

December 2, 1985  
(NMP2L 0550)

Mr. R. W. Starostecki, Director  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region I  
Division of Reactor Projects  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Re: Nine Mile Point - Unit 2  
Docket No. 50-410

Dear Mr. Starostecki:

Enclosed is a final report in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e) for the problem concerning the unqualified weld filler material used on the primary containment liner. This problem was reported via tel-con to S. Hudson of your staff on May 22, 1985.

Very truly yours,

*C. V. Mangan*  
C. V. Mangan  
Senior Vice President

CVM/GG/c1a  
(1333H)

xc: Director of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555

R. A. Gramm, NRC Senior Resident Inspector

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION  
NINE MILE POINT - UNIT 2  
DOCKET NO. 50-410

Final Report for a Problem  
Concerning Unqualified Weld  
Filler Material (55(e)-85-16)

Description of the Problem

The welding of attachments to the primary containment liner requires the use of weld filler material qualified by impact testing. A site contractor, ITT Grinnell, welded attachments to the liner using an unapproved grade of weld filler metal, which did not meet the impact test requirements of the design criteria, thereby invalidating the qualification of the welding procedure used.

The extent of the problem was investigated and found to involve only five Category I attachments to the primary containment liner. The remainder were found to be temporary Non-Category I attachments. Upon investigation of the problem, it was found that the root cause was human error in issuing the correct welding rod. The electrode required was E8018-C1 while the types issued were E8018-B2L, E7018 and E308-16.

The ITT Grinnell Procedure FQC-9.1-4 governing the verification of documentation requires a review of weld filler metal heat numbers in preparation for turnover. It was this review that initiated the investigation that identified and documented the error.

Analysis of Safety Implications

Initially it was assumed the deficiency had gone undetected due to a Quality Assurance Program breakdown since inspections during installation did not identify the deficiency. However, upon further investigation it was found that the deficiency was identified and documented under the existing contractor's Quality Assurance Program and appropriate Nonconformance and Disposition Reports were issued to effect repairs. Furthermore, the deficiency did not require extensive repair or redesign.

Therefore, the problem does not meet the criteria of a reportable deficiency under 10 CFR50.55(e).