UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

DEC 16 1985

Docket No. 50-219

LICENSEES: GPU Nuclear Corporation
Jersey Central Power and Light Company

FACILITY: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station

SUBJECT: MEETING FEBRUARY 13, 1985, ON INSTALLATION OF QUALIFIED CONTAINMENT PURGE AND VENT VALVES DURING CYCLE 11R OUTAGE

On Wednesday, February 13, 1985, a meeting was held at NRR Headquarters, Bethesda, Maryland, to discuss GPU Nuclear's (the licensee's) considerations to withdraw its commitments to (1) install qualified containment (drywell) vent and purge valves and (2) upgrade the nitrogen vent and purge system during the Cycle 11 Refueling (Cycle 11R) outage. This meeting was held at the request of the licensee. Attachment 1 is the list of the individuals attending the meeting. The following is a summary of the significant items discussed and the actions taken or proposed.

The meeting was a preliminary meeting for the licensee prior to submitting a request to the staff. The licensee stated that this was part of its reassessment of commitments which have been made to the staff to upgrade Oyster Creek to determine if the commitments were appropriate and not beyond the staff's requirements.

The commitment to install qualified purge and vent valves was part of the licensee's response to the staff's review of multi-plant generic activity B-24, Containment Purging During Normal Plant Operation. In the NRC letter of November 29, 1978, the staff identified its generic concern to all operating reactor licensees. The licensee made the commitment in its letter dated July 31, 1980.

The commitment to upgrade the nitrogen vent and purge system was part of the licensee's response to the Short Term Lessons Learned NUREG-0578 of the staff's TMI Action Plan and to 10 CFR 50.44. The licensee made the commitment in its letter of June 10, 1980. This issue is also involved in the primary means for combustible gas control for Oyster Creek.

The licensee described the primary containment ventilation and inerting system. This system contains the purge and vent isolation valves and the nitrogen vent and purge valves. These are shown in the figure from the Oyster Creek Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) in Attachment 2.

The licensee stated that the request to not replace the containment purge and vent isolation valves by qualified valves will affect valves V-27-1/2, V-28-17/18/47, V-27-3/4, V-23-13/14 and V-23-15/16 in the figure in Attachment 2. All these are containment isolation valves. The request to not upgrade the nitrogen system will affect valves V-23-17/18, V-23-19/20, V-23-21/22 and V-28-47 of this figure.

The licensee stated that the commitment on the containment isolation valves is being considered to be withdrawn because these valves are blocked partially closed and met the staff's interim position for containment purge of October 23, 1979. The licensee would propose this interim position as its final position. The licensee stated that this position is conservative and the valves will close against the design basis accidents.

The licensee stated that considerations to propose the withdrawal of the commitment on the nitrogen system was based on the BWR Owner's Group model of the hydrogen source term for the LOCA. This model was an analysis performed by General Electric (NEDO-22155). The licensee stated the BWROG's model showed Oyster Creek should not reach the hydrogen flammability limit within 2 years after the LOCA.

The staff and the licensee discussed the technical arguments for the licensee's proposed withdrawal of its commitments. The staff stated that the licensee should propose additional technical specifications on the existing containment vent and purge isolation valves to inspect and test these valves if they have resilient seals. The valves that would replace the existing valves do not have resilient seals. The staff referred to its January 18, 1985, letter to the BWROG which stated that a containment high range radiation signal should go to all containment vent and purge isolation valves, large and small. The staff stated that 10 CFR Part 50.44(d) provides a design basis hydrogen source and that Generic Letter 84-09 (May 8, 1984) provides a basis for an exemption to the recombiner capability required in 10 CFR Part 50.44(c)(3)(ii) but it is not applicable for design basis accidents.

The licensee submitted its request to withdraw the commitments to (1) install qualified containment vent and purge isolation valves and (2) upgrade the nitrogen vent and purge system in its letter dated September 24, 1985.

Jack N. Donohew, Jr.

Jack N. Donohew, Project Manager
BWR Project Director #1
Division of BWR Licensing

Attachments:
1. List of Attendees
2. Licensee Handout

cc: J. Zwolinski
G. Lear
H. Kister, Region I
J. Chen
K. Leu
N. Chokshi

cc:
G. F. Trowbridge, Esquire
Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge
1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

J.B. Liberman, Esquire
Bishop, Liberman, Cook, et al.
1155 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036

Regional Administrator, Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

BWR Licensing Manager
GPU Nuclear
100 Interpace Parkway
Parsippany, New Jersey 07054

Deputy Attorney General
State of New Jersey
Department of Law and Public Safety
36 West State Street - CN 112
Trenton, New Jersey 08625

Mayor
Lacey Township
818 West Lacey Road
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

D. G. Holland
Licensing Manager
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Post Office Box 388
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Mr. P. B. Fiedler
Vice President & Director
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Post Office Box 388
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Resident Inspector
c/o U.S. NRC
Post Office Box 445
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Commissioner
New Jersey Department of Energy
101 Commerce Street
Newark, New Jersey 07102

Eugene Fisher, Assistant Director
Division of Environmental Quality
Department of Environmental
Protection
380 Scotch Road
Trenton, New Jersey 08628

ATTACHMENT 1

MEETING OF FEBRUARY 13, 1985
ON THE ESSF

Name	Affiliation
J. Donohew	NRC/NRR/DL
M. Laggart	GPUN*
M. Hober	State of New Jersey**
R. Wright	NRC/NRR/DE
J. Kudrick	NRC/NRR/DSI
N. Trikouros	GPUN
P. Wells	GPUN
P. Smith	GPUN
R. Lorenzo	GPUN
A. Rochino	GPUN

* GPU Nuclear Corporation
** Department of Environmental Protection



GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION (UPDATED) FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT	PRIMARY CONTAINMENT VENTILATION/ INERTING SYSTEM	
	REV. 6, 12/84	FIGURE 6.2-20

ATTACHMENT 2

The licensee stated that the request to not replace the containment purge and vent isolation valves by qualified valves will affect valves V-27-1/2, V-28-17/18/47, V-27-3/4, V-23-13/14 and V-23-15/16 in the figure in Attachment 2. All these are containment isolation valves. The request to not upgrade the nitrogen system will affect valves V-23-17/18, V-23-19/20, V-23-21/22 and V-28-47 of this figure.

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Jack N. Donohew, Project Manager
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DISTRIBUTION
Docket File
NRC PDR
Local PDR
BWD#1 Rdg
JZwolinski
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BGrimes
ACRS (10)
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DBL:PD#1 DBL:PD#1
JDonohew:tm JZwolinski
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