

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Sequoyah, Unit 1										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 7				PAGE (3) 1 OF 02						
TITLE (4) Isolation of Required Fire Hose Stations in Containment																				
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)										
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)							
1	1	8	8	5	0	4	6	0	0	1	2	1	7	8	5	0	5	0	0	0
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)																		
6		20.402(b)				20.405(c)				50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)						
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.405(a)(1)(i)				50.36(c)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)						
0 0 0		20.405(a)(1)(ii)				50.36(c)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 386A)						
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)										
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)										
		20.405(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(ix)										
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																				
NAME M. R. Cooper, Compliance Section Engineer										TELEPHONE NUMBER 6 1 1 5 8 7 0 - 6 7 6 6										
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																				
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC										
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR				
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)												<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO								

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On November 14, 1985, at 1305 CST, a high pressure fire protection (HPFP) valve, 1-FCV-26-231, inadvertently opened and charged fire hose stations in unit 1 containment. A determination was made that the opening of the deluge valve was not necessary, and the header was manually isolated. A review of drawings to determine what equipment was protected by this header was made by the unit operator (UO), and he determined that only hose stations around the reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) were involved. (This was incorrect since the header also supplies fire hose stations in the annulus.) Since the unit was in mode 6 and the RCPs are not required, an entry in action (a) of Technical Specification limiting condition of operation (LCO) 3.7.11.4 was not made. On November 18, 1985, at 1330 CST, a Surveillance Instruction (SI)-654 was performed which identified the annulus fire hose stations as being isolated. At 1345 CST, the header was returned to service. A personnel error made by the UO on November 14, 1985, when reviewing flow diagrams, was the root cause of this event.

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)  Sequoyah, Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0 5 0 0 0 3 2 7	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		8 5	0 4 6	0 0 0	2	OF	0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On November 14, 1985, at 1305 CST while in refueling, a deluge valve, 1-FCV-26-231, on high pressure fire protection (HPFP) inadvertently opened and charged the fire hose stations in unit 1 containment annulus and the area around the reactor coolant pumps (RCPs). An alarm on the pyrotronics panel in the main control room indicated the opening of the valve but gave no indication of fire by cross zone fire detectors for that area. An assistant unit operator (AUO) was dispatched to investigate the problem and found the discharge drain valve on the deluge valve leaking. The valve was manually isolated by the AUO, and draining of the header was initiated. The unit operator (UO) in the main control room reviewed HPFP drawings and made a determination that only the hose station around the RCPs was being isolated. Since Technical Specification limiting condition for operation (LCO) 3.7.11.4 requires backup hoses run only for areas that contain equipment which is required to be operable, the UO thought he was in compliance with the plant technical specification. In actuality, the annulus hose stations were also supplied by this header. Since the annulus contains equipment that is required operable, a failure to comply with action (a) of Technical Specification LCO 3.7.11.4 occurred. This condition remained until its discovery on November 18, 1985, during the performance of a HPFP surveillance on valve positions. At that time, approximately 1345 CST, the header and associated hose stations were returned to service.

Cause of the Event

The primary cause of this failure to comply with the technical specification was a personnel error made by the control room UO in determining what area was protected by the subject header. The drawing used by the UO had "Reactor Coolant Pumps" labeled next to hose stations at the top of the page but also contained smaller lettering at the bottom of the page identifying other hose stations in the annulus coming off this same header.

Analysis of Event

This event is considered reportable per 10 CFR 50.73, paragraph a.2.i since the plant was not in compliance with action (a) of Technical Specification LCO 3.7.11.4. Action (a) requires areas that hose stations are used for backup fire suppression to have temporary hoses routed within 24 hours. There were no temporary hoses routed during the four days that the annulus hose stations were out of service. In view of the fact that no fire occurred in the subject area during this time, there was no effect on public health or safety due to this event.

Corrective Actions

The header and hose stations were returned to service as soon as it was discovered that they were isolated. On November 18, 1985, the UO who failed to identify the annulus as an isolated area was involved in the discovery of his mistake. TVA considers this to be an isolated occurrence, and no additional action is required to preclude future occurrences.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant  
Post Office Box 2000  
Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379

December 17, 1985

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555


Gentlemen:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET NO.  
50-327 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT  
SQRO-50-327/85046

The enclosed licensee event report provides details concerning inoperable  
fire hose stations. This event is reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73,  
paragraph a.2.i.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



P. R. Wallace  
Plant Manager

Enclosure  
cc (Enclosure):

J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Suite 2900  
101 Marietta Street, NW  
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Records Center  
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations  
Suite 1500  
1100 Circle 75 Parkway  
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

NRC Inspector, NUC PR, Sequoyah

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