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Washington Public Power Supply System

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1985 AUG -7 AM 11: 27

August 2, 1985
G02-85-409

REGION V

Docket No. 50-397

Mr. R. A. Scarano, Director
Division of Radiation Safety
and Safeguards
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region V
1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210
Walnut Creek, CA 94596

Dear Mr. Scarano:

Subject: NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2
OPERATING LICENSE NPF-21, RESPONSE TO JULY 2, 1985
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION REGARDING NRC-REGION V
IDENTIFIED CONCERNS

Reference: Letter, Ross A. Scarano (NRC-Region V) to G. C.
Sorensen (SS), "Emergency Response Facilities
Appraisal", dated July 5, 1985

The reference letter identified no deficiencies nor violations of NRC requirements as a result of the subject appraisal. In a related telephone conversation on July 2, 1985, the Staff identified specific concerns with the WNP-2 Graphic Display System (GDS) and the Emergency Dose Projection System (EDPS) which the Supply System agreed to examine and take appropriate corrective actions. The Supply System further agreed to inform the NRC in writing of the results of our examination within 30 days of the date of the reference letter. This letter constitutes that response.

85-10-02 The data collection, storage and display system, (GDS and EDPS) did not appear to provide an acceptable level of reliability because (1) the data acquisition software did not exclude test data and projections from the operational data, (2) did not provide confirmatory prompts and user assists to help prevent "lock up" and (3) permitted projection analyses to change the displayed classification status.

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Responses

- (1) GDS and EDPS by design include test data in the historical records. The test data can be identified as such by examination of records to determine if the monitored parameter was in the surveillance mode at the time in question. We agree that this could be time consuming and undesirable in an emergency situation. We will explore alternative means of differentiating between real and test data.

The historical records do not store data from the projection (predictive) mode. There is apparently some confusion with the manual mode which does (and should) feed the historical files. No action is planned on this item.

- (2) The following actions have been taken to correct this concern.
- o The plant computer has been upgraded from a 750 to a 9950 which will improve response time.
 - o GDS colorgraphic operations can no longer be accessed from black and white terminals. This modification will also be installed on EDPS.
 - o Terminals that will not lockup have been installed for plant (non-colorgraphic) emergency functions.
 - o Communications hardware has been upgraded and some software modifications have been made to minimize lockup and to aid in escape should a lockup occur.
- (3) Again, there appears to be confusion between the predictive and manual modes of EDPS operation. The predictive mode which is used for projection analysis does not change the displayed classification status. The manual mode does establish an emergency classification based on the calculated dose at the EAB. This is as designed and is considered to be an operator aid. Administrative controls will be implemented to prevent use of the manual EDPS mode on the plant computer except in an emergency or for testing purposes.

85-10-03 Modify the EDPS software to allow correction of the inadvertent input of incompatible data without termination of the program execution.

Response

The normal mode of operation for the EDPS is the automatic mode which requires no operator input. In the event of instrument malfunction the manual mode allows operator input followed by operation of the enter key. The program

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
RESPONSE TO JULY 2, 1985 TELEPHONE CONVERSATION REGARDING NRC-REGION V
IDENTIFIED CONCERNS

then reads the input, checks it for range of allowable entry and displays the value for operator review. Only after the operator accepts the value by a second operation is the value unalterably entered into the program. In the event that multiple failures and errors result in an irreversible error situation, the operator may resort to the backup EDPS system. No further action is planned relative to this concern.

Additionally, during the EDPS verification testing relative to open item 85-10-08, errors were found in the code. The potential impact on projected dose has not yet been determined. The errors have been corrected, and the Supply System is continuing to assess the total impact the error might have had in order to determine its significance. When this assessment is complete, the Supply System will evaluate this event's reportability under 10 CFR Part 21 and take the appropriate actions.

Should you have any questions, please contact D. Larson, Radiological Programs, at (509) 377-8054.

Very truly yours,



G. C. Sorensen, Manager
Regulatory Programs

HLA/tmh

cc: JO Bradfute - NRC
WS Chin - BPA
JB Martin - NRC RV
E Revell - BPA
NS Reynolds - BLCP&R