

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 4 9										PAGE (3) 1 OF 2				
TITLE (4) Unit 3 Reactor Scram Due to Loss of Power to Both Reactor Protection System Buses Resulting in Reactor Building Ventilation Trip and Automatic Start of Standby Gas Treatment																								
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)														
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES			DOCKET NUMBER (5)												
1	1	2	0	8	5	8	5	0	2	4	0	0	1	2	1	9	8	5	N/A	0	5	0	0	0
OPERATING MODE (9) N												THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)												
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 1 0 1 0		20.402(b)				20.405(c)				X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)										
		20.405(a)(1)(i)				50.36(c)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)										
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)				50.36(c)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vi)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)										
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)														
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)														
		20.405(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ix)														
LICENEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)												TELEPHONE NUMBER												
NAME Mark Leahy, Technical Staff Engineer												AREA CODE 8 1 5 9 4 2 7 2 9 2 0												
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																								
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC										
A				N																				
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)												
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)												X NO												
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)																								
<p>On November 20, 1985, at 2123 hours, with Unit 3 in a refueling outage, while preparing to inspect the reactor protection system (RPS) motor generator (MG) set output breakers, the "A" RPS MG set was turned off, resulting in a half scram on RPS channel "B", a trip of the reactor building ventilation system, and an automatic start of the standby gas treatment (SBGT) system. The "B" RPS MG set was then turned off, which de-energized RPS channel "A", resulting in a full scram.</p> <p>Personnel error contributed to this event. A miscommunication between the Operating Foreman and the Shift Engineer led the Foreman to believe that the Reactor Building ventilation monitors were powered by an alternate power source, and were ready for the RPS MG sets to be de-energized. After the first RPS bus was de-energized, and without the alternate power feeds to the radiation monitors, the reactor building ventilation monitor failed upscale, and SBGT automatically started. Also, as all scrams were jumpered, the Shift Engineer suggested to the Foreman that both RPS buses could be de-energized simultaneously. The Foreman instructed the Equipment Operator to turn off both RPS MG sets. After the Operator de-energized the first bus he was instructed to call the Control Room. He misunderstood and believed that the Control Room would call him. When no contact was made, the Operator proceeded to de-energize the second bus, and a reactor scram resulted. The Unit Operating Engineer reviewed this event with the Operating Foreman and the Shift Engineer. The event will be discussed in the six week Operator training to ensure that the errors were understood by all parties, and to minimize the likelihood of a recurrence of events of this type. As the unit was shut down for refueling with all fuel removed, and the standby gas treatment system initiated as required, the safety significance of this event is considered minimal. The last event of this type was reported by R.O. 85-014, on Docket #050249.</p>																								
8512270105 851219 PDR ADOCK 05000249 S PDR																								

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104  
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3	0   5   0   0   0   2   4   9	8   5	—   0   2   4	—   0   0	0   2	OF	0   2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

With Unit 3 in a refueling outage, while preparing to inspect the reactor protection system (RPS) motor generator (MG) set output breakers, the "A" RPS MG set was turned off at 2123 hours on 11/20/85, resulting in a half scram on RPS channel "B". This also resulted in a trip of the Reactor Building ventilation system, and an automatic start of the standby gas treatment system (BH). The "B" RPS MG set was then turned off, which de-energized RPS channel "A", resulting in a full scram. All fuel had been removed from the vessel.

Personnel error contributed to this event. Before the MG sets were turned off, the Reactor Building ventilation system radiation monitors were to be supplied with an alternate power source. Due to a miscommunication with the Shift Engineer, the Operating Foreman mistakenly believed that the alternate power feed to the radiation monitors had been connected. The Operating Foreman then had the Equipment Operator de-energize the RPS MG sets. When the "A" MG set was turned off, the "B" radiation monitor no longer had a power feed, the upscale and downscale relays de-energized, the Reactor Building ventilation system tripped, and the standby gas treatment system automatically started on a Reactor Building ventilation high radiation signal.

Prior to taking the MG sets out of service, the Operating Foreman discussed the outage request with the Shift Engineer. The Shift Engineer noted that since all of the scram contacts were jumpered in the RPS circuitry, he could see no reason not to de-energize both RPS buses at the same time. Although the scram contacts were jumpered, the scram relays themselves were still an active part of the circuit. The Foreman then instructed the Equipment Operator to de-energize both buses.

However, there was a misunderstanding on the part of the Equipment Operator who was to de-energize the MG sets. The Operator believed that the Control Room was to contact him after the first MG set was de-energized. The Station Control Room Engineer, however, wanted the Operator to contact the Control Room. When no contact was made between them, the Operator assumed that all was set to de-energize the second MG set. He did so, causing a scram on loss of power to both RPS buses.

On the following two nights, the MG sets were inspected, with the alternate power supplies provided to the radiation monitors and one RPS bus energized at all times.

The Unit Operating Engineer reviewed this event with the Operating Foreman and the Shift Engineer. The Station Control Room Engineer reviewed the event with the Equipment Operator, to ensure that the errors were understood by all parties. To minimize the likelihood of a recurrence of events of this type a review of this event and Operating Order 22-85, Required Discussion Prior to Complex Plant Evolutions, will be conducted with all Operating Staff during the six week Operator training. As the unit was shut down for refueling with all fuel removed, and the standby gas treatment system initiated as required, the safety significance of this event is considered minimal. The last event of this type was reported by R.O. 85-014 on Docket #050249.




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DJS Ltr #85-1178

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Licensee Event Report #85-024-0, Docket #050249 is being submitted as required by Technical Specification 6.6, NUREG 1022 and 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv).

  
D.J. Scott  
Station Manager  
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

DJS/kjl

Enclosure

cc: J.C. Keppler, Regional Administrator, Region III  
File/NRC  
File/Numerical

IE22  
1/1