NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Dresden Nuclear Power Station Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 2 3 7	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)

Inadvertent Group II Isolation

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
									N/A	0 5 0 0 0
0 1	3 0	8 5	8 5	— 0 0 5	— 0 1	1 2	1 7	8 5	N/A	0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
N		20.402(b)	20.405(c)	X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
0 0 0		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Leslie Turnquest (X-523)	AREA CODE 8 1 5 9 4 2 - 2 9 2 0

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	
A				N							

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

During a normal Unit 2 refueling outage on 1/30/85 the Instrument Mechanics were working on reactor water level transmitter 2-263-58B. This transmitter feeds primary containment isolation system (PCIS) channel B. While working on transmitter 2-263-58B a half group II isolation signal was present as expected. Upon completion of work the isolation signal was reset. The IM's then proceeded to work on transmitters 2-263-58A and 2-263-57A which feed PCIS channel A and resulted in an expected half group II isolation. At the same time the Operator and Foreman were returning transmitter 2-263-58B to service. While valving the transmitter back into service an isolation signal was generated from the transmitter resulting in a full Group II isolation. The cause of the event is Operator error.

To prevent recurrence this event and the proper technique for valving level transmitters to and from service will be discussed in an Operator six week training session. The safety significance is minimal since the reactor was defueled and all systems associated with the Group II functioned as designed. This is the first occurrence of this type.

IE22
1/1

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 2 3 7	8 5	— 0 0 5	— 0 1	0 2 OF 0 2

TEXT *(If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's)* (17)

During a normal Unit 2 refueling outage on 1/30/85 the Instrument Mechanics (IMs) notified the Operating Foreman that they would be working on reactor water level transmitters 2-263-58B, 2-263-57A and 2-263-58A. While working on these transmitters a half Group II isolation signal will be present. Following completion of work on transmitter 2-263-58B, the IMs requested that the transmitter be returned to service and the half Group II isolation signal was reset. Level transmitter 2-263-58B feeds primary containment isolation system (PCIS) channel B. At 1330 on 1/30/85 the IMs proceeded to work on transmitters 2-263-57A and 2-263-58A which feed PCIS channel A. This resulted in an expected half Group II isolation. At the same time an Operator and Foreman were proceeding to return transmitter 2-263-58B back to service. The way in which the transmitter was valved back in resulted in a pressure spike to the transmitter. Consequently a signal was received by PCIS channel B, resulting in a full Group II isolation. When valving in the transmitter the equalizing valve, if it had been opened first, would have prevented any inadvertent spiking. The cause of this event is Operator error. Neither the Foreman nor the Operator were aware of the proper method for returning the transmitter to service.

To prevent another occurrence of this type, this event and the proper technique for valving these level transmitters to and from service will be discussed in an Operator six week training session. The safety significance was minimal since the reactor was defueled and all systems associated with the Group II functioned as designed. This is the first occurrence of this kind at Dresden Station.

SUPPLEMENT TO DVR

DVR NO. STA	UNIT.	YEAR	NO.
D - 12	- 2	- 85	- 15

PART 1 TITLE OF EVENT

Inadvertent Group II Isolation

OCCURRED: 1/30/85 (DATE) 1330 (TIME)

REASON FOR SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT

To give the root cause and corrective actions taken as a result of this occurrence.

PART 2

ACCEPTANCE BY STATION REVIEW: J. A. Hutchins / John M. A[illegible]

DATE: 12/18/85 / 12/18/85

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT APPROVED AND AUTHORIZED FOR DISTRIBUTION: Douglas M. Scott — STATION SUPERINTENDENT — 12/18/85 DATE

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Commonwealth Edison
Dresden Nuclear Power Station
R.R. #1
Morris, Illinois 60450
Telephone 815/942-2920

December 17, 1985

DJS Ltr #85-1166

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

An update to Licensee Event Report #85-005-1, Docket #050237 is being submitted as required by Technical Specification 6.6, NUREG 1022 and 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv). This report is being submitted to state the root cause of the event and the corrective action.

D. L. Scott
Station Manager
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

DJS/kjl

Enclosure

cc: J.G. Keppler, Regional Administrator, Region III
File/NRC
File/Numerical