

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Cooper Nuclear Station										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 9 8										PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 3																																																																																																																																																																																																							
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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

With the plant in shutdown conditions (reactor less than 212°F and vented), during acceptance testing for a plant design change, the reactor building ventilation radiation monitors were found to be inoperable. The acceptance testing required initiation of a Group VI isolation, which failed to occur. A subsequent investigation revealed that electrical jumpers were installed in the auxiliary trip units of the reactor building ventilation radiation monitors. This condition prevented the Group VI isolation from occurring. The electrical jumpers were immediately removed and the reactor building ventilation radiation monitors were returned to an operable condition. Through further investigation it was determined that the electrical jumpers had been installed five days earlier during surveillance testing on the reactor building ventilation radiation monitors. The surveillance testing procedure requires the electrical jumpers to be removed following testing, however the technician conducting the surveillance testing failed to remove the electrical jumpers. These electrical jumpers would have prohibited automatic reactor building isolation and standby gas treatment system initiation upon a reactor building ventilation high radiation signal. During the five day period that the jumpers were installed, irradiated fuel was handled in the spent fuel pool. This condition constitutes a violation of CNS Technical Specifications. This event is attributable primarily to personnel error, compounded by procedural deficiencies. It is believed this event has no generic implications.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 2150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/88

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On November 18, 1985, with the plant in shutdown conditions (reactor less than 212°F and vented), acceptance testing was being performed for a plant design change. The acceptance testing imposed a Group VI isolation. A Group VI isolation initiation causes Primary Containment purge and vent valves to close, the reactor building to isolate, the reactor building ventilation equipment to shutdown, the reactor recirculation motor generator vent system to isolate, the Standby Gas Treatment System to start, and Reactor Equipment Cooling critical loop operation to initiate. The acceptance testing was started by the on-duty control room operator by generating a trip signal to the reactor building ventilation radiation monitors, thus initiating a Group VI isolation. The Group VI isolation did not occur as required and an investigation into the problem was started. This investigation revealed that electrical jumpers were installed in the auxiliary trip units of the reactor building ventilation radiation monitors. Installation of these electrical jumpers would prohibit a Group VI isolation upon a reactor building high exhaust radiation signal. The control room operators removed the electrical jumpers immediately and returned the reactor building ventilation radiation monitors to an operable condition. Instrumentation and control room annunciators which would identify a reactor building high exhaust radiation condition remained operable during the period the electrical jumpers were installed.

During subsequent investigation, it was discovered that the electrical jumpers had been installed on November 13, 1985, by an I&C technician during performance of CNS Surveillance Procedure 6.3.7.5, "Reactor Building Ventilation Radiation Monitor Calibration and Functional/Functional Test". This surveillance procedure requires the installation of two electrical jumpers in the auxiliary trip units of the reactor building ventilation radiation monitors in order to conduct the required testing of the radiation monitors. After completion of surveillance testing, the procedure also requires the removal of the installed electrical jumpers, which had not been done.

Installation and removal of the jumpers is documented by signing the related step in the surveillance procedure. A review of Surveillance Procedure 6.3.7.5, completed on November 13, 1985, indicated that the procedural steps had been properly completed on paper, and was documented by signature of the I&C technician who conducted the surveillance. Discussion with the I&C technician involved revealed that the procedural step indicating removal of the electrical jumpers was signed prior to actual electrical jumper removal. The I&C technician who had signed the procedural step fully intended to remove the electrical jumpers, but decided to first recheck that certain trip signals and control room annunciators had cleared before removing the electrical jumpers. The I&C technician after doing this recheck, became involved in other I&C work in the Control Room and forgot to remove the installed electrical jumpers. The surveillance procedure was considered complete and the installed electrical jumpers were not discovered until November 18, 1985, during the acceptance testing for the aforementioned station design change. During the period the electrical jumpers were installed, eighteen irradiated fuel bundles were loaded into a spent fuel cask. This constituted a violation of CNS Technical Specifications.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

This event is considered to be attributable to:

1. Personnel error, in that the I&C technician involved signed the 6.3.7.5 procedural step prior to actual completion of the action required by the step and failed to remove the installed electrical jumpers as required per Surveillance Procedure 6.3.7.5.
2. Procedural deficiency in Surveillance Procedure 6.3.7.5, specifically the procedure steps which require installation and removal of the electrical jumpers, lacked clarity. Also, to ensure that the reactor building ventilation radiation monitors are returned back to an operable status following the testing, the procedure lacked necessary independent verification that the electrical jumpers were removed.

Corrective actions taken to preclude recurrence of this event are:

1. The I&C technician involved has been temporarily removed from duties which involve surveillance testing or maintenance on plant critical systems. In addition, all temporary modifications (electrical jumpering, fuse removal, etc.) conducted by the technician from October 5, 1985, (plant shutdown for turbine repair outage) to the date of the event, were verified to be correctly implemented. The I&C technician was also counseled about the event and appropriate disciplinary action was taken.
2. I&C Department personnel will be counseled by the Operations Manager and the I&C Supervisor to stress the importance of completing the action required by a procedural step prior to signing the step as completed.
3. CNS Surveillance Procedure 6.3.7.5, "Reactor Building Ventilation Radiation Monitor Calibration and Functional/Functional Test", was reviewed and improvements initiated. These improvements included: (a) clarity in the procedural steps requiring installation and removal of electrical jumpers and (b) independent verification that electrical jumpers installed have been removed as required.
4. All CNS Surveillance Procedures which require temporary modifications to plant components or systems are being reviewed. This review will identify procedural deficiencies and these deficiencies will be corrected. As one definite improvement, all surveillance procedures requiring temporary modifications will provide independent verification, as required, to ensure that the temporary modification is removed and the related components or systems are returned to service.

This event had no effect on the public health and safety and has no generic implications.



Nebraska Public Power District

COOPER NUCLEAR STATION
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TELEPHONE (402) 825-3811

CNSS850709

December 17, 1985

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

Cooper Nuclear Station Licensee Event Report 85-015 is forwarded as an attachment to this letter.

Sincerely,

P. V. Thomason
Division Manager of
Nuclear Operations

PVT:lb

Attach.

cc: R. D. Martin
L. G. Kunc1
J. D. Weaver
L. R. Berry
INPO Records Center
ANI Library

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