES F DURING SCHEDULED REFUELING SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS, MOVIS 843A, 843B AND 849 (HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION STOP VALVES) WERE NOT VERIFIED CLOSED WITH THEIR BREAKERS RACKED-OUT AS REQUIRED BY TECH SPEC 3.15.1 AND OPERATING PROCEDURE 0201.2, HOT SHUTDOWN TO COLD SHUTDOWN CONDITIONS. THIS IS REPORTABLE UNDER TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B.3. THE ERROR WAS DISCOVERED BY OPERATIONS DURING A REVIEW OF THE SHUTDOWN EVENTS RECORDS, AND PLANT MANAGEMENT WAS NOTIFIED ON 11/17/83. THE RACKING-OUT OF THE ASSOCIATED BREAKERS, THE VERIFICATION OF THE VALVES BEING CLOSED, AND THE COMPLETION OF THE PROCEDURE SIGN-OFF STEPS WERE PERFORMED WITHIN APPROXIMATELY 6 HOURS AFTER THE PCS TEMPERATURE WAS TAKEN BELOW 200 DEGREES F. AS CORRECTIVE ACTIONS, OPERATORS WERE INSTRUCTED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF ADHERENCE TO PROCEDURES.

FORM 60 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85
 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1983 023 0 840130176 188313 12/01/83

DOCKET: 250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE: PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSG: WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

ABSTRACT
 WHILE UNIT 3 WAS SHUTDOWN, A CHEMISTRY TECHNICIAN NOTICED THAT THE UNIT 3 SPENT FUEL PIT EXHAUST RADIATION MONITOR WAS DE-ENERGIZED. SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATIONS REVEALED THAT THE MONITOR WAS OUT OF SERVICE FOR ABOUT 28 HOURS. THIS IS REPORTABLE UNDER THE PROVISIONS SET FORTH BY TECH SPEC 3.9.1.D. ESTIMATED ACTIVITY IN THE SPENT FUEL PIT DURING THE INCIDENT WAS CALCULATED TO BE 2.4 E-5 CURIES OF I-131 AND NO DETECTABLE PARTICULATE ACTIVITY. A SIMILAR INCIDENT WAS REPORTED UNDER LER 250-79-18. THE ROOT CAUSE COULD NOT BE POSITIVELY DETERMINED. THE NUCLEAR OPERATOR ON SHIFT SIMPLY SWITCHED THE POWER FEED BREAKER (LP 30 CIRCUIT 16) TO THE OFF AND ON POSITIONS AND THE MONITOR WAS ENERGIZED. THERE WAS NO INDICATION OF THE BREAKER BEING TRIPPED. AS A CORRECTIVE ACTION, A SIGN WILL BE POSTED BY LP 38 CIRCUIT 16 IDENTIFYING THE BREAKER AS A TECH SPEC ITEM.

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1983 024 0 8401170245 188119 12/09/83

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: TPL

REFERENCE LERS:
 1 250/79-018 2 250/83-023

ABSTRACT

WHILE UNIT 3 WAS SHUTDOWN, A CHEMISTRY TECHNICIAN NOTICED THAT THE UNIT 3 SPENT FUEL PIT EXHAUST RADIATION MONITOR WAS DE-ENERGIZED. SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATIONS REVEALED THAT THE MONITOR WAS OUT OF SERVICE FOR ABOUT 20 HOURS. THIS IS REPORTABLE UNDER THE PROVISIONS SET FORTH BY TECH SPEC 3.9.1.D. ESTIMATED ACTIVITY IN THE SPENT FUEL PIT DURING THE INCIDENT WAS CALCULATED TO BE 5.6 E-6 CURIES OF I-131 AND NO DETECTABLE PARTICULATE ACTIVITY. SIMILAR INCIDENTS WERE REPORTED UNDER LERS 250-79-13 AND 250-83-023. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS THE "C" MOTOR CONTROL CENTER (MCC) BEING DE-ENERGIZED WHILE ENGINEERING APPROVED MODIFICATIONS WERE PERFORMED. "C" MCC FEED LIGHTING PANEL (LP) 38 FROM WHICH CIRCUIT 16 IS THE POWER FEED TO THE SPENT FUEL PIT EXHAUST RADIATION MONITOR. THE MONITOR WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE IN APPROXIMATELY 20 HOURS.

FORM 62 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1983 025 0 8401260157 188329 12/14/83

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: TPL

REFERENCE LERS:
 1 250/83-003 2 250/82-006

ABSTRACT

WITH UNIT 3 IN THE COLD SHUTDOWN CONDITION, A SPURIOUS ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION SIGNAL WAS RECEIVED AND THE "B" EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR (DG) FAILED TO START. THIS IS REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B.2. SIMILAR LERS WERE 250-83-003 AND 250-82-006. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS DETERMINED TO BE THE MALFUNCTION OF THE DIESEL AIR START PRESSURE REGULATOR. A NEW AIR START PRESSURE REGULATOR WAS INSTALLED. THE "B" EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR WAS SUCCESSFULLY TESTED AND RETURNED TO SERVICE ON 12/21/83.

FORM 63 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1983 025 0 8402270414 188334 12/15/83

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR

REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: IECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS

STEP 1: NEI-TIRE STOP. STEP 2: EFFECT XX = ROLLED DOWN RAMP. STEP 5:
COMP XVZ = SOLENOID VALVE.

ABSTRACT

WITH UNIT 3 AT COLD SHUTDOWN UNDERGOING FILLING AND VENTING OF THE RCS
AND UNIT 4 AT 100% POWER, THE PLANT SUPERVISOR-NUCLEAR WAS ADVISED BY
CONSTRUCTION PERSONNEL OF AN INCIDENT INVOLVING A PORTABLE AIR
COMPRESSOR ROLLING DOWN THE UNIT 3 CONTAINMENT EQUIPMENT RATCH RAMP
AND STRIKING THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL OIL TRANSFER PIPING
ADJACENT TO THE STORAGE TANK. THERE WAS NO BREACH OF PIPE INTEGRITY.
THE AVAILABILITY OF THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS WAS NOT AFFECTED.
THIS IS REPORTABLE PURSUANT TO TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B.3. THE ROOT CAUSE
WAS DETERMINED TO BE LOSS OF FOOTING (TIRE STOPS) FOR THE PORTABLE AIR
COMPRESSOR ALLOWING IT TO ROLL DOWN THE RAMP. AS A PRECAUTION
AGAINST FIRE HAZARDS, THE FOLLOWING IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS WERE
TAKEN: 1) THE FUEL OIL STORAGE TANK WAS TEMPORARILY ISOLATED, 2) THE
OIL TRANSFER PUMPS WERE DE-ENERGIZED, AND 3) A FIRE TEAM WAS
DISPATCHED TO THE AREA.

FORM 64 LER SSC- DATA 08-02-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1984 001 0 8402130289 189023 01/08/84

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: IECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS

STEP 5: CAUSE CODE XX = CONTROLS HAVE NOT HAD TIME TO RESPOND TO
TRANSIENT.

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ESF actuations.

REFERENCE LERS:

1 250/80-024

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 030%. ON JAN. 8, 1984, A REACTOR TRIP OCCURRED. THE
ROOT CAUSE WAS DETERMINED TO BE DUE TO A SPURIOUS SIGNAL WHICH
RESULTED IN CLOSURE OF THE 'A' STEAM GENERATOR FEEDWATER FLOW CONTROL
VALVE. THE TRANSIENT RESULTED IN 'STEAM FLOW/FEEDWATER FLOW MISMATCH'
COINCIDENT WITH 'LOW A /G WATER LEVEL' PROTECTION SIGNALS WHICH
TRIPPED THE REACTOR. ALL EQUIPMENT FUNCTIONED AS DESIGNED ON
INITIATION OF THE ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SIGNAL (ESFAS).
PLANT PERSONNEL CHECKED THE FLOW CONTROL VALVE AND ASSOCIATED
COMPONENTS AND SATISFACTORILY STROKED THE VALVE OPEN AND CLOSED. NO
ABNORMALITIES WERE DETERMINED TO EXIST THAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THE
VALVE TO CLOSE. THE FLOW CONTROL VALVE AND ASSOCIATED COMPONENTS HAVE
FUNCTIONED WITHOUT PROBLEM SINCE. SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: LER
250-80-24.

FORM 65 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1984 000 0 8402100202 189024 01/09/84

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: IECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS

STEP 1: CAUSE CODE XX - EXCESSIVE STEAM USAGE; STEP 2: CAUSE CODE XX -
DUE TO STARTUP CONDITIONS.

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ESF actuations.

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 001%. ON JAN. 8, 1984, A REACTOR TRIP OCCURRED DUE TO INITIATION OF 'SAFETY INJECTION' WITH FLOW NOT REQUIRED TO BE DELIVERED TO THE CORE. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS DETERMINED TO BE DUE TO EXCESSIVE STEAM USAGE IN THE SECONDARY SYSTEM AND STEAM LEAKAGE THROUGH THE STEAM SUPPLY VALVES TO THE MOISTURE SEPARATOR REHEATERS. THE BYPASS VALVES FOR THE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES (MSIV'S) ARE OPENED TO WARM UP THE STEAM HEADER AND TO EQUALIZE THE STEAM HEADER PRESSURE WITH THE STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURES, EQUALIZING THE STEAM PRESSURES ACROSS THE MSIV'S WHICH IS REQUIRED TO OPEN THESE VALVES. HOWEVER, THE EXCESSIVE STEAM USAGE AND THE STEAM LEAKAGE IDENTIFIED ABOVE RESULTED IN HIGHER THAN NORMAL DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURES REMAINING ACROSS THE MSIV'S. EFFORTS TO REDUCE THE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURES ACROSS THE MSIV'S WERE ATTEMPTED BY INCREASING ATMOSPHERIC STEAM DUMP. THIS RESULTED IN 'HIGH STEAM FLOW' COINCIDENT WITH 'LOW T AVERAGE' PROTECTION SIGNALS AND INITIATED SI WHICH TRIPPED THE REACTOR. ALL EQUIPMENT FUNCTIONED AS DESIGNED ON INITIATION OF THE ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SIGNAL (ESFAS). FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF THE POST-TRIP REVIEW, A WALK-DOWN OF THE SECONDARY SYSTEM RESULTED IN A REDUCTION OF STEAM USAGE AND ISOLATION OF STEAM LEAK PATHS. ONGOING WORK TO UPGRADE EQUIPMENT IN THE SECONDARY SYSTEM WILL HELP PREVENT A RECURRENCE. ADDITIONALLY, PROCEDURE CHANGES ARE BEING INCORPORATED UNDER THE PROCEDURE REVIEW PROJECT.

FORM 66 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1984 000 0 8402130230 189025 01/09/84

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: IECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ESF actuations.

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 063%. ON JAN. 9, 1984, A REACTOR TRIP OCCURRED. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS DETERMINED TO BE PERSONNEL ERROR IN THAT A LICENSED

OPERATOR INADVERTENTLY TRIPPED REACTOR TRIP BREAKER 'A' WITH THE 'A' BYPASS BREAKER OPEN. INSTEAD OF TRIPPING THE 'B' REACTOR TRIP BREAKER. THE REACTOR TRIP AND ASSOCIATED LOGIC PERFORMED AS DESIGNED. THE FOLLOWING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS WILL BE TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE: 1) REVIEW OF THIS INCIDENT DURING THE REQUALIFICATION SESSIONS FOR LICENSED OPERATORS; 2) REVIEW OF PROCEDURE FOR HUMAN FACTORS CONSIDERATIONS. THIS WILL INCLUDE SUCH THINGS AS ADDITIONAL SIGN OFFS FOR CLOSING AND LOCKING THE RACK DOOR, PROCEEDING TO ANOTHER RACK, AND UNLOCKING AND OPENING THE DOOR FOR THAT RACK.

FORM 67 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1984 004 0 8402270125 188942 01/04/84

DOCKET: 250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE: PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: PECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

- 10 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i): Shutdowns or technical specification violations.
- 14 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): Event that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function.

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 000%. WITH UNIT 3 AT HOT SHUTDOWN RETURNING FROM A REFUELING OUTAGE AND UNIT 4 AT 100% POWER, OPERATING PROCEDURE 7304.1, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM PERIODIC TEST WAS INITIATED. THE 'A' PUMP STARTED BUT DID NOT PRODUCE THE REQUIRED FLOW. THE PLANT SUPERVISOR - NUCLEAR SUSPENDED TESTING OF THE 'A' PUMP AND DECLARED THE PUMP OUT OF SERVICE. THE INSTRUMENT AND CONTROL STAFF WAS REQUESTED TO CHECK THE PUMP. FOLLOWING A THOROUGH INSPECTION, THE ROOT CAUSE WAS FOUND TO BE MISPOSITION OF THE MANUAL GOVERNOR SPEED CONTROL KNOB. AFTER RESETTING THE KNOB TO THE MAXIMUM POSITION, THE 'A' PUMP WAS TESTED SATISFACTORILY. IN SUPPORT OF CONTINUING WITH OPERATING PROCEDURE 7304.1, THE 'C' PUMP WAS STARTED BUT ALSO DID NOT PRODUCE REQUIRED FLOW. IT WAS IMMEDIATELY STOPPED AND INVESTIGATIONS ALSO REVEALED THE MANUAL GOVERNOR SPEED CONTROL KNOB TO BE MISPOSITIONED. THE KNOB WAS RESET AND THE PUMP TESTED SATISFACTORILY. THE 'B' PUMP WAS TESTED AND PERFORMED SATISFACTORILY. RECENT MODIFICATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH NUREG 0737, SPLIT THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM INTO TWO REDUNDANT TRAINS COMPOSED OF THE 'A' AND 'C' PUMPS FORMING THE 'A' TRAIN AND THE 'B' PUMP FORMING THE 'B' TRAIN. EACH TRAIN IS CAPABLE OF DRAWING STEAM FROM ALL STEAM GENERATORS ON EITHER UNIT AND DIRECTING WATER FROM EITHER CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK TO BOTH UNITS AS REQUIRED. SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: NONE.

MISPOSITION OF
AFW MANUAL GOVERNOR
SPEED CONTROL KNOB
FOR BOTH A+C AFWP'S.

FORM 68 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1984 005 0 8402280038 188950 01/25/84

DOCKET: 250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE: PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: PECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.

SYMBOL: IPL

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ESF actuations.

REFERENCE LERS:

1 250/84-003

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 100%. ON JAN. 25, 1984, A REACTOR TRIP OCCURRED. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS DETERMINED TO BE DUE TO AN ACCIDENTAL TRIP OF A 4160 VOLT BUS FEEDER BREAKER BY A MEMBER OF THE PLANT CONSTRUCTION WORK FORCE. THE BREAKER TRIP DE-ENERGIZED THE BUS AND ITS POWER SUPPLIES TO A MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP AND CONDENSATE PUMP. THE REDUCED FEEDWATER FLOW TRANSIENT RESULTED IN A REACTOR TRIP ON REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM LOGIC - 'STEAM FLOW/FEEDWATER FLOW MISMATCH' COINCIDENT WITH 'LOW C STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVEL'. ALL EQUIPMENT FUNCTIONED AS DESIGNED ON INITIATION OF THE ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SIGNAL (ESFAS). IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS STOPPED ALL CONSTRUCTION WORK IN THE PLANT UNTIL A PLANT CONSTRUCTION ADMINISTRATIVE SITE PROCEDURE COULD BE PREPARED, APPROVED, AND IMPLEMENTED. LONG-TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION IS TO FOLLOW-UP IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW PROCEDURE, INCLUDING TRAINING OF PERSONNEL, ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROCEDURE AND POSSIBLE FUTURE REVISIONS TO CLARIFY AND STREAMLINE INSTRUCTIONS TO AFFECTED PERSONNEL. SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: LER 250-84-007.

FORM 69

LER DATA

08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DOCS NUMBER NSFC EVENT DATE
250 1724 0 0 9403160059 189143 02/12/84

BUCKET: 250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE: PWR

REGION: 2 NSSES: WE

ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH

FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.

SYMBOL: IPL

COMMENTS

STEP 1: CAUSE CODE IX = MALFUNCTION IN FOSSIL UNIT YARD

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ESF actuations.

REFERENCE LERS:

1 250/84-007 2 24/84-001

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 100%. ON FEB. 12, 1984, A REACTOR TRIP OCCURRED. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS DETERMINED TO BE DUE TO AN ELECTRICAL RELAY MALFUNCTION WHICH RESULTED IN LOSS OF POWER TO A NON-SAFETY RELATED 4160 V BUS. THIS DE-ENERGIZED THE 4 60 V POWER SUPPLY TO A STEAM GENERATOR FEEDWATER PUMP. THE REDUCED FEEDWATER FLOW TRANSIENT RESULTED IN A REACTOR TRIP ON REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM LOGIC - 'STEAM FLOW/FEEDWATER FLOW MISMATCH' COINCIDENT WITH 'LOW C/S/G WATER LEVEL'. ALL EQUIPMENT FUNCTIONED AS DESIGNED ON INITIATION OF THE ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SIGNAL (ESF). IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INCLUDED A DESIGN REVIEW AND COMPLETION OF SATISFACTORY TESTING OF THE AUTOMATIC TURBINE GOVERNOR RUNBACK LOGIC CIRCUITRY TO VERIFY THAT A RUNBACK 1 INITIATED ON LOSS OF A S/G FEEDWATER PUMP. LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS WILL BE ADDRESSED IN LER 250-84-007. SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: NINE.

FORM 70 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1984 000 0 8403220104 189201 02/16/84

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: ECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS
STEP 16: MODEL 12H0417001

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ESP actuations.

REFERENCE LERS:
1 250/84-006 2 251/84-001

ABSTRACT
POWER LEVEL = 100%. WHILE AT STEADY STATE OPERATION ON BOTH UNITS, A LOSS OF THE 4C 4160 V BUS CAUSED A REACTOR TRIP ON UNIT 4 FROM 100% POWER. THE REACTOR TRIP ACTUATION LOGIC WAS STEAM FLOW GREATER THAN FEED FLOW COINCIDENT WITH LOW LEVEL ON 4A STEAM GENERATOR CAUSED BY 4B STEAM GENERATOR FEEDWATER PUMP TRIPPING UPON LOSS OF THE 4C BUS. APPROXIMATELY 1 MIN LATER, A LOCKOUT OF THE 3C 4160 V BUS TRANSFORMER SCRIPPED THE 3C BUS AND TRIPPED THE 3B STEAM GENERATOR FEEDWATER PUMP. THE ENSUING TRANSIENT CAUSED A REACTOR TRIP ON UNIT 3 FROM 100% POWER DUE TO HIGH PRESSURIZER PRESSURE. A DETAILED EXPLANATION OF THE ROOT CAUSES AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS IS INCLUDED IN THE TEXT PORTION OF THIS REPORT. SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: 250-84-006 AND 251-84-001.

FORM 71 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1984 000 0 8404020138 189209 02/23/84

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: ECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
10 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i): Shutdowns or technical specification violations.

REFERENCE LERS:
1 250/83-012 2 250/83-009 3 250/80-006

ABSTRACT
POWER LEVEL = 000%. WHILE PERFORMING OPERATING PROCEDURE 7504.1, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM MONTHLY TEST, FLOW OSCILLATIONS WERE OBSERVED DURING THE "B" PUMP TEST. THE "B" PUMP WAS DECLARED OUT OF SERVICE AND THE MONTHLY TEST CONTINUED WITH THE "C" PUMP. AT THE TIME, UNIT 3 RCS TEMPERATURE WAS ABOUT 450 F WHILE HEATING UP FROM COLD SHUTDOWN. UNIT 4 WAS CRITICAL AND THE EVOLUTION FROM HOT

SHUTDOWN TO POWER OPERATION WAS IN PROGRESS. INSTRUMENT AND CONTROL STAFF WERE NOTIFIED AND PROCEEDED TO WORK ON THE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE CELL (D/P CELL) WHICH WAS BELIEVED TO BE THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE FLOW OSCILLATION. FOLLOWING REPAIR EFFORTS, A SECOND TEST OF THE "B" PUMP INDICATED THE FLOW OSCILLATION CONDITION WAS STILL UNCORRECTED. AT THIS TIME, UPON RECOMMENDATION OF THE PLANT NUCLEAR SAFETY COMMITTEE, THE PLANT MANAGER (UCCLAR) HALTED RCS HEAT UP (RCS TEMPERATURES AT 530 F). A TEMPORARY SYSTEM ALTERATION WAS REVIEWED AND APPROVED TO ISOLATE D/P CELL 2402. FOLLOWING ISOLATION OF THE D/P CELL, A SATISFACTORY TEST OF THE "B" AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP PLACED IT BACK IN SERVICE. A SUBSEQUENT REVIEW OF THIS EVENT REVEALED THAT AN IMMEDIATE COLDOWN TO BELOW 350 F ON UNIT 3 SHOULD HAVE BEEN INITIATED PER TECH SPEC 3.8.4 AND A SPECIAL INSTRUCTION WAS ISSUED TO THIS EFFECT. SIMILAR EVENTS: 250-83-012, 250-83-007, AND 250-80-004.

APPROVED
APPROVED
APPROVED

FORM 72 LER SCSS DATA 08-00-85
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1984 007 0 2404100356 189144 03/06/84

DOCKET: 250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE: PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FOL

CURRENTS

STEP 2: EFFECT 1X - TURBINE RUNBACK.

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ESP activations.

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 100%. WHILE AT 10% POWER, UNIT 3 EXPERIENCED A TURBINE RUNBACK TO APPROXIMATELY 410 MWE. THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED WHILE PERFORMING OPERATING PROCEDURE OP 1004.2, REACTOR PROTECTION TEST. AN INVESTIGATION WAS IMMEDIATELY INITIATED. UNIT 3 WAS STABILIZED AND HELD AT APPROXIMATELY 80% UNTIL THE INVESTIGATION WAS COMPLETED. I AND C STAFF, IN COORDINATION WITH OPERATIONS, RECONSTRUCTED THE CHAIN OF EVENTS LEADING TO THE TURBINE RUNBACK AND FOUND NO ABNORMAL INDICATIONS OF DEFICIENCIES IN THE LOGIC CIRCUITRY. THE INCIDENT IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION RESULTS WERE REVIEWED BY THE PLANT NUCLEAR SAFETY COMMITTEE THUS DETERMINING THAT THE ROOT CAUSE WAS A SPURIOUS SIGNAL TO THE ROD DROP LOGIC OF NIS N44. AUTHORIZATION WAS THEN GIVEN TO RETURN UNIT 3 TO FULL POWER AND THE REACTOR PROTECTION TEST WAS COMPLETED WITH NO FURTHER PROBLEMS. THE LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION WILL BE FOR I AND C STAFF TO MONITOR UNIT 3 NIS N44 RACK WHILE PERFORMING REACTOR PROTECTION TESTS IN AN EFFORT TO DETERMINE, IN CASE OF RECURRENCE, THE ROOT CAUSE FOR THE TURBINE RUNBACK. ALL SAFETY EQUIPMENT AND ASSOCIATED LOGIC PERFORMED SATISFACTORILY. A SIGNIFICANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WAS MADE TO NRCDC VIA EMS. SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: THE SPURIOUS ROD DROP SIGNAL IN NIS N44 UNIT 3 HAS BEEN EXPERIENCED ONCE PRIOR TO THIS INCIDENT AND INVESTIGATIONS HAVE NOT REVEALED A DEFINITE ROOT CAUSE.

FORM 73 LER SCSS DATA 08-00-85
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1984 010 0 2404200006 189511 03/17/84

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BSCH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS

STEP 1: CAUSE AX - APPENDIX R MODIFICATIONS, ISYS SW - UNKNOWN
STRUCTURES, OTHER REPORTABILITY - SPECIAL REPORT.

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

21 OTHER: Voluntary report, special report, Part 21 report,
etc.

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 000%. AS WE REPORTED ON JUNE 16, 1983 (L-83-364) AND OCT
13, 1983 (L-83-519), MANY MODIFICATIONS HAVE NECESSITATED A NUMBER OF
FIRE BARRIERS TO BE BREACHED. IN COMPLIANCE WITH TECH SPECS, AN
HOURLY FIRE WATCH HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED. APPENDIX R MODIFICATIONS ARE
CURRENTLY UNDERWAY WHICH INCLUDE ESTABLISHING SPECIFIC FIRE AREA
BOUNDARIES SEPARATED BY RATED FIRE BARRIERS. ALL PENETRATIONS IN A
FIRE AREA BOUNDARY WILL BE SEALED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR APPENDIX R
COMMITMENTS, AND WILL BE INCLUDED AS PART OF THE APPENDIX R BACKFIT
SCHEDULES. THE HOURLY FIRE WATCH WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR THESE AREAS
IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPECS.

FORM 74 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1984 011 0 8404260194 189316 03/23/84

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS

STEP 4: EFFECT CODE FX - RUNBACK

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ESF actuations.

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 100%. WHILE AT 100% POWER, UNIT 3 EXPERIENCED A TURBINE
RUNBACK RESULTING IN AN AUTOMATIC LOAD REDUCTION TO 83%. THE ROOT
CAUSE WAS FOUND TO BE THE B DETECTOR READING LOW ON HIS POWER RANGE
CHANNEL 42, THUS PRODUCING AN OVERPOWER AND OVERTEMPERATURE DELTA T
AND ROD DROP SIGNAL. A FLUX MAP VERIFIED THAT THERE WERE NO DROPPED
RODS IN THE REACTOR. A SIGNIFICANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WAS MADE TO
NRCUC VIA ENS IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10 CFR 50.72(d)(2)(II). SUBSEQUENT
INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE FAILURE REVEALED THAT WATER HAD ENTERED THE
RESPECTIVE CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CANISTER THUS PRODUCING AN INNER TO
OUTERSHIELD SHORT IN THE "B" DETECTOR CABLE WHICH CONDUCTS THE POWER
RANGE SIGNAL TO N42 CABINET. THE SOURCE OF THE WATER LEAK WAS FOUND
AND SEALED. THE "A" DETECTOR WAS CHECKED AND FOUND SATISFACTORY. THE
CABLES FOR THE "B" DETECTOR WERE DRIED AND ALL CONNECTOR INTERNAL
PARTS WERE REPLACED EXCEPT FOR THE CENTER CONDUCTOR WHICH WAS CLEANED
WITH FREON. THE "B" DETECTOR WAS THEN CHECKED AND FOUND TO BE
PERFORMING PROPERLY. UNIT 3 WAS RETURNED TO FULL POWER OPERATION WITH

NO FURTHER PROBLEMS. THE TOTAL TIME AT REDUCED POWER WAS 2 HOURS AND 40 MINUTES. SHORT TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS TAKEN TO TEMPORARILY SEAL THE SEAMS ON THE ELECTRICAL PENETRATION ROOMS. LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS SEALING THE AUX. BLDG. ROOF. NO SIMILAR OCCURRENCES.

FORM 75 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DUCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1984 013 0 8405030013 189603 03/29/84

DUCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BOCH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS

STEP 6: EFFECT CODE XX - TRANSFERRED TO ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ESF actuations.

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 100%. ON MAR 29, 1984, AN AUTOMATIC TRANSFER OF A 480 V POWER SUPPLY OCCURRED. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS DETERMINED TO BE DUE TO THE ACCIDENTAL JARRING OF AN ELECTRICAL AUXILIARY RELAY BY A MEMBER OF THE PLANT CONSTRUCTION WORK FORCE. THE JARRED RELAY, WHICH SENSES LOSS OF VOLTAGE, MOMENTARILY COMPLETED CIRCUITS THAT FUNCTION TO AUTOMATICALLY TRANSFER THE AFFECTED 480 V BUS TO ITS ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY. ALL EQUIPMENT FUNCTIONED AS DESIGNED. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INCLUDED FUNCTIONAL CHECKS OF ASSOCIATED ELECTRICAL CIRCUITS AND A MANUAL RESET OF THE AUTO-TRANSFER (TELEMANO SWAP) RELAY.

FORM 76 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DUCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1984 013 0 8405030083 189597 04/03/84

DUCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: PECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS

STEP 2: EFFECT CODE FX - TURBINE RUNBACK

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ESF actuations.

REFERENCE LERS:

1 250/84-009

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 100%. ON APRIL 3, 1984, A TURBINE RUNBACK OCCURRED. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS DETERMINED TO BE DUE TO A SPURIOUS ROD DROP SIGNAL POTENTIALLY ORIGINATING IN THE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM (NIS) CHANNEL N-44. ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT MONITORING, INITIATED AS A RESULT

OF A PREVIOUS RUNBACK (LER 250-84-003), PROVIDED RECORDED DATA INDICATING THAT COMPONENTS PREVIOUSLY SUSPECTED DID NOT CAUSE THIS RUNBACK. APL EQUIPMENT FUNCTIONED AS DESIGNED. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INCLUDED STABILIZING THE PLANT AT APPROXIMATELY 75% POWER WITHOUT PROBLEM, SATISFACTORY OPERATIONAL TESTING OF THE NIS CHANNEL N-44 ROD DROP RATE CIRCUIT, AND PREPARATIONS TO PERFORM A SPECIAL TEST UNDER SIMILAR AND/OR SIMULATED PLANT CONDITIONS TO ISOLATE THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE SPURIOUS SIGNAL. SIMILAR OCCURRENCE: LER 250-84-003.

FORM 77 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1984 014 0 8405300114 189451 04/24/84

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
 13-10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ECF actuations.

REFERENCE LERS:
 1 250/84-003

ABSTRACT
 POWER LEVEL ~ 100%. ON 4/24/84, A REACTOR TRIP OCCURRED. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS DETERMINED TO STEM FROM A PERSONNEL ERROR THAT PROPAGATED INTO THE REACTOR TRIP. A TURBINE OPERATOR (TO) TAKING THE "A" "STANDBY" (AS) STATIC INVERTER OUT OF SERVICE ERRONEOUSLY OPENED THE OUTPUT BREAKER OF AN ADJACENT "NORMAL" (3A) STATIC INVERTER THAT WAS IN SERVICE SUPPLYING POWER TO A VITAL PANEL. LOSS OF POWER TO THE VITAL PANEL RESULTED IN A TURBINE RUNBACK. UPON REALIZING HIS ERROR, THE TO RECLOSED THE 3A INVERTER'S OUTPUT BREAKER. HOWEVER, DUE TO THE CURRENT SURGE ASSOCIATED WITH INSTANTANEOUSLY PICKING UP ALL OF THE LOADS, COUPLED WITH AN INSTRUMENT POWER SUPPLY FAILURE IN A RACK POWERED BY THE 3A INVERTER, A CURRENT LIMITER IN THE 3A INVERTER CAUSED ITS OUTPUT VOLTAGE TO GO LOW. A SECOND TURBINE RUNBACK OCCURRED WHEN THE 3A INVERTER'S OUTPUT VOLTAGE WENT LOW AND RESULTED IN A REACTOR TRIP. ALL EQUIPMENT FUNCTIONED AS DESIGNED ON INITIATION OF THE ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SIGNAL (ESFAS) GENERATED IN THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS). SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: LER 250-84-003.

FORM 78 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1984 015 0 8406180289 190302 05/14/84

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS
 STEP 7: EFFECT CODE FX - TURBINE RUNBACK

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): EOL actuations.

REFERENCE LERS:

1 250/84-009 2 250/84-013

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 100%. ON MAY 14, 1984, A TURBINE RUNBACK OCCURRED. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS DETERMINED TO STEM FROM AN INSTRUMENT POWER SUPPLY FAILURE IN THE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM (NIS) THAT RESULTED IN AN NIS ROD DROP SIGNAL (NIS CHANNEL N-41) WHICH GENERATED THE TURBINE RUNBACK. ALL EQUIPMENT FUNCTIONED AS DESIGNED. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INCLUDED PROMPT IDENTIFICATION OF THE CAUSE OF THE RUNBACK AND RESTORATION OF FULL POWER OPERATION, TRIPPING THE ASSOCIATED REACTOR TRIP DISTABLES FOR THE NIS CHANNELS REMOVED FROM SERVICE, ISOLATION OF THE FAILED POWER SUPPLY, AND RETURN TO SERVICE OF NIS CHANNEL N-41. SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: LER 250-84-009 AND LER 250-84-013.

FORM 79 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1984 010 0 0406190261 190101 05/13/84

DOCKET: 250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE: PWR
REGION: 2 NSSTATE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TSCB
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: TPL

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

10 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i): Shutdowns or technical specification violations.

REFERENCE LERS:

1 251/83-019

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 100%. ON MAY 13, 1984, AN ISOTOPIC ANALYSIS FOR IODINES IN THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) WAS NOT PERFORMED WITHIN THE TIME INTERVAL REQUIRED BY TECH SPECS. THE ROOT CAUSE HAS BEEN DETERMINED TO STEM FROM INADEQUATE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN OPERATIONS AND CHEMISTRY PERSONNEL THAT RESULTED IN THE RCS SAMPLE BEING OBTAINED APPROX. 1 HR TOO EARLY. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INCLUDED DISCUSSIONS WITH PLANT PERSONNEL DURING EFFORTS TO DETERMINE THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE, ADDITIONAL TRAINING OF CHEMISTRY PERSONNEL ON THE APPLICABLE NUCLEAR CHEMISTRY PROCEDURE, ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW METHOD FOR DETERMINING THE NEED TO PERFORM SAMPLING AND ISOTOPIC ANALYSIS FOR IODINE IN THE RCS AND AN INCREASED EMPHASIS TO BOTH OPERATIONS AND CHEMISTRY PERSONNEL TO MAINTAIN AN AWARENESS OF TECH SPEC REQUIREMENTS AND THEIR FULFILLMENT. LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS WILL CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF PROVIDING AN INTEGRATED POWER METER WITH ALARM CAPABILITIES. THE SPECIFIC ACTIVITY OF THE RCS, INCLUDING IODINES, DID NOT EXCEED THE LIMITS DEFINED IN THE TECH SPEC. SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: LER 251-83-019.

FORM 80 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE

BUCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA TOWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FTL

COMMENTS

STEP 1: EFFECT DX - DAMAGED. STEP 3: ISSS SW - UNKNOWN STRUCTURAL.

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

- 9 10 CFR 50.36(a)(2): Limiting conditions for operation.
- 10 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i): Shutdowns or technical specification violations.

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 100%. ON JUNE 7, 1984, AT 3:00 P.M., A PRIMARY WATER VALVE (3-220) WAS DISCOVERED TO BE LEAKING. AN EVALUATION DETERMINED THAT THE PRIMARY WATER STORAGE TANK (PWS) WOULD HAVE TO BE ISOLATED TO ISOLATE THE LEAK BUT THAT THE REPAIR WOULD ONLY TAKE ONE TO TWO HOURS. THE MATERIALS FOR THE VALVE REPAIR WERE ASSEMBLED AND AT 6:20 P.M., THE PWS WAS ISOLATED TO REPAIR VALVE 3-220. THE ISOLATION OF THE LEAK RESULTED IN THE UNIT NOT BEING IN COMPLIANCE WITH TECH SPEC 3.6.C.6. HOWEVER, TECH SPEC 3.6.1 ALLOWED SUFFICIENT TIME TO REPAIR THE VALVE WITHOUT A UNIT POWER REDUCTION. THE VALVE WAS REPAIRED BY REPLACING THE STEM AND NUT/BOLTS. THE REPAIRS WERE COMPLETED AND THE PWS RETURNED TO SERVICE AT 7:00 P.M. ON THE SAME DAY. UNIT 3 OPERATION AT FULL POWER WAS UNAFFECTED DURING THIS TIME. THE VOLUME OF WATER IN THE PWS REMAINED ABOVE TECH SPEC REQUIREMENTS. HOWEVER, THE ABILITY TO SUPPLY PRIMARY WATER TO THE PRIMARY WATER SYSTEM WAS DEGRADED. NO EFFECT ON THE ABILITY TO DISTRIBUTE THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM RESULTED. A SIGNIFICANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WAS MADE TO NRCDC VIA ENS PURSUANT TO LO CFR 50.103(c)(2). SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: NONE.

FORM 81

LER SCPS DATA

08-03-85

BUCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1984 013 0 0407100000 190593 07/17/84

BUCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA TOWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FTL

COMMENTS

OTHER REPORTABILITY - PART 21 REPORT.

WATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

231 REPORTS ASSOCIATED WITH PART 21

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

- 11 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i): Unanalyzed conditions.
- 14 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v): Event that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function.
- 21 OTHER: Voluntary report, special report, Part 21 report, etc.

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 100%. ON JUL 17, 1984, TURKEY POINT WAS NOTIFIED BY REACTOR OF A 10 CFR PART 21 DEFICIENCY CONCERNING THE CONTROL CIRCUITRY FOR PRESSURE CONTROLLERS PC600 AND PC501. THE CONTROL CIRCUITRY IS POWERED BY A SINGLE NON-VITAL SOURCE AND LOSS OF POWER WILL RESULT IN DE-ENERGIZING THE INTERLOCKING RELAYS TO SAFETY-RELATED VALVES MOV-862A, 862B, 143A, AND 862B IN THE RHR PUMP SUCTION AND DISCHARGE LINES RESULTING IN THE REACTOR OPERATORS BEING UNABLE TO OPEN THE VALVES FROM THE CONTROL ROOM, WHEN IN A POST-LOCA CONDITION, THE SWITCH-OVER TO HIGH HEAD RECIRCULATION PHASE REQUIRES THAT MOV-862A AND B BE CLOSED AND MOV-862A AND B BE OPENED. THIS DEFECT, COINCIDENT WITH A LOSS OF POWER, WILL NOT AFFECT THE ABILITY TO CLOSE MOV-862A AND B BUT IT WOULD NECESSITATE THE MANUAL OPENING OF MOV-862A AND B, IF RADIOLOGICAL CONDITIONS IN THE AREA PERMIT SUCH ACTION. THE INABILITY TO OPEN THESE VALVES COULD HAMPER THE ABILITY TO ADEQUATELY COOL THE CORE. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INCLUDE: 1) PROVIDING JUMPERS AND TOOLS TO BYPASS THE PRESSURE CONTROL INTERLOCK ALLOWING THE VALVES TO BE OPENED FROM THE CONTROL ROOM, 2) LABELING OF THE APPROPRIATE RELAY ROCKS AND THE TERMINAL STRIPS AND CONTACTS, PER THE RESPECTIVE VALVES, ON THE INSIDE OF THE PACK DOORS, 3) TRAINING OF ALL REACTOR OPERATORS ON ACTIONS TO TAKE VIA A TRAINING BRIEF, AND 4) EMERGENCY PROCEDURE E-1 HAS BEEN REVISED TO INCLUDE INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW AND WHEN TO INSTALL THE JUMPERS.

FORM 82 LER SOLS DATA 08-02-85

 DATE YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 290 1 1984 017 0 8408030220 190792 06/25/84

BUCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:FWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS

STEP 1: COMP MSC - GLAND FOLLOWER

RELIABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

10 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i): Shutdowns or technical specification violations.

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 100%. ON JUN 25, 1984, UNIT 3 WAS SHUT DOWN FROM 100% POWER DUE TO A REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) LEAK OF APPROX 10 GPM. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS DETERMINED TO STEM FROM A PACKING LEAK DUE TO A BROKEN GLAND FOLLOWER ON VALVE 3-532. THE LOWER ISOLATION VALVE ON THE INSTRUMENT SENSING LINE TO LT-3-460. THE AFFECTED LOOP BYSTAFES WERE TRIPPED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPERATING PROCEDURE 0203.14, THUS SATISFYING THE TECH SPEC REQUIREMENT FOR MINIMUM DEGREE OF REDUNDANCY FOR REACTOR TRIP SIGNALS ON PRESSURIZER HIGH WATER LEVEL. DURING A RCS LOADDOWN TO AFFECT REPAIRS, VALVE 3-532 WAS MANUALLY BACKSEATED AND STOPPED THE LEAK. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INCLUDED: (1) A MANUAL UNIT SHUTDOWN AND SUBSEQUENT COOLDOWN TO REPAIR VALVE, (2) ORIGINAL VALVE PACKING GLAND FLANGE WAS REPLACED WITH A "STRONG-BACK" PLATE AND WASHER, AND (3) AN OVERPRESSURE TEST AND VISUAL LEAK CHECK OF THE RCS WERE PERFORMED AND SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED. THE LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION TO BE TAKEN IS TO REPLACE THE TEMPORARY "STRONG-BACK" WITH A PERMANENT ENGINEERED DEVICE DURING THE NEXT REFUELING OUTAGE. SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: NONE.

FORM 84 LER SCSS DATA 08-07-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1984 020 0 8408100521 191042 07/12/84

DOCKET: 250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE: PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS
 STEP 9: EFFECT DX = DEGRADED (LER DOES NOT STATE HOW.)

WATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
 13 UPDATE NEEDED

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
 10 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i): Shutdowns or technical
 specification violations.

REFERENCE LERS:
 1 250/84-019

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 100%. ON JUL 12, 1984, UNIT 3 WAS SHUT DOWN FROM 100% POWER DUE TO A REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) LEAK OF APPROX 13.5 GPM. THE CAUSE WAS LEAKAGE DUE TO A BROKEN GLAND FLANGE ON VALVE 3-538. THE LOWER ROOT VALVE ON THE PRESSURIZER LEVEL INSTRUMENT SENSING LINE TO LT-3-459. THE AFFECTED LOOP BISTABLES WERE TRIPPED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPERATING PROCEDURE 0200.14. THEREFORE, THE TECH SPEC REQUIREMENT FOR MINIMUM DEGREE OF REDUNDANCY FOR REACTOR TRIP SIGNALS ON PRESSURIZER HIGH WATER LEVEL WAS SATISFIED. DURING A RCS COOLDOWN TO AFFECT REPAIRS, VALVE 3-538 WAS MANUALLY BACKSEATED AND THE LEAK STOPPED. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INCLUDED: 1) A MANUAL UNIT SHUTDOWN AND SUBSEQUENT COOLDOWN TO REPAIR VALVE, 2) ORIGINAL VALVE PACKING GLAND FLANGE WAS REPLACED WITH A 'STRONG-BACK' PLATE AND WASHER, 3) AN INSPECTION OF ALL ROCKWELL 3/4 INCH VALVES ON UNITS 3 AND 4 WITH BOTH UNITS SHUT DOWN AND, 4) AN OVERPRESSURE TEST AND VISUAL LEAK CHECK OF THE RCS WERE PERFORMED AND SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED. THE LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION TO BE TAKEN IS TO HAVE ENGINEERING EVALUATE THESE FAILURES FOR THE ROOT CAUSE AND PROVIDE PERMANENT FIX RECOMMENDATIONS. SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: 250-84-019.

FORM 84 LER SCSS DATA 08-07-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1984 021 0 8408200273 191043 07/14/84

DOCKET: 250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE: PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
 13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ESF actuations.

REFERENCE LERS:
 1 251/84-014

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 000%. ON JUL 14, 1984, UNIT 3 EXPERIENCED A REACTOR TRIP FROM A SUBCRITICAL CONDITION. THE REACTOR TRIP SIGNAL WAS CAUSED BY A POWER INTERRUPTION OF THE SOURCE RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION CONTROL POWER WHILE MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL WERE TROUBLESHOOTING THE CIRCUITRY. ALL EQUIPMENT FUNCTIONED AS DESIGNED ON INITIATION OF THE ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SIGNAL (ESFAS). IMMEDIATE ACTIONS INCLUDED: 1) VERIFICATION THAT AN ACTUAL REACTOR POWER EXCURSION HAD NOT OCCURRED VIA THE OTHER SOURCE RANGE CHANNEL N-31 AND, INTERMEDIATE RANGE CHANNELS N-33 AND N-34. 2) VERIFICATION THAT A POWER INTERRUPTION OF THE N-32 CIRCUITRY HAD OCCURRED BY MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL TROUBLESHOOTING THE EQUIPMENT. 3) PERFORMED OFF-NORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURE 208.1 FOR REACTOR TRIP. 4) IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ii), NOTIFICATION OF A SIGNIFICANT EVENT WAS MADE TO THE NRC AND THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS TO COUNSEL MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL ON THE NEED TO EXERCISE CAUTION WHEN TROUBLESHOOTING THE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION WITH THE REACTOR PROTECTION EQUIPMENT IN SERVICE. SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: 251-34-14.

FORM 85 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1984 022 0 0408270203 191241 07/21/84

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:FWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: EPL

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

10 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i): Shutdowns or technical specification violations.

REFERENCE LERS:

1 250/80-012

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 100%. ON SATURDAY, JULY 21 AND SUNDAY, JULY 22, THE DAILY CALIBRATION OF THE NUCLEAR POWER RANGE (THERMAL POWER CALCULATION) WAS NOT PERFORMED AS REQUIRED BY TECH SPEC 4.1, TABLE 4.1-1, ITEM 1 FOR UNIT 3 AND 4, RESPECTIVELY. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS A LICENSED OPERATOR OVERSIGHT THAT RESULTED IN THE CALCULATION NOT BEING DONE WHILE PERFORMING OPERATING PROCEDURE 0204.2, SCHEDULE OF PERIODIC TESTS, CHECKS, AND OPERATING EVALUATIONS. THE MISSED CALCULATIONS WERE NOT DISCOVERED UNTIL MONDAY MORNING, JULY 23, 1984. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN WERE THE FOLLOWING: 1) A CHECK WAS MADE TO SEE IF THE CALCULATION HAD BEEN DONE FOR UNIT 3 ON JULY 22. IT HAD BEEN COMPLETED AND REVEALED NO ABNORMALITIES. 2) A CHECK WAS MADE TO SEE IF THE CALCULATIONS HAD BEEN COMPLETED FOR BOTH UNIT 3 AND 4 ON MONDAY, JULY 23, 1984. THE CALCULATIONS HAD BEEN COMPLETED AND REVEALED NO ABNORMALITIES. 3) AN ADDITIONAL CALCULATION WAS DONE FOR UNIT 4 ON MONDAY, JULY 23, 1984, AND REVEALED NO ABNORMALITIES. 4) SUPERVISORY DISCUSSIONS WERE HELD WITH THE LICENSED OPERATOR AND PLANT SUPERVISOR - NUCLEAR ON THE IMPORTANCE OF PERFORMING THE REQUIRED SURVEILLANCES AND UNDERSTANDING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THEIR ACTIONS. SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: LER 250-80-012.

FORM 86 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

 DCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1984 023 0 8410020533 191620 08/22/84

DUCKET: 250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE: PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): FPL actions.

REFERENCE LERS:

1 251/83-008 2 250/83-005 3 250/80-022

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 100%. ON AUGUST 22, 1984, WHILE UNIT 3 WAS AT 100% POWER, A TURBINE RUBBAC TO 45% POWER OCCURRED. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS DETERMINED TO STEM FROM A DROPPED CONTROL ROD IN SHUTDOWN BANK A. THE DROPPED ROD WAS CAIRED BY A BLEW STATIONARY GRIPPER FUSE. ALL EQUIPMENT FUNCTIONED AS DESIGNED ON INITIATION OF THE ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTIVATION SIGNAL (ESFAS). IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INCLUDED: 1) STABILIZING THE UNIT AT 45% POWER, 2) HAVING 1 AND 2 PERSONNEL IDENTIFY THE CAUSE OF THE DROPPED ROD AND AFFECTING REPAIRS, AND 3) CALCULATING QUADRANT TO AVERAGE POWER TILT AND REDUCING NIS POWER RANGE HIGH NEUTRON FLUX TRIP SETPOINT TO 75% POWER AS REQUIRED BY TECH SPECS. A SIGNIFICANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WAS MADE TO NRCOC VIA LENS IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10 CFR 50.72. SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: LER 251-83-003, LER 250-83-005 AND LER 250-80-022.

FORM 87

LER SCSS DATA

08-09-85

 DCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1984 024 0 8410160110 191620 09/02/84

DUCKET: 250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE: PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

10 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i): Shutdowns c technical specification violations.

REFERENCE LERS:

1 251/82-009 2 251/79-012

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 100%. IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE BIWEEKLY TEST FOR (AVE) AND DELTA-T WAS NOT PERFORMED AS REQUIRED BY TECH SPEC 4.1.1, TABLE 4.1-1, ITEM 4. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS AN OVERSIGHT ON THE PART OF THE PLANT PERSONNEL IN THAT THE SURVEILLANCE TEST WAS NOT COMPLETED WITHIN THE ALLOWED TECH SPEC TIME INTERVAL (14 DAYS PLUS OR MINUS 2%). THE PREVIOUS BIWEEKLY TEST HAD BEEN PERFORMED ON 8-16-84. THE NEXT TEST SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED ON 8-30-84, WITH A 3 DAY GRACE PERIOD, MAKING THE TEST OVERDUE AFTER 9-2-84. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN WERE THE FOLLOWING: 1) THE SURVEILLANCE TEST WAS COMPLETED UPON DISCOVERY AND THE RESULTS INDICATED THAT ALL CHANNELS

TESTED WERE FOUND TO BE WITHIN THE TOLERANCE ALLOWED BY TECH SPEC. (2) THE METHOD OF SCHEDULING CERTAIN TECH SPEC SURVEILLANCE WILL BE CHANGED TO REQUIRE THEIR COMPLETION ON A SPECIFIC DAY. ITEM 4 IN TABLE 4.1-1 OF TECH SPEC 4.1 WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE REVISED SCHEDULE. (3) THE QC PROGRAM TO TRACK TECH SPEC SURVEILLANCES HAS BEEN ENHANCED. THE ENHANCEMENT IS THAT IF QC IS NOT NOTIFIED THAT A REQUIRED TECH SPEC SURVEILLANCE TEST HAS BEEN COMPLETED BY THE END OF THE TIME PERIOD SPECIFIED IN TECH SPEC, QC WILL NOTIFY THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBLE, STATING THAT THIS TEST MUST BE COMPLETED BEFORE THE END OF THE GRADE PERIOD.

FURN 88 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1984 026 0 8411010422 191745 09/23/84

DOCKET: 250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE: PWR
 REGION: 2 NSS: WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: ICH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

WATCH LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
 13 URGENT NEEDED

REPORTABILITY CODES (OR THIS LER ARE:
 14 10 OFF 30.73(2)(a): Event that could have prevented
 fulfillment of a safety function.

ABSTRACT
 POWER LEVEL - 100%. ON 9-23-84, WHILE UNIT 3 WAS AT 100% POWER AND UNIT 4 WAS AT 50% POWER, THE RESULTS OF PERFORMANCE TESTS AND PRELIMINARY ENGINEERING EVALUATION ON THE INTAKE COOLING WATER (ICW) SYSTEM REVEALED THE COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW) SYSTEM HEAT EXCHANGERS (HX) MAY NOT MEET THE DESIGN HEAT REMOVAL CAPABILITY UNDER DESIGN ICW INLET CONDITIONS. THE TESTS AND ENGINEERING EVALUATION OF THE ICW SYSTEM WERE PERFORMED AFTER A CONCERN WAS RAISED WITH PLANT MANAGEMENT ON THE PERFORMANCE OF THE ICW SYSTEM. THE ORIGINAL CONCERNS WERE A FLOW RESTRICTION IN THE ICW SYSTEM PIPING AND A TEMPORARY REPAIR TO A SECTION OF ICW PIPING. THE PLANT NUCLEAR SAFETY COMMITTEE REVIEWED THE TESTS AND THE ENGINEERING EVALUATIONS AND DETERMINED THE ICW AND CCW SYSTEMS WERE CAPABLE OF PERFORMING THEIR SAFETY FUNCTIONS UNDER CURRENT ICW INLET CONDITIONS. IN ADDITION, THE FOLLOWING SHORT TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS WERE IMPLEMENTED: 1) A TEMPORARY LCO BASED ON ICW SYSTEM INLET TEMPERATURE, PUMP, AND HX ARRANGEMENT WAS ESTABLISHED IMMEDIATELY. 2) ENGINEERING PERFORMED A TCCRSO.50 EVALUATION OF THE TEMPORARY REPAIR TO A SECTION OF ICW PIPING AND FOUND NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS. 3) OPERATING PROCEDURES WERE MODIFIED TO ADDRESS THE ACTION TO BE TAKEN DURING OFF-NORMAL CONDITIONS OF THE ICW SYSTEM. 4) PERFORMANCE TESTS AND INSPECTIONS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS.

FURN 89 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1984 026 0 8411190312 192024 10/09/84

DOCKET: 250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE: PWR
 REGION: 2 NSS: WE

ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: EPL
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: EPL

COMMENTS

STEP 4: EFFECT EX - TURBINE RUNBACK.

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ESF actuations.

REFERENCE LERS:

1 251/84-011 2 251/84-022

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 100%. AT 2:37 AM ON 10-2-84, WHILE UNIT 3 WAS AT 100% POWER, A TURBINE RUNBACK TO 70% REACTOR POWER OCCURRED. DURING AN INVESTIGATION FOR A GROUND ON AN INVERTER OF UNIT 4, A TEMPORARY LOSS OF POWER OCCURRED ON THE 120V AC INSTRUMENT BUS SUPPLYING POWER TO THE ELECTRICAL PANEL 3P07. THIS CAUSED NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM (NIS) TO GENERATE AN "NIS ROD DROP" SIGNAL CAUSING A TURBINE RUNBACK TO 70% POWER. 30 SECONDS AFTER THE RUNBACK SIGNAL, THE POWER LEVEL RETURNED AND THE N-42 POWER SENSE CHANNEL RETURNED TO NORMAL OPERATION LEVELS. AN INADVERTENT TRANSFER OF POWER FOR PANEL 3P07 FROM THE NORMAL 3A INVERTER TO THE SPARE AS INVERTER, WHICH IS SHARED WITH UNIT 4, IS BELIEVED TO BE THE CAUSE OF THE LOSS OF POWER. JUST PRIOR TO THIS UNIT 3 EVENT, THE AS INVERTER HAD BEEN MADE INOPERABLE BY A BLOWN FUSE AS THE RESULT OF AN UNRELATED EVENT ON UNIT 4 (LER 251-04-022). A THOROUGH INVESTIGATION INVOLVING EQUIPMENT TESTS, FAILED TO REVEAL ANY EQUIPMENT RELATED CAUSE FOR THIS TEMPORARY LOSS OF POWER. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS WERE TO STABILIZE UNIT 3 AT 70% REACTOR POWER. AFTER A 12 HR INVESTIGATION FAILED TO REVEAL ANY EQUIPMENT FAILURES, PREPARATIONS WERE BEGUN ON 10-2-84 TO RETURN UNIT 3 TO FULL POWER. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INCLUDED TRAINING ON INVERTER SWITCHING FOR THE PERSONNEL ON-SHIFT DURING THE EVENT. THE EVENT WILL BE DISCUSSED IN OPERATOR REGUALIFICATION CLASSES VIA THE OPERATING EXPERIENCE FEEDBACK PROGRAM.

FORM 90 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

BUCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1984 027 0 8411070113 192025 10/02/84

BUCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: FECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: EPL

COMMENTS

OTHER REPORTABILITY: VOLUNTARY. STEP 3: COMPONENT MSC - COIL TAPE,
EFFECT DA - DAMAGED. STEP 4: COMPONENT MSC - INSULATING (OPERATING)
LINK.

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

21 OTHER: Voluntary report, special report, Part 21 report,
etc.

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 100%. ON 10-2-84, WITH UNIT 4 AT COLD SHUTDOWN WITH REFUELING SHUTDOWN BORON CONCENTRATIONS, AND UNIT 3 AT 100% POWER, THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS WERE FOUND DURING ROUTINE SURVEILLANCE AND

TESTING OF THE WESTINGHOUSE DB-70 REACTOR AND BYPASS TRIP BREAKERS ON UNIT 4: 1) UNDERVOLTAGE (TRIP ATTACHMENT COIL TAKE DAMAGED, 2) CRACKED INSULATING LINK, 3) MANUAL CLOSING MECHANISM BRACKET, 4) MANUAL CLOSING MECHANISM, FAILED BEARING. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION INCLUDED INSPECTION AND FUNCTIONAL TESTING OF THE UNIT 3 REACTOR TRIP/BYPASS TRIP BREAKERS. ALL THE TRIP BREAKERS COMPLETED FUNCTIONAL TESTS. THE INSPECTION REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: 1) MANUAL CLOSING BRACKET, 2) MANUAL CLOSING MECHANISM, FAILED BEARING. WESTINGHOUSE WAS CONTACTED TO EVALUATE THE IMPACT ON SAFETY OF THE CRACKED BRAZE JOINTS ON THE MANUAL CLOSING MECHANISM BRACKET AND THE FAILED BEARING IN THE MANUAL CLOSING MECHANISM. THE WESTINGHOUSE EVALUATION STATED THE CRACKED BRAZE JOINT OR BEARING FAILURE WOULD NOT IMPACT THE ELECTRICAL CLOSING AND OPENING OF THE BREAKER FUNCTIONS. THE SAFETY FUNCTION OF THE BREAKERS WOULD NOT BE COMPROMISED. CORRECTIVE ACTION INCLUDED REPLACEMENT OF THE FAILED BEARINGS PRIOR TO THE START-UP OF UNIT 4 AND WESTINGHOUSE IS EVALUATING THE FAILURE MODE OF THE BEARINGS AND IS PROVIDING A REPAIR PROCEDURE FOR THE CRACKED BRAZE JOINTS. SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: NONE.

FORM 91 LER SCSS DATA 08-02-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1984 020 0 8412100557 192481 10/30/84

DOCKET: 250 TURN 7 POINT 3 TYPE: PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: PCH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

10 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i): Shutdowns or technical specification violations.

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 100%. ON 10-30-84, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE MINIMUM DEGREE OF REDUNDANCY FOR THE UNIT 3 RPS OVERTEMPERATURE - DELTA TEMPERATURE AND OVERPOWER - DELTA TEMPERATURE REACTOR TRIP FEATURES WAS LESS THAN THAT REQUIRED BY TECH SPEC 3.5, TABLE 3.5-1. A MONTHLY PERIODIC FUNCTIONAL TEST OF THE POWER RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION INDICATED THAT 1 OF 3 CHANNELS, CHANNEL 1 FOR EACH OF THE OVERTEMPERATURE - DELTA TEMPERATURE AND OVERPOWER - DELTA TEMPERATURE REACTOR TRIP FEATURES HAD DIMINISHED OPERABILITY DUE TO INCORRECT VARIABLE SETPOINTS. A SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT THE INCORRECT VARIABLE SETPOINTS RESULTED FROM THE SWAPPING OF A PAIR OF ADJACENT NIS CABINET OUTPUT LEADS, TRANSMITTING PROCESSED INPUT SIGNALS FROM THE UPPER AND LOWER EXCORE ION DETECTION CHAMBERS FOR THE NIS POWER RANGE CHANNEL N-41. THE SWAPPED LEADS WOULD HAVE ALLOWED THE CORE AXIAL FLUX IMBALANCE PENALTY FUNCTION INPUTS TO THE OVERTEMPERATURE - DELTA TEMPERATURE AND OVERPOWER - DELTA TEMPERATURE SETPOINTS TO VARY IN VALUES OUTSIDE THOSE SPECIFIED IN TECH SPEC 2.3. UPON DISCOVERY, THE 2 SWAPPED LEADS WERE CORRECTLY TERMINATED AND THE NIS CHANNEL N-41 WAS FUNCTIONALLY TESTED AND PLACED BACK INTO SERVICE. PRECAUTIONS INCLUDED FUNCTIONAL TESTING FOR ALL OTHER UNIT 3 NIS CHANNELS AND ALL UNIT 4 NIS CHANNELS. NO OTHER SWAPPED LEADS WERE DISCOVERED AND ALL OTHER NIS CHANNELS WERE FUNCTIONALLY TESTED TO ENSURE PROPER SETPOINTS.

FORM 92 LER SCSS DATA 08-02-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1 84 02 0 8502270520 192715 11/27/84

DOCKET: 250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE: PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: ECCH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS

STEP 3 & 4: EFFECT IX - TURBINE RUNBACK; STEP 8: CAUSE XX - RAPID DROP
 IN REACTOR POWER; STEPS 7 & 11: RUNBACK MOTOR CAUSED FASTER LOAD
 REDUCTION THAN REQUIRED.

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

13 10 LFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ESF actuations.

REFERENCE LERS:

1 250/84-013 2 250/84-009

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 100%. ON 11-27-84, WHILE UNIT 3 WAS AT 100% POWER, A
 TURBINE RUNBACK TO 50 MWE AND APPROX 65% REACTOR POWER OCCURRED.
 DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF OPERATING PROCEDURE 12304.2, POWER RANGE
 NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION PERIODIC CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST, ON NIS
 CHANNEL N-43, AN OPERATOR INADVERTENTLY TOOK THE DROPPED ROD MODE
 SWITCH OUT OF BYPASS AND PLACED IN NORMAL WITH A TEST SIGNAL PRESENT,
 INITIATING A NIS ROD DROP TURBINE RUNBACK. THE OPERATOR IMMEDIATELY
 PLACED THE MODE SWITCH BACK TO BYPASS. A SECOND RUNBACK WAS GENERATED
 WHEN THE REMAINING NIS INSTRUMENTATION PICKED UP A ROD DROP SIGNAL
 DUE TO THE RAPID DROP IN REACTOR POWER. THESE RUNBACKS REDUCED
 GENERATOR LOAD TO APPROX 50 MWE. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
 INCLUDED: 1) STOPPING THE LOAD DECREASE BY RAISING GOVERNOR OIL
 PRESSURE WHICH INCREASED THE GENERATOR LOAD TO APPROX 225 MWE, 2)
 STABILIZING THE UNIT AT 65% POWER BY INCREASING GENERATOR LOAD TO
 MATCH REACTOR POWER, AND 3) SUPERVISORY DISCUSSION WAS HELD WITH THE
 OPERATOR INVOLVED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF PROCEDURAL COMPLIANCE AND
 SIGNIFICANCE OF HIS ACTIONS. ALL EQUIPMENT FUNCTIONED AS DESIGNED
 UPON INITIATION OF THE ESFAS. THE GOVERNOR RUNBACK LOGIC FOR A NIS
 ROD DROP SIGNAL IS SET TO REDUCE LOAD 30% IN A ONE TIME NINE SECOND
 PERIOD. THE REASON FOR THE MAGNITUDE OF THE RUNBACKS WAS THAT THE
 GOVERNOR RUNBACK MOTOR WAS CAUSING A FASTER LOAD REDUCTION THAN
 REQUIRED.

FORM 93 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1984 030 0 8501090665 192572 11/29/84

DOCKET: 250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE: PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS

STEP 1: CAUSE SX - MODIFICATIONS IN PROGRESS; STEPS 4, 5, 6, 8: ISYS SW
 - MULTIPLE AREAS; STEP : CAUSE XX - APPENDIX R MODIFICATIONS IN
 PROGRESS.

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

10 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i): Shutdowns or technical specification violations.

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL ~ 100%. ON 11-29-84, THE SURVEILLANCE EXTENSION PERIOD ALLOWED BY TECH SPEC 4.15.2.A.6 EXPIRED. WHEN FUNCTIONAL TESTING OF THE MOTOR-DRIVEN AND DIESEL-DRIVEN FIRE PUMPS COULD NOT BE COMPLETED IN A TIMELY MANNER. TECH SPEC 4.15.2.A.6 REQUIRES THAT FUNCTIONAL TESTING OF THE 2 FIRE PUMPS BE COMPLETED WITHIN AN 18 MONTH PERIOD WITH A MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE EXTENSION OF 25% OF THE SURVEILLANCE INTERVAL. THE ROOT CAUSE FOR MISSING THE 18 MO SURVEILLANCE PERIOD AND THE 25% EXTENSION WAS DUE TO THE NUMBER AND SCHEDULE OF APPENDIX B MODIFICATIONS MADE TO THAT PART OF THE SYSTEM NECESSARY FOR FUNCTIONAL TESTING OF THE FIRE PUMPS. WHEN TESTING OF THE PUMPS BEGAN SEVERAL DAYS BEFORE THE EXTENSION PERIOD EXPIRED, PROBLEMS WERE EXPERIENCED WITH THE NEWLY INSTALLED FLOW MEASUREMENT INSTRUMENTATION MAKING IT IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN CONSISTENT FLOW MEASUREMENTS. THE DIESEL DRIVEN PUMP SPEED WAS FOUND TO BE LOW, AND IT WAS DECLARED OUT OF SERVICE TO ADJUST THE SPEED GOVERNOR. ON 11-29-84, MOTOR-DRIVEN PUMP TESTING WAS COMPLETED, BUT NOT ENOUGH VENDOR INFO WAS AVAILABLE ON FLOW INSTRUMENTATION TO ALLOW CALCULATION OF FLOWS AND DETERMINE PUMP OPERABILITY. TO COMPLY WITH TECH SPEC 3.14.2, ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ALTERNATE SCREEN WASH PUMP SUPPLY OF FIRE PROTECTION WATER WERE MADE. ON 11-30-84, THE FLOW DATA FOR THE MOTOR-DRIVEN PUMP WERE VERIFIED TO MEET MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS AND THE PUMP WAS OPERABLE. THE PUMP WAS PLACED INTO SERVICE ON 12-5-84.

FORM 94 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1 036 031 0 8501100106 192793 12/02/84

DOCKET: 250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE: PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: FECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

11 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii): Unanalyzed conditions.

REFERENCE LERS:

1 251/84-020 2 251/84-007

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL ~ 100%. ON 12-2-84 AT 10:45 AM, CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE, CV-3-855, WOULD NOT INDICATE CLOSURE IN THE CONTROL ROOM, WHILE PERFORMING OPERATING PROCEDURE 0209.1, VALVE EXERCISING PROCEDURE. CV-3-855 DID NOT GIVE AN INDICATION OF CLOSURE IN THE CONTROL ROOM UPON RECEIPT OF A CLOSURE SIGNAL. OPERATIONS PERSONNEL VERIFIED LOCALLY THAT THE VALVE DID NOT CLOSE. CV-3-855 IS THE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE IMMEDIATELY OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT IN THE NITROGEN SUPPLY SYSTEM TO THE SAFETY INJECTION ACCUMULATORS. THE SYSTEM CONTAINS A CHECK VALVE IMMEDIATELY INSIDE CONTAINMENT TO PREVENT BACK FLOW AND AIR OPERATED SHUT-OFF VALVES ARE LOCATED AT EACH ACCUMULATOR. THESE WOULD PREVENT A RELEASE PATH TO THE ENVIRONMENT. INVESTIGATION BY I & C PERSONNEL DETERMINED THAT AN ASCO SOLENOID VALVE HAD MALFUNCTIONED KEEPING THE AIR SUPPLY APPLIED TO CV-3-855. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING: 1) THE AIR SUPPLY TO THE VALVE WAS SECURED AND THE VALVE CLOSED AS DESIGNED, 2) 1

3. C REFLECTED THE AFD SC ENVID VALUE AND THE SYSTEM WAS RETURNED TO ITS NORMAL CONFIGURATION. AN INCIDENT EVENT WAS DECLARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH TURKEY POINT ENERGY PLAN. THE INCIDENT EVENT WAS TERMINATED WHEN THE AIR SUPPLY TO C-3-855 WAS SECURED AND ALL REQUIRED NOTIFICATIONS WERE MADE. SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: LER 251-84-020 AND LER 251-84-009.

FORM 95 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1984 002 0 8501100064 192573 12/03/84

DOCKET: 250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE: PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

10 10 CER 30.73(a)(2)(1): Shutdowns or technical specification violations.

REFERENCE LER: 1 250-84-008 2 251-83-012 3 250-83-009 4 250-80-006

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 100%, ON 12-3-84. WHILE UNIT 3 WAS AT 100% POWER AND UNIT 4 WAS IN A HOT SHUTDOWN CONDITION IN THE PROCESS OF A UNIT START-UP, THE TECH SPEC 3.8.4.1 LCO, RELATED TO THE AFW PUMP AVAILABILITY, WAS INADVERTENTLY EXCEEDED. ALTHOUGH TECH SPEC 3.8.4.1 DOES NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESS THE REMEDIAL ACTIONS NECESSARY WHEN ONE AFW PUMP BECOMES IMPERFECT AND EITHER PCS IS HEATED TO ABOVE 350 F BUT IS AT LESS THAN 2X LF FULL POWER, AN INTERPRETATION OF THIS TECH SPEC WOULD REQUIRE AN IMMEDIATE COOLDOWN OF ONE UNIT TO LESS THAN 350 F. DURING PERIODIC FUNCTIONAL TESTING OF THE 'A' AFW PUMP, THIS PUMP WAS TAKEN OUT OF SERVICE FOR 2 HRS AND 14 MINS WITHOUT INITIATING A UNIT 4 COOLDOWN. THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE WAS THE FAILURE BY PLANT PERSONNEL TO PROPERLY APPLY 2 RECENT INTERPRETATIONS OF TECH SPEC 3.8.4 WHICH WOULD REQUIRE THE INITIATION OF A REACTOR SYSTEM COOLDOWN OF 1 UNIT TO LESS THAN 350 F, PROVIDED THAT THIS UNIT IS MAINTAINING A REACTOR COOLANT TEMPERATURE ABOVE 350 F PUT IS AT LESS THAN 2X POWER. SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: 250-80-005, 250-84-009, 250-83-012, 250-84-008.

FORM 96 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1984 003 0 8501202005 192679 12/13/84

DOCKET: 250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE: PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS

STEP 1: COMPONENT MSC-ROTOR; STEP 4: COMPONENT MSC-DIODE WHEEL AND ITS COMPONENTS AND HEAT SINKS; EFFECT IX-DAMAGED.

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ECF actuations.

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 100%. ON 12-13-84, WHILE UNIT 3 WAS AT 100% POWER, A REACTOR TRIP OCCURRED. A FAULT IN THE EXCITER CAUSED A LOSS OF GENERATOR FIELD AND A GENERATOR TRIP. THE GENERATOR TRIP CAUSED A TURBINE TRIP WHICH RESULTED IN A REACTOR TRIP. ALL EQUIPMENT FUNCTIONED AS DESIGNED UPON ACTUATION OF THE ECF ACTUATION SIGNAL. AN INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT THE FAULT IN THE EXCITER WAS CAUSED BY A SHORTING OF THE DC (NEGATIVE WHEEL) TO THE AC SIDE OF THE EXCITER ROTOR. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING: 1) STABILIZE THE UNIT AND THEN PROCEED TO COLD SHUTDOWN CONDITIONS DUE TO THE "A" EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR BEING OUT OF SERVICE FOR PERIODIC MAINTENANCE. 2) INVESTIGATION OF EXCITER MALFUNCTION, DETERMINING THE EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE AND EFFECTING REPAIRS. SIGNIFICANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WAS MADE TO THE NRC VIA ENS PURSUANT TO 10 CFR 50.72(B)(2)(II). SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: NONE.

FORM 97 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1984 001 0 8501220213 192731 12/13/84

DOCKET: 250 TURKEY POINT 2 TYPE: PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: ICC
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

10 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i): Shutdowns or technical specification violations.

REFERENCE LERS:

1 250/84-032 2 251/84-020 3 251/84-009 4 250/83-016

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 000%. ON 12-13-84, WHILE UNIT 3 WAS PROCEEDING FROM HOT TO COLD SHUTDOWN UNDER ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS, CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE WOULD NOT INDICATE CLOSURE IN THE CONTROL ROOM. CV-3-204 IS THE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE IMMEDIATELY OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT IN THE CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM LETDOWN LINE. INSIDE CONTAINMENT THERE ARE 3 LETDOWN ORIFICE ISOLATION VALVES THAT REMAINED OPERABLE AND WOULD PREVENT A FLOW PATH TO OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT. AN INVESTIGATION BY I&C PERSONNEL DISCOVERED THAT THE SOLENOID VALVE TO CV-3-204 HAD MALFUNCTIONED SUCH THAT INSTRUMENT AIR WAS CONTINUOUSLY APPLIED TO THE VALVE DIAPHRAGM KEEPING IT FROM CLOSING. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INCLUDED: 1) THE INSTRUMENT AIR SUPPLY TO THE VALVE WAS SECURED AND THE VALVE CLOSED AS DESIGNED. 2) I&C REPLACED THE SOLENOID VALVE AND RELEASED IT TO OPERATIONS. THE VALVE WAS TESTED SATISFACTORILY AND PLACED BACK IN SERVICE. AN UNUSUAL EVENT WAS DECLARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TURKEY POINT EMERGENCY PLAN AND ALL REQUIRED NOTIFICATIONS WERE MADE. THE UNUSUAL EVENT WAS TERMINATED WHEN THE INSTRUMENT AIR SUPPLY TO CV-3-204 WAS SECURED AND CV-3-204 CLOSED. SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: LER 250-84-032, 251-84-020, 251-84-009, AND 250-83-016.

FORM 98 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1984 003 0 8502040613 193222 12/30/84

DOCKET: 250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE: PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BOCH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

10 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i): Shutdowns or technical
specification violations.

REFERENCE LERS:

1 251/83-011

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 000%. ON 12-30-84 WHILE INVESTIGATING FOR THE SOURCE OF
LEAKAGE INTO THE PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK OF UNIT 3. IN HOT SHUTDOWN,
IT WAS DETERMINED THAT MOV-3-503 THE BLOCK VALVE UPSTREAM FROM PORV
PCV-3-456 WOULD NOT CLOSE COMPLETELY. THE REDUNDANT PORV AND
ASSOCIATED BLOCK VALVE REMAINED OPERABLE THROUGHOUT THIS EVENT. THE
TORQUE LIMIT SWITCH ON THE VALVE MALFUNCTIONED WHICH PREVENTED
COMPLETE CLOSURE OF THE VALVE. UPON DISCOVERY THAT THE BLOCK VALVE
WOULD NOT CLOSE COMPLETELY, ACTIONS WERE TAKEN TO DIAGNOSE THE PROBLEM
AND CLOSE THE VALVE SAFELY. THE 1 HR LCO OF TECH SPEC 3.1.1.E.3 WAS
EXCEEDED BY 20 MINS BEFORE THE VALVE WAS COMPLETELY CLOSED. THE
BREAKER CONTACTS THAT ENERGIZE THE VALVE OPERATOR WERE MANUALLY
MANIPULATED TO DRIVE THE VALVE FULLY CLOSED. THE TORQUE SWITCH WAS
REPLACED AND TESTED RETURNING THE VALVE TO FULL SERVICE. A
SIGNIFICANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WAS MADE VIA EMS IN ACCORDANCE WITH
10CFR50.36(c)(2). SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: LER 251-83-011.

FORM 99 LER SCSS DATA 08-02-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1984 003 0 8501310532 192733 12/22/84

DOCKET: 250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE: PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BOCH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS

STEP 2: COMPONENT MATERIAL - COPPER.

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

14 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v): Event that could have prevented
fulfillment of a safety function.

REFERENCE LERS:

1 250/84-036 2 250/83-025 3 250/83-003 4 250/82-006

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 000%. ON 12-22-84. AT 3:00 PM, THE 'B' EMERGENCY DG WAS
DECLARED OUT OF SERVICE TO REPLACE AN APPROX 12-INCH LONG SECTION OF
VENT LINE FROM THE ENGINE COOLANT DISCHARGE TO THE SURGE TANK. THE
VENT LINE WAS DISCOVERED TO BE LEAKING DURING DAILY OPERABILITY
TESTING OF THE 'B' EMERGENCY DG. 'A' EMERGENCY DG HAD BEEN TAKEN OUT

UP SURVIVED EARLIER. THE VENT LINE WAS REPLACED BY 02:03 PM. AND THE 7/8
EMERGENCY DG WAS DECLARED BACK IN SERVICE AT 4:15 PM. AFTER CHECKING
THE LINE FOR LEAKS AND SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF PERIODIC TEST PER OP
4304.1. THE VENT LINE WAS LEAKING BECAUSE THE VIBRATION OF THE ENGINE
ADJACENT DISCHARGE LINE FIRING DIESEL OPERATION CAUSED THE CROWN
BOLDING THE VENT LINE IF THE COULANT LINE TO BREAK. THE APPROX 12-IN
SECTION OF LEAKING VENT LINE AND CROWN WERE REPLACED. A PLANT
CHANGE/MODIFICATION (PC/185-05) WAS REQUESTED AND IMPLEMENTED TO
REPLACE THE SOLID COPPER VENT LINE WITH FLEXIBLE PIPING TO ELIMINATE
THE VIBRATION EFFECTS ON THE CROWN. THE US NRC WAS NOTIFIED OF A
SIGNIFICANT EVENT PURSUANT TO 10CFR50.72(B)(2)(11)(D) VIA THE ENS AT
04:04 PM. SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: 250-04-036, 250-03-025, 250-83-003, AND
250-02-065.

FORM 100 LER SCSS DATA 08-02-85

BUCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1984 003 0 85010550 192734 12/22/84

BUCKET: 250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE: PWR
REGION: 2 NSSG: ME
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS
OTHER REPORTABILITY - VOLUNTARY REPORT.

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
21 OTHER: Voluntary report, special report, Part 21 report,
etc.

ABSTRACT
POWER LEVEL - 0002. ON 12-22-84, WITH UNIT 3 IN A REPAIR SHUTDOWN AND
UNIT 4 AT 100% POWER. THE 'A' EMERGENCY DG WAS STARTED FOR THE 8 HR
FULL LOAD AND LOAD REJECTION TESTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPERATING
PROCEDURE 4304.3. THE RESULTS OF THIS TESTING REVEALED THAT A SHORT
DURATION SPIKE OF APPROX 5000 VOLTS (MAX OF 5170 VOLTS) OCCURRED
DURING THE INITIAL SECOND OF THE REJECTION. FURTHER EVALUATIONS BY
THE ELECTRICAL MAINTENANCE AND TECHNICAL DEPARTMENTS CONCLUDED THAT:
1) THE VOLTAGE REGULATOR WAS ADJUSTED FOR OPTIMUM PERFORMANCE.
THEREFORE, THE REGULATOR SETTINGS WERE RETURNED TO THEIR ORIGINAL
VALUES AND A FINAL TEST WAS PERFORMED. 2) FROM THE TEST DATA AND THE
VOLTAGE REGULATOR TECH MANUAL, THE VOLTAGE REGULATOR WAS NOT CAPABLE
OF MAINTAINING THE GENERATOR TRANSIENT VOLTAGE WITHIN TECH SPECS. 3)
BASED ON THIS, EVALUATIONS WERE INITIATED IN THE AREAS OF: A) TECH
ASPECTS, B) TECH SPEC COMPLIANCE AND INTERPRETATION, AND C) DESIGN
PERFORMANCE ASPECTS. 4) SIMILAR TESTING WAS PERFORMED ON THE 'B' EDG
ON 1-4-85, AND THE RESULTS REFLECT IDENTICAL CONDITIONS AS THOSE
ENCOUNTERED ON 'A' EDG. THIS REPORT IS BEING SUBMITTED AS A MEANS OF
DOCUMENTING PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED AND EVALUATIONS PERFORMED AS A RESULT
OF EDG TESTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH OP 4304.3. THIS REPORT DOES NOT
FALL UNDER THE 10CFR50.3 REPORTABILITY CRITERIA BUT IT IS SUBMITTED
AS THE RESULT OF AGREEMENTS BETWEEN NRC REGION 11 AND TURKEY POINT
PLANT MANAGER.

FORM 101 LER SCSS DATA 08-02-85

BUCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
250 1985 003 0 8502270287 193273 01/19/85

PROJECT: 250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE: FWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
 13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv); ESR actuations.

REFERENCE LERS:
 1 250/84-008

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 010%. ON 1-19-85, AT 5:25 AM, WITH UNIT 3 AT 10% POWER DESCENDING FROM FULL POWER TO HOT SHUTDOWN PER OP 0205.1, UNIT SHUTDOWN - FULL LOAD TO HOT SHUTDOWN CONDITION, DUE TO A SUSPECTED CONDENSER TUBE LEAK. PERMISSIVE P-7 DISARMED AT 6:46:06 WHEN POWER WAS REDUCED BELOW 10%, BUT REARMED AT 6:46:10 DUE TO A "LIGHT POWER INCREASE". NOT REALIZING THAT P-7 HAD REARMED, THE TURBINE WAS MANUALLY TRIPPED TO PREVENT IT-AVE FROM DECREASING ENOUGH TO CAUSE A SAFE V INJECTION SIGNAL. THE REACTOR TRIPPED DUE TO A TURBINE TRIP WITH POWER ABOVE P-7. OFF-NORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURE 0203.1, SHUTDOWN RESULTING FROM A REACTOR TRIP OR TURBINE TRIP, WAS INITIATED AND A POST-TRIP REVIEW PERFORMED. ALL EQUIPMENT FUNCTIONED AS DESIGNED ON INITIATION OF THE ECF ACTUATION SIGNAL. THE USNRC WAS NOTIFIED OF A SIGNIFICANT EVENT PURSUANT TO 10CFR50.72(B)(2)(11) VIA LMS AT 8:44 AM. SIMILAR OCCURRENCE: LER 250-84-006. THE REACTOR TRIP WAS CAUSED BY PERSONNEL OVERSIGHT BY TRIPPING THE TURBINE WITH POWER ABOVE PERMISSIVE P-7. REACTOR OPERATORS WILL BE INSTRUCTED ON THIS EVENT IN REQUALIFICATION CLAS-5 AND INSTRUCTED TO PAY CLOSE ATTENTION TO PERMISSIVE P-7 WHEN MANUALLY TRIPPING THE TURBINE DURING POWER REDUCTION.

FORM 102 LER SCSS DATA 08-02-85
 Docket Year LER Number Revision DCS Number NSIC Event Date
 250 1985 006 0 8502270615 193274 01/16/85

DOCKET: 250 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE: FWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS
 OTHER REPORTABILITY: SPECIAL REPORT.

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
 21 OTHER: Voluntary report, special report, Part 21 report, etc.

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 100%. SECTION 111A OF 10CFR50 APPENDIX R REQUIRES: "TWO SEPARATE WATER SUPPLIES SHALL BE PROVIDED TO FURNISH NECESSARY WATER VOLUME AND PRESSURE TO THE FIRE MAIN LOOP." AND "WHEN STORAGE TANKS ARE USED FOR COMBINED SERVICE-WATER/FIRE-WATER USES THE MINIMUM VOLUME FOR FIRE USES SHALL BE INSURED BY MEANS OF DEDICATED TANKS OR BY SOME OTHER MEANS SUCH AS A VERTICAL STANDPIPE FOR OTHER WATER SERVICE. ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS INCLUDING LOCKS FOR TANK OUTLET VALVES, ARE

UNACCEPTABLE AS THE ONLY MEANS TO ENSURE MINIMUM WATER VOLUME." TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 HAVE IMPLEMENTED THESE REQUIREMENTS FOR FIRE SUPPRESSION WATER SUPPLY. A REDUNDANT RAW WATER TANK II IS NOW INSTALLED. BOTH THE ORIGINAL RAW WATER TANK (TANK I) AND THE REDUNDANT RAW WATER TANK II HOLD 300,000 GALLONS OF WATER DEDICATED TO FIRE SUPPRESSION. THE HIGH TOWER HAD PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED 20,000 GALLONS OF FIRE SUPPRESSION WATER INVENTORY. THIS SOURCE OF WATER WILL NOW BE REMOVED FROM THE FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM BY CLOSING AND ADMINISTRATIVELY LOCKING THE HIGH TOWER OUTLET VALVE (724). PREVIOUSLY THE HIGH TOWER HAD BOTH FIRE PROTECTION WATER AND SERVICE WATER IN COMMON. THE CURRENTLY IMPLEMENTED CHANGE REMOVES THE SHARED HIGH TOWER WATER SOURCE FROM THE FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR50 APPENDIX R. A WATER STORAGE VOLUME ABOVE THE 300,000 GALLONS OF DEDICATED WATER IS AVAILABLE TO THE PLANT SERVICE WATER SYSTEM.

FORM 100 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1985 007 0 2504040402 193600 02/21/85

DOCKET:250 TURKEY POINT 2 TYPE:FWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
 10 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i): Shutdowns or technical
 specification violations.

ABSTRACT
 POWER LEVEL ~ 100%. THE TURKEY POINT TECH SPECS REQUIRE A MONTHLY POSITION VERIFICATION AND AN ANNUAL CYCLING OF EACH VALVE IN THE FLOWPATH OF THE FIRE PROTECTION WATER SYSTEM TO DEMONSTRATE THE OPERABILITY OF THE FLOWPATH. AS THE RESULT OF A PROGRAMMATIC TECH SPEC OPERABILITY REVIEW, AN EVALUATION OF TECH SPEC 2.14.2 AND 4.15.2 FOR FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS CONCLUDED THAT PLANT PROCEDURES DID NOT INCLUDE ALL FLOWPATH VALVES WHICH SHOULD BE PERIODICALLY VISUALLY VERIFIED FOR POSITION AND FUNCTIONALLY CYCLED. PRIOR TO THE RECENT TECH SPEC OPERABILITY REVIEW, PLANT PROCEDURES WERE WRITTEN TO ADDRESS THE OPERABILITY OF POST INDICATOR VALVES AND ROOT VALVES, YARD FIRE HYDRANTS, FIRE HOSE CABINETS, AND SPRAY AND/OR SPRINKLER VALVES. THIS WAS CONSIDERED SATISFACTORY TO MEET THE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM OPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS OF APPLICABLE PLANT TECH SPECS. WHEN THESE WERE DEVELOPED IN 1981. SINCE 1981, VARIOUS APPENDIX R MODIFICATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE TO THE FIRE PROTECTION WATER SYSTEM WHICH HAS CHANGED THE CONFIGURATION OF THE SYSTEM FLOWPATH AND ADDED NEW VALVES. APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS AND MODIFICATIONS HAVE PLACED A GREATER EMPHASIS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS TO PLANT SAFETY. AS A RESULT, TO ENHANCE THE DEMONSTRATION OF THE OPERABILITY OF THE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM, THE RECENT TECH SPEC OPERABILITY REVIEW WAS PERFORMED FROM A MORE CONSERVATIVE STANDPOINT.

FORM 104 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 250 1985 010 0 2505090550 194014 03/30/85

DOCKET: 251 TURKEY POINT 3 TYPE: PWR
REGION: 3 NSSS: WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: DECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

10 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i): Shutdowns or technical
specification violations.

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 100%. AT 7:35 PM, ON 3-30-85, A PLANT SHUTDOWN OF UNIT 3 WAS INITIATED FOR BOTH A SCHEDULED REFUELING OUTAGE AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF TECH SPEC 3.5, TABLE 3.5-5, WHICH DEFINES THE MINIMUM OPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE REACTOR SUBCOOLING MARGIN MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION. THIS SHUTDOWN WAS INITIATED DUE TO THE POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF OPERABILITY OF BOTH INDEPENDENT CHANNELS OF THE UNIT 3 REACTOR SUBCOOLING MARGIN MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION. THE REASON FOR BOTH INDEPENDENT SUBCOOLING MARGIN MONITORS BEING CONSIDERED INOPERABLE WAS DUE TO THE FAILURE OF 6 RCS WIDE-RANGE TEMPERATURE ELEMENTS TO MEET ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN TAKEN OR ARE PLANNED TO ENSURE THAT THE SUBJECT TEMPERATURE ELEMENTS HAVE ACCEPTABLE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATIONS INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING: THE UNIT 4 REACTOR SYSTEM TEMPERATURE ELEMENTS FOR THE SUBCOOLING MARGIN MONITORS WERE HERMETICALLY SEALED AS A PRECAUTION UNTIL THE ENV. QUALIFICATIONS OF THE TEMPERATURE ELEMENTS COULD BE VERIFIED. THE UNIT 3 SUBCOOLING MARGIN MONITOR TEMPERATURE ELEMENTS WILL BE HERMETICALLY SEALED DURING THE PRESENT REFUELING OUTAGE. TO ENHANCE PLANT MAINTENANCE, THE EXISTING TEMPERATURE ELEMENTS WILL BE REPLACED BY ENV. PRE-QUALIFIED TEMPERATURE ELEMENTS OF A DIFFERENT MANUFACTURER. THIS REPLACEMENT WILL BE COMPLETED FOR UNITS 3 AND 4 DURING FUTURE REFUELING OUTAGES.

FORM 105 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1781 001 0 9107200470 166744 01/12/81

DOCKET: 251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE: PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: DECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS


STEP 1: CAUSE XX - INCREASED WATER DEMAND DURING LOW POWER PHYSICS TESTING.

REFERENCE LERS:

| | | | |
|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| 1 250/78-004 | 2 250/78-011 | 3 250/78-012 | 4 250/78-013 |
| 5 250/79-011 | 6 250/79-022 | 7 250/80-002 | 8 251/79-007 |
| 9 251/78-013 | 10 251/78-014 | 11 251/79-017 | 12 251/80-002 |
| 13 251/80-004 | | | |

ABSTRACT

DURING STARTUP, FOR A PERIOD OF ABOUT 4 HOURS, THE CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK (CST) CONTAINED LESS THAN THE 185,000 GALLONS REQUIRED BY TS. THE CST INVENTORY DURING THIS INTERVAL WAS NOT REDUCED BELOW APPROXIMATELY 180,000 GALLONS. REFERENCE SIMILAR OCCURRENCE LER 250-80-2. THERE WERE NO EQUIPMENT FUNCTIONAL PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH



LESS THAN
REQ'D VOLUME
IN CST.

THIS EVENT. INCREASED WATER DEMAND DURING LOW POWER PHYSICS TESTING EXCEEDED WATER TREATMENT PLANT OUTPUT AND RESULTED IN CST LEVEL DECREASING TO LESS THAN THE TS LIMIT. PLANT CHANGES AND MODIFICATIONS CURRENTLY SCHEDULED WILL REDUCE THE POTENTIAL EXPOSURE TO EVENTS OF THIS TYPE.

FORM 106 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DUCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1/81 002 0 8104130324 165430 02/14/81

DUCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: DSCB
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

REFERENCE LERS:
1 251/74-001 2 251/74-002 3 251/75-002 4 251/77-012
5 251/78-001 6 251/81-001

ABSTRACT

BORIC ACID FLOW IN THE NORMAL FLOWPATH FROM THE BORIC ACID TANKS (BATS) COULD NOT BE ESTABLISHED. FLOW FROM THE BATS VIA THE EMERGENCY DURATION FLOWPATH WAS IMMEDIATELY VERIFIED. FLOW WAS RESTORED IN 5 HOURS. ON 2/17/81 A LOW TEMPERATURE READING WAS FOUND IN THE FLOWPATH FROM THE BATS. THIS WAS CORRECTED IN 14 HOURS. SIMILAR LERS WERE 251-74-1, 74-6, 75-1, 75-12, 75-1, AND 250-81-2. FLOW WAS INITIALLY RESTORED BY APPLYING EXTERNAL HEAT TO THE BLENDER, BUT WHEN THE BLOCKAGE AND THE LOW TEMPERATURE WERE INVESTIGATED, THREE SPLICES ON HEAT TRACING CIRCUITS WERE FOUND TO NEED REPAIR. THESE ITEMS WERE REPAIRED AND TO MINIMIZE FUTURE PROBLEMS, ONE SECTION OF CIRCUIT WITH NUMEROUS SPLICES WAS REPLACED.

FORM 107 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DUCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1/81 003 0 8104130191 165432 02/19/81

DUCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: DSCB
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

ABSTRACT

A RCS VOLUME CALCULATION AND A SUMP LEVEL INCREASE INDICATED THAT AN APPROXIMATE .25 GPM (COMBINED) LEAK EXISTED IN THE RCS. A CONTAINMENT ENTRY WAS MADE AND IT WAS FOUND THAT A CRACKED WELD BETWEEN A VENT VALVE LINE AND THE 1A R/P SEAL SUPPLY LINE WAS THE SOURCE OF THE LEAK. THE LEAK WAS ISOLATED, THE WELD WAS REPAIRED, AND THE SEAL LINE WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE. THIS IS THE FIRST LER OF THIS TYPE. IT IS SUSPECTED THAT THE CRACK WAS DUE TO STRESS FROM LINE VIBRATION. THE CRACK WAS REPAIRED BY CUTTING THE VENT LINE AND REWELDING IT TO THE SEAL LINE. A PLANT CHANGE/MODIFICATION WILL BE IMPLEMENTED TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL SUPPORT OF THIS VENT LINE.

FORM 108 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

BUCKET YEAR LER NO. LER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1981 0 2105120403 165088 04/07/81

BUCKET: 251 TURKEY POINT 1 TYPE: PMR
REGION: 2 NSSC: ME
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: FLOCH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS
UNKNOWN CAUSE OF FAILURE TO TRANSFER FROM AUX. TO STARTUP TRANSFORMER
- OCCURRED TWICE.

WATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
#13 UPDATE NEEDED
#75 POSSIBLE SIGNIFICANT EVENT
#90 COMPLEX EVENT

ABSTRACT
ON BOTH MARCH 22, AND APRIL 11, THE 4A 4160 V BUS DID NOT ENERGIZE ON
TRANSFER FROM THE AUXILIARY TO STARTUP TRANSFORMER FOLLOWING A REACTOR
TRIP. THE AUTOMATIC TRANSFER BETWEEN THE AUXILIARY AND STARTUP
TRANSFORMER IS DESIGNED TO OPERATE WITHIN 10 CYCLES AFTER THE
GENERATOR MAIN BREAKERS HAVE OPENED. THE CAUSE OF THE FAILURE OF THE
4A 4160 V BUS TO TRANSFER FROM THE AUXILIARY TO THE STARTUP
TRANSFORMER HAS NOT BEEN DETERMINED. HOWEVER, EVALUATION AND TESTING
ARE IN PROGRESS. IT IS CURRENTLY FELT THAT THE RELAY DROP OUT TIME
VARIED INTERMITTENTLY.

FORM 109 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

BUCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1981 0 2105120403 165088 04/07/81

BUCKET: 251 TURKEY POINT 1 TYPE: PMR
REGION: 2 NSSC: ME
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: FLOCH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS
PUMP IN STEP 1 REMOVED FROM SERVICE BY 1 AND E BULLETIN 79-14 FOR
MODIFICATIONS.

WATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
#72 RESULT OF IE BULLETIN 79-14, OTHERS, ETC. (IEB 81-7)

ABSTRACT
THE A AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (AFW) PUMP WAS TESTED. THE ACCEPTANCE
CRITERIA WERE MET. HOWEVER, THE NEED FOR GOVERNOR ADJUSTMENT WAS
IDENTIFIED. THE A AFW PUMP WAS OUT-OF-SERVICE FOR 1 1/2 HOURS BULLETIN
79-14 MODIFICATION. THE A AFW PUMP WAS TAKEN OUT-OF-SERVICE FOR 1
HOURS 25 MINUTES TO REPLACE THE GOVERNOR. THE A AFW PUMP WAS THEN
TESTED AND RETURNED TO SERVICE.

FORM 110 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

BUCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE

APR 08
FOR GOVERNOR
ADJUSTMENT

251 1981 000 0 8106080373 166422 04/22/81

DOCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 1 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: IOCH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS

STEP 2: CAUSE CX - A WELDED JOINT VERSUS A THREADED JOINT.

REFERENCE LERS:

1 250/79-006 2 251/79-004 3 251/79-009

ABSTRACT

A CONSTRUCTION WORKER REPORTED TO THE OPERATIONS STAFF THAT A SNUBBER HAD BROKEN LOOSE IN HIS WORK AREA. THE SNUBBER WAS A HORIZONTAL SUPPRESSOR ON THE SUPPLY STEAM LINE TO THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM. SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: LER 250-79-6, 251-79-4, 251-79-9. UNDER NORMAL LOADS, THE THREADED JOINT FOR THE CONNECTION OF THE SNUBBER ROD FROM THE TURNDUCKLE TO THE ADAPTOR PLATE FAILED. A PLANT MODIFICATION PROVIDED A WELDED JOINT VERSUS A THREADED JOINT. THE CALCULATED STRENGTH OF THE WELDED JOINT EXCEEDS THE DESIGN CAPACITY OF THE SNUBBER ITSELF BY A FACTOR OF TEN.

*SNUBBER FAILURE
ON AFW LINE*

FORM 111 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1981 000 0 8106080363 166456 04/24/81

DOCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: IOCH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

ABSTRACT

THE LOW COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW) SURGE TANK LEVEL ALARM AND AN INCREASING CONTAINMENT SUMP LEVEL LED OPERATIONS PERSONNEL TO A FAILED FLEXITALLIC GASKET ON THE INLET FLANGE OF THE EXCESS LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER. CCW WAS ISOLATED TO THE HEAT EXCHANGER. THIS FAILURE IS REPORTABLE BECAUSE TECH. SPEC. REQUIRES ALL VALVES, PIPING, AND INTERLOCKS TO BE OPERABLE. THE EXCESS LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER WAS IDENTIFIED AS THE SOURCE OF THE LEAKAGE BY USING AN OFF NORMAL OPERATIONS PROCEDURE. THE HEAT EXCHANGER WAS ISOLATED AND WILL BE REPAIRED DURING THE NEXT OUTAGE.

FORM 112 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1981 000 0 8108240097 168495 07/17/81

DOCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

ABSTRACT
WHILE PERFORMING MAINTENANCE REPAIRS ON PRESSURIZER SPRAY VALVE
LV-4-453B, THE VALVE WAS STARTED CAUSING AN IDENTIFIED REACTOR
COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) LEAKAGE OF APPROXIMATELY 2.5 GPM THROUGH A CRACK
IN AN UNUSED AND CAPED PAGING LEAK-OFF LINE. SINCE THIS SYSTEM
BOUNDARY CANNOT BE ISOLATED, THE REACTOR WAS BROUGHT TO COLD SHUTDOWN.
INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT THE STEM SEAL BELLOW EITHER FAILED WHEN
THE VALVE WAS STOKED OR HAD BEEN FAILE AND THE NIPPLE IN THE LEAK-OFF
LINE CRACKED (APPROX. 1/2 IN. LONGITUDINAL CRACK). THE CAUSE OF THE
CRACK IN THE STAINLESS STEEL NIPPLE IS UNKNOWN. THE VALVE WAS
OVERHAULED AND THE NIPPLE WAS CUT AND RECAPED.

FORM 113 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85
DUCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1-81 000 0 8109090253 169357 07/28/81

DUCKET: 251 - TURKEY POINT 1 TYPE: PWR
REGION: 2 NSS: WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

REFERENCE LERS:
1 251-81-004

ABSTRACT
A REACTOR TRIP OCCURRED FROM 100% POWER WITH PROPER UNIT LOCKOUT
ACTION, BUT THE 4A 160V BUS FAILED TO TRANSFER PROPERLY (START-UP ACT
4AAWS DID NOT CLOSE AFTER AUXILIARY ACB 4A02 TRIPPED). THIS IS
REPORTABLE PURSUANT TO TECH. SPEC. BOTH DIESEL GENERATORS WERE
OPERABLE AND AVAILABLE DURING THIS OCCURRENCE. A SIMILAR OCCURRENCE
WAS REPORTED ON LER 251-81-004. THE MOST LIKELY CAUSE OF THIS FAILURE
TO TRANSFER IS THOUGHT TO BE THE INTERMITTENT OPERATION OF THE
TRANSFER INHIBIT RELAY 162/4A2 WHICH WAS FOUND WITH A LOOSE BRIMP ON
THE COIL WIRE. CONSEQUENT TESTING OF THE AUTOMATIC TRANSFER, AFTER
REPLACING RELAY 162/4A2, COULD NOT REPLICATE THE FAILURE.

FORM 114 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85
DUCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1-81 010 0 8110150397 169335 09/03/81

DUCKET: 251 - TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE: PWR
REGION: 2 NSS: WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

REFERENCE LERS:
1 250/81-004 2 21/81-005

ABSTRACT
WHILE PERFORMING A TEST THE A AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (AFW) PUMP COULD
NOT BE PROPERLY TRIPPED AND WAS TAKEN OUT OF SERVICE TO BE REPAIRED.
THE B AND C AFW PUMPS WERE OPERABLE. THE MOST RECENT OCCURRENCES
RELATING TO THE AFW SYSTEMS WERE REPORTED AS LER'S 250-81-04 AND
251-81-05. THE CAUSE WAS A LOOSE SET SCREW AND A MISALIGNED YOKE ON
THE EMERGENCY OVER-PEED TRIP VALVE. THE YOKE WAS REALIGNED AND THE

AFW AFW26
trip valve
malfunction of

SET SCREW WAS RETIGHTENED. THE PUMP WAS THEN TESTED AND RETURNED TO SERVICE.

FORM 115 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1981 011 0 8111100452 169587 10/21/81

DOCKET: 251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE: PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: EECB
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

ABSTRACT

WHILE PERFORMING A ROUTINE PERIODIC TEST DURING PARTIAL DRAINING OF THE PRIMARY SYSTEM AT THE BEGINNING OF A PLANNED REFUELING OUTAGE, THE FLOW PATH TO THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM ASSOCIATED WITH THE BORON INJECTION TANK (BIT) WAS FOUND TO BE OBSTRUCTED. THE APPARENT CAUSE OF THE OBSTRUCTION WAS REDUCED TEMPERATURE RESULTING FROM MISSING INSULATION IN THE VICINITY OF A 4" TEE AT THE INLET OF THE BIT. A VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE PIPE AROUND THE BIT WAS CONDUCTED AND NO ADDITIONAL UNINSULATED SECTIONS WERE FOUND. NEW INSULATION MATERIAL WAS INSTALLED ON THE AFFECTED PORTION OF THE PIPING.

FORM 116 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1981 012 0 8201060273 171946 11/24/81

DOCKET: 251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE: PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: EECB
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS

STEP 1: CAUSE AX - FOR TESTING

REFERENCE LERS:

1 251/79-008

ABSTRACT

THE SAFEGUARD SYSTEMS WERE BEING TESTED. THE 4A 4160V BUS STRIPPED AS REQUIRED BUT THIS WAS NOT SENSED BY THE BUS CLEARING RELAYS. CONSEQUENTLY, THE 4A EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR (EDG) DID NOT CLOSE IN ON THE 4A BUS. A SIMILAR LER WAS REPORTED AS LER 251-79-008. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS DETERMINED TO BE THE MALFUNCTION OF TWO 4KV BREAKER AUXILIARY SWITCHES ASSOCIATED WITH THE BUS CLEARING LOGIC. THESE SWITCHES WERE REPLACED AND THE SAFEGUARD SYSTEMS WERE RETESTED SUCCESSFULLY.

FORM 117 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1981 013 0 8112140300 171204 11/16/81

BUCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 1 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

REFERENCE LERS:
1 251/75-006

ABSTRACT

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY WAS MOMENTARILY BREACHED BY HAVING BOTH THE INSIDE AND OUTSIDE DOORS OF THE PERSONNEL HATCH OPEN SIMULTANEOUSLY. THIS OCCURRED DURING A SHIFT CHANGE WHEN A LARGE GROUP OF CONTRACT PERSONNEL WERE EXITING CONTAINMENT. THE REACTOR HAD BEEN SHUTDOWN FOR OVER 600 HOURS AT THE TIME THE EVENT OCCURRED. A SIMILAR CONDITION WAS REPORTED AS AO 51-73-006. THE CAUSE WAS "DOG EAR" POSITIONER IN THE AIR LOCK SIDE OF THE INNER HATCH DOOR WHICH HAD BEEN DISABLED. THIS CONDITION ALLOWED THE DOOR LATCH MECHANISM TO BE PLACED IN THE LATCHED POSITION WITH THE DOOR OPEN. THE "DOG EAR" WAS REPOSITIONED AND THE DOORS TESTED AND RETURNED TO SERVICE.

FORM 118 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

BUCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1981 013 0 8112100310 171927 11/23/81

BUCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 1 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS
STEP 1: CAUSE XX - INADEQUATE CEMENTATION; EFFECT 0X - CHIPPED.

REFERENCE LERS:
1 250/81-013

ABSTRACT

WHILE DRILLING A HOLE FOR AN EXPANSION ANCHOR, A DEFECTIVE AREA IN THE CONTAINMENT LINER PLATE CONCRETE COVER WAS DISCOVERED. THE DEFECTIVE AREA WAS LOCATED UNDER APPROXIMATELY FOUR INCHES OF SOUND CONCRETE AND CONSISTED OF A LAYER, ROUGHLY 0.04 CU.FT. IN VOLUME, OF LARGE AGGREGATE WITH INADEQUATE FINES. THERE WAS A SLOW SEEPAGE OF WATER INTO THE HOLE. THIS IS REPORTABLE PURSUANT TO TECH SPEC 6.9.2.A.2. A SIMILAR OCCURRENCE WAS REPORTED AS LER 250-81-013. THE CAUSE APPEARS TO BE INADEQUATE CEMENTATION OF THE ORIGINAL POUR AS A RESULT OF A DEFECTIVE CONCRETE BATCH. THE OVERLYING SOUND CONCRETE AND AGGREGATE IN THE DEFECTIVE AREA WAS REMOVED. THE AREA WAS SUBSEQUENTLY DRIED, PREPARED TO RECEIVE REPLACEMENT CONCRETE, AND THEN FILLED WITH NEW CONCRETE WITH THE ANCHOR BOLT EMBEDDED.

FORM 119 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

BUCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1981 013 0 8201060528 171348 11/29/81

BUCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE

ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: IECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS

TWO OVERPRESSURE INCIDENTS: ONE OF 1100 PSIG, THE OTHER OF 750 PSIG.

WATCH LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

Y/S POSSIBLE SIGNIFICANT EVENT
Y/P COMPLEX EVENT

REFERENCE LERS:

1 250/74-011

ABSTRACT

THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) WAS IN A WATER SOLID CONDITION WITH A TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE OF APPROXIMATELY 110F AND 310 PSIG, RESPECTIVELY. TWO OVERPRESSURE CONDITIONS DEVELOPED FOR WHICH THE OVERPRESSURE MITIGATING SYSTEM (OMS) FAILED TO OPERATE. THIS IS REPORTABLE PURSUANT TO TECH. SPEC. 6.9.2.B.1. A SIMILAR OVERPRESSURE SITUATION WAS REPORTED AS AO 250-74-11. THE CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM WAS FOUND TO BE A FAILED SUMMATOR ON THE OMS CIRCUITRY COUPLED WITH A PRESSURE TRANSMITTER WHICH WAS UNINTENTIONALLY LEFT ISOLATED. PROCEDURE CHANGES WILL BE MADE AS PART OF THE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS, TO INCLUDE ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT CHECKS.

FORM 120 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1081 01 0 8201130017 171A02 12/04/81

DOCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE

ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: IECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

REFERENCE LERS:

1 251/81-001

ABSTRACT

FOR A PERIOD OF ABOUT 4 HOURS DURING LOW POWER PHYSICS TESTS, THE CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK (CST) CONTAINED LESS THAN THE 195,000 GALLONS REQUIRED. THE CST MINIMUM INVENTORY DURING THIS INTERVAL WAS APPROXIMATELY 148,000 GALLONS. REFERENCE SIMILAR OCCURRENCE: LER 251-81-001. DURING MAINTENANCE THE CONTROL VALVE ASSOCIATED WITH THE NORMAL MAKEUP FLOW TO THE HOTWELL WAS LEFT DISASSEMBLED AND CLOSED. THIS REDUCED THE CONDENSER LEVEL TO A POINT REQUIRING MAKEUP FROM THE CST. PLANT CHANGES AND MODIFICATIONS CURRENTLY SCHEDULED WILL REDUCE THE POTENTIAL EXPOSURE TO EVENTS OF THIS TYPE.

LESS THAN REQ'D
VOLUME IN CST

FORM 121 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1281 01 0 8202100376 172036 12/22/81

DOCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE

ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: IECH

ABSTRACT

WHILE PERFORMING A CALIBRATION CHECK OF THE HEAT TRACING RECORDER ONE OF THE BURST INJECTOR WINK (BIT) CIRCUITS WAS FOUND OUT OF CALIBRATION. FURTHER INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT CIRCUIT 549 WAS OPEN AT THE PLESTER AND COULDED. CIRCUIT 540 WAS IN NORMAL RANGE. THE UNIT WAS IN A HOT SITUATION IN CONCLUSION. THE ROOT CAUSE COULD NOT BE DETERMINED. THE OPEN CIRCUIT HAS REPAIRED, TESTED AND RETURNED TO SERVICE WITHIN FIVE HOURS.

FORM 122 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85
BUCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1982 00 0 8201000003 171737 01/05/82

BUCKET: 251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE: PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TETH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: 11L

ABSTRACT

THE D MOTOR CONTROL CENTER (MCC) TRIPPED AS A RESULT OF A MOMENTARY PHASE TO PHASE FAULT ASSOCIATED WITH THE MCC BUS. NONE OF THE EQUIPMENT RE-ENERGIZED CAUSED OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS OR PLACED THE UNIT OUTSIDE LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION DUE TO INDIVIDUAL COMPONENT OR EQUIPMENT UNAVAILABILITY. THIS IS REPORTABLE PURSUANT TO TEF, SPEC. 3.7.1.1. THIS IS THE FIRST LER OF THIS TYPE. THE FAULT WAS PRODUCED BY THE INADEQUATE INTRODUCTION OF A METAL FISH TAPE THROUGH AN UNDER CONDUIT EMBEDDED IN THE WASTE EVAPORATOR ROOM FLOOR SLAB BEHIND THE D MCC. FAULT SHUTDOWN WAS INITIATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDELINE 3. THE MCC WAS INSPECTED, NEGOTIATED AND RE-ENERGIZED. THE CAUSED CONDUIT WAS CAFFEED AND THE UNIT RETURNED TO FULL POWER.

FORM 122 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85
BUCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1982 00 0 8204160501 172716 03/17/82

BUCKET: 251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE: PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TETH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: 11L

ABSTRACT

WHILE TRANSFERRING WATER FROM THE UNIT 3 REFUELING CAVITY TO THE UNIT 3 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK (RWST) SOME WATER WAS INADVERTENTLY DIRECTED TO THE UNIT 4 RWST. APPROXIMATELY 11,000 GALLONS OF WATER CONTAINING APPROXIMATELY 122 MILLICURIES OF GROSS ACTIVITY OVERFLOWED TO THE GROUND AROUND THE TANK. ALTHOUGH NO RELEASE LIMITS WERE APPROACHED, THE RELEASE OF THIS WATER WAS UNINTENTIONAL AND UNMONITORED. THIS TRANSFER WAS PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH A PROCEDURE THAT DID NOT PROVIDE FOR VERIFICATION THAT A POSSIBLE FLOW PATH TO THE UNIT 4 RWST WAS BLOCKED. THE WATER TRANSFER OPERATION WAS IMMEDIATELY TERMINATED. THE AREA INVOLVED WAS SURVEYED AND

DECONTAMINATED OR ISOLATED AS APPROPRIATE. THE INADEQUATE PROCEDURE WAS CORRECTED.

FORM 124 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1/82 001 0 8204280340 173175 03/31/82

DOCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: DECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS
IE BULLETIN 79-14

WATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
932 RESULT OF IE BULLETINS, ORDERS, ETC. (IED 81-7)

REFERENCE LERS:
1 250/79-026 2 250/79-046 3 250/80-008 4 250/80-014
5 251/80-014 6 250/80-025

ABSTRACT
NOTIFICATION WAS RECEIVED THAT THE INSPECTION/EVALUATION IN PROGRESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH USNR I & E BULLETIN 79-14 HAD REVEALED A DEFICIENCY INVOLVING SUPPORTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM. THIS CONDITION WOULD POTENTIALLY EXIST WHEN SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKE LOADS ARE SUPERIMPOSED ON ALL OTHER DESIGN BASIS LOADS. EVALUATION REVEALED THAT THE CALCULATED MAXIMUM STRESS EXCEEDED THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA (ESTABLISHED FOR THIS REVIEW) ON THE ABOVE SUPPORTS. BASED ON THE LOW PROBABILITY OF A SEISMIC EVENT AND CONTINUED OPERABILITY OF THE SYSTEM, POWER OPERATION CONTINUED WHILE PLANT CHANGE/MODIFICATIONS WERE EXPEDITIOUSLY IMPLEMENTED TO SUPPORT THE PIPING.

FORM 125 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1/82 004 0 8205040579 173387 04/08/82

DOCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: DECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

ABSTRACT
A ROUTINE SAMPLE ANALYSIS FOUND THE BORON CONCENTRATION IN THE BORON INJECTION TANK LOWER THAN THE MINIMUM ALLOWABLE CONCENTRATION OF 2000 PPM. THIS IS REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 3.4.1.A.2. A REACTOR SHUTDOWN WAS INITIATED. TWO HEAT TRACING CIRCUITS ON THE BIT RECIRCULATION LINE WERE FOUND INOPERABLE. BORIC ACID HAD SOLIDIFIED AND WAS OBSTRUCTING THE FLOW PATH. THE CIRCUITS WERE REPAIRED AND THE LINE WAS FLUSHED WITH STEAM. RECIRCULATION FLOW WAS ESTABLISHED AND A BIT SAMPLE WAS ANALYZED, CONFIRMING AN ACCEPTABLE BORON CONCENTRATION. THE UNIT WAS RETURNED TO FULL POWER OPERATION.

FORM 123 ER SCSS DATA 08-09-85
 Docket YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 251 1982 005 0 8205210258 17346 04/14/82

DUCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE:RWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: FECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FOL

REFERENCE LERS:
 1 251/79-017 2 251/80-002 3 251/80-004 4 251/81-001
 5 251/81-016 6 251/79-027 7 250/80-002

ABSTRACT

THE OPERATORS RECEIVED A LOW LEVEL ALARM FOR THE CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK. WHILE ATTEMPTING TO FILL THE TANK, THE LEVEL FELL BELOW THE MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF 185,000 GALLONS. THIS IS REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 3.4.1.A. SIMILAR OCCURRENCES WERE REPORTED AS LERS 251-79-17, 251-80-02, 251-80-04, 251-81-01, 251-81-16, 250-79-29 AND 250-80-02. MANUAL VALVE TURNS - 001 TO THE NEW TANK WAS OPEN, ALLOWING A PATH TO THE DEMINERALIZED WATER STORAGE TANK. WHEN 19-1540 WAS OPEN TO FILL THE CST, THE WATER WENT TO THE DRUMS INSTEAD BECAUSE IT WAS AT A LOWER ELEVATION. THE VALVES WERE RE-ALIGNED AND THE CST WAS FILLED TO AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL IN LESS THAN ONE HOUR.

IN
 LOW
 VOLUME
 CST

FORM 127 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85
 Docket YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 251 1982 005 0 8206070458 173005 05/09/82

DUCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE:RWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: FECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FOL

REFERENCE LERS:
 1 251/82-004

ABSTRACT

A SAMPLE WAS TAKEN FROM THE BORON INJECTION TANK FOR ROUTINE CHEMICAL ANALYSIS. THE BORON CONCENTRATION WAS FOUND TO BE LOWER THAN THE MINIMUM ALLOWABLE CONCENTRATION. THIS IS REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 3.4.1.A. AND 6.9.3.A.2. A SIMILAR OCCURRENCE WAS REPORTED AS LER 251-82-04. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS PLUGGING OF THE NORMAL RECIRCULATION SUPPLY LINE COINCIDENT WITH LOSS OF THE MINT RETIRC. PUMP. THE HEAT TRAILING ON THIS LINE IS PRESENTLY UNDER REPAIR. FLOW WAS RE-ESTABLISHED TO THE BIT THROUGH THE ALTERNATE LINE USING A BORT ACID PUMP. SHORTLY AFTER, AN ACCEPTABLE BORON CONCENTRATION IN THE BIT WAS CONFIRMED.

FORM 128 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85
 Docket YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 251 1982 007 0 8206210365 173913 05/22/82

BUCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 1 TYPE:PMR
REGION: 2 NSSC:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

ABSTRACT

BORON INJECTION TANK (BIT) WAS BEING RECIRCULATED WITH C BORIC ACID STORAGE TANK (EAST). A SAMPLE TAKEN FROM THE BIT REVEALED THAT THE BORON CONCENTRATION WAS BELOW THE MINIMUM ALLOWABLE LIMIT OF 20,000 PPM. THIS IS REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 3.4.1.A.2. THE 1 EAST WAS THEN RECIRCULATED AND A SAMPLE WAS DRAWN. THIS BORON CONCENTRATION WAS ALSO FOUND TO BE BELOW THE LIMIT. A AND B BASTS WERE SAMPLED AND FOUND TO HAVE ACCEPTABLE BORON CONCENTRATIONS. INSPECTION OF THE SYSTEM LINEUP FOUND MOV-4-8678 OPEN ONE TURN. IT WAS MANUALLY CLOSED. A HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION PUMP WAS BEING USED TO FILL THE ACCUMULATOR ON UNIT 3 WITH WATER FROM THE REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK. IT IS SUSPECTED THAT SOME OF THIS FLOW WENT THROUGH MOV-4-8678, DILUTING THE BIT. ADEQUATE BIT CONCENTRATION WAS CONFIRMED IN 2.25 HOURS.

FORM 129 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

BUCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1982 001 0 8207060244 174153 06/08/82

BUCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 1 TYPE:PMR
REGION: 2 NSSC:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS

STEPS 2, 3: 1SVS SW - UNKNOWN AREA.

REFERENCE LERS:

1 250/81-007

ABSTRACT

THE 4A MAIN FEEDWATER CHECK VALVE, CV-4-2900, WAS BEING SERVICED TO CORRECT A BONNET LEAK. WHEN THE VALVE WAS DISASSEMBLED TO INSPECT THE GASKET, THE DISC STUD NUT WAS FOUND MISSING. THIS IS REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B. A SIMILAR EVENT WAS REPORTED AS LER-250-81-007. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS FAILURE OF THE NUT LOCKING DEVICE. A NEW LOCKING DEVICE WAS INSTALLED ON THE VALVE ACCORDING TO PLANT CHANGE/MODIFICATION 81-5. THE OTHER MAIN FEEDWATER CHECK VALVES ON UNIT 4 WILL BE REPAIRED ACCORDING TO PC/M 81-5A DURING THE UPCOMING STEAM GENERATOR REPAIR OUTAGE. THESE MODIFICATIONS ARE ALREADY COMPLETE ON UNIT 3.

FORM 130 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

BUCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1982 001 0 820820180 175532 06/23/82

BUCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE:PMR
REGION: 2 NSSC:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH

FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

REFERENCE LERS:
1 251/79-012

ABSTRACT

THE BIWEEKLY TESTING FOR TAVE AND DELTA T PROTECTION CHANNELS WAS COMPLETED TWO DAYS AFTER THE LATEST ALLOWABLE DATE AS DESCRIBED IN TECH SPEC 4.9.1 AND TABLE 4.1-1. THIS IS REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B.3. WHEN THE PERIODIC TEST WAS PERFORMED, THE RESULTS WERE SATISFACTORY AND NO ADJUSTMENTS WERE NEEDED. A SIMILAR EVENT WAS REPORTED AS LER 251-79-12. THE SCHEDULED DATE FOR THE PERIODIC TEST (6/25/82) WAS COMPUTED USING 6/8/82 AS THE COMPLETION DATE FOR THE PREVIOUS TEST. ON 6/24/82, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT 6/6/82 HAD BEEN THE ACTUAL COMPLETION DATE. THE DUE DATE WAS RECALCULATED TO BE 6/23/82, WHICH HAD ALREADY PASSED. THE CHANNEL TEST WAS COMPLETED BY 6/25/82.

FORM 131 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1792 010 0 8208200146 175456 07/13/82

DOCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: PSCH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS

STEPS 2 AND 3: CAUSE AC = FOREIGN OBJECTS LEFT IN SG FROM PREVIOUS MAINTENANCE OR FABRICATION.

REFERENCE LERS:
1 250/79-039

ABSTRACT

UNIT 4 WAS SHUT DOWN TO REPAIR AN ESTIMATED 5-10 GPM TUBE LEAK IN 'B' STEAM GENERATOR. A SECONDARY SIDE CAMERA INSPECTION OF ALL THREE STEAM GENERATORS WAS MADE. THE INSPECTIONS REVEALED FOREIGN OBJECTS AS WELL AS MINOR TUBE DAMAGE AROUND THE PERIPHERY OF THE STEAM GENERATORS. THIS IS REPORTABLE PURSUANT TO TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B.4. A SIMILAR EVENT WAS REPORTED AS LER-250-79-39. THE INSPECTION RESULTS INDICATED THAT THE LEAK AS WELL AS THE MINOR TUBE DAMAGE WERE ASSOCIATED WITH FOREIGN OBJECTS OBSERVED AT OR NEAR TUBE SHEET ELEVATIONS. A METAL IMPACT MONITORING SYSTEM HAS BEEN INSTALLED ON ALL THREE STEAM GENERATORS. THESE GENERATORS ARE SCHEDULED TO BE REPLACED IN OCTOBER, 1982.

FORM 132 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1792 011 0 8209160123 176069 08/09/82

DOCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: PSCH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.

SYMBOL: TPL

ABSTRACT

A LOW PRESSURE ALARM (SET AT 625 PSIG) WAS RECEIVED ON THE 4B ACCUMULATOR. THE SYSTEM WAS IMMEDIATELY LINED UP FOR NITROGEN ADDITION. BUT WHEN THE SUPPLY AND FILL VALVES WERE OPENED, THE ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE DROPPED TO APPROXIMATELY 450 PSIG. THIS IS LESS THAN THE MINIMUM PRESSURE OF 600 PSIG REQUIRED BY TECH SPEC 3.4.1.A.5. THIS IS REPORTABLE PURSUANT TO TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B.2. CONTROL ROOM INDICATION SHOWED THE ACCUMULATOR VENT VALVE HV-936, TO BE IN THE OPEN POSITION. INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT THE SETTING CONTROL POTENTIOMETER FOR THIS VALVE WAS LOOSE, CAUSING IT TO CYCLE WHEN TOUCHED. THE ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE WAS RETURNED TO NORMAL WITHIN 20 MINUTES. THE POTENTIOMETER WAS REPAIRED AND PROPER VALVE OPERATION WAS VERIFIED.

FORM 133 LER SCSS DATA 09-09-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 251 1982 013 0 0209210296 176733 09/31/82

DOCKET#251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE:PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: TPL

WATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
 /L2 UPDATE NEEDED

REFERENCE LERS:
 1 251/79-001 2 251/81-017 3 251/77-012 4 251/74-008

ABSTRACT

DURING A ROUTINE REVIEW OF OUTSTANDING CLEARANCES, OPERATIONS FOUND A CLEARANCE DENOTING INOPERABILITY OF A SAFETY-RELATED HEAT-TRAILING-CIRCUIT ASSOCIATED WITH THE BORIC ACID FLOW PATH TO THE LVCS BLENDER. THE ACTUAL BORIC ACID FLOW PATH WAS NOT BLOCKED. AN ALTERNATE FLOW PATH TO THE REACTOR FROM THE RWST WAS ALSO AVAILABLE. THIS IS REPORTABLE PURSUANT TO TECH SPEC 6.9.2.A.2. SHUTDOWN WAS INITIATED AND IN PROGRESS UNTIL REPAIR COMPLETION. THE INOPERABLE CIRCUIT WAS FOUND ON 8/23/82 WITH THE CABLES CONNECTING THE THERMOSTATS TO THEIR POWER SUPPLY CUT. PLANT DOCUMENTATION WAS NOT UPDATED, ACCORDING TO PROCEDURE, AFTER A PLANT CHANGE WHICH MADE THIS CIRCUIT SAFETY RELATED. THIS ACCOUNTED FOR THE DELAY TO TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTION. THE CIRCUIT WAS REPAIRED AND THE DOCUMENTATION IS BEING UPDATED.

FORM 134 LER SCSS DATA 09-09-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 251 1982 013 0 0210040212 177593 09/06/82

DOCKET#251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE:PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: TPL

COMMENTS

PRESSURIZER SPRAY VALVE FAILED TO CLOSE (INSTRUMENT ERROR) AND CAUSED
A RCS PRESSURE-TEMP. TRANSIENT

WATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

975 POSSIBLE SIGNIFICANT EVENT
990 COMPLEX EVENT

REFERENCE LERs:

1 251/81-008 2 251/81-015

ABSTRACT

THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM EXPERIENCED A RAPID DECREASE IN PRESSURE
DUE TO A FAILED OPEN PRESSURIZER SPRAY VALVE. THE REACTOR WAS
MANUALLY TRIPPED AND AUTOMATIC SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED. THE MINIMUM
PRESSURE REACHED DURING THE TRANSIENT WAS 1450 PSIG. THIS IS
REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 3.1.8.5 AND 6.9.2.P.2.
SIMILAR EVENTS WERE REPORTED AS LERS 251-81-8 AND 251-81-15. THE UNIT
WAS BACK ON LINE IN 39 HOURS. PRESSURE CONTROL WAS REGAINED USING
CHARGING PUMPS AND PRESSURIZER HEATERS. WHEN SPRAY VALVE MALFUNCTION
WAS POSITIVELY CONFIRMED, THE SYSTEM WAS COOLED DOWN TO 350 F FOR
REPAIRS. THE I/P CONVERTER ON PCV-4-455C HAD FAILED. THE COMPONENT
WAS REPLACED AND THE VALVE PACKING WAS ADJUSTED TO MINIMIZE A LEAK
WHICH MAY HAVE CAUSED THE I/P CONVERTER FAILURE.

FORM 136 LER SCSS DATA 08-02-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1982 011 0 8211090120 178042 10/03/82

BUCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 1 TYPE:PWR

REGION: 2 NSSG:WE

ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH

FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.

SYMBOL: FPL

REFERENCE LERs:

1 251/82-004 2 251/82-006 3 251/82-012 4 251/82-011

ABSTRACT

WHILE TAKING ROUTINE LOG READINGS FROM THE HEAT TRACING RECORDER, ONE
OF THE BIT CIRCUITS (CKT-54) WAS FOUND TO BE BELOW THE TECH SPEC LIMIT
OF 145 F. BUT THE PLANT SUPERVISOR-NUCLEAR (NPS) WAS NOT PROMPTLY
NOTIFIED. THERE WAS NO BLOCKAGE OF THE BIT PIPING. THIS IS
REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B.3. SIMILAR LERS
REPORTED RECENTLY ARE: 251-82-04, 251-82-06, 251-82-12, 251-82-011.
THE ROOT CAUSE WAS INADEQUATE PLANT TRAINING AND INFORMATION
DISSEMINATION TO FIRST LINE PLANT PERSONNEL ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE
HEAT TRACING SYSTEM. THE TEMPERATURE WAS PROMPTLY RETURNED TO NORMAL.
CIRCUIT 54B WAS REPAIRED AND THE ASSOCIATED PIPING LAGGED. A TASK
FORCE WAS FORMED TO RECOMMEND SOLUTIONS TO PRECLUDE RECURRENCE.

FORM 136 LER SCSS DATA 08-02-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1983 001 1 8306210197 185061 03/31/83

BUCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE:PWR

REGION: 2 NSSG:WE

ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS
STEP 3: NE1 - STEEL PLATFORM

ABSTRACT
ON 3/31/83, WHILE UNIT 4 WAS IN A REFUELING SHUTDOWN, THE LICENSEE WAS NOTIFIED BY THE ENGINEERING STAFF OF CERTAIN FIELD DISCREPANCIES IDENTIFIED IN THE PLATFORM STEEL INSIDE CONTAINMENT. THESE DISCREPANCIES INVOLVE INSTALLATION DEFICIENCIES FOR THE BAYTING OF THE PLATFORM FRAMING STEEL AT ELEVATION 58'0" TO THE CONTAINMENT LINER EMBLEMENTS. THIS FRAMING STEEL SUPPORTS THE CONTAINMENT EMERGENCY COOLERS AND FILTERS AND PROVIDES A WORKING SURFACE. THIS IS REPORTABLE PURSUANT WITH TECH SPEC 6.9.2.A.9. AN INSPECTION ON UNIT 4 REVEALED SIGNIFICANTLY FEWER DEFICIENCIES THAN UNIT 4. THE ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT CONCLUDED THAT THE UNIT 3 STEEL PLATFORM CONNECTIONS ARE ACCEPTABLE UNDER DESIGN LOADING CONDITIONS. THE DEFICIENCIES IN UNIT 4 HAVE BEEN CORRECTED.

FORM 137
LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1'83 00 1 0401040419 189009 04/17/83

DOCKET: 251 TURKEY POINT 1 TYPE: PUR
REGION: 2 NSS: WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

REFERENCE LERS:
1 251/73-002 2 251/75-007

ABSTRACT
WHILE LIFTING SPENT FUEL ASSEMBLY X-13 OUT OF ITS DESIGNATED RACK IN THE UNIT 4 SPENT FUEL POOL, THE HOISTING CABLE ON THE FUEL HANDLING CRANE PARTED AND ASSEMBLY X-13 DROPPED BACK INTO ITS RACK FROM THE FULLY LIFTED POSITION. THIS IS REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 6.9.2.A.2. THERE IS NO INDICATION OF FUEL CLADDING DAMAGE. AS RADIATION MONITOR READINGS AND SURVEY RESULTS ARE UNCHANGED FROM PRE-EVENT VALUES. SIMILAR LER'S WERE 251-73-2 AND 251-75-7. A MALFUNCTION OF THE TWO LIMIT SWITCHES ON THE HOISTING CRANE FAILED TO STOP THE UPWARD MOVEMENT OF THE FUEL ASSEMBLY. THIS CAUSED THE CABLE TO BE OVERSTRESSED. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE CABLE PARTED. REPAIRS HAVE BEEN MADE TO THE LIMIT SWITCHES. ADDITIONAL INSPECTIONS OF X-13 WERE CONDUCTED IN THE SPENT FUEL POOL. NO SIGNS OF CLADDING DAMAGE TO THE ASSEMBLY WERE REVEALED.

FORM 138
LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85
DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1'83 00 1 8312090112 187720 04/17/83

DOCKET: 251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE: PUR
REGION: 2 NSS: WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.

REFERENCE LER: 1 251/83-002

ABSTRACT

DURING THE LOADING OF THE UNIT 4 CORE, IT WAS OBSERVED THAT FUEL ASSEMBLY X-04 HAD LEANED ACROSS THE EMPTY CORE CENTER AND WAS RESTING AGAINST ASSEMBLY W-51. ASSEMBLY X-17 WAS ALSO LEANING APPROXIMATELY 12 INCHES FROM UPRIGHT. A RECONSTRUCTION OF THE EVENT INDICATES THAT X-04 INITIALLY STRUCK ASSEMBLY Z-06, SKIRTED ALONG IT AND DISPLAYED X-17, AND CAME TO REST AGAINST 9-51. THIS IS REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 6.9.2.A.5. A SIMILAR EVENT WAS LER 251-83-002. THE ROOT CAUSE APPEARS TO BE THAT X-04 WAS NOT PROPERLY SEATED ON THE GUIDE PINS. X-04, W-51, X-17, Z-06 AND FOUR OTHER POTENTIALLY CONTACTED FUEL ASSEMBLIES WERE REMOVED TO THE SPENT FUEL POOL FOR INSPECTION. NO BREACH OF CLADDING WAS FOUND ON ANY ASSEMBLY. REFUELLING PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN MODIFIED ADDING NEW REQUIREMENTS FOR INCREASED LIGHTING AND FOR TV CAMERA AND VISUAL VERIFICATION OF FUEL ASSEMBLY LOCATION.

FORM 139 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85
 DUCT YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 251 1983 000 0 8306770424 184084 05/27/85

BUCKET: 251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE: PWR
 REGION: 2 NSS: WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

REFERENCE LER: 1 250/79-012 2 251/83-002

ABSTRACT

DURING A ROUTINE TEST OF THE B AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP, MOV-4-1405 FAILED TO OPEN. MOV-4-1405 AND MOV-4-1404 ARE NORMALLY LIFTED UP TO SUPPLY STEAM TO THE A AND C AFW PUMP TURBINES. THE B AFW PUMP TURBINE IS SUPPLIED THROUGH MOV 4-1403, AND THE A AND C PUMPS WOULD HAVE OPERATED FROM MOV-4-1404. A SIMILAR LER WAS 250-77-12. THIS IS REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B.2. INSPECTION OF THE VALVE AND VALVE OPERATOR REVEALED HIGH RESISTANCE ACROSS THE CONTACTS INSIDE THE MOTOR OPERATOR. THE CONTACTS WERE CLEANED, THE VALVE WAS TESTED TO VERIFY OPERABILITY AND RETURNED TO SERVICE. NO FURTHER ACTION IS PLANNED.

FORM 140 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85
 DUCT YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 251 1983 000 0 8306770200 183580 06/01/83

BUCKET: 251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE: PWR
 REGION: 2 NSS: WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS

AF3
 MOV FAILED
 TO OPEN

1EB 79-14

WATCH-LIST COMES FOR THIS LER AND:
252 RESULT OF IE BULLETINS, OFFERS, ETC (IFR 81-7)

REFERENCE LERS:
1 250/79-006 2 251/81-005 3 250/82-007

ABSTRACT

DURING NORMAL OPERATION, A MECHANICAL MAINTENANCE SUPERVISOR DETERMINED THAT A SAFETY RELATED SNUBBER WAS INOPERABLE BECAUSE A MODIFICATION TO THE ATTACHMENT WAS NOT COMPLETED. THE SNUBBER, NO. 54 IS LOCATED IN THE AUXILIARY BUILDING THE SNUBBER HAD BEEN INOPERABLE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION INDICATED THE SNUBBER HAD BEEN INOPERABLE LONGER THAN 72 HOURS. THIS IS REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 6.9.2.A.2 AND TECH SPEC 3.13. SIMILAR LERS INCLUDE 250-79-06, 251-81-05, AND 250-82-07. THE ROOT CAUSES HAVE BEEN DETERMINED TO BE PERSONNEL ERROR AND PROCEDURE DEFICIENCIES. AS PER I&E BULLETIN 79-14, A MODIFICATION (IC/M 82-83) WAS BEING IMPLEMENTED THAT REQUIRED CHANGES TO SNUBBER NO. 54 SUPPORTS. CONSTRUCTION FORCES WERE IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED AND PROCEEDED TO COMPLETE THE NECESSARY MODIFICATIONS TO THIS SNUBBER TO MAKE IT FUNCTIONAL WITHIN 6 1/2 HOURS AFTER DISCOVERY.

FORM 141 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1983 000 0 8309070005 184428 07/05/83

DOCKET: 251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE: PWR
REGION: 2 NSSC: WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

REFERENCE LERS:
1 251/82-011

ABSTRACT

DURING NORMAL FULL POWER OPERATION, A LOW PRESSURE ALARM WAS RECEIVED FOR THE 4B ACCUMULATOR. THE NITROGEN FILL VALVE 853B WAS OPENED TO ALIGN THE SYSTEM FOR NITROGEN ADDITION. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE 4B ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE DROPPED BELOW THE MINIMUM REQUIRED PRESSURE OF TECH SPEC 3.4.1.A.3. AFTER 4 HOURS, REACTOR SHUTDOWN WAS COMMENCED AS DIRECTED BY TECH SPEC 3.0.1. THIS IS REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B.2. A SIMILAR EVENT WAS REPORTED AS LER 251-82-011. VALVE HCV-4-206 ON THE ACCUMULATOR VENT LINE WAS FOUND PARTLY OPEN (ALTHOUGH CONTROL ROOM INDICATION SHOWED IT AS CLOSED) AND THE DOWNSTREAM BALL VALVE 9 7 WAS ALSO LEAKING. THE BALL VALVE WAS REPLACED AND THE LOCAL VALVE POSITIONER ON HCV 4-206 WAS ZEROED, CLOSING THE VALVE.

FORM 142 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1983 007 0 8309120379 185446 08/03/83

DOCKET: 251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE: PWR
REGION: 2 NSSC: WE

ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: IECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

REFERENCE LERS:
1 251/78-006

ABSTRACT

WHILE ATTEMPTING TO PERFORM A ROUTINE TEMPERATURE REDUCTION ON THE UNIT 4 PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK (PRT) PRIOR TO PUMPING, A PRT HIGH LEVEL ALARM WAS RECEIVED FOLLOWED BY THE RUPTURING OF ONE OF THE PRT RUPTURE DISCS. UNIT 4 WAS AT ABOUT 50% POWER FOLLOWING A ROUTINE START UP AND ESCALATING TO FULL POWER. THIS IS REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B.4. A SIMILAR LER WAS REPORTED AS 251-78-06. THE ROOT CAUSE HAS BEEN DETERMINED TO BE THE OVERPRESSURIZATION OF THE PRT WHILE ADDING QUENCH WATER WHICH CAUSED THE DISC TO RUPTURE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ITS INTENDED FUNCTION. THE PRT RUPTURE DISC HAS BEEN REPLACED. PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN THIS INCIDENT HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF CLOSELY MONITORING ANY EVOLUTION KNOWN TO CONTAIN RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS.

FORM 143 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1983 000 0 8309130023 185267 08/06/83

DOCKET: 251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE: PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: IECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

REFERENCE LERS:
1 250/80-922

ABSTRACT

WHILE UNIT 4 WAS OPERATING AT 100% POWER, ROD CONTROL CLUSTER N-9 IN SHUTDOWN BANK "A" DROPPED. AN AUTOMATIC TURBINE RUNBACK TO 70% POWER OCCURRED. A MANUAL POWER REDUCTION TO 50% WAS MADE AND ATTEMPTS TO RETRIEVE THE ROD N-9 WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. AT THIS TIME, BECAUSE OF AN UPCOMING MAINTENANCE OUTAGE, THE DECISION WAS MADE TO REMOVE THE UNIT FROM THE LINE. THIS IS REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B.2. A SIMILAR LER WAS REPORTED AS 250-80-22. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS DETERMINED TO BE RCS LEAKAGE FROM THE N9 UPPER CRDM HOUSING VENT VALVE. THE EXCESSIVE MOISTURE IN THE VICINITY OF THE CRDM CAUSED THE STATIONARY COIL CIRCUIT TO OPEN. INABILITY TO RE-ENERGIZE THE CIRCUIT PREVENTED THE ROD FROM BEING RETRIEVED.

FORM 144 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1983 000 0 8309120391 185424 08/03/83

DOCKET: 251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE: PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: IECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

REFERENCE LER:

1 250-79-007 2 251/80-04

ABSTRACT

FOLLOWING A UNIT 4 REACTOR TRIP, THE 4A STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN ISOLATION VALVE (CV-4-6275A) FAILED TO CLOSE UPON A BLOWDOWN ISOLATION SIGNAL CAUSED BY LO LO S/G LEVEL AND AUTO START OF AUX. FEED. PUMPS. THE CORRESPONDING SAMPLE VALVE CLOSED AS PER DESIGN RESULTING IN UNMONITORED BLOWDOWN OF 4A S/G FOR APPROXIMATELY 1 MINUTE. BLOWDOWN SAMPLES TAKEN DURING THE DAY SHOWN NO DETECTABLE ACTIVITY. THIS IS REPORTABLE PURSUANT TO TECH SPEC 3.9.1.1 AND TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B.2. SIMILAR LER'S WERE REPORTED AS 250-79-37 AND 250-80-27. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS FOUND TO BE INSTRUMENT AIR ISOLATION TO THE VALVE ACTUATOR. THIS ACTUATOR REQUIRES AIR TO OPERATE BUT IS SLATED FOR MODIFICATION TO MAINTAIN POSITIVE CLOSURE ABILITY IN THE EVENT OF A SLOW LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR. WITHIN APPROXIMATELY ONE MINUTE, THE INSTRUMENT AIR SUPPLY WAS RESTORED AND CV-4-6275A OPERATED SATISFACTORILY.

FORM 145

LER SCSS DATA

08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1983 010 1 8309250340 186380 08/09/83

DOCKET: 251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE: PWR
REGION: 2 NSSC: WE

ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

REFERENCE LER:

1 250-79-012 2 251/83-004

ABSTRACT

WITH UNIT 4 IN A SHUTDOWN CONDITION, "4A" STEAM GENERATOR STEAM SUPPLY VALVE (MOV-4-1403) TO LIE "B" AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP, FAILED TO OPEN IN RESPONSE TO AN AUTO START SIGNAL TO FEED PUMPS. MOV-4-1404 AND MOV-4-1405, STEAM SUPPLY VALVES, OPENED AND ALLOWED THE ASG AFW PUMPS TO START. THIS IS REPORTABLE PURSUANT TO TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B.2. SIMILAR LER'S WERE REPORTED AS 250-79-12 AND 251-83-04. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS FOUND TO BE CARBON BUILD-UP ON THE LIMIT SWITCH CONTACTS INSIDE THE MOTOR OPERATOR. THE CONTACTS WERE CLEANED AND MOV-4-1403 WAS TESTED SATISFACTORILY. PROCEDURE MF 0729 HAS BEEN MODIFIED TO INCLUDE INSPECTION AND CLEANING OF GEARED LIMIT SWITCH ELECTRICAL CONTACTS.

FORM 146

LER SCSS DATA

08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1983 011 0 8309150301 185380 08/09/83

DOCKET: 251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE: PWR
REGION: 2 NSSC: WE

ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS

STEP 3 EFFECT AX - BLOC VALVE INTERNALS NOT REMOVED FOR RCS VENTING WITHIN TECH. SPEC. TIME DUE TO RADIATION AND BINDING OF VALVE.

AFW MOV FAILED
TO 0 PM
5 CONTACTS
PM
(CHECK)

ABSTRACT

WHILE UNIT 4 WAS AT COLD SHUTDOWN, BOTH POWER OPERATED BELT VALVES (PORVS) WERE OUT OF SERVICE AND CLOSED FOR A PERIOD LONGER THAN 24 HOURS WITH RCS TEMPERATURE LESS THAN 275 DEGREES F. DURING THIS TIME DEPRESSURIZATION AND VENTING OF THE RCS WAS DONE VIA THE RCS VENTING SYSTEM. THIS PATH DOES NOT AMOUNT TO THE MINIMUM REQUIRED AREA OF 2.20 SQUARE INCHES. THIS IS REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B.3. THIS IS THE FIRST OCCURRENCE OF THIS TYPE. THE ROOT CAUSES WERE DETERMINED TO BE: A) LACK OF COORDINATION BETWEEN THE MAINTENANCE AND OPERATIONS DEPARTMENTS BECAUSE THE WORK NECESSARY REQUIRED THAT THE BLOCK VALVE INTERNALS BE REMOVED AND THE 24 HOUR TIME FRAME WAS NOT PROPERLY EXPLAINED TO THE MAINTENANCE DEPARTMENT. B) REMOVAL OF THE BLOCK VALVE INTERNALS WAS PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT DUE TO RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS AND BINDING OF THE VALVE DISC.

FORM 147 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 251 1783 01 0 8309260283 186022 08/19/83

DOCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE:PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: TPL

COMMENTS

STEP 3: START UP OF REACTOR AND INCREASE OF RCS TEMP. ABOVE 200 DEGREES F WITH CONTAINMENT ISOL. VALVE OPEN

ABSTRACT

WHILE STARTING UP UNIT 4, CONTAINMENT BREATHING AIR VALVE OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT (CV-4-6165) WAS FOUND PINNED OPEN AS PER PROCEDURE. THIS VALVE SHOULD BE OPERABLE FROM THE CONTROL ROOM WHEN RCS TEMPERATURE IS ABOVE 200F. THIS IS A DEVIATION FROM TECH SPEC 3.3.3 AND IS REPORTABLE PURSUANT TO TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B.3. THIS IS THE FIRST OCCURRENCE OF THIS TYPE. MAINTENANCE WORK WAS BEING PERFORMED INSIDE CONTAINMENT. THIS NECESSITATED AVAILABILITY OF BREATHING AIR TO PERSONNEL PERFORMING THE WORK. AS A SAFETY PRECAUTION, CV-4-6165 IS PINNED IN THE OPEN POSITION TO PREVENT AN INADVERTENT CLOSURE OF THE VALVE ISOLATING VITAL BREATHING AIR SUPPLY.

FORM 148 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 251 1783 01 0 8310030262 185366 08/25/83

DOCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE:PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: TPL

ABSTRACT

WHILE PERFORMING A SAFEGUARD TEST ON UNIT 4, THE 4A EMERGENCY LOAD SEQUENCER FAILED. THIS FAILURE WOULD HAVE PRECLUDED THE AUTOMATIC RELOADING OF THE TRAIN A SAFEGUARD EQUIPMENT ONTO THE 4A 4160 V BUS UPON A LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER. IN THIS MODE, ALL SAFEGUARD EQUIPMENT

IS AVAILABLE AND CAN BE MANUALLY LOADED. THIS IS REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH 4.2.B.2. A SIMILAR OCCURRENCE WAS REPORTED UNDER AO 4-73-13, THE ROOT CAUSE WAS DETERMINED TO BE AN OPEN-CIRCUITED THERMOCOIL IN THE 4A SEQUENCE CONSIDERED TO BE DUE TO NORMAL END OF LIFE. THE 4A SEQUENCE RELAY WAS REPLACED AND THE SEQUENCE WAS SATISFACTORILY TESTED AND RETURNED TO SERVICE WITHIN 3 AND ONE-HALF HOURS. AS A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE, C-4004.2 HAS BEEN CHANGED TO CAUTION THE OPERATOR ON THE PAPER TEST SWITCH POSITIONING WHILE PERFORMING SAFEGUARDS TEST.

FORM 149 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 251 1983 013 0 8400000000 188469 09/17/83

BUCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE:PMR
 REGION: 2 NSSC:WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS

STEP 1: CAUSE XX - MODIFICATION CONSTRUCTION DELAYS KEPT THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP OUT OF SERVICE LONGER THAN ALLOWABLE.

REFERENCE LERS:

1 250/83-008

ABSTRACT

DURING NORMAL FULL POWER OPERATION, THE 4B CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP WAS OUT OF SERVICE LONGER THAN THE TIME LIMIT ALLOWED BY TECH SPEC 4.2.B.2 WHILE THE SUCTION PIPING WAS BEING MODIFIED IN ACCORDANCE WITH IER 73-14. ACTION WERE INITIATED TO BRING THE UNIT TO HOT SHUTDOWN. THIS IS REPORTABLE UNDER TECH SPEC 4.2.B.2. A SIMILAR EVENT WAS REPORTED AS LFR 250-83-008. PRIOR TO INITIATING WORK, THE 4A CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP HAD BEEN SATISFACTORILY TESTED. THE PUMP WAS OUT OF SERVICE LONGER THAN THE ALLOWABLE TIME AS A RESULT OF CONSTRUCTION DELAYS. WHEN REPAIRS WERE COMPLETED, THE PUMP WAS TESTED, RETURNED TO SERVICE, AND THE UNIT WAS RETURNED TO FULL POWER.

FORM 150 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 251 1983 013 0 8310210223 186099 09/13/83

BUCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE:PMR
 REGION: 2 NSSC:WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

REFERENCE LERS:

1 251/81-013

ABSTRACT

A LOCAL LEAK RATE TEST IN THE UNIT 4 CONTAINMENT PERSONNEL HATCH AIRLOCK REVEALED LEAKAGE IN EXCESS OF THAT ALLOWED BY TECH SPEC 4.4. AFTER VERIFYING THAT THE LEAKAGE WAS NOT FROM THE OUTER PERSONNEL HATCH DOOR TO ATMOSPHERE, THE OUTER HATCH DOOR WAS OPENED AND THE

HATCH WAS ENTERED IN ORDER TO INSPECT THE INNER DOOR FOR LEAKAGE. CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, AS DEFINED IN TECH SPEC 6.5, WAS MOMENTARILY BREACHED WHEN THE OUTER DOOR WAS OPENED. THIS IS REPORTABLE UNDER TECH SPEC 6.7.2.B.2. A SIMILAR EVENT WAS REPORTED AS LER 251-91-13. THE EQUALIZING VENT VALVE ON THE INNER DOOR WAS NOT FULLY CLOSED, ALTHOUGH THE REACH ROD HANDLE WAS IN THE CLOSED POSITION AND THE VALVE INDICATOR WAS ON "CLOSED." THE VALVE WAS MANUALLY TIGHTENED SO THAT CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY WOULD BE PRESERVED WHEN THE OUTER DOOR WAS OPENED TO EXIT THE HATCH AND RE-ENTERED TO REPAIR THE VALVE. THE REACH ROD LINKAGE AND VALVE PACKING WERE ADJUSTED. THE HATCH WAS SUCCESSFULLY TESTED.

FORM 151 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1983 01 0 9310270277 186331 10/04/83

DOCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

ABSTRACT

WITH UNIT 4 AT 100% POWER AND WHILE VERIFYING SYSTEM LINEUP IN PREPARATION FOR A ROUTINE PERIODIC TEST OF THE UNIT 4 CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMPS, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE MANUAL DISCHARGE VALVES (4-891A&B) ON BOTH THE 4A AND 4B CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMPS WERE LOCKED IN THE CLOSED POSITION, THUS ISOLATING THE UNIT 4 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM. THIS IS REPORTABLE PURSUANT TO TECH SPEC 6.9.2.A.6. A SIMILAR OCCURRENCE WAS REPORTED UNDER LER 250-83-007. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS DETERMINED TO BE PERSONNEL ERROR IN THAT THE NON-LICENSED OPERATOR ASSIGNED TO CLOSE THE SAME IDENTICAL VALVES ON UNIT 3 (COLD SHUTDOWN) CLOSED THE 4-891A&B VALVES ON UNIT 4 (100% POWER) INSTEAD. UPON DISCOVERY, THE MANUAL DISCHARGE VALVE FOR THE 4B PUMP WAS IMMEDIATELY RETURNED TO THE OPEN POSITION AND LOCKED AS REQUIRED.

*Co-850904
CONTAINMENT SPRAY
VALVES OUT OF
POSITION*

FORM 152 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1983 017 0 9311090343 186339 10/04/83

DOCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

WATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
913 UPDATE NEEDED

REFERENCE LERS:
1 281/83-014

ABSTRACT

WHILE PERFORMING A ROUTINE SURVEILLANCE TEST ON UNIT 4'S B CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP (CSP), THE PUMP SHAFT BROKE AND RENDERED THE 4B PUMP INOPERABLE. TESTING KEPT THE PUMP OUT OF SERVICE 34 MINUTES LONGER THAN THE 24 HOURS ALLOWED BY TECH SPECS. THIS IS REPORTABLE UNDER

TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B.2. PREPARATIONS IN ANTICIPATION OF UNIT SHUTDOWN WERE IN PROGRESS WHEN THE 4B CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE. THE 4A CSP HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN TESTED SATISFACTORILY. A SIMILAR LER WAS 251-93-014. PRELIMINARY INDICATIONS ARE THAT RECENT MODIFICATIONS TO THE ASSOCIATED PIPING MAY HAVE CAUSED MISALIGNMENT AND SUBSEQUENT OVERTRESSING OF THE SHAFT. A STUDY OF THE FAILURE MODE IS STILL IN PROGRESS. ANY NEW DETAILS WILL BE REPORTED WHEN AVAILABLE. A CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP FROM UNIT 3 (IN REFUELING SHUTDOWN) WAS INSTALLED, ALIGNED, AND TESTED IN THE PLACE OF THE 4B PUMP. 4B CSP WAS REPAIRED AND REINSTALLED ON UNIT 3.

FORM 150 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 251 1983 010 0 8311170045 187505 10/11/83

DOCKET: 251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE: PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: ICCH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: TPL

ABSTRACT

WHILE PERFORMING A ROUTINE SURVEILLANCE TEST OF THE 4B RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP, THE 4160 VOLT LEADS TO THE MOTOR FAILED RENDERING THE 4B RHR PUMP INOPERABLE. THE UNIT WAS BROUGHT TO HOT SHUTDOWN BECAUSE IT WAS ESTIMATED THAT REPAIRS WOULD TAKE SEVERAL DAYS AND EXCEED THE 24 HOUR TIME LIMIT ALLOWED BY TECH SPEC 3.4.1.B.4. THIS IS REPORTABLE PER TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B.2. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS DETERMINED TO BE WATER IN THE MOTOR LEAD CONNECTION BOX. THE SOURCE OF THE WATER WAS ELIMINATED AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS WERE TAKEN TO PREVENT A REPEAT OCCURRENCE OF THIS TYPE. THE MOTOR LEADS WERE REPLACED, THE RHR PUMP WAS PUT BACK IN SERVICE, AND THE UNIT WAS RETURNED TO FULL POWER OPERATION.

FORM 154 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 251 1983 010 0 8312200051 187767 11/12/83

DOCKET: 251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE: PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: ICCH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: TPL

ABSTRACT

FOLLOWING A SHUTDOWN OF UNIT 4 FOR UNSCHEDULED MAINTENANCE, A REACTOR COOLANT SAMPLE TAKEN FOR ISOTOPIC ANALYSIS OF IODINE IN THE COOLANT, DID NOT SATISFY TECH SPEC SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY AS SPECIFIED IN TABLE 4.1-2 ITEM 1.H.2. THE SAMPLE IN QUESTION WAS TAKEN PRIOR TO THE SPECIFIED 2 TO 6 HOUR TIME FRAME. THIS IS REPORTABLE PURSUANT TO TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B.3. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS DETERMINED TO BE PERSONNEL ERROR IN THAT THE LAB TECHNICIAN DID NOT FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS SPECIFYING THE TIME FRAME TO TAKE THE REACTOR COOLANT SAMPLE. PERSONNEL INVOLVED WERE RE-INSTRUCTED IN THE IMPORTANCE OF PERFORMING SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE SPECIFIED PERIODS.

FORM 156 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85
 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DC# NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 251 1983 020 0 2401050544 187984 12/07/83
 DOCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE:PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

REFERENCE LERS:
 1 250/82-015

ABSTRACT
 DURING AN OUTAGE OF UNIT 4, FULL-FLOW RECIRC PIPING WAS ADDED TO THE 4A AND 4B HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION PUMP DISCHARGE PIPING. WHEN RETURNING THE UNIT TO OPERATION, THE REACTOR WAS TAKEN CRITICAL BEFORE THE NEWLY MODIFIED DISCHARGE PIPING WAS HYDROTESTED AT PUMP DISCHARGE PRESSURE WITH A QUALIFIED INSPECTOR PRESENT. THIS IS REPORTABLE UNDER TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B.3. THE NEW WELDS HAD BEEN LIQUID-PENETRANT TESTED. A SYSTEM OPERABILITY TEST AT THE PUMP DISCHARGE PRESSURE WAS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED SEVERAL DAYS EARLIER. A SIMILAR LER WAS 250-82-015. A LOWER PRESSURE, 10-YEAR HYDROTEST PERFORMED A WEEK EARLIER WAS MISTAKENLY CONSIDERED TO HAVE SATISFIED THE DESIGN PACKAGE'S HYDROTEST REQUIREMENT. THE MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE CONCERNED DEPARTMENTS WAS RESOLVED, THE REQUIRED HYDROSTATIC TEST WAS COMPLETED WITHIN APPROX. 5 HOURS AFTER CRITICALITY, AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN IN THE FORM OF INCREASED MANAGEMENT ATTENTION TO THIS AREA.

FORM 156 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85
 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DC# NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 251 1983 021 0 2401050544 187984 12/07/83
 DOCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE:PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

REFERENCE LERS:
 1 251/83-006

ABSTRACT
 WHILE ADDING NITROGEN TO THE UNIT 4 ACCUMULATORS, THE RELIEF VALVE ON THE 4B ACCUMULATOR LIFTED PREMATURELY AT APPROX. 640 PSIG INSTEAD OF THE 700 PSIG SETPOINT. CONSEQUENTLY, THE 4B ACCUMULATOR WAS DEPRESSURIZED TO APPROX. 550 PSIG. THIS IS BELOW THE MINIMUM PRESSURE OF 600 PSIG REQUIRED BY TECH SPEC 3.4.1.A.3 AND IS REPORTABLE UNDER TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B.3. A SIMILAR LER WAS 251-83-006. THE ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE WAS RETURNED TO THE REQUIRED 600 PSIG IN APPROX. 4 MINUTES. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS THE APPARENT PREMATURE LIFTING OF RELIEF VALVE 85386. A PLANT WORK ORDER HAS BEEN WRITTEN TO INSPECT THE VALVE AND TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTION IF NECESSARY DURING THE NEXT AVAILABLE OUTAGE. AGE.

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 251 1983 022 0 8401260022 188220 12/12/83

DOCKET: 251 TURKEY POINT 1 TYPE: PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

REFERENCE LERS:
 1 250/76-004 2 251/76-004

ABSTRACT

WHILE UNIT 4 WAS AT 100% POWER, A ROUTINE SAMPLE OF THE BORIC ACID STORAGE TANKS (BAST) BORON CONCENTRATION REVEALED THAT ALL THREE TANKS WERE EXCEEDING TECH SPECS LIMITS (20,000 TO 22,500 PPM). UNIT 3 WAS AT COLD SHUTDOWN AT THE TIME. THIS IS REPORTABLE PURSUANT TO TECH SPEC 6.9.2.B.2. SIMILAR INCIDENTS WERE REPORTED UNDER LERS 250-76-04 AND 251-76-04. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS DETERMINED TO BE LACK OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN CHEMISTRY AND OPERATIONS PERSONNEL WHILE BATCHING AND TRANSFERRING BORIC ACID WITHIN THE CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM. THIS EVENT AND ITS IMPORTANCE WILL BE REVIEWED IN THE OPERATORS REQUALIFICATION CLASSES AND IN CHEMISTRY LAB PERSONNEL TRAINING. THE "C" BAST WAS RETURNED TO TECH SPECS LIMITS IN APPROXIMATELY 4 HOURS.

FORM 158 LER SCSS DATA 08-02-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 251 1984 001 0 8403160022 189145 02/12/84

DOCKET: 251 TURKEY POINT 1 TYPE: PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
 13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ESF actuations.

REFERENCE LERS:
 1 251/84-003 2 250/84-006

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 100%. ON FEBRUARY 12, 1984, A REACTOR TRIP OCCURRED. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS DETERMINED TO BE DUE TO AN ELECTRICAL RELAY MALFUNCTION WHICH RESULTED IN LOSS OF POWER TO A NON-SAFETY RELATED 4160 VOLT BUS AND OCCURRED DURING ATTEMPTS TO POWER ANOTHER NON-SAFETY RELATED 4160 VOLT BUS FROM ITS ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY. THIS DE-ENERGIZED THE 4160 VOLT POWER SUPPLY TO A STEAM GENERATOR (S/G) FEEDWATER PUMP. THE REDUCED FEEDWATER FLOW TRANSIENT RESULTED IN A REACTOR TRIP ON REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM LOGIC - "STEAM FLOW/FEEDWATER FLOW MISMATCH" COINCIDENT WITH "LOW "A" S/G WATER LEVEL." ALL EQUIPMENT FUNCTIONED AS DESIGNED ON INITIATION OF THE ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SIGNAL (ESFAS). IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INCLUDED A DESIGN REVIEW AND COMPLETION OF SATISFACTORY TESTING OF THE AUTOMATIC TURBINE GOVERNOR RUNBACK LOGIC CIRCUITRY TO VERIFY THAT A RUNBACK IS INITIATED ON LOSS OF A S/G FEEDWATER PUMP. LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS WILL BE ADDRESSED IN LER

FORM 159 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 251 1984 002 0 8403150069 189024 02/12/84

DOCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE:PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: IECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS

STEP 5: CAUSE XX = DUE TO STARTUP CONDITIONS, FLOW TRANSMITTER
 ROSEMOUNT MODEL NO. 1150DD6.

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ESI actuations.

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL = 015%. WHILE UNIT 4 WAS AT 15% POWER AND ESCALATING TO
 FULL POWER FROM A PREVIOUS UNIT TRIP (LER 251-84-001), A REACTOR TRIP
 OCCURRED DUE TO STEAM FLOW GREATER THAN FEED FLOW COINCIDENT WITH LOW
 LEVEL IN THE 4A STEAM GENERATOR. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS FOUND TO BE A
 HIGH STEAM FLOW READING ON 4A STEAM GENERATOR. THIS COUPLED WITH AN
 ACTUAL STEAM GENERATOR LOW LEVEL MADE UP THE REQUIRED LOGIC FOR THE
 REACTOR TRIP. FEEDWATER FLOW CONTROL WAS IN THE MANUAL MODE AT THIS
 STAGE OF POWER ASCENSION. CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS TAKEN TO PERFORM A
 CALIBRATION CHECK ON THE TRANSMITTER. A ZERO SHIFT WAS CORRECTED.
 THE FOLLOWING DAY THE TRANSMITTER WAS OBSERVED TO BE READING HIGH
 AGAIN. THE MALFUNCTIONING TRANSMITTER WAS THEN REPLACED AND SHOP
 TESTED. THE INSTRUMENT LOOP WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE WITH NO FURTHER
 PROBLEMS AND THE UNIT WAS RESTORED TO FULL POWER OPERATION. SIMILAR
 OCCURRENCES: NONE.

FORM 160 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 251 1984 003 0 8404100234 189393 03/07/84

DOCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE:PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: IECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS

STEP 4: EFFECT KX - OPERATIONAL MODE OF SYSTEM CHANGED

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ESI actuations.

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL = 000%. WHILE PERFORMING ROUTINE SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS, OF
 0205.2, ON UNIT 4, A CONTAINMENT PURGE WAS INITIATED IN PREPARATION
 FOR PERSONNEL CONTAINMENT ENTRY. WHILE PURGING, A SPURIOUS SIGNAL
 (SPIKE), USED TO PROCESS RADIATION MONITOR R-11, ACTUATED THE
 CONTAINMENT AND CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM'S LOGIC THUS CLOSING

THE PURGE VALVES AND PLACING THE CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM IN THE RECIRCULATION MODE. NO ABNORMAL LEVELS OF ACTIVITY WERE DETECTED IN CONTAINMENT. THE R-11 ALARM WAS RESET AND THE CONTAINMENT PURGE WAS REINITIATED. THE CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM WAS RETURNED TO NORMAL OPERATING MODE. A SIGNIFICANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WAS MADE TO NRCDC VIA ENS. SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: NONE.

FORM 161 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1984 003 0 8405170282 189604 04/12/84

DOCKET: 251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE: PWR
REGION: 2 NSSC: WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: FECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS
OTHER REPORTABILITY - VOLUNTARY REPORT.

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

21 OTHER: Voluntary report, special report, Part 21 report,
etc.

REFERENCE LERS:

1 251/80-003 2 250/80-010

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 000%. DURING IN-SERVICE INSPECTION OF THE 4A STEAM GENERATOR FEEDWATER NOZZLE TO REDUCER WELD AREA, CRACK-LIKE ULTRASONIC INDICATIONS WERE DETECTED IN THE 18" X 14" REDUCER BASE METAL. SUBSEQUENT TO REMOVAL OF THE REDUCER ON APR 12, 1984, A CIRCUMFERENTIALLY ORIENTED CRACK WAS CONFIRMED BY LIQUID PENETRANT. THE CRACK WAS FOUND TO BE IN THE COUNTERBORE THICKNESS TRANSITION APPROXIMATELY 270 DEGREES AROUND THE CIRCUMFERENCE. ADDITIONAL EXAMINATIONS PERFORMED ON THE OTHER STEAM GENERATORS INCLUDING THE ADJACENT HORIZONTAL RUN OF PIPE REVEALED A SIMILAR CONDITION ON THE 4C STEAM GENERATOR. THIS CRACK WAS FOUND TO BE ORIENTED IDENTICAL TO THE ONE ON 4A BUT WITH A LENGTH OF APPROXIMATELY 180 DEGREES. REPAIRS ARE BEING IMPLEMENTED (FC/M 84-80) BY REPLACEMENT OF THE REDUCERS AND ELIMINATION OF INTERNAL THICKNESS TRANSITIONS. UNDER THIS FC/M, THE FEEDWATER NOZZLE EXTENSION IS TO BE REDUCED IN LENGTH (1/2 INCH) TO REMOVE THE COUNTERBORE. THE NOZZLE TO REDUCER AREAS WERE EXAMINED ON THE 4B AND UNIT 3 SA, 3B, AND 3C STEAM GENERATORS AND NO EVIDENCE OF CRACKING WAS FOUND. SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: LER 251-80-09 AND LER 250-80-13.

FORM 162 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1984 003 0 8406130082 190303 05/05/84

DOCKET: 251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE: PWR
REGION: 2 NSSC: WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: FECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ESF actuations.

REFERENCE LERs:

1 250/84-012

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 000%. ON MAY 5, 1984, WITH UNIT 4 IN A SCHEDULED REFUELING OUTAGE (CORE OFF-LOADED), ACTUATION OF BUS STRIPPING RELAYS ON A 4KV BUS OCCURRED. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS DETERMINED TO STEM FROM PERSONNEL ACCIDENTALLY CARRYING OR SHORTING AN ELECTRICAL AUXILIARY RELAY CONTACT PAIR. THIS OCCURRED DURING PERFORMANCE, BY MEMBERS OF THE PLANT CONSTRUCTION WORK FORCE, OF MODIFICATIONS IN THE 4KV BUS SEQUENCER CUBICLE AND ASSOCIATED WITH THE ADDITION OF UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY PROTECTION. THIS RESULTED IN A LOSS OF VOLTAGE CONDITION THAT DID NOT ACTUALLY EXIST, APPEARING TO THE LOGIC CIRCUITRY FOR BUS STRIPPING. ACTUATION OF THE BUS STRIPPING RELAYS RESULTED, STRIPPING THE AFFECTED 4KV BUS, STARTING THE ASSOCIATED DIESEL GENERATOR AND INITIATING SEQUENCER ACTION. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INCLUDED TRANSFERRING THE 4KV BUS BACK ONTO THE ASSOCIATED START-UP TRANSFORMER AND SECURING THE DIESEL GENERATOR. ADDITIONALLY, SUPERVISORS OVERSEEING THE UNDERVOLTAGE MODIFICATIONS WERE INSTRUCTED TO EXERCISE MORE CARE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WORK TO PRECLUDE A RECURRENCE. SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: 250-84-012.

FORM - 163 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 251 1984 003 0 8407090221 190540 06/01/84

DOCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE:PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ESF actuations.

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 010%. ON JUNE 1, 1984, A REACTOR TRIP OCCURRED. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS DETERMINED TO STEM FROM A PERSONNEL ERROR THAT RESULTED IN REACTOR POWER REACHING 10% WITH THE TURBINE IN A TRIPPED CONDITION AND OCCURRED DURING ATTEMPTS TO OPEN THE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES (MSIVS). THE MSIVS ARE OPENED ONLY AFTER EQUALIZING THE STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURES WITH THE STEAM HEADER PRESSURE. THIS IS ACCOMPLISHED BY OPENING THE ASSOCIATED BYPASS VALVES AROUND THE MSIVS AND INCREASING ATMOSPHERIC STEAM DUMP IN THE RESPECTIVE HEADERS TO REDUCE THE PRESSURE UPSTREAM OF THE MSIVS. THE STEAM USAGE ASSOCIATED WITH EQUALIZING THE STEAM PRESSURE ACROSS THE MSIVS REDUCES THE AVERAGE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM TEMPERATURE (TAVG). DURING ATTEMPTS TO OPEN THE MSIVS, THE LICENSED OPERATOR INCREASED REACTOR POWER IN ANTICIPATION OF A SAGGING T(AVG). HOWEVER, REACTOR POWER REACHED 10% DURING THE EVOLUTION AND SINCE THE TURBINE WAS IN A TRIPPED CONDITION, A REACTOR TRIP RESULTED. ALL EQUIPMENT FUNCTIONED AS DESIGNED ON INITIATION OF THE ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SIGNAL (ESFAS) GENERATED IN THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INCLUDED SUPERVISOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE LICENSED OPERATORS ON THE INITIATING CONDITIONS AND PLANT PARAMETERS AND UNDERSTANDING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THEIR ACTIONS. SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: NONE.

FORM 164 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85
BUCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1984 00 0 8407000264 190541 05/09/84

BUCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE:PMR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS
STEPS 1,6,7,12,13, AND 14: EFFECT DX - DAMAGED.

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
10 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i): Shutdowns or technical
specification violations.

ABSTRACT
POWER LEVEL - 100%. ON MAY 27, 1984, WHILE UNIT 4 WAS AT HOT SHUTDOWN,
AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO DRAIN THE REACTOR COOLANT DRAIN TANK (RCDDT).
LOW FLOW WAS OBSERVED FROM THE DISCHARGE OF THE RCDDT PUMPS. FOLLOWING
INVESTIGATIONS, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE LOW FLOW WAS CAUSED BY
BLOCKAGE IN PCV-4-4-68A (PHASE A CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE).
MAINTENANCE FOUND AND REPLACED A DAMAGED DIAPHRAGM. ON MAY 28, 1984,
WITH THE UNIT 4 STILL AT HOT SHUTDOWN, LOW FLOW WAS AGAIN OBSERVED
WHILE ATTEMPTING TO DRAIN THE RCDDT. A DAMAGED DIAPHRAGM IN
PCV-4-4-68A WAS AGAIN DISCOVERED AND REPLACED. ADJUSTMENTS TO THE
VALVE STROKE WERE MADE. ON MAY 29, 1984, A REVIEW OF THE SEQUENCE OF
EVENTS AND RESPECTIVE CLEARANCES ISSUED TO PERFORM REPAIRS REVEALED
THAT, EVEN THOUGH THERE WAS NO DIRECT FLOW PATH FROM CONTAINMENT TO
THE OUTSIDE ENVIRONMENT, CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY WAS TECHNICALLY
BREACHED. THE FLOW PATH FROM THE RCDDT TO OUTSIDE ENVIRONMENT WAS
ISOLATED BY MEANS OF VALVES NOT QUALIFIED AS CONTAINMENT ISOLATION
VALVES. THIS IS CONTRARY TO TECH SPEC 1.25 AND THUS IT IS REPORTABLE
UNDER 10 CFR 50.73. THE STATE OF FLORIDA AND NRCOC WERE PROPERLY
NOTIFIED OF THE MAY 27, 1984 OCCURRENCE. THERE WAS NO POTENTIAL FOR
RADIOACTIVE RELEASES TO THE ATMOSPHERE. AFTER A THIRD FAILURE ON MAY
30, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT DAMAGED O-RINGS IN THE STEM GUIDE TO THE
VALVE ACTUATOR WERE CAUSING THE DIAPHRAGM FAILURES.

FORM 165 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

BUCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1984 010 0 8407110322 190594 06/04/84

BUCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE:PMR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ESF actuations.

ABSTRACT
POWER LEVEL - 100%. ON JUNE 4, 1984, WITH UNIT 4 AT 100% POWER, THE 4A
STEAM GENERATOR FEEDWATER PUMP TRIPPED DUE TO LOW SUCTION PRESSURE.

THIS OCCURRED WHILE CLOSING THE LOW PRESSURE HEATER BYPASS VALVE. THIS CAUSED A 30% TURBINE RUNBACK ON THE UNIT. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE REACTOR TRIPPED. THE CAUSE OF THE UNIT TRIP WAS NOT IMMEDIATELY APPARENT SO A REVIEW OF THE EVENTS WAS INITIATED. THE DIGITAL DATA PROCESS SYSTEM (DDPS) PRINTOUT INDICATED THAT THE TRIP WAS INITIATED BY OPENING OF THE 100 REACTOR TRIP BREAKER. THIS IN TURN TRIPPED THE TURBINE WHICH DE-ENERGIZED REACTOR TRIP RELAYS 2 AND 10 AND OPENED THE 8 REACTOR TRIP BREAKER. NO APPARENT CAUSE FOR OPENING OF THE 100 REACTOR TRIP BREAKER COULD BE IDENTIFIED. FIRST OUT ANNUNCIATORS INDICATED THAT THE TRIP WAS CAUSED BY STEAM FLOW GREATER THAN FEED FLOW COINCIDENT WITH LOW STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL ON 100 STEAM GENERATOR. YET THE DDPS PRINTOUT HAD NO INDICATION OF ANY STEAM GENERATOR REACTOR TRIP MATRIX BEING MADE UP. ADDITIONAL DETAILS ARE DESCRIBED IN THE TEXT PORTION OF THIS REPORT. SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: NONE. SIGNIFICANT EVENT NOTIFICATION MADE TO NRCOC VIA ENS PURSUANT TO 10 CFR 50.72(a)(2)(ii).

FORM 166 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1984 01 0 8407130079 190542 06/10/84

DOCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 1 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: DECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS
STEP 1: EFFECT IX - ELECTRICAL TRANSIENT. STEP 4: EFFECT FX - TURBINE RUNBACK.

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ECF actuations.

REFERENCE LERS:
1 250/84-009 2 250/84-013 3 250/84-015

ABSTRACT
POWER LEVEL - 100%. ON JUNE 10, 1984, AT 12:18 A.M., A TURBINE RUNBACK TO APPROXIMATELY 510 MEGAWATTS OCCURRED. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS DETERMINED TO STEM FROM AN ELECTRICAL TRANSIENT IN THE "NORMAL" (4A) STATIC INVERTER (4Y01) THAT WAS IN SERVICE SUPPLYING POWER TO A VITAL 120 VOLT (A.C.) INSTRUMENT POWER BUS (PANEL 4P07). THIS RESULTED IN A MOMENTARY LOSS OF POWER TO VITAL PANEL 4P07 AND ITS FEEDS TO THE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM (NIS) CHANNEL N-42 POWER RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION. A MOMENTARY LOSS OF NIS CHANNEL N-42 DETECTOR VOLTAGE RESULTED AND INITIATED AN "NIS ROD DROP" SIGNAL WHICH GENERATED THE TURBINE RUNBACK. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INCLUDED STABILIZING THE UNIT, SLAPPING THE VITAL PANEL ONTO THE "STANDBY" (AS) STATIC INVERTER (3Y04) AND COMPLETION OF SATISFACTORY LOGIC CIRCUIT TESTING AND LOAD TESTING OF THE 4A INVERTER WITH A RESISTIVE LOAD OF 53 AMPS PERFORMED WITH LINE DISTURBANCE MONITORING EQUIPMENT WHICH DID NOT RECORD ANY ABNORMAL FLUCTUATIONS. THE 4A INVERTER WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE AND LICENSED OPERATORS WERE REQUESTED TO MAINTAIN AN AWARENESS OF THE INVERTERS STATUS. SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: LER 250-84-009, LER 250-84-013, AND LER 250-84-015.

FORM 167 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

| DOCKET | YEAR | LER NUMBER | REVISION | DCS NUMBER | NSIC | EVENT DATE |
|--------|------|------------|----------|------------|--------|------------|
| 251 | 1984 | 010 | 0 | 8407100000 | 190449 | 06/11/84 |

DOCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 1 TYPE:PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSG:WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: ECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS

MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT TECH SPEC WAS EXCEEDED

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

- 9 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2): Limiting conditions for operation.
- 10 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i): Shutdowns or technical specification violations.

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL = 091%. ON JUNE 11, 1984, THE MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT (MTC) TECH SPEC WAS EXCEEDED. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS DETERMINED TO STEM FROM INADEQUATE PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT CHANGES IN PARAMETERS AFFECTING FULFILLMENT OF THE TECH SPEC REQUIREMENT. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING: 1) A REDUCTION IN REACTOR POWER TO A LEVEL SATISFYING THE TECH SPEC REQUIREMENT, 2) SUPERVISOR DISCUSSION WITH THE OPERATORS ON INITIATING CONDITIONS AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EVENT, 3) INCREASED COORDINATION BETWEEN OPERATIONS AND REACTOR ENGINEERING ON DETERMINATION OF XENON AND BORON CONCENTRATIONS AND CONDITIONS REQUIRED FOR POWER ASCENSION TO 70% AND ABOVE WITHOUT EXCEEDING TECH SPEC, 4) VERIFICATION BY REACTOR ENGINEERING THAT CONDITIONS ON THE MTC CURVE ARE SATISFIED, AND 5) REQUEST FUEL VENDOR, WESTINGHOUSE, REVIEW MTC PARAMETERS TO SEE IF AVAILABLE MARGIN EXISTS TO INCREASE OPERATING FLEXIBILITY. LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS IN PROGRESS INCLUDE INVESTIGATING POSSIBLE TECH SPEC CHANGES AND INVESTIGATING A CHANGE IN CORE DESIGN PHILOSOPHY TO ENSURE DESIGN PARAMETERS MEET TECH SPEC IN ALL OPERATING CONDITIONS AND A PROCEDURE CHANGE WAS MADE TO REQUIRE REACTOR ENGINEERING TO EVALUATE AND ESTABLISH THE PLANT CONDITIONS REQUIRED PRIOR TO POWER ASCENSION TO 70% AND ABOVE. SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: NONE.

| FORM | 168 | LER SCSS DATA | 08-09-85 | | | |
|--------|------|---------------|----------|------------|--------|------------|
| DOCKET | YEAR | LER NUMBER | REVISION | DCS NUMBER | NSIC | EVENT DATE |
| 251 | 1984 | 010 | 0 | 8407210037 | 190595 | 06/24/84 |

DOCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 1 TYPE:PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSG:WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: ECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

- 13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ETC actuations.

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL = 050%. ON JUN 24, 1984, AUTOMATIC INITIATION OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (AFW) OCCURRED. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS DETERMINED TO STEM FROM THE TRIP OF THE 4B SG FEEDWATER PUMP (SFP) DUE TO INADEQUATE SECTION PRESSURE. DURING ESCALATION TO FULL POWER OPERATION, THE 4A CONDENSATE PUMP WAS STARTED AND THE 4B SFP THAT WAS IN SERVICE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. THE SYSTEMS OF THE NEW SYSTEMS. THE OPERATOR ATTEMPTED TO START THE 4A COLD. BUT IT DID NOT START DUE TO IMMEDIATE ACTION. THE UNIT WAS STABILIZED AND AFW SECURED WITHIN 2 HRS AND RESET. POWER ESCALATION CONTINUED WITH NO FURTHER PROBLEMS. ALL EQUIPMENT FUNCTIONED AS DESIGNED ON INITIATION OF THE ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SIGNAL (ESFAS). SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATIONS FAILED TO REVEAL ANY EQUIPMENT FAILURE. SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: NONE.

FORM 169 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

 BUCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 251 1984 010 0 8408010191 190081 06/26/84

BUCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 1 TYPE: PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYM L: FPL

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
 13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ETC actuations.

ABSTRACT
 POWER LEVEL - 000%. ON JUNE 26, 1984, UNIT 4 EXPERIENCED A REACTOR TRIP WHILE AT HOT SHUTDOW IN CONDITIONS. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS DUE TO A SOURCE RANGE DETECTOR, N-32, THAT FAILED HIGH ABOVE THE REACTOR TRIP LOGIC FOR A SOURCE RANGE HIGH NEUTRON FLUX LEVEL AT SHUTDOWN TRIP. THEREFORE, WHEN N-32 FAILED HIGH, THE REACTOR TRIP LOGIC WAS COMPLETED AND A REACTOR TRIP OCCURRED. ALL EQUIPMENT FUNCTIONED AS DESIGNED ON INITIATION OF THE ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SIGNAL (ESFAS). IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INCLUDED: 1) I AND C SWITCHED THE FAILED DETECTOR FOR N-32 WITH THE SPARE DETECTOR FOR REFUELING. 2) N-32 WAS RECALIBRATED BY 1 AND C. 3) OPERATIONS PERFORMED A SOURCE RANGE PERIODIC FUNCTIONAL TEST ON BOTH SOURCE RANGE DETECTORS N-32 AND N-31. SUBSEQUENTLY, ON JULY 16, 1984, THE FAILED DETECTOR WAS REPLACED AND THE SYSTEM RETURNED TO NORMAL CONFIGURATION. SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: NONE.

FORM 170 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

 BUCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 251 1984 010 0 8408170191 190081 07/16/84

BUCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 1 TYPE: PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYM L: FPL

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
 13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ETC actuations.

REFERENCE LERS:
 1 250/84-007 2 250/84-012 3 251/84-006

ABSTRACT
 POWER LEVEL - 000%. ON JUL 16, 1984, WHILE AT COLD SHUTDOWN

CONDITIONS, UNIT 4 EXPERIENCED AN UNEXPECTED START OF THE 4A HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION (HISI) PUMP. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS DETERMINED TO STEM FROM CONSTRUCTION PERSONNEL INSTALLING SCAFFOLDING IN THE VICINITY OF THE BREAKER AND DUE TO THE LIMITED SPACE BETWEEN THE SCAFFOLDING AND SWITCHGEAR, THEY BANGSHET AGAINST THE LOCAL SWITCH STARTING THE PUMP. NO ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SIGNAL (ESFAS) WAS PRESENT. THEREFORE, THE VALVES DID NOT LINE UP AND NO FLOW WAS DELIVERED TO THE CORE. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INCLUDED: 1) THE 4A HISI PUMP WAS STOPPED AND IN AN ATTEMPT TO VERIFY THE ROOT CAUSE, PLANT PERSONNEL RECREATED THE EVENTS AT THE BREAKER CUBICLE WHICH INDEED STARTED THE PUMP, AND 2) CONSTRUCTION PERSONNEL WERE CAUTIONED ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING CAREFUL WHEN WORKING IN THE VICINITY OF ELECTRICAL BREAKERS. SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: LER 250-34-007, LER 250-84-012, AND LER 251-34-006.

FORM 171 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 251 1984 017 0 2409130497 191342 06/24/84

DOCKET: 251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE: PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSC: WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: 171

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
 13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ECF activations.

ABSTRACT

PUMP LEVEL - 074%. ON JUN 24, 1984, MANUAL INITIATION OF THE AFW FLEDMATER (AFW) SYSTEM OCCURRED. THE AFW SYSTEM WAS MANUALLY STARTED IN ANTICIPATION OF A FEEDWATER PUMP TRIP DUE TO LOW SUCTION PRESSURE. THE UNIT WAS DECREASING POWER BECAUSE OF OIL CONTROL PROBLEMS CAUSING CONTROL VALVE OSCILLATIONS ON THE TURBINE-GENERATOR. THE LEVEL IN THE HOTWELL BEGAN DECREASING AND AS THE LEVEL GOT CLOSE TO 10%, THE AFW SYSTEM WAS MANUALLY STARTED TO HELP MAINTAIN HOTWELL LEVEL BY REDUCING THE REQUIRED MAIN FEEDWATER FLOW. THE HOTWELL REJECT REGULATOR, LCV-1500, WAS FOUND TO HAVE FAILED OPEN AND WAS ISOLATED. ISOLATION OF THE REJECT REGULATOR CAUSED THE HOTWELL LEVEL TO BEGIN INCREASING AND THE AFW PUMPS WERE SECURED. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INCLUDED STABILIZING THE UNIT IN A HOT SHUTDOWN CONDITION TO RESOLVE THE TURBINE CONTROL PROBLEMS AND HAVING MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL REPAIR THE HOTWELL REJECT REGULATOR. ALSO, A LETTER WAS SENT TO ALL OPERATIONS PERSONNEL CLARIFYING THE REQUIREMENTS FOR SIGNIFICANT EVENT NOTIFICATIONS OUTLINED IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 0102.12. NOTIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS TO NRC. SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: NONE. SUBSEQUENT REVIEW OF THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH THE USNRC SENIOR RESIDENT INSPECTOR DETERMINED THAT THE EVENT WAS REPORTABLE AND A SIGNIFICANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WAS MADE TO THE NRC ON VIA ENS PER 10 CFR 50.73(b)(2)(ii) ON 8-2-84.

FORM 172 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 251 1984 017 0 2409130576 191343 08/07/84

DOCKET: 251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE: PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSC: WE

ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS

STEPS 2 AND 74 CAUSE XX-FOSSIL UNITS 1 AND 2 OR OPERATOR'S FAILURE.

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ESF actuations.

REFERENCE LERs:

1 250/84-007

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 100%. ON 8-7-84, WITH BOTH UNIT 3 AND 4 AT 100% POWER, UNIT 4 EXPERIENCED A REACTOR TRIP COINCIDENT WITH A LOSS OF THE UNIT 3 START-UP TRANSFORMER. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS DETERMINED TO STEM FROM AN INCORRECT SWITCHING ORDER THAT, WHEN EXECUTED FROM THE FOSSIL UNITS 1 AND 2 CONTROL ROOM, CAUSED THE UNIT 3C TRANSFORMER TO BE DE-ENERGIZED, THUS, DE-ENERGIZING THE 1C 4KV BUS, THE 4B SG FEED PUMP AND 4C CONDENSATE PUMP ARE POWERED BY THE 4C BUS AND EACH, THEREFORE, TRIPPED. THE UNIT 4 REACTOR TRIP OCCURRED WHEN THE REACTOR PROTECTION LOGIC OF STEAM FLOW GREATER THAN FEED FLOW, COINCIDENT WITH SG LOW LEVEL FOR 4C WAS MADE UP, CAUSED BY THE FEEDWATER FLOW REDUCTION. THE SOURCE OF OFFSITE POWER, THAT WAS INADVERTENTLY DISCONNECTED, SUPPLIES POWER TO THE UNIT 3C TRANSFORMER (WHICH POWERS UNIT 4C BUS) AND THE UNIT 3 START-UP TRANSFORMER. UNIT 4 WAS STABILIZED AND POWER WAS RESTORED TO THE UNIT 3 START-UP TRANSFORMER. UNIT 3C TRANSFORMER AND TO THE UNIT 4C BUS SHORTLY AFTER THE REACTOR TRIP. ALL EQUIPMENT FUNCTIONED AS DESIGNED ON INITIATION OF THE ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SIGNAL (E-FAS). SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: 250-84-007.

FORM 170 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1984 012 0 8410100697 191536 08/29/84

DOCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

9 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2): Limiting conditions for operation.
10 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i): Shutdowns or technical
specification violations.

REFERENCE LERs:

1 251/83-011

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 100%. ON 8-29-84, WHILE UNIT 4 WAS AT 100% POWER, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT A LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) FOR THE 4B INTAKE COOLING WATER (ICW) HEADER HAD BEEN EXCEEDED. ON 8-24-84, THE 4B ICW STRAINER ON THE "ALTWATER" SIDE OF THE COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW) HEAT EXCHANGER WAS TAKEN OUT OF SERVICE (OOS) FOR CLEANING. THIS PLACED THE 4B ICW HEADER OOS WHICH IS A TECH SPEC ITEM WITH A 24 HR LCO, BUT THIS WAS NOT REALIZED AT THE TIME DUE TO PERSONNEL OVERSIGHT. ALSO, NO ENTRY WAS MADE IN THE EQUIPMENT OOS LOG FOR THE ICW STRAINER. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION INCLUDED: 1) RELEASED THE

CALLANCE ORDER, PRESENTIZED THE STRAINER, CHECKED FOR LEAKAGE AND RETURNED THE STRAINER TO SERVICE. 2) ON THE SPOT CHANGES (OTSC) WERE MADE TO GENERAL PROCEDURES TO CHANCE OPERATOR AWARENESS OF TECH SPEC RELATED ALERTS. 3) SUPERVISORY DISCUSSIONS WERE HELD WITH ALL OPERATIONS PERSONNEL ON THE IMPORTANCE OF IDENTIFYING TECH SPEC RELATED EQUIPMENT DURING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THEIR ACTIONS. SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: LER 1-8-011.

FORM 174 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

 BUCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 251 1984 01 0 8410110222 191744 09/01/84

BUCKET: 251 TURKEY POINT 1 TYPE: PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSG: WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FTL

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
 10 10 DER 30.73(4,2)(1): Shutdowns or technical
 specification violations.

REFERENCE LER: 1 250/80-012 2 250/84-022

ABSTRACT
 POWER LEVEL - 100%. ON 9-1-84, WHILE UNIT 4 WAS AT 100% POWER, THE DAILY CALIBRATION OF THE NUCLEAR POWER RANGE (THERMAL POWER CALCULATION) WAS NOT PERFORMED AS REQUIRED BY TECH SPEC 4.1, TABLE 4.1-1, ITEM 1. THE ROOT CAUSE WAS A LICENSED OPERATOR OVERSIGHT THAT RESULTED IN THE CALCULATION NOT BEING DONE WHILE PERFORMING OPERATING PROCEDURE 12304.2, SCHEDULE OF PERIODIC TESTS, CHECKS, AND OPERATING EVOLUTIONS. THE MISED CALCULATION WAS NOT DISCOVERED UNTIL TUES MORNING, 9-4-84. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN WERE THE FOLLOWING: 1) IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT A THERMAL CALORIMETRIC HAD BEEN RUN USING THE DOPS PROGRAM CAL ON SATURDAY MORNING, 9-1-84. USING THIS CALCULATION AND THE NIS POWER RANGE READINGS FOR THE SAME TIME YIELDED A DIFFERENCE FOR THE CALORIMETRIC THAT WAS WITHIN THE PLUS OR MINUS 1% ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR THE CALORIMETRIC. 2) OPERATING PROCEDURE 12304.3, POWER RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SHIFT CHECKS AND DAILY CALIBRATIONS, HAS BEEN REVISED TO REQUIRE THE THERMAL POWER CALCULATION TO BE COMPLETED BEFORE DOING THE SHIFT CHECK OF THE NIS. ALSO, A SIGN-OFF HAS BEEN ADDED TO THE DAY SHIFT OF THE NIS TO INDICATE THAT THE THERMAL POWER CALCULATION HAS BEEN COMPLETED. 3) SUPERVISORY DISCUSSIONS WERE HELD WITH THE LICENSED OPERATOR AND PLANT SUPERVISOR - NUCLEAR ON THE IMPORTANCE OF PERFORMING THE REQUIRED SURVEILLANCES AND UNDERSTANDING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THEIR ACTIONS. SIMILAR LER: 250-81-022 AND 250-90-012.

FORM 175 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

 BUCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 251 1984 01 0 8410230461 191775 09/14/84

BUCKET: 251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE: PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSG: WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.

SYMBOL: FTL

COMMENTS
STEP 1: COMPONENT M11 - REACH ROD, STEP 2: COMPONENT M11-LOCK.

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

10 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i): Shutdowns or technical
specification violations.

REFERENCE LER:

1 251/84-009

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 100%. ON 9-14-84, WHILE UNIT 4 WAS AT 100% POWER, 1 OF
REDUNDANT CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (V-4-204) ON THE SERVICE AIR
HEADER TO CONTAINMENT WAS FOUND OPEN DURING MAINTENANCE ON THE VALVE.
WHILE PERFORMING RATING PROCEDURE (OP) 5504.1, POST ACCIDENT
CONTAINMENT VENT SYSTEM - FILTER PERFORMANCE, WHICH REQUIRES THE
CLOSING OF CERTAIN VALVES AMONG WHICH IS CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE
V-4-204, SERVICE AIR HEADER TO CONTAINMENT, PLANT PERSONNEL NOTICED
THE REACH ROD CLIPPING AND ISSUED A PLANT WORK ORDER (PWO) TO REPAIR
THE REACH ROD. MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL BEGAN WORK ON THE REACH ROD AND
SUBSEQUENTLY INFORMED OPERATIONS PERSONNEL THAT THEY SUSPECTED THAT
THE VALVE WAS OPEN. OPERATIONS PERSONNEL VERIFIED THAT THE VALVE WAS
OPEN. WHILE V-4-204 WAS OPEN, V-4-203, A HEADER ISOLATION MANIFOLD
VALVE DOWNSTREAM FROM V-4-204, REMAINED CLOSED AND LOCKED DURING THE
ENTIRE EVENT AND THE CHECK VALVE ON THIS LINE LOCATED INSIDE
CONTAINMENT ALSO REMAINED CLOSED, SO NO RELEASE PATH TO THE
ENVIRONMENT WAS PRESENT. AN UNUSUAL EVENT WAS DECLARED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE TURKEY POINT EMERGENCY PLAN AND ALL REQUIRED NOTIFICATIONS
WERE MADE. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INCLUDED CLOSING THE VALVE,
TERMINATING THE UNUSUAL EVENT AND RELOCATING THE LOCK FOR THE VALVE TO
THE VALVE HANDLE WHILE THE REACH ROD WAS DISCONNECTED. THE REACH ROD
HAS BEEN FIXED AND THE VALVE RETURNED TO ITS NORMAL CONFIGURATION.
SIMILAR LER 251-84-009.

FORM 176

LER SCSD DATA

08-09-85

BUCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1984 02 0 841101042R 191798 09/20/84

BUCKET: 251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE: PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TCH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FTL

COMMENTS

STEP 8: EFFECT FX=1 RBIN RUNDAC.

WATCH-LIST CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

-13 UPDATE NEEDED

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ESF actuations.

REFERENCE LER:

1 251/84-011

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 100%. ON -20-84, WHILE UNIT 4 WAS AT 100% POWER, A

TURBINE RUNBACK AND SUBSEQUENT REACTOR TRIP OCCURRED. DURING AN INVESTIGATION FOR A GROUND IN THE 3A DC BUS, THE "NORMAL" (4A) STATIC INVERTER (4Y01) TRIPPED DUE TO A BLOWN FUSE. THE 4A INVERTER WAS IN SERVICE SUPPLYING POWER TO A VITAL 120V AC INSTRUMENT BUS (PANEL 4P07). THE 4A INVERTER FAILURE RESULTED IN A LOSS OF POWER TO VITAL PANEL 4P07 WHICH CAUSED NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM (NIS) CHANNEL N-42 TO GENERATE AN "NIC ROD DROP" SIGNAL CAUSING A TURBINE RUNBACK TO 70% POWER. FOLLOWING THE TURBINE RUNBACK, A REACTOR TRIP OCCURRED WHEN THE REACTOR PROTECTION LOGIC OF STEAM FLOW GREATER THAN FEED FLOW, COINCIDENT WITH SO LOW LEVEL FOR THE "B" SO WAS MADE UP. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INCLUDED STABILIZING THE UNIT AND RE-ENERGIZING VITAL PANEL 4P07. LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION IS TO REPLACE THE INVERTERS TO ENSURE A MORE RELIABLE POWER SUPPLY. ALL EQUIPMENT FUNCTIONED AS DESIGNED ON INITIATION OF THE ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SIGNAL (ESFAS) GENERATED IN THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM. SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: LER-251-84-11.

FORM 177 LER SCSS DATA 08-02-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 251 1984 02 0 041112059% 192026 10/09/84

DOCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE:PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSC:WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: ISCH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: IPL

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
 13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ECF actuations.

REFERENCE LERS:
 1 251/84-011 2 251/84-021 3 250/84-009 4 250/84-013
 5 250/84-026

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 000%. ON 10-9-84, WHILE UNIT 4 WAS HEATING UP FROM COLD SHUTDOWN TO HOT SHUTDOWN, A REACTOR TRIP OCCURRED. THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE REACTOR TRIP WAS A BLOWN FUSE IN THE NORMAL 4A STATIC INVERTER (4Y01) THAT WAS SUPPLYING 120V AC INSTRUMENT POWER TO VITAL PANEL 4P07, WHICH CAUSED THE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION DISTABLES FOR CHANNELS N-32 (SOURCE RANGE) AND N-36 TO DEENERGIZE, GENERATING REACTOR TRIP SIGNALS. IN ADDITION, THE LOSS OF POWER TO PANEL 4P07 INITIATED THE CLOSURE OF THE LETDOWN LINE PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE (PCV-4-145), WHICH WAS OPERATING IN THE AUTOMATIC MODE. THE LOSS OF POWER TO THE OVERPRESSURE MITIGATING SYSTEM ON PANEL 4P07 OPENED THE PRESSURIZER POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVE (PORV-V-4-455C) WHEN THE TEMPERATURE INPUTS FAILED LOW RESULTING IN THE RCS PRESSURE DROPPING TO 50 PSIG. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS WERE TO PLACE VALVE PCV-4-145 IN THE MANUAL MODE TO REESTABLISH LETDOWN PRESSURE CONTROL, CLOSE THE PORV, COOL DOWN AND STABILIZE THE RCS AND REENERGIZE THE VITAL PANEL 4P07 USING THE SPARE 4B INVERTER. INVESTIGATIONS BY MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL REVEALED A WIRING ERROR IN THE DC INPUT FILTER SECTION OF THE 4A INVERTER WHICH ALLOWED THE CIRCUIT TO BE MORE SUSCEPTIBLE TO DC BUS PROBLEMS. THE INVERTER WAS REWIRED AND SATISFACTORILY TESTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANUFACTURER'S PROCEDURES. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS WILL BE TO REPLACE THE INVERTERS TO ENSURE A MORE RELIABLE POWER SUPPLY.

FORM 173 LER SCSS DATA 08-02-85

BUCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1984 0 0 841120145 192027 10/16/84

BUCKET: 251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE: PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA TOWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

13 10 CFR 50.73(c), (2)(iv): ESF actuations.

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 000%. ON 10-16-84, WHILE COOLING DOWN UNIT 4, A REACTOR TRIP OCCURRED. THE ROOT CAUSE FOR THIS EVENT WAS A DETECTOR ON THE NIS N-32 CHANNEL WHICH FAILED, GENERATING A HIGH LEVEL SIGNAL. DURING THIS COOLDOWN, WITH THE CONTROL ROD GROUPS FULLY INSERTED, THE SHUTDOWN RODS BANK B' FULLY INSERTED, THE SHUTDOWN RODS BANK 'A' 86 STEPS WITHDRAWN, AND REACTOR TRIP BREAKER CLOSED, THE SOURCE RANGE NIS CHANNELS N-31 AND N-32 ENERGIZED AS DESIGNED WHEN THE REACTOR POWER ON THE INTERMEDIATE RANGE NIS CHANNELS DECREASED BELOW THE P-6 PERMISSIVE LEVEL. BECAUSE OF A FAILED DETECTOR IN NIS CHANNEL N-32, THIS CHANNEL GENERATED A HIGH FLUX LEVEL SIGNAL WHICH TRIPPED THE REACTOR, OPENING THE REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS AND DROPPING SHUTDOWN GROUP RODS BANK 'A' TO THEIR FULLY INSERTED POSITIONING. THE NIS CHANNEL N-32 WAS TAKEN OUT OF SERVICE AND ITS DETECTOR WAS REPLACED, TESTED, AND RETURNED TO SERVICE. ALL SAFETY EQUIPMENT FUNCTIONED AS DESIGNED UPON INITIATION OF THE LFAS SIGNAL GENERATED IN THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM. SIGNIFICANT EVENT NOTIFICATION FOR THE REACTOR TRIP EVENT WAS MADE TO THE NRC VIA THE ENS PURSUANT TO 10 CFR 50.72(B)(2)(iii). SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: NONE.

FORM 179

LER SCSS DATA

08-00-85

BUCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1984 0 0 841160419 192028 10/17/84

BUCKET: 251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE: PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA TOWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS

STEP 2: CAUSE LX = INPUT SPIKE.

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

14 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v): Event that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function.

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 100%. ON 10-7-84, WHILE UNIT 4 WAS AT 100% POWER, THE (TAVE) AND DELTA T SUMMATOR MODULE NM412D WAS FOUND DEFECTIVE DURING ROUTINE SURVEILLANCE AND THE DEFECTIVE MODULE WAS REPLACED. THIS PARTICULAR FAILURE MODE HAS BEEN NOTED ON OTHER W15D7100 PROCESS CONTROLS SUMMATORS WITH LIMITS (P/N 411084-002 AND P/N 411084-004). THESE SUMMATORS WERE USED IN THE X10 OR X100 SCALE HAVE A TENDENCY TO BREAK INTO SUSTAINED OSCILLATIONS (LOCK-UP). THESE OSCILLATIONS USUALLY OCCUR WHEN THE INPUT IS DRIVEN HIGH OR WHEN THE SUMMATOR INPUT EXPERIENCES A SPIKE. PLANT MANAGEMENT DETERMINED ON 10-15-84, THAT

THE LOCK-UP PROBLEM WAS REPORTABLE AS A GENERIC DEFECT. THE SAFETY FUNCTION OF THE (TAVE) AND DELTA T SUMMATOR IN QUESTION WAS PART OF A REDUNDANT SYSTEM THAT REMAINED OPERABLE. MORE DETAIL IS PROVIDED IN THE ATTACHED TEST. OUR ENGINEERING STAFF IS EVALUATING A MODULE UPGRADE TO ELIMINATE THE PROBLEM. SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: NONE.

FORM 180 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85
 Docket YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 251 1/84 025 0 8501030285 192628 11/24/84

DOCKET: 251 TURKEY POINT 1 TYPE: PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FTL

COMMENTS
 STEP 3: EFFELT DX - RUPTURED.

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
 13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ECF activations.

REFERENCE LERs:
 1 251/84-006

ABSTRACT
 POWER LEVEL - 100%. ON 11-24-84, WHILE UNIT 4 WAS AT 100% POWER, A REACTOR TRIP OCCURRED. THE ROOT CAUSE STEMMED FROM A GROUND IN 1 STAB CONNECTOR OF THE 4A RCP BREAKER (4A001) WHICH EVOLVED INTO A FAULT INVOLVING MULTIPLE STAB CONNECTORS. VIBRATIONS FROM THE FAULT TRIPPED THE NEXT BREAKER (4A002) WHICH DE-ENERGIZED THE BUS AND CLEARED THE FAULT. LOSS OF THE BUS RE-ENERGIZED THE 4A RCP. SUBSEQUENTLY A REACTOR TRIP OCCURRED WHEN THE REACTOR PROTECTION LOGIC OF LOW RCS FLOW ON 2 OUT OF 3 CHANNELS IN 1 OUT OF 3 LOOPS (LOOP A) WAS COMPLETED. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INCLUDED STABILIZING THE UNIT AND INSPECTING THE 3A RCP BREAKER AND 4A 4KV BUS TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE. PLANT MANAGEMENT DECIDED TO TAKE THE UNIT TO REFUELING SHUTDOWN CONDITIONS TO DE-ENERGIZE THE 4A 4KV BUS FOR INSPECTION AND REPAIRS AND TO COMPLY WITH TECH SPECS. SIGNIFICANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WAS MADE TO THE NRC VIA BELL COMMERCIAL LINE PURSUANT TO 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(vi). AN UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED AT 10:15 AM, UNDER TABLE 1, SECTION 16 OF EMERGENCY PROCEDURE 20101, DUTIES OF EMERGENCY COORDINATOR. THE UNUSUAL EVENT WAS TERMINATED AT 9:30 AM, ON 11-25-84. SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: 251-84-006.

FORM 181 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85
 Docket YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 251 1/84 026 0 8501030602 192674 11/24/84

DOCKET: 251 TURKEY POINT 1 TYPE: PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FTL

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
 13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ECF activations.

REFERENCE LER:

1 251/84-025 2 251/84-013

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 000%. ON 11-24-84, AT 1:10 PM, WHILE UNIT 4 WAS PROCEEDING FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO COLD SHUTDOWN UNDER ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS, AN AUTOMATIC INITIATION OF THE AFW SYSTEM OCCURRED. THE UNIT WAS PROCEEDING TO COLD SHUTDOWN DUE TO PROBLEMS EXPERIENCED WITH THE 4A 4KV BUS (LER 251-84-025) WHEN AN ALARM FOR AN ACTUAL HIGH LEVEL IN THE 'B' SG WAS RECEIVED CAUSING THE B SG FEEDWATER PUMP (SGFP) TO TRIP. THE HIGH LEVEL IN THE B SG WAS DUE TO PERSONNEL OVERSIGHT IN NOT MAINTAINING AN ADEQUATE SG LEVEL. THE A SGFP HAD ALREADY TRIPPED DUE TO THE 4A 4KV BUS PROBLEMS. WHEN THE B SGFP TRIPPED, THIS COMPLETED THE SG PROTECTION LOGIC OF 2 SGFPs TRIPPED AND THE AFW SYSTEM AUTOMATICALLY STARTED. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS WERE TO ALLOW THE LEVEL IN THE B SG TO DECREASE, RESTARTING THE B SGFP AND STOPPING AND SECURING THE AFW PUMPS. THE UNIT CONTINUED TO COLD SHUTDOWN WITH NO FURTHER PROBLEMS. ALL EQUIPMENT FUNCTIONED AS DESIGNED ON INITIATION OF THE ESFAS. SIGNIFICANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WAS MADE TO THE NRCDC VIA THE ENS PURSUANT TO 10 CFR 50.72(B)(2)(II). SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: 251-84-013.

FORM 182 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 251 1984 027 0 8501100117 192575 11/30/84

DOCKET: 251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE: FWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

IS 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii): Single failure criteria.

REFERENCE LERS:

1 250/83-019

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 000%. ON 11-30-84, WHILE UNIT 4 WAS AT REFUELING SHUTDOWN (RPSD) CONDITIONS, THE RHR SYSTEM FLOW WAS INTERRUPTED FOR APPROX 4 MINS. THE ROOT CAUSE STEMMED FROM THE CLOSURE OF MOV-4-751, ISOLATION VALVE IN THE RHR PUMP SUCTION LINE, CAUSED BY A MALFUNCTION IN PRESSURE CONTROLLER PC-405B, FAILING HIGH PRODUCING A FALSE INDICATION OF HIGH RCS PRESSURE THUS ACTIVATING THE PROTECTIVE INTERLOCK. THIS INTERLOCK PREVENTS RHR SYSTEM OVERPRESSURIZATION BY CLOSING MOV-4-751 UPON HIGH RCS PRESSURE. THE OPERATORS WERE ALERTED TO THE CONDITION BY THE OVERPRESSURE MITIGATING SYSTEM (OMS) HIGH PRESSURE ALERT ANNUNCIATOR. UPON ACTUATION OF THE OMS, CONTROLLING IN THE LOW PRESSURE SETTING (415 PSIG), POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVES (PORVS), PCV-456 AND PCV-455C CYCLED OPEN TO RELIEVE RCS PRESSURE THUS PERFORMING THEIR INTENDED FUNCTION. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INCLUDED: 1) THE B RHR PUMP WAS STOPPED, 2) THE OPERATING CHARGING PUMP WAS STOPPED AND PRESSURE WAS CONTROLLED BY PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE, PCV-145, 3) MOV-4-751 WAS SUCCESSFULLY OPENED BY BYPASSING THE PRESENT CLOSING SIGNAL AND RACKING OPEN ITS BREAKER, 4) I&C REPLACED PC-405B AND RELEASED IT TO OPERATIONS. THE RESPECTIVE BREAKER FOR MOV-4-751 WAS RACKED IN, THUS RETURNING THE RHR SYSTEM TO NORMAL OPERATION. DURING TRANSIENT RCS PRESSURE INCREASED FROM 350 PSIG TO 415 PSIG AND

NU RCS HEATUR WAS OBSERVED. SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: LER 250-03-10.

FORM 183 LER SCSS DATA 08-02-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1985 001 0 8502030079 193518 01/02/85

DOCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
10 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i): Shutdowns or technical
specification violations.

REFERENCE LERS:
1 251/84-020 2 250/84-031

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 100%. ON 1-2-85 AT 1:06 AM, CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE SV-2819 FAILED TO CLOSE UPON RECEIVING A CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION SIGNAL DURING TESTING OF CONTAINMENT PROCESS RADIATION MONITORS R-11 AND R-12 AS PER OPERATING PROCEDURE 0204.2. THE VALVE WAS CLOSED IMMEDIATELY BY MANUALLY TRIPPING LOCKOUT RELAY OR50 IN THE CONTROL ROOM. SV-2819 IS A CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE FOR THE INSTRUMENT AIR BLEED LINE AND IS LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION FOR THIS LINE IS ALSO PROVIDED BY SV-2826. LOCATED INSIDE CONTAINMENT, WHICH DID CLOSE ON THE CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION SIGNAL. THERE WAS NO DETECTABLE RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE GASES FROM CONTAINMENT AS A RESULT OF THIS INCIDENT. SIMILAR LERS: 251-84-020 AND 250-84-031. A SET OF CONTACTS IN LOCKOUT RELAY OR50 FOR CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION DID NOT CONSISTENTLY MAKE CONTACT DUE TO OXIDATION AND DIRT BUILDUP ON THE SURFACES FROM EXTENDED USE. THIS PREVENTED THE ISOLATION SIGNAL FROM REACHING SV-2819. THE CONTACTS OF THE LOCKOUT RELAY IN OR50 WERE REPLACED AND SV-2819 WAS CYCLED SUCCESSFULLY. AN UNUSUAL EVENT WAS DECLARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TURKEY POINT EMERGENCY PLAN. THE REQUIRED STATE OFFICIALS WERE NOTIFIED AT 1:15 AM, AND THE NRC WAS NOTIFIED VIA THE ENS AT 1:20 AM, PURSUANT TO 10CFR50.72(A)(3). THE UNUSUAL EVENT ENDED IMMEDIATELY WHEN THE VALVE WAS MANUALLY CLOSED.

FORM 184 LER SCSS DATA 08-02-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1985 003 0 8503150483 193342 02/06/85

DOCKET:251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE:PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS:WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:
13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ESF actuations.

REFERENCE LERS:
1 251/84-017 2 250/84-007 3 250/84-006 4 250/84-005

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 027%. ON 2-3-85, WHILE UNIT 4 WAS AT 27% POWER, A REACTOR TRIP OCCURRED. A NORMAL REACTOR START-UP WAS BEING PERFORMED WITH THE SG LEVEL CONTROLS IN AUTOMATIC. THE REACTOR TRIP OCCURRED WHEN THE REACTOR PROTECTION LOGIC OF STEAM FLOW GREATER THAN FEED FLOW COINCIDENT WITH SG LOW LEVEL ON THE 'A' SG WAS MADE UP. ALL EQUIPMENT FUNCTIONED AS DESIGNED UPON INITIATION OF THE ESF ACTUATION SIGNAL GENERATED IN THE RPS. DURING THE REACTOR STARTUP, LICENSED OPERATORS EXPERIENCED DIFFICULTIES MAINTAINING SG LEVEL ON THE 'A' SG. WHILE ATTEMPTING TO STABILIZE THE LEVEL, THE STEAM FLOW/FEED FLOW MISMATCH ALARMED AND A SUDDEN DECREASE IN SG LEVEL COMPLETED THE REACTOR TRIP LOGIC AND A REACTOR TRIP OCCURRED. CORRECTIVE ACTION: 1) STABILIZE THE UNIT AT HOT SHUTDOWN CONDITIONS; 2) I&C CHECKED THE SETPOINTS AND CALIBRATION OF THE SG LEVEL, FEEDWATER FLOW, AND STEAM FLOW TRANSMITTERS. THE LEVEL, FEEDWATER FLOW, AND STEAM FLOW SETPOINTS WERE WITHIN LIMITS. THE FEEDWATER FLOW REGULATING VALVES WERE INSPECTED AND FOUND TO BE OPERATING SATISFACTORILY. 3) TEMPORARY RECORDERS WERE USED TO MONITOR 'A' SG LEVEL CHANNELS I AND II, 'A' SG FEEDWATER AND STEAM FLOW CHANNELS III, AND 'A' SG FEEDWATER FLOW REGULATING VALVE DURING THE FOLLOWING UNIT 4 STARTUP TO DETECT ANY RECURRENCE OF INITIATING PROBLEMS. SIMILAR LERS 251-84-17; 250-84-07; 250-84-06, 250-84-05, AND 250-84-01.

FORM 185 LER SCSS DATA 09-09-85

 DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
 251 1985 005 0 8503220397 193542 02/07/85

DOCKET: 251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE: PWR
 REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH
 FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS

STEP 1: EFFECT AX - CYCLING.

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ESF actuations.

REFERENCE LERS:

1 250/84-002 2 251/85-004

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 000%. ON 2-7-85, AT 6:52 AM, 12 MINS AFTER A UNIT 4 REACTOR TRIP, A SPURIOUS SAFETY INJECTION SIGNAL WAS GENERATED IN THE ESF'S SYSTEM WITH NO RESULTANT SAFETY INJECTION FLOW DELIVERED TO THE RCS. THE INITIATION OF THE AUTOMATIC SAFETY INJECTION SIGNAL RESULTED FROM THE COINCIDENT ESF'S LOGIC OF 'HIGH STEAM GENERATOR FLOW' COMBINED WITH AN ACTUAL 'LOW AVERAGE REACTOR COOLANT TEMPERATURE (T-AVG)'. FOLLOWING THE SAFETY INJECTION INITIATION, THE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE EP 20000 WAS FOLLOWED FOR IMMEDIATE ACTIONS AND DIAGNOSTICS. THE SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION SYSTEM WAS RESET AT 6:56 AM, AND CHARGING FLOW WAS RE-ESTABLISHED. UNIT 4 WAS STABILIZED IN A HOT SHUTDOWN CONDITION FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION AND CORRECTIVE MEASURES. ALL EQUIPMENT ACTUATED BY THE ESF'S ACTUATION SIGNALS FUNCTIONED AS DESIGNED. A SIGNIFICANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WAS MADE TO THE NRCOC VIA ENS PURSUANT TO 10CFR50.72 AS A RESULT OF THE SAFETY INJECTION INITIATION. SIMILAR LERS: 250-84-002. REFER TO LER

251-85-004 FOR A REPORT OF THE REACTOR TRIP. AN INVESTIGATION BY PLANT PERSONNEL INTO THE CAUSE OF THE SPURIOUS SAFETY INJECTION INITIATION REVEALED THAT A BLOWN FUSE ON FLOW COMPARATOR FC-485 OF SG 'B' COINCIDENT WITH A TRANSIENT ELECTRICAL SPIKE OF INDETERMINATE ORIGIN IN THE CIRCUITRY OF THE FLOW COMPARATOR FC-475 FOR SG 'A' COMBINED WITH AN ACTUAL LOW T-AVG WAS THE UNDERLYING CAUSE OF THIS EVENT.

FORM 186 LER SCSS DATA 08-09-85

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE
251 1985 007 0 8503280803 193601 02/18/85

DOCKET: 251 TURKEY POINT 4 TYPE: PWR
REGION: 2 NSSS: WE
ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH
FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
SYMBOL: FPL

COMMENTS

STEP 4: COMP MSC - CLOSING SPRINGS.

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

- 10 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i): Shutdowns or technical specification violations.
- 9 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2): Limiting conditions for operation.

REFERENCE LERS:

1 251/83-017 2 251/83-014

ABSTRACT

POWER LEVEL - 100%. ON 2-13-85, THE 4A CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP POWER SUPPLY BREAKER WAS FOUND TO BE INOPERABLE. THE CSP 480V POWER SUPPLY BREAKER CLOSING SPRINGS WERE FOUND DISCHARGED AND THE CLOSING SPRING CHARGING MOTOR WAS TURNED OFF. THEREFORE, THE PUMP POWER SUPPLY BREAKER WOULD NOT HAVE CLOSED IN RESPONSE TO A PUMP START SIGNAL. THIS RENDERED THE PUMP INOPERABLE FOR A PERIOD OF TIME THAT EXCEEDED THE TECH SPEC LCO. AT THE TIME OF THIS EVENT, THE 4B CSP AND THE EMERGENCY CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM WERE FULLY OPERATIONAL. SIGNIFICANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WAS MADE TO THE NRCOC VIA ENS PURSUANT TO 10CFR50.36(C)(2). SIMILAR LERS 251/83-017 AND 251/83-014. INVESTIGATIONS HAVE DISCOVERED THAT THE LAST OPERABILITY TEST OF THE 4A CSP OCCURRED ON 2-6-85. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE CLOSING SPRING CHARGING MOTOR WAS OFF DURING THIS TEST RESULTING IN THE CLOSING SPRINGS BEING DISCHARGED. ONE POSSIBLE REASON FOR THE CHARGING MOTOR BEING OFF WAS THAT AFTER AN IN-PLANT CLEARANCE ORDER FOR THE POWER SUPPLY BREAKER WAS RELEASED ON 2-3-85, THE SWITCH FOR THE CHARGING MOTOR HAD BEEN INADVERTENTLY LEFT IN THE OFF POSITION. ANOTHER POSSIBLE REASON COULD BE THAT THE SWITCH WAS ACCIDENTLY BUMPED TO OFF BY CONSTRUCTION WORKERS SOMETIME BEFORE THE 4A CSP OPERABILITY TEST ON 2-6-85.

*
IKJ56470I LAST STEP COMPLETION CODE WAS SYSTEM 522
IKJ56470I PXC LOGGED OFF TPO AT 12:16:41 ON AUGUST 9, 1985
IKJ56453I SESSION CANCELLED

(4) DESTINATION DISCONNECT
Which System (1 thru 50)?
(12) INACTIVITY DISCONNECT
N1

Turkey Point Preliminary Findings.

A. Design Changes/Modifications (Architzel, Overbeck, Morris)

- ① FSAR states that AFW flow control valves can be operated locally in manual. However, half (one train in each unit) of the FCVs are practically inaccessible, and the necessary indication for local operation is on a different platform out of sight.
- ② Extensive temporary scaffolding exists throughout the AFW piping. Much of the scaffolding is mounted above AFW flow element transmitters and associated sensing lines. This scaffolding has been installed for over a year, yet no analysis has been done to consider the threat to seismic qualifications (e.g., consideration of "two-over-one").
- ③ A.C. motor operated valves in the AFW steam inlet lines have been replaced in some cases with D.C. ~~mov~~ MOVs. Team has concerns about differences in MOV sizing and corresponding cable and heater sizes.
- ④ A new AFW steam header ^{auto} drain valve is powered from an AC supply. It appears that it should be powered from a DC supply.
- ⑤ The load table (in FSAR) for the vital station batteries do not ~~ref~~ reflect the various DC

powered MOVs. The load test performed on the battery (30 minutes) appears to be unrealistic and may be inadequate.

- ⑥ AFW steam line drain isolation valves are not seismically qualified as required.
- ⑦ The condensate storage tank redundant level alarm ckt does not meet the single failure criteria.
- ⑧ the backup N_2 low pressure alarm not being maintained safety grade ("O")
- ⑨ The N_2 bottle sizing (N_2 serves as a backup for instrument air) may be inadequate.
- ⑩ CST level indication and alarm ckt is based on calculations that don't reflect as-built.
- ⑪ The AFW system was not tested adequately after modifications of the FCVs and N_2 system.

B. Ops/Training (Shymlock, Smith)

- ① AFW steam supply system is poorly maintained. ~~There is~~ One train has significant steam leakage. Seismic restraints were not made up on N_2 system.

- ② Numerous tagging problems exist throughout the AFW system: tags are missing and valves are mislabelled.
- ③ Operators are not adequately trained for local operation of FCVs. Procedural support for local operation is also inadequate.
- ④ Operators are not trained and adequate procedures do not exist to ~~prevent~~ ensure the timely isolation of the affected steam generator in the event of a steam line break.
- ⑤ Heavy use of overtime is ~~constantly~~ employed consistently.
- ⑥ Control room turnovers may be too short.
- ⑦ The AFW surveillance program is weak. ~~So~~ Some interlocks are not being tested properly, and the N2 backup system is not being adequately tested.

C. Maintenance (Martin)

- ① Maintenance (equipment) failures are not trended to provide input into preventive

maintenance program

- ② Equipment failure root causes are not evaluated. The "cause" section on Plant Work Orders (PWOs) is typically left blank.
- ③ Post maintenance testing requirements are not included as part of maintenance planning, and the completion of post maintenance testing is poorly documented.
- ④ No current calibration records or procedure to calibrate the low-pressure alarms for AFU N₂ Siphon
- ⑤ Mechanical maintenance is unsure about the ~~type~~ type of grease to be used in safety-related limit torque actuators.
- ⑥ Lack of training for maintenance personnel. In ~~particular~~ particular, no training on limit torque repair.
- ⑦ Very low experience for ITC technicians.

D. Overall

- ① System modifications (and their associated safety analysis) appear to be performed often without reference to design documents (calcs, P&IDs, etc.) which is a concern.

documents may not be available for many safety-related systems.

- ② Maintenance appears to be weak, with considerable repetitive failures, lack of effort to identify root causes, poor ~~pro~~ procedures, poor documentation, and lack of post-maintenance testing records and planning.

↓

ITEMS TO FOLLOW-UP ON DURING SECOND WEEK

IDS ME 1. Control of instrument root valves - Not responsibility of I+C shop. How is their position verified. OPERATIONS Controls -

IDS 2. Overall training for maintenance techs.

3. Get copy of Q-List ~~for~~ section applicable to instrument air and AFW N₂ system
CRNIG
WALINGA

~~4. When will the mech. maintenance department have solved their problem of what type of grease is in MOV gearboxes.~~

IDS 5. Get a copy of AP 0190.28, Post Maint Test Control

ME 6. Does post-maint. mechanical systems testing adequately address integrated system operation or merely account for component operation under less than optimum conditions.
 (P) Does this procedure do A/S surveillance as required to call operable as required to call operable

IDS 7. Control and awareness of ongoing maintenance activities by control room operators.
OK

IDS 8. Procedures (O-SMI-059.1 and 2), for instrument indep. verification, should be reviewed to see if they are inclusive. O-SMI-059.2 left out the Aux Feed System - they pointed this out to me and said they were going to fix it.
 ± have Proc

IDS 9. Pursue adequacy of maint. instructions on PWOs.

IDS 10. The control of vendor tech manuals for Aux Feed Pump and AFWs air reg. valves. See if any info. recommendations for preventive maint are factored into PM program.

()** Followup - MOV-MFW isolation valve testing under Full Disch. Pressure.
(P) AFW MFW - Common Line Thr. Cont? No!
 i.e. cannot for 100%

APPENDIX A

No. 1

PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL OBSERVATION

AREA: MAINTENANCE

INSPECTOR: MARTIN

ISSUE: MAINTENANCE (EQUIPMENT) FAILURES ARE NOT
TRENDED TO PROVIDE INPUT INTO PREVENTIVE
MAINTENANCE PROGRAM.

REQUIREMENTS:

ANSI N18.7-1972

EXAMPLES:

1. Equipment failures were not trended or tracked
2. Machinery history records were not kept up to date
in the electrical and mechanical areas.
3. Repeat problems with air operated valves and limit torque
actuators were not factored into PM system
4. Weak PM system tracking - One AFW steam supply valve (4-1)
last electrically overhauled on 5/79 - of particular significance
because of history of limit switch and torque
switch failures.

DISCUSSION:

✓
APPENDIX A

No. 2

PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL OBSERVATION

AREA: MAINTENANCE

INSPECTOR: MARTIN

ISSUE: FAILURE TO EVALUATE THE CAUSE OF
EQUIPMENT FAILURE

REQUIREMENTS:

ANSI N 18.7-72

EXAMPLES:

Numerous examples of the "CAUSE" section of Plant Work Order (PWO) not being filled out. Interviews revealed that cause evaluation has not been "formalized" and is being tracked and determined by maint. supervision without being documented.

DISCUSSION:

APPENDIX A

No. 5

PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL OBSERVATION

AREA: Maintenance

INSPECTOR: Martin

ISSUE: Mechanical maintenance is unsure about type of grease in safety-related Limitorque actuators.

REQUIREMENTS:

Maint. procedure requirements ANSI A18.7
10 CFR 50 App B

EXAMPLES:

Numerous Limitorque actuators

DISCUSSION:

Unsure as to whether actuators are lubricated with MARFAC or NEBULA. Mixing grease is not recommended and may cause it to harden.

Licencee is aware of this issue and has started a testing program to identify which grease is being used. This issue will be carried as an open item in our report.

APPENDIX A

No. 7

PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL OBSERVATION

AREA: Maintenance

INSPECTOR: Martin

ISSUE: Lack of training for Limitorque repair

REQUIREMENTS:

EXAMPLES:

The only training that has been held for mech. + elect
maint. personnel on Limitorques has been CST
and pre-maint. briefs. No documented training.

DISCUSSION:

APPENDIX A

No. 4

PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL OBSERVATION

AREA: Maintenance

INSPECTOR: Martin

ISSUE:

No current calibration records or procedure to calibrate low pressure alarms for AFW N₂ system.

REQUIREMENTS:

10 CFR 50 APP B
RG 1.33
ANSI N 18.7

ONOP 0208.11 3/20/85 (500 psi
setpoints)

EXAMPLES:

PS 2322
PS 2323

DISCUSSION:

These alarms are not considered to be safety-related by the licensee.

Last ~~record~~ record of calibration of these instruments

PS 2322 6/14/78 set at 1005 PSI

PS 2323 6/14/78 set at 368 PSI

Present alarm response procedure and drawing show these instruments set at 500_{A-1} psi.

APPENDIX A

No. 3

PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL OBSERVATION

AREA: MAINTENANCE

INSPECTOR: MARTIN

ISSUE: Post maintenance testing is not being documented on Plant Work Orders.

REQUIREMENTS:

ADMIN. PROCEDURE 0190.19

EXAMPLES:

PWO #3919 3B R Coolant Pump 4160V BKR

2840 ^{Repair} MOV 4-1405 - testing req'ments but no results

7569 Repair of HIC 1401A and FI 1401A

2163 Repair B AFP trip system linkage - testing req'ments but no results

6951 AUX FD REG VLV4-2833 does not fully close.

7201 Repair DPT 2402

DISCUSSION:

In many cases the testing req'd to demonstrate operability and the testing actually conducted are not specified on the PWO. AP 0190.28 is often specified on PWO which specifies mechanical testing req'ments only. No such procedure exists for I+C or Electrical related testing.

APPENDIX A

No. 6

PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL OBSERVATION

AREA: Maintenance

INSPECTOR: Martin

ISSUE: ~~Self~~ Independent verification of returning instruments to service.

REQUIREMENTS:

NUREG 0737 I.C. 6

EXAMPLES:

DISCUSSION:

Licensee has a good program for verifying that instruments are properly aligned both inside and outside of containment before starting up after an outage. However, instrument line-up is not usually independently verified if maintenance is done when the plant is not in an outage condition.

APPENDIX A

No. 8

PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL OBSERVATION

AREA: MAINTENANCE

INSPECTOR: MARTIN

ISSUE: LOW EXPERIENCE LEVEL OF I+C MAINTENANCE
TECHNICIANS

REQUIREMENTS:

EXAMPLES:

See attached

DISCUSSION:

18 of 34 maintenance techs (I+C) have
less than two years experience at
Turkey Point

I & C DEPARTMENT
BI-WEEKLY ROSTER

| | LAST NAME | FIRST NAME | SENIORITY DATE |
|----|------------|------------|-------------------|
| 1 | SIMMS | BOB | 03/19/73 |
| 2 | WILSON | BILL | 04/15/76 |
| 3 | PHIPPS | GARY | 02/15/78 |
| 4 | SZYMCHYK | ED | 01/30/79 |
| 5 | THOMPSON | HUGH | 03/05/79 |
| 6 | HOLMES | MARK | 11/28/79 |
| 7 | MATHIS | LORETHA | 12/26/79 |
| 8 | BEEBEE | TIM | 01/14/80 |
| 9 | BENEDETTO | PAT | 05/04/81 |
| 10 | RABORN | RANDY | 07/06/81 |
| 11 | STORMS | BOB | 07/20/81 |
| 12 | MCCARTHY | BRIAN | 12/02/81 |
| 13 | KENNESSEY | FRANK | 01/11/82 |
| 14 | SAPORITO | TOM | 03/08/82 |
| 15 | DILLON | MATT | 07/20/82 |
| 16 | TOTTON | JIM | 02/14/83 |
| 17 | SMITH | LARRY | 09/21/83 |
| 18 | WHITE | LELAND | 02/17/84 |
| 19 | RODRIGUEZ | GASPAR | 03/01/84 |
| 20 | GARNER | DENNIS | 06/04/84 |
| 21 | MALEY | DAVE | 10/08/84 |
| 22 | HARLEY | GERRY | 10/19/84 |
| 23 | MEAD | BILL | 10/22/84 |
| 24 | SANTIAGO | WILLIE | 11/09/84 |
| 25 | HOLDREN | RUSS | 11/13/84 |
| 26 | SMITH | REX | 11/30/84 |
| 27 | WOOD | BILL | 12/07/84 |
| 28 | WINNINGHAM | ED | 02/19/85 |
| 29 | SAUMELL | ED | 03/04/85 |
| 30 | LAZENBY | BILL | 03/11/85 |
| 31 | SHACKETT | GEORGE | 03/22/85 |
| 32 | SQUIRES | MORRIS | 06/03/85 |
| 33 | FIORI | JIM | 06/28/85 |
| 34 | THOMPSON | LLOYD | 07/08/85 |

18/34 I+C Techs
have less than
2 years exp at
TP

14/34

MAINTENANCE

1. The lack of evaluating the root cause of equipment failures and not trending these failures to provide input into the preventive maintenance program was considered a significant weakness. The Plant Work Order (PWO) form is used to document the performance of maintenance and a section of this form is provided to describe the cause or reason for the trouble found. A review of completed PWO forms revealed that the cause of the associated equipment failure was described in very few cases. Interviews with maintenance supervisory personnel revealed that the cause of equipment failures and the consideration of the recurrent nature of failures are tracked informally by relying upon the memory of maintenance supervisors. The machinery history records were not being kept up to date in the electrical and mechanical areas.

An extensive review of the maintenance history records for the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system, which included PWOs and Licensee Event Reports (LERs), revealed a number of component failures of a recurrent nature. These included seven separate examples, since January 1984, of the failure of an air-operated AFW flow control valve to properly function due to water or foreign material in the supply air.

In 1983, on two separate occasions, two of the six auxiliary feed steam supply motor operated valves (MOV) failed to open because of carbon build-up on the motor operator limit switches. A search of the maintenance records for the remaining four auxiliary feed steam supply MOVs revealed that, despite the recent failures mentioned above, MOV 3-1404 had not been electrically cleaned and inspected since October 1981 and MOV 4-1404 had not been electrically cleaned and inspected since 1979. Several additional weaknesses associated with maintenance on MOVs are discussed in observations 2 and 3.

2. A review of the maintenance activities performed on MOVs revealed weaknesses with training for the repair of these valves. Interviews with supervisory maintenance personnel revealed that no training has been conducted in either the mechanical or electrical areas on the repair of MOVs with the exception of undocumented, on-the-job training and pre-maintenance briefings. A mock-up of a Limitorque valve operator was available in the training department offices but apparently had not been used to train maintenance personnel.
3. Of significant concern was the uncertainty on the part of mechanical maintenance personnel of the type of grease used in MOV gearboxes. This is considered a problem for two reasons. First, the mixing of different types of grease in the gearbox could cause hardening or separating of the lubricant. The potential for this exists at Turkey Point because their preventive maintenance instructions for Limitorque gearboxes specify the use of Texaco Marfac and these same Limitorques are known to have been supplied with either Exxon Nebula EPO or EPI or Sun 50 EP lubricants. Secondly, the

only Limitorque lubricant that meets the environmental qualification requirements of 10 CFR 50.49 at Turkey Point is Exxon Nebula EPO or EPI.

The licensee had previously identified the problems discussed above regarding Limitorque lubrication. A program to address these concerns is underway and scheduled for completion by December 1986. The progress of this effort will be tracked by the NRC Region II Office (50-250/85-XX-XX, 50-251-XX-XX).

4. Although several of the previous observations may indicate a general weakness regarding MOV maintenance, the licensee has recently taken some positive steps to improve MOV reliability. Temporary Operating Procedure 166 was issued in May 1985 and provides detailed instructions for troubleshooting and repair of MOVs, including limit switches, torque switches, and post-maintenance testing. This procedure provides specific torque switch settings for safety-related motor operated valves and the requirement that, during maintenance, proper torque switch setting be verified by an electrical quality control inspector. Discussions with management representatives revealed that the licensee is in the process of purchasing some relatively new and innovative MOV test equipment in order to improve the the reliability of their MOVs.
5. A review of calibration records revealed that the low pressure alarms for the AFW nitrogen supply system are not routinely calibrated. This nitrogen supply system provides the capability to operate the AFW system flow control valves in the event of a failure of the non-safety-related instrument

air system. These alarms, set a 500 psi, require local manual action to valve in or replace a new nitrogen supply cylinder. A search of calibration records with the assistance of an Instrument and Control (I&C) supervisor revealed that the last available records of the calibration of PS 2322 and PS 2323 were dated June 14, 1978. In addition, no procedure was available for the calibration of these alarms. The apparent failure to periodically calibrate these instruments and provide a procedure for this purpose was discussed with the licensee and will remain unresolved pending followup by the NRC Region II Office (250/85-XX-XX, 251/85-XX-XX).

6. The control and documentation of post-maintenance testing was found to be weak. In many cases, neither the instructions outlining appropriate post-maintenance testing nor the results of the testing performed were documented on the Plant Work Order. This was particularly evident for I&C and electrical-related maintenance activities. Administrative Procedure (AP) 0190.28, "Post Maintenance Test Control," was specified on the PW0 in most cases involving mechanical-related maintenance. This procedure describes much of the testing considered adequate to return mechanical systems to operability and provides a form to document the test results which is then attached to the PW0.

The apparent failure to provide adequate instructions for post-maintenance testing on the PW0 appears to be contrary to AP 0190.19, "Conduct of Maintenance on Nuclear Safety Related and Fire Protection Systems," was discussed with the licensee, and will remain unresolved pending followup by the NRC Region II Office (250/85-XX-XX, 251/85-XX-XX).

7. A weakness was noted in the program to ensure that instruments are properly returned to service following maintenance or calibration while the plant is operating. The licensee had a program for providing general assurance that instruments inside and outside the containment are properly aligned when the plant is returning to operation from an outage condition. The procedures describing the instruments to be checked, O-SMI-059.1 and O-SMI-059.2, were generally adequate, providing a place for first and second check verification for each applicable instrument. Interviews with I&C supervisory personnel revealed that these procedures would normally be used only to verify instrument alignment at the end of an outage condition. Instrument line-ups were not required by the licensee to be independently verified following maintenance or calibration when the plant is in an operating status. Of additional consideration in this issue is the fact that 14 of 34 I&C maintenance technicians at the time of this inspection had less than one year experience at Turkey Point.

Document Name:
DRAFT/TMARTIN

Requestor's ID:
JOANNE

Author's Name:
TMartin

Document Comments:

CONSULTANT INSPECTOR NOTES

- 1 TRAIN 2 Flow control valves are located on a platform below the TRAIN 2 FLOW INDICATION. FSAR STATES INDICATION IS AT VALVE
- 2 TEMPORARY SERVICE PLATFORMS ARE LOCATED NEXT TO OR ABOVE ALL FOUR AFW FLOW INSTRUMENTATION
- 3 DC MOTOR STARTER DATA SHEET DOES NOT MATCH MOTOR NAMEPLATE DATA .66 HP VS .72 HP

OPEN ITEMS:

- A. CABLE SIZING CALCULATION
 - B. MOTOR OVERLOAD HEATER SELECTION
 - C. MOTOR TORQUE OUTPUT VS VALVE REQUIREMENTS
- 4 NEW STEAM HEADER DRAIN VALVE IS POWERED FROM A 1 IE AC SUPPLY. ORIGINAL DRAIN VALVE IS POWERED FROM TRAIN B DC BATTERY. OPEN ITEM

5 BATTERY REPLACEMENT

SIZING CALCS - FSAR TABLES DO NOT INCLUDE DC MOV'S

- FSAR TABLE INDICATES A 30 MINUTE LOAD DURATION.

TEXT INDICATES BATTERIES ARE SIZED FOR 1 HOUR

BUT ASSUMES BATTERY CHARGERS ARE RETURNED TO SERVICE IN LESS THAN 30 MINUTES

- DG LOADING TABLE IN FSAR DOES NOT INCLUDE BATTERY CHARGE
(^{50KW} 400A + ^{35KW} 300A) as an automatic load. Load shown after 30 minutes is 65KW. But is really 95KW @ 135A at 110V & 100% eff. & 104KW @ 125V & 95% eff. 110KW @ 95% EFF.

B/2

6 DC OPERATING PROCEDURE - 9604.1

- 2 NON SAFETY BATTERIES ADDED (C-BUS) BUT TECH SPEC LCO DOES NOT DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN THE 6 BATTERIES (4 BATTERIES MUST BE OPERABLE TO START UP EITHER UN

7 9654 LOAD TESTS PROCEDURES

- References to Battery Instruction Manuals REF. C&D MANUAL
 - a) Does not include NEW GOULD/ GNB BATTERIES
 - b) Does not include OLD EXIDE BATTERIES

- Call for a 30 minute Load Profile Discharge Test based upon current of FSAR TABLE.

Current not adjusted for:

1. Aging
2. Electrolyte temp at start of test
- (3. MARGIN)

8 PM Procedure O-PME-003.1

sets DC BUS LV relay @ 120-122VDC

OPEN: WHAT IS BASIS?

Doesn't Charger have its own Lo voltage Alarm set @ _____

for control
voltage alarm
on battery is
voltage

9 Potting / Splice Material, cable sizes

APPENDIX A

DATE 8-30-85
Rev 0

No. _____

PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL OBSERVATION

AREA: DESIGN OF STEAM SUPPLY TO AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TURBINES
(PCM-80-117)

INSPECTOR: ARCHITZEL / OVERBECK

ISSUE: SEISMIC DESIGN OF CV-3-6448, CV-3-2321, CV-4-6448 AND CV-4-2321. LOSS OF THESE VALVES FOLLOWING A SEISMIC EIC WITH AFW INITIATION WILL RESULT IN A 3/4" STEAM VENT PATH TO ATMOSPHERE.

REQUIREMENTS: FSAL APPENDIX 5A, "SEISMIC CLASSIFICATION & DESIGN BASIS FOR STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT FOR TURKEY POINT" INDICATES THAT STEAM LINES OF THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM ARE CLASS I (STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT, ^{WHOSE FAILURE COULD CAUSE UNCONTROLLED RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVITY} IN EXCESS OF THE ESTABLISHED GUIDELINES AS PRESCRIBED IN 10CFR 100, ETC)

DISCUSSION: THESE SOLENOID-OPERATED VALVES ARE NORMALLY OPEN TO VENT THE STEAM SUPPLY LINES DOWNSTREAM OF STEAM SUPPLY VALVES IN EACH TRAIN. THE VALVES ARE ACTUATED CLOSED UPON SENSING STEAM ADMISSION BY PRESSURE SWITCHES. REVIEW OF SEISMIC BOUNDARY DRAWINGS FOR THE MAIN STEAM SYSTEM (BECHTEL DWG _____) AND BECHTEL P&ID DWG 5610-M-1302, REV 0 DTD 11/1/83 INDICATED THAT THESE SOLENOID-OPERATED VALVES ARE OUTSIDE OF THE SEISMIC BOUNDARY

As a consequence a $\frac{3}{4}$ " vent path in each train system supply can be postulated following a seismic event. The effects of a loss of vent valve was addressed in Bechtel letter dated 10-15-1981. This letter addresses the consequences at high steam pressures and indicates that about 67,000 lb/hr of steam will be lost and that 26,000 lb/hr of steam is required for the AFW pump at the same conditions (total 95,000 lbm/hr). The letter concludes that sufficient margin is available. However, the analysis does not appear to address the consequences at low steam pressures (i.e. can auxiliary feedwater turbine receive enough steam to maintain required flow to permit initiation of RHR system long term cooling).

In addition the analysis does not address the consequences of these valves becoming gravity missile and the potential for damaging other safety-related equipment.

APPENDIX A

DATE 8-30-85
Rev 0

No. _____

PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL OBSERVATION

AREA: DESIGN OF SAFETY-RELATED CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK
REDUNDANT LEVEL INDICATION AND ALARM CIRCUITRY (FC/M 80-77/71)

INSPECTOR: OVERBECK

ISSUE: OPERATOR ERROR TO CLOSE MANUAL ISOLATION VALVE CAN
CAUSE AN UNDETECTED COMMON MODE FAILURE OF SAFETY-RELATED
CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK LEVEL INDICATION.

REQUIREMENTS: IN A 12-20-1979 LETTER FP3L STATED THAT REDUNDANT
LEVEL INDICATIONS AND LOW LEVEL ALARMS FOR THE AFW SYSTEM
PRIMARY WATER SUPPLY (CST's) WERE PROVIDED IN CONTROL. REDUNDANT
IMPLIES NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO SINGLE-FAILURE. INWSEZ RELATED
TO AMENDMENT NO 75 5/69 THE LICENSEE'S STATEMENT WAS USED TO
EXAMPLES: CONCLUDE THAT THE DESIGN MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS OF ADDITIONAL
SHORT TERM RECOMMENDATION 1 (NUREG-0611)

DISCUSSION: THE LEVEL TRANSMITTERS FOR REDUNDANT LEVEL INDICATION
ARE CONNECTED TO A COMMON INSTRUMENT TAP FROM THE
CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK. THE COMMON INSTRUMENT TAP HAS
A NORMALLY OPEN ISOLATION VALVE (428). THE MANUAL
VALVE IS NOT SHOWN LOCKED OPEN ON BECHTEL P31.D.
5610-M-1311 REV. 0, dtd 12/15/83. THE ISOLATION VALVE
CAN BE MISTAKENLY CLOSE BY AN OPERATOR CAUSING COMMON MODE
FAILURE OF THE LEVEL INSTRUMENTS. NO VALVE POSITION INDICATION
IS PROVIDED TO ALERT OPERATOR OF INCORRECT POSITION AND
ADMINISTRATIVE MEANS ARE NOT EMPLOYED (LOCKING OPEN) TO ENSURE
A-1

PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL OBSERVATIONAREA: Incomplete Q ListINSPECTOR: OVERBECK

ISSUE: Pressure switches used to alert the control room operation of a low N₂ supply and the need for operator action were not being treated as safety-related by the site I&C department requirements:

FP₃L System Design Description, "Shroud Auxiliary Feedwater System Description and Design Bases," Rev 0, 1-31-85 identified the AFW system as an emergency safeguards system to prevent core damage in the event of transients such as a loss of normal feedwater or a main steam line break. The N₂ backup system is essential to the operation of the AFW flow control valves, as such the N₂ backup system is safety-related.

DISCUSSION: FP₃L Quality Instructions JPE-QI-2.3A Rev 2 dtd 2/15/84, "Classification of Structures, Systems and Components."

Indicates that no electrical and instrumentation and control equipment associated with the N₂ backup system are safety-related. The team was informed that a more detailed component level Q-list is being developed and that this list indicates the pressure switches are safety-related; however, this list has not been issued from engineering. A-1 The Q-list in FP₃L procedure is a system level list.

PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL OBSERVATION

AREA: DESIGN OF THE NITROGEN BACKUP SYSTEM FOR AFW FLOW
CONTROL VALVES (PC/M 80-117)

INSPECTOR: OVERBECK

ISSUE: DESIGN ANALYSIS WAS NOT DOCUMENTED (OR NOT PERFORMED,
TO CONFIRM THAT THE SYSTEM SAFETY FUNCTION CAN BE PERFORM
WITH THE ADDITION OF NEW AFW FLOW CONTROL VALVES,
NEW ACTUATORS ON EXISTING VALVES, AND DIVISION OF SYSTEM INTO
REQUIREMENTS: SEPARATE TRAINS.

FP3L QUALITY INSTRUCTION, JPE-QI 3.2 REV. 3 dtd 7/30/82

"DESIGN AND SAFETY ANALYSES PERFORMED BY JPE" STATES THAT.

"ENGINEERING JUDGEMENT ... OR PREVIOUSLY APPROVED DESIGNS MAY BE

EXAMPLES:

UTILIZED TO DEMONSTRATE THE APPLICABILITY OF AN EXISTING SAFETY
ANALYSIS OR COMPLIANCE WITH A FUNCTIONAL DESIGN REQUIREMENT,
PROVIDED THAT THE TECHNICAL BASIS FOR THE CONCLUSION IS DOCUMENTED

THE INSTRUCTION FURTHER STATES THAT "DEVIATIONS FROM THE
PREVIOUSLY APPROVED OR STANDARDIZED DESIGN AND THE BASES
JUSTIFYING ACCEPTABILITY SHALL BE DOCUMENTED" CONTRARY
TO THESE REQUIREMENTS SIGNIFICANT MODIFICATIONS WERE MADE
WITHOUT ADEQUATE DOCUMENTATION.

DISCUSSION: IN 1972, THE NITROGEN BACKUP SYSTEM WAS DESIGNED
TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT CONTROL AIR ^{FROM ONE NITROGEN BOTTLE} FOR 34 MINUTES OF EQUIPMENT
OPERATION. A PRESSURE SWITCH (PS-3-2322) WOULD ALERT THE
CONTROL ROOM OPERATOR 15 MINUTES BEFORE THE USEABLE CAPACITY
OF THE N₂ BOTTLE IS EXHAUSTED. A DESIGN ANALYSIS WAS
OBTAINED FROM BECHTEL MICROFILM FILES WHICH CONFIRMED
ADEQUATE SYSTEM PERFORMANCE WITH ASSUMPTIONS. HOWEVER
THE TEAM COULD NOT DETERMINE THAT A SIMILAR
DESIGN ANALYSIS WAS PERFORMED TO CONFIRM THE

ADEQUACY OF THE SYSTEM DESIGN WITH MODIFICATIONS MADE AS A RESULT OF PC/M 80-117. SPECIFICALLY, THE TEAM FOUND NO DOCUMENTED BASES FOR CONCLUDING SUCCESSFULLY SYSTEM OPERABILITY WITH THE ADDITION OF THREE NEW FLOW CONTROL VALVES AND ACTUATORS, REPLACEMENT OF THREE EXISTING ACTUATORS WITH NEW ONES, AND THE DIVISION OF EXISTING NITROGEN SUPPLY INTO TWO REDUNDANT TRAINS.

IN ADDITION THE TEAM FOUND THAT FP₂L SYSTEM DESIGN DESCRIPTION, "SHARED AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM DESCRIPTION AND DESIGN BASES", REV 0 dtd 1-31-85 REVISED THE OPERATOR TIME FROM LOW LEVEL ALARM TO 10 MINUTES AND INDICATE THAT EACH BOTTLE WOULD PROVIDE A 30 MINUTE SUPPLY.

THE TEAM WAS REFERRED TO PLANT TESTING; HOWEVER, THE TEAM CONCLUDED THAT THIS TESTING WOULD NOT CONFIRM THE DESIGN BASIS.