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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
TECHNICAL REVIEW TEAM STAFF

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Taken by: Carmen Gooden, CSR, RPR September 19, 1984

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265-3481

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
TECHNICAL REVIEW TEAM

TECHNICAL INTERVIEW

Wednesday, September 19, 1984

[REDACTED]

This interview was commenced at 7:30 p.m.

PRESENT:

MR. DICK WESSMAN
Technical Review Team Staff
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

MR. PAUL CHEN
Technical Review Team Staff
Nuclear Regulatory Commission

[REDACTED]

FORM 404
JAN 1980
NRC

1 MR. WESSMAN: For the record, this is an interview of
2 Bob Messerly for the purpose of clarifying some technical
3 activities at Comanche Peak Power Plant. It is a follow-up
4 of an earlier interview that we did on August 2, 1984; how-
5 ever it does cover some different subjects than the August
6 interview. The location of the interview is at [REDACTED]

7 [REDACTED]
8 [REDACTED]
9 [REDACTED]
10 [REDACTED]
11 MR. WESSMAN: [REDACTED] Present at the interview
12 are myself, Dick Wessman, for the NRC Staff; Paul Chen, NRC
13 Staff; and [REDACTED] As we've agreed, the interview is
14 being transcribed.

15 The NRC has some questions in the areas of some
16 welding activities out there and also some questions con-
17 cerning work on the main steam pipe that occurred out there
18 a couple of years ago.

19 Paul, if you would, let's pursue the other
20 questions and then we'll come back to the main steam line
21 questions.

22 MR. CHEN: I have some questions here related to some
23 things that were mentioned in your affidavit of February
24 3, 1983.

25 MR. WESSMAN: This is an affidavit that you filed with

1 CASE that was subsequently filed before the Licensing Board.

2 MR. CHEN: In this affidavit you mentioned a man that
3 you tried to fire three times. You said that he was a
4 general foreman on the night shift, and you implied that he
5 was incompetent. Can you identify this man for us?

6 [REDACTED] No, I can't. It's been many, many
7 moons.

8 MR. WESSMAN: [REDACTED] let me show you that affidavit
9 again, if I could, and see whether as you read the text of
10 that whether anything comes to mind that might give us a
11 little additional information on that. We're in the middle
12 of page 6 of that document, I believe, and read, if you
13 would, for a moment.

14 [REDACTED] All right. I know what I'm talking
15 about now. I can't think of his name. His name is in one
16 of my affidavits. [REDACTED]

17 MR. WESSMAN: [REDACTED]

18 [REDACTED] Yeah, I think that's it; [REDACTED]

19 MR. CHEN: Is that his last name?

20 [REDACTED] Yeah, that's his last name. This is
21 a man that I tried to fire numerous times. He done several
22 things that were not up to standards. He done several
23 things--the man was a scaffold builder. He built scaffold.
24 He was a very--pardon my French, ma'am--piss-poor frame
25 carpenter. I tried to fire this man on numerous occasions

1 because he was unqualified, did not know his work, could
2 not read a blueprint. I been in steel most of my life.
3 This man could not read a blueprint. He could not build
4 anything to specs. [REDACTED]

5 MR. WESSMAN: His first name was [REDACTED]
6 [REDACTED] was his
7 name.

8 MR. WESSMAN: Do you recall an approximate timeframe
9 that this fellow was working there?

10 [REDACTED] It was about--I imagine about a year
11 before I got fired; that was on [REDACTED] It was
12 about a year before that. This man wasn't qualified for
13 nothing. He built some stuff for a Gold Hat, built a
14 porch and so on, sun porch, and that's the only reason he
15 had a job there.

16 MR. WESSMAN: Was this gentleman a Gold Hat?

17 [REDACTED] No, he was--well, he later wound up
18 as a general foreman, which was next to a Gold Hat; but I've
19 forgotten more than that man ever remembered.

20 MR. WESSMAN: Anyway, his name was [REDACTED] to
21 your recollection.

22 [REDACTED] Right.

23 MR. WESSMAN: Okay. With that we ought to be able to
24 pursue it via records at the plant. Go ahead.

25 MR. CHEN: The second question relates to something

1 that was mentioned in your sworn statement of June '83 in
2 which you talked about torch cutting bolt holes in the back
3 side of tube steel that would be used for anchor bolts.

4 [REDACTED] Right.

5 MR. CHEN: Was this a very common practice?

6 [REDACTED] Very common, especially with people that
7 didn't know what they were dealing with.

8 MR. CHEN: Can you elaborate on that for us?

9 [REDACTED]: Well, I tried to explain to you-all
10 before that you have got a wall which a bolt is supposed to
11 come out 90 degrees. These bolts are set in a pattern when
12 they're poured in the concrete. They are not 90 degrees.
13 There's no way. This [REDACTED] was one of the charac-
14 ters that poured this concrete. It's easy to set up a
15 form and say, "Here it is." When you go tying in precision
16 steel where you're allowed an eighth and a sixteenth and
17 a minimum, it don't work that way. This bolt comes out of
18 the wall--we'll exaggerate just a minor fraction--at 45
19 degrees. If this bolt comes out at 45 degrees, you heat
20 this bolt and turn it 90 degrees in order to fit a piece of
21 six-by-six tube steel. When the inspector looks at it, he
22 looks at it as it's coming straight through. All right.
23 [REDACTED] which turned in to be a general foreman,
24 cut holes four and five inches in diameter in a six-inch
25 piece of tube steel in order to get the back part to go

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1 through the front part.

2 MR. CHEN: I see.

3 [REDACTED] This I reported to my supervisors, and
4 I was told, [REDACTED] don't look at it."

5 MR. CHEN: Given 100 supports, how many of those 100
6 would you say would have this problem?

7 [REDACTED] Fifty percent.

8 MR. CHEN: I just wanted to get a feel for it.

9 [REDACTED] Well, the concrete inserts were not
10 put in the way they should have been. When you put a con-
11 crete insert in the wall--I don't know whether you ever
12 poured any concrete or not--the concrete moves things up,
13 down, sideways; and when you put in a tube steel that has
14 to be flat up against the wall like so--okay?--if it's not
15 flat, if it's cocked any way inside that wall--this, that,
16 up, down--then you have got a piece of steel coming out here
17 that's not 90 degrees; it's up, it's down, it's sideways,
18 one side or the other. This is what [REDACTED] caught,
19 the back side of the steel which QC don't see, nobody can
20 see because you have--in most cases you have a six by six
21 one-inch plate with an inch-and-a-quarter hole in it. It
22 goes against the wall, the tube steel goes up against it,
23 and then it goes out through the tube steel; you have a
24 one-inch plate up against the tube steel on the outside,
25 then you have your nuts. So what do you see? You see a

1 nut and a bolt coming through a tube steel. You don't know
2 what's behind it, you don't know what's in the middle of
3 it, you don't know anything except what you're seeing.

4 MR. CHEN: Was this done in Unit One and Unit Two, or--
5 [REDACTED] Unit One is the only one I worked in;
6 I did not work in Unit Two.

7 MR. CHEN: Can you identify any hangers or areas or
8 rooms where this condition might have--

9 [REDACTED] I worked between 860 and 905. I had all
10 of main steam; I had all of feed water, the main feed water
11 in Reactor One.

12 MR. CHEN: Would this be all the main steam lines?

13 [REDACTED] I had all the big main steam.

14 MR. CHEN: On all four loops?

15 [REDACTED] No, just on 860--between 860 and 905.

16 MR. WESSMAN: In the Reactor Building itself?

17 [REDACTED] Right.

18 MR. WESSMAN: Now, a minute ago you said you thought
19 as many as 50 percent of these Richmond inserts--is that the
20 proper term--were incorrectly installed. Are you talking
21 about 50 percent of those that [REDACTED] was involved
22 in or 50 percent of all of those?

23 [REDACTED] I'm talking about 50 percent of all
24 Richmond inserts were installed improperly. I would say
25 as much as that, because I was involved in feed water, I was

1 involved in safeguard, auxiliary, turban, and they were all
2 the same.

3 MR. WESSMAN: Now, that's a large number, and obviously
4 we're again stuck with trying to pin down some specifics
5 like we've talked before, [REDACTED] I need some suggested areas
6 where we go look. Obviously if we go pick ten and don't
7 find any, we haven't looked in the right place possibly.
8 Can you give us some suggestions of some real good examples
9 if we have to go actually look for them?

10 [REDACTED] Just between me and you, if you went
11 and picked ten, eight of them wouldn't be wrong, on Richmond
12 inserts. At an angle other than what, if I'm not mistaken,
13 was six degrees, we were allowed out.

14 MR. WESSMAN: Let me be sure I understand you. You're
15 saying normally the bolt should sit exactly straight out
16 from the wall--

17 [REDACTED] Ninety-degrees.

18 MR. WESSMAN: --90 degrees angle between the bolt and
19 the wall. -- If it varies by more than six degrees in either
20 direction--

21 [REDACTED] I think that's what we were allowed; I'm
22 not real sure.

23 MR. WESSMAN: All right. If it varied by more than
24 six degrees, you think it was out of specification then.

25 [REDACTED] According to specs that I was taught.

1 MR. WESSMAN: Your suggested place that we would look
2 for examples is on this 860 to 905-foot levels of the
3 Reactor Building where you had actually seen some of these
4 that were incorrectly installed.

5 [REDACTED] Well, I never actually seen the anchor
6 installed incorrectly. I'm just saying when I screwed my--
7 when I screwed my anchor bolts into the walls, I would say
8 eight out of ten were not within six degrees. We heated
9 bolts, we put a nut on the end of a bolt, and took a sledge
10 hammer and smacked it in order to make the 90 degrees so
11 we would not have to burn or drill a hole oversized on the
12 inside to allow for the outside to look good.

13 MR. WESSMAN: Are you saying that if we went and looked
14 today, we would be very hardpressed to see whether any of
15 them are out of spec or not?

16 [REDACTED] Yes.

17 MR. WESSMAN: Because you heated them or pounded them
18 with a hammer to bend them straight.

19 [REDACTED] I would say eight out of ten of them.

20 MR. WESSMAN: Do you know whether there are any NCR's
21 or documentation on the ones that were crooked?

22 [REDACTED] No, because you got to realize you did
23 not call an inspector until the actual hanger was up, and
24 what that inspector saw was the finished product. He did
25 not see how that bolt was put in there or whether it was

1 beat, heated or otherwise. What the inspector saw was the
2 finished product with the plate behind it, the tube steel,
3 the plate in front of it, and the actual torque of the
4 plate.

5 MR. WESSMAN: I think in this earlier affidavit you
6 also talked about how they would sometimes cut the hole on
7 the back side of the tube steel out so that it would fit a
8 slightly crooked bolt. Would that evidence still be
9 present?

10 [REDACTED] On the actual ones that I found, no.

11 MR. WESSMAN: What happened?

12 [REDACTED] I fixed them. I heated the bolt, I
13 straightened it out; I beat the bolt, I straightened it
14 out.

15 MR. WESSMAN: So you weren't involved in actually
16 cutting these enlarged holes in the tube steel. You
17 straightened the bolt instead of cutting holes in the back
18 of the tube steel.

19 [REDACTED] If I ever caught one of my men cutting
20 a hole in the back of tube steel, I'd have fired him. There
21 ain't no doubt in my mind.

22 MR. WESSMAN: Did you actually see some situations
23 where these holes were cut in the back of the tube steel?

24 [REDACTED] Yes, I seen--well, wait a minute. I
25 seen the results of it. I did not actually see the tube

1 steel being cut, but I seen the results of it the next
2 morning. [REDACTED] was general foreman on nights.
3 So when I pulled the particular hanger off, or hangers, that
4 I'm talking about and you see a three-inch hole in a six-
5 inch piece of tube steel, you report it to your Gold Hat,
6 which was [REDACTED] and you're told to shut your
7 mouth. This is what I'm talking about.

8 MR. WESSMAN: [REDACTED] said this?

9 [REDACTED] Yes.

10 MR. WESSMAN: Is that [REDACTED] or something?

11 [REDACTED] No, it's [REDACTED] or something. He
12 pronounces it [REDACTED] It's actually [REDACTED] but he pro-
13 nounces it [REDACTED]

14 MR. CHEN: Are you saying that about 80 percent of all
15 the Richmond inserts were outside the six percent tolerance?

16 [REDACTED] Well, I would say if you checked eight
17 out of ten you would find 50 to 80 percent out of the six
18 percent--we were allowed six percent--or six degrees is what
19 we were allowed, six degrees out of tolerance. Okay. You
20 take a 90 degree wall and you go six degrees one way or the
21 other, I would say, yeah, I would say 80 percent. There
22 was no way that they were within six degrees.

23 MR. CHEN: Not all of these that were outside of this
24 six-degree limit had holes enlarged in the back of the tube
25 steel against the wall.

1 [REDACTED] No.

2 MR. CHEN: What percent of the hangers that you were
3 aware of had holes enlarged in the back of the tube steel?

4 [REDACTED] That's hard to say for the simple fact
5 that you don't know until you take one down.

6 MR. CHEN: Okay.

7 [REDACTED] What I'm saying is--give me a piece of
8 scratch paper there--

9 MR. WESSMAN: Let's go off the record for a minute
10 while we're sketching and drawing.

11 (Off-the-record discussion held.)

12 MR. WESSMAN: While we were off the record, we were
13 sketching a diagram of how the Richmond inserts were
14 installed in the wall and how those holes in the back of a
15 tube steel for pipe support would be invisible to an
16 observer once the installation had been complete. Paul,
17 go ahead with your questions.

18 MR. CHEN: Can you identify for us any hanger that has
19 this problem that you are aware of?

20 [REDACTED] Not really. Like I stated before, my
21 shack had all the hangers that were wrong, but I've been
22 gone for two years and there's no way--they have covered--
23 you--all got one problem and I'll keep stating it and I'll
24 keep stating it. You--all bring this stuff up, and you give
25 them six months to correct it. Until you put a man out

1 there from you-all's organization and let him see what's
2 going on--because I talk to guys every day. I talked to a
3 guy last weekend. The same stuff is going on daily, and
4 until you-all put a son-of-a-gun out there and find out
5 what's going on, you ain't going to believe a damn thing
6 I'm saying or anybody else is saying.

7 MR. WEISSMAN: Are you saying right now we could probably
8 see some of this sort of thing happening over in Unit Two--
9 [REDACTED] If you-all put somebody out there--Unit
10 Two is a joke, man. Unit Two is a joke. I went over there
11 and watched people do things that you wouldn't believe.
12 Until you-all put somebody out there and see what's going
13 on--because they'll hire anybody. They don't care what you
14 are; they'll hire you.

15 MR. WEISSMAN: Okay. Let's go on with the next
16 question. If you've got anything more on the hangers--

17 MR. CHEN: This next question concerns your allegation
18 that lugs were welded to stainless steel lines without
19 purging with an inert gas. Can you give us any particulars
20 such as the line number or support number or anything like
21 that for us to--

22 [REDACTED] There's no way I can do it. I seen it
23 done; I seen it done by the welding foreman out there, [REDACTED]
24 [REDACTED] I seen [REDACTED] weld lugs on a line. In fact, I
25 held the lugs on for him on 832 elevation on a stainless

1 steel pipe.

2 MR. WESSMAN: Any recollection of what system it was?

3 [REDACTED] Man, there's no way. You're talking
4 two years; I don't remember them systems.

5 MR. WESSMAN: Do you remember how big a pipe it was?

6 [REDACTED] It was a three- or four-inch. I'm not
7 real sure on that. It was a three- or four-inch line on
8 832 elevation, which Roy Estes was in charge of. He had
9 a bunch of lugs that were down there that were malfunction
10 and the whole bit. We covered them up with [REDACTED] welding
11 because I held the lugs on for him.

12 MR. WESSMAN: Was this shortly before you were termi-
13 nated out there? Do you remember the approximate time-
14 frame?

15 [REDACTED] I don't remember the time; I don't.

16 MR. WESSMAN: Any other suggestions for us on the
17 welding of lugs that we might look at to try to find some
18 individuals or timeframes or any unusual incidents that
19 might come to mind, or an WCR that was filed that might
20 help us find something?

21 [REDACTED] I can't. I wish I could. I wish I
22 could name dates and everything else, but I can't do it.

23 MR. CHEN: You mentioned a few minutes ago that from
24 some of your friends that some of the kinds of activities
25 that you're telling us about is going on in Unit Two. Is

1 this the kind of thing that's going on now in Unit Two?

2 [REDACTED] Yes; yes, it is. It's the same thing.
3 You've got people that are unqualified doing Unit Two.
4 You've got rebar people, form people, and it's been--the
5 man in charge of Unit Two when I left there was a man that
6 stated--and I stated it to him before--was a man that looked
7 at one of my blueprints on the main steam hanger and said,
8 "Man, I don't understand how you can even do anything like
9 that," and two weeks later he was a general foreman over
10 Unit Two in pipe supports. This is the type of people you
11 got out there. You got the same people out there that was
12 out there two years ago. They are unqualified. There's
13 no way in hell that they're qualified to put up a pipe
14 support or any kind of steel support.

15 MR. CHEN: I have no further questions in that area
16 unless you do.

17 MR. WESSMAN: No, I don't. Let's pursue your questions
18 on the main steam line.

19 MR. CHEN: I was looking through your affidavit and
20 some of the interviews that were conducted with you on this
21 business about relocating the main steam lines. I'd like
22 to get as much information as I can from you in order to be
23 able to investigate what happened. Tell me, this is the
24 main steam line in Unit One; is that correct?

25 [REDACTED] Yes.

1 MR. CHEN: Can you describe for me a little bit what
2 the configuration was? Was the main steam line completely
3 installed at the time that this was done?

4 [REDACTED] The only thing I can do is draw you a
5 picture.

6 MR. WESSMAN: Let's go off the record and let's draw
7 a sketch of what went on.

8 (Off-the-record discussion held.)

9 MR. WESSMAN: While we were off the record, we
10 developed a couple of sketches of the configuration of the
11 main steam line installation showing where the permanent
12 line was located and the permanent hangers that [REDACTED]
13 [REDACTED] was involved in the installation of. We've also
14 identified where a temporary connection near the steam
15 generator was made for flushing purposes. Go ahead from
16 there with your questions, and let's describe where this
17 line moved when they cut it again, if you would, [REDACTED]

18 [REDACTED] Well, the line was moved six to twelve
19 inches from when they cut it loose. I was there; I
20 witnessed it. My general foreman told me to get my people
21 off that floor on account of the whip restraint the steel
22 has, and get them off that floor between 860 and 905.
23 There was also a Gold Hat there that had the polar crane
24 tied to the top of this to pull it into position.

25 MR. CHEN: Just a moment. Can I point out at this

1 point that [REDACTED] pointed at the junction between the
2 32-inch main steam line and the smaller diameter flushing
3 line. Go ahead.

4 [REDACTED] And my general foreman told me to leave
5 the floor and get all my people off the floor on account of
6 the strain that pipe was in.

7 MR. CHEN: I believe you stated in affidavits that
8 the line, the main steam line, was off six inches
9 vertically and four inches horizontally.

10 [REDACTED] Right.

11 MR. CHEN: What was the source of that information?

12 [REDACTED] The source of the information was the
13 pipe people themselves, and a man was down there with a
14 come-along pulling this thing over in position. [REDACTED]
15 was the foreman on pipe that made this change. I can't
16 remember the general foreman. [REDACTED] was the man that
17 caused this. They took come-alongs and they took the over-
18 head polar crane and pulled this thing into position. The
19 tonnage was something like 40 or 50 ton to pull this thing
20 into position after it was cut. We had to move approximately
21 four hangers, which I can take you out there and show you
22 right now, that were moved.

23 MR. CHEN: Were these hangers on the main steam line?

24 [REDACTED] These hangers were on that steam line,
25 on that expansion joint, that we had to move because they

1 were out of location. I'm talking about a hanger that we
2 spent three or four weeks on just welding up.

3 MR. CHEN: Did you happen to see which hook on the
4 polar crane was used during this operation?

5 [REDACTED] The big one.

6 MR. WESSMAN: How did you know it was about 40 tons
7 on the polar crane?

8 [REDACTED] They had a gauge on it.

9 MR. WESSMAN: And you were able to see the gauge?

10 [REDACTED] They had a gauge on it, a round gauge;
11 it showed the tonnage pull.

12 MR. WESSMAN: This is a gauge--it must be a large gauge
13 that's visible to people standing on the floor.

14 [REDACTED] It's, oh, 24 inches in diameter; or
15 bigger; or smaller; I really don't know.

16 MR. WESSMAN: I understand.

17 MR. CHEN: Let me clarify--get something straight. In
18 some of your documents that I have reviewed, it indicates
19 that you've said the load might have been as high as 85
20 tons.

21 [REDACTED] I really don't know what tonnage it was.
22 I'm just guessing. I'll just put it to you this way: I've
23 been in steel all my life, and you don't pull steel in
24 tonnage and expect it to hold. This was also done by a man
25 that was fired by another man five years prior to Comanche

1 Peak, because he was incompetent; the Gold Hat of the
2 Pipe Department out there right now.

3 MR. CHEN: I'm a little bit confused because I think
4 in some of the documents and affidavits you mentioned
5 temporary supports. Now you're saying that they're
6 permanent supports. Can you show me on this sketch roughly
7 where these supports were?

8 [REDACTED] No, I'd have to go out there and show
9 you. I'd have to go out there and show you permanent
10 supports, the ones we moved, the ones we had to move, and
11 the whole bit. See, they have--they got a spring load
12 support, you got a support that keeps from going longitude
13 and latitude, and you have all these kinds of supports.
14 The support that we had to move on account of the pipe being
15 in the wrong place when they put the polar crane on it, we
16 had to completely revise that; we had to completely rebuild
17 that. Charlie Copeland fired the Gold Hat that was in
18 charge of pipe four or five years prior to Comanche Peak
19 because he was incompetent, and this was a Gold Hat out
20 there. I can't remember his name now; I wish I could.

21 MR. CHEN: He fired him on some other job other than
22 Comanche Peak?

23 [REDACTED] Right; for incompetence.

24 MR. CHEN: How much adjustments did you make in the
25 hangers? Can you remember that?

1 [REDACTED] What do you mean by adjustments?

2 MR. WESSMAN: You had to move several hangers. Did
3 you move them like three or four inches or are we talking
4 a relocation that may involve several feet, or just--

5 [REDACTED] No, we're talking anywhere from three
6 inches to ten inches to a foot, after the pipe was through
7 the concrete; and you don't put a bind on steel like that.

8 MR. CHEN: Can you tell me how many come-alongs were
9 used?

10 [REDACTED] About four.

11 MR. CHEN: Do you know what capacity these come-alongs
12 were?

13 [REDACTED] I did, but it's been a while. But they
14 had a guy out there named [REDACTED] that would make four of
15 me and you combined, and he put an eight-foot cheater on the
16 come-alongs to pull this pipe, and I'm talking about an
17 expansion chamber, into position. If you think I'm kidding
18 you, go out there and talk to [REDACTED]

19 MR. WESSMAN: I'm not too good on come-alongs. Are
20 there standard sizes, like one ton--

21 [REDACTED] --two ton, three ton, four ton, five
22 ton; but you put a cheater on them and you can get a lot
23 more.

24 MR. WESSMAN: Were the come-alongs being used likely
25 to be four or five tons or one or two tons?

1 [REDACTED] I'd say four or five ton.

2 MR. WESSMAN: Okay.

3 [REDACTED] With eight-, ten-, twelve-foot cheater.

4 As I told you before, go out there and see [REDACTED]

5 MR. CHEN: Just to be sure I understand what is con-
6 tained in some of these affidavits, you said the lift was
7 supervised by a Gold Hat, but there were no engineers any-
8 where around.

9 [REDACTED] There was not an engineer nowhere. I
10 don't give a damn what they say. There was none, because
11 my general foreman told me to get my people off the floor;
12 there was no engineers; he didn't know where that pipe was
13 going, and he didn't want none of his people hurt.

14 MR. WESSMAN: When this pipe made its move, this was
15 while they were pulling on it and they were making the cut
16 at the joint in the generator; so there was one guy down
17 there finishing the cut, and as he finished the cut, the
18 thing popped and moved; is that right?

19 [REDACTED] That's how far it was out of stress;
20 right.

21 MR. CHEN: Are you aware or have you heard of similar
22 incidents on the main steam line?

23 [REDACTED] No, not really. I can't say I do. All
24 I know is what happened in Reactor One, Containment One.
25 I was there; I was there on everything.

1 MR. WESSMAN: Do you know whether they ever did this
2 on any other main steam lines out there?

3 [REDACTED] No, I don't. I can't say that they did
4 or didn't.

5 MR. WESSMAN: Do you know whether they ever did it on a
6 feed line or any other of the big lines out there?

7 [REDACTED] No, I do not. I went over in Reactor
8 Two and seen the results of what they did with the polar
9 crane pulling the feed water and the main steam lines
10 because the pipe hangers wouldn't fit; and the welding was
11 wrong and so forth and so on. But that's all I can say.

12 MR. WESSMAN: They had to do some similar pulls like
13 this in Reactor Two?

14 [REDACTED] You got to understand what took over
15 Reactor Two: Rebar people, concrete people, people who are
16 used to building forms; they do not know nothing about
17 steel. They do not know nothing about the stress of it,
18 about the tolerance of it, or anything else. This is what
19 you got to realize. It's all a clique; they're all from
20 South Carolina, North Carolina; and they all come up there
21 on the same deal. It's the same deal with the general
22 foreman that did not know nothing about blueprints that I
23 was doing, and two weeks later he wound up as a general
24 foreman over pipe support.

25 MR. WESSMAN: Were you working any hangers in Reactor

1 Two where you would have seen any of this?

2 [REDACTED] I have not done nothing in Reactor Two,
3 nothing in Containment and Reactor, other than a few pipe
4 supports in two-inch and under. That's all I've done in
5 Reactor Two, Containment Two, or anything to do with Two.

6 MR. CHEN: Let me just try and clarify in my own mind
7 exactly what you're saying. You're saying that this line
8 was in place; it was cut here, and that was where the
9 flopping of the piping occurred, and then the pipe was
10 lifted.

11 [REDACTED] Right.

12 MR. CHEN: While it was lifted you had to go back and
13 undo some of your hangers and--

14 [REDACTED] Approximately five, six hangers I had
15 to redo completely.

16 MR. CHEN: I have no other questions.

17 MR. WESSMAN: Was this all done in one overnight shift,
18 or was this a several-day period this--

19 [REDACTED] No, it was a several day, because one
20 of the hangers we had to air arc completely off of whip
21 restraints and redo completely.

22 MR. WESSMAN: Anything else you can think of to share
23 with us on this? I know you've talked this subject before
24 with the NRC.


25 [REDACTED] No, not really; just that it was done;

1 I was an eye witness at it. I'll swear to it in anybody's
2 court.

3 MR. WESSMAN: Okay, Paul, you have no other questions;
4 is that correct?

5 MR. CHEN: No.

6 MR. WESSMAN: As before, have you given all your
7 statements to us freely and voluntarily, Bob?

8  I have.

9 MR. WESSMAN: Okay. We thank you for your time.
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CERTIFICATE OF PROCEEDINGS

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission


In the Matter of: COMANCHE PEAK, TECHNICAL INTERVIEW

Date of Proceedings: September 19, 1984

Place of Proceedings: [REDACTED]

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original
transcript for the file of the Commission.

Carmen Gooden
Certified Shorthand Reporter


Certified Shorthand Reporter

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AQC-13

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22 A-19

Telephonic Interview of [REDACTED]

On August 17, 1983, [REDACTED] a former Brown & Root, Inc., employee, was telephonically interviewed by NRC Investigator H. Brooks GRIFFIN. [REDACTED] stated he worked at CPSES for about 5 years and had worked for a number of supervisors during that period.

[REDACTED] stated he had worked for a "3 striper" by the name of [REDACTED], who intimidated him into loaning out "rebar eater" Drillco concrete drills without proper documentation as he had already detailed in a previous deposition to the NRC Office of Investigations Field Office, Region IV case no. (A4-83-005). [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] threatened to fire him if he did not follow his instructions. [REDACTED] stated he had heard from other B&R employees that [REDACTED] later found the pressures of the job too great, and that [REDACTED] voluntarily dropped back to working as a welder.

[REDACTED] stated he believed a supervisor named [REDACTED] tried to fire him on a number of occasions because he ([REDACTED] had become personal friends with [REDACTED] a superintendent. [REDACTED] said he believed [REDACTED] was afraid that he [REDACTED] would "get his [REDACTED] job."

[REDACTED] stated he had a "personality clash" with one of his supervisors named [REDACTED], who would not provide him with as much work as he ([REDACTED]) thought his crew should have been given. [REDACTED] stated he was forced to "hide his crew out," since they had not been assigned work. [REDACTED] said he had no problems with his former supervisors, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated his problems with some of his supervisors were generally the result of the supervisor's lack of intelligence, but said the threat by [REDACTED] was the only time he was intimidated.

FOIA-85-59
CZ09

PROCEEDINGS

MR. GRIFFIN: If we can go on the record.
Would you stand up to be sworn in, please.

Whereupon,

[REDACTED]
having been first duly sworn by Investigator Herr, was
examined and testified as follows:

MR. GRIFFIN: For the record this is an
interview of [REDACTED] who is employed by Brown and
Root at the Comanche Peak site.

The location of this interview is the
Somervell County Courthouse in Glen Rose, Texas.

Present at this interview are Richard Herr and
Brooks Griffin with the NRC, [REDACTED] and the court
reporter. As agreed, this interview is being transcribed
by the court reporter, this lady here.

The subject matter of this interview concerns,
one, we are going to be asking you some questions about
intimidation and then I believe you have some of your own
issues that you want to bring up. We will get to those. We
will give you an opportunity to get to those.

Also let the record reflect that the NRC has
entered into a confidentiality agreement and extended this
to [REDACTED] on 8/24/83. He has agreed to the terms and
has signed the agreement.

AGC-15 04-84-001

A-2416 Testimony

1 them that had to be sawed off to get the engagement, you
2 know, so we can torque them down. All QC had to buy on it
3 was the torque. They didn't have to see how much
4 engagement we had on the threads.

5 MR. GRIFFIN: Okay.

6 [REDACTED] I have got one more. In the fuel
7 building on the waste monitor system on the track that the
8 cart runs on we put hilty bolts in to hold the track down.

9 MR. GRIFFIN: This is a switch track to handle
10 the fuel?

11 [REDACTED]: No, it handles the waste and it is
12 in the fuel building, the waste track. We had a problem of
13 hitting rebar.

14 MR. GRIFFIN: With hilty bolts?

15 [REDACTED] Yes, sir. Okay, we couldn't drill
16 deep enough. We had paperwork to move the hole, you know,
17 three inches I believe north and south but nothing east
18 and west, and east and west was the way we was hitting
19 rebar. Okay, we got the paperwork on the ones that we did
20 to drill through the rebar, but this was an extension. I
21 think it was a four foot and something extension onto the
22 track.

23 On down they had I guess 30 foot of track that
24 they did not have the paperwork on to drill through the
25 rebar. [REDACTED] is the man that installed the hilty bolts

TAYLOE ASSOCIATES

1625 I STREET, N.W. - SUITE 1004

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006

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AGC-15

Q4-84-001

A-218

TESTIMONY

1 on that and he told me himself that he didn't get the
2 paperwork to drill through the rebar and the went ahead
3 and drilled through it.

4 MR. GRIFFIN: Is there any way we can identify
5 where those are?

6 [REDACTED]: Yes, sir. It is on 815 in the fuel
7 handling building, Unit 1.

8 MR. GRIFFIN: But those holes are kind of hard
9 to find, aren't they? Are they covered? Did they grout
10 over them?

11 [REDACTED]: No, sir. They have got a deal they
12 can set on top of the hilty bolt and tell you how much
13 engagement you have got and it will pick up the rebar if
14 it is hitting rebar. I don't remember what room that is,
15 but I could get the room number.

16 MR. GRIFFIN: Do you have any idea how many
17 times this occurred down there?

18 [REDACTED]: That they went through rebar?

19 MR. GRIFFIN: Without the paperwork.

20 [REDACTED]: No, sir. I know they have several
21 times though.

22 MR. GRIFFIN: Okay. When was this?

23 MR. [REDACTED]: Probably in January.

24 MR. GRIFFIN: Of '83?

25 [REDACTED]: Yes, sir.

1 MR. GRIFFIN: Okay. [REDACTED], what is his job?

2 [REDACTED] He was a millwright, but he is no
3 longer with the company. he lives at [REDACTED]

4 MR. GRIFFIN: That is where he lives now?

5 [REDACTED] Yes, sir.

6 MR. GRIFFIN: If we contacted him do you think
7 he would tell us?

8 [REDACTED] Yes, sir, I am satisfied he would.

9 MR. GRIFFIN: Who actually made the cuts
10 through the rebar?

11 [REDACTED] There was a foreman over there
12 that come over and he looked at the problem. We got the
13 paperwork on the ones that we drilled through to go ahead
14 and drill through it. We drilled through the first rebar
15 and then we hit another rebar. We didn't have the
16 paperwork to drill through the second one. So we had to
17 cut the hilty bolt and change the embedment of the hilty
18 bolt, you know, to a lesser amount. We had to get the
19 engineer to change the embedment so we wouldn't have to
20 drill through the second one.

21 MR. GRIFFIN: Okay, but on these ones that were
22 cut without paperwork, who did the cutting?

23 [REDACTED] I don't remember the man's name.
24 He was in a different craft. They have got a certain
25 craft that comes out when you do have to drill through the

1 rebar.

2 MR. GRIFFIN: Were you there when this
3 occurred?

4 [REDACTED] Yes, sir.

5 MR. GRIFFIN: Did anybody say anything about
6 cutting through the rebar without the authorization?

7 [REDACTED] Yes, sir.

8 MR. GRIFFIN: Who decided to do it? Who was
9 running the show? Was it [REDACTED]

10 [REDACTED] No, sir. [REDACTED] was getting
11 the work done.

12 MR. GRIFFIN: Did [REDACTED] tell the guy from the
13 drill crew to cut through it?

14 [REDACTED] Yes, sir, he told him to cut
15 through it.

16 MR. GRIFFIN: Did the guy argue with him at
17 all?

18 [REDACTED] Yes, he argued with him. We had to
19 wait another day, an extra day. They threatened me then on
20 account it was taking so long in us trying to drill
21 through the rebar. They tried to get us to go ahead and
22 drill through it with a dirty drill and we couldn't. It
23 wouldn't cut it. So then when we had to get another craft
24 involved they had to get the paperwork.

25 MR. GRIFFIN: Okay, but you said they cut

1 through rebar without paperwork.

2 [REDACTED] This was on the first extension
3 that [REDACTED] put in. On the extension I put in we did
4 have the paperwork.

5 MR. GRIFFIN: But on [REDACTED] they didn't
6 have the paperwork?

7 [REDACTED] True.

8 MR. GRIFFIN: On some of them?

9 [REDACTED] On all of them.

10 MR. GRIFFIN: But the drill crew still were the
11 ones that did the cutting, didn't they?

12 [REDACTED] No, sir.

13 MR. GRIFFIN: They didn't have to go through
14 rebar?

15 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] drilled them himself.

16 MR. GRIFFIN: Did he go get a rebar eater and
17 go through it himself?

18 [REDACTED] he went and got a rebar eater and
19 went through it himself.

20 MR. HERR: Did anybody see [REDACTED] do that?

21 [REDACTED] I am satisfied there was.

22 MR. HERR: Can you give us a name of a witness?

23 [REDACTED] I don't remember who his helper
24 was right now, but I am satisfied that [REDACTED] would admit to
25 doing it if you would talk to him on account of his job

1 was threatened several times by [REDACTED] too.

2 MR. GRIFFIN: Do you have any others?

3 [REDACTED] No, sir. There is another item,
4 but I can't remember the name of the piece of equipment.
5 It happened two days before they laid me off of the
6 millwrights. It was right in the fuel building and one of
7 the TUGCO guys, Texas Utility guys stopped the work on it
8 himself. It was his piece of equipment that Brown and Root
9 was working on. It had already been turned over.

10 MR. HERR: Let's go off the record for a
11 second.

12 (Discussion off the record.)

13 MR. HERR: Back on the record.

14 MR. GRIFFIN: [REDACTED] you have provided us
15 with a number of instances here where you have been
16 intimidated or had performed work without either proper
17 documentation or in violation of procedures at the
18 direction of your superiors.

19 [REDACTED] Yes, sir.

20 MR. GRIFFIN: Do you agree to take further
21 measures to help us identify these locations so that we
22 can have our inspectors look at these various areas?

23 [REDACTED] Yes, sir.

24 MR. GRIFFIN: Do you have any other areas of
25 concern? You have told us that these are instances that

Amade V.

Alt-S - page 3

Don't think so

3/31/83 Affidavit

AFFIDAVIT OF [REDACTED]

My name is [REDACTED] better known as [REDACTED] I live in [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] I worked for Brown & Root for approximately ten years, including
about seven years at the Comanche Peak nuclear power plant. During that time
I was a [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] While I was performing my duties as a [REDACTED] I saw
a lot of things at the Comanche Peak plant which were not according to procedures
and travelers, many of which could jeopardize the health and safety of the public.

I knew that something needed to be done before the fuel came in for the
plant. I thought it over and decided that I would go to Houston to the Brown
& Root main office and report these violations to the President of Brown & Root
direct, Mr. Thomas Feehan. I went to Houston and met with Mr. Feehan. I told
him of some violations that were going on and told him that after ten years of
experience, I thought some of those people might know better and show better
craftsmanship and intelligence than they had used at the nuclear plant in
Southport, North Carolina.

I told him about working at the North Carolina plant on some weld seams
that were not supposed to lose more than an ounce of radiation per year (we
were told). These seams, some of which were approximately 100 feet long, were
in some instances leaking as much as 65 lbs. every three seconds, according to
what was indicated when we turned the gauge off and watched the gauge drop.
At first we took the test channel off and started repairing the bad welds,
which took several days. We were getting approximately 28 pin holes and indi-
cations per foot. This was taking too much time to repair properly, apparently,
so somebody in Brown & Root's organization came up with the brainy idea of having
us take the first foot or eighteen inches off, repair the weld, replace the eighteen
inches of test channel, block it off, and just hydro the one-foot area. QC assumed
we had the whole 100 feet under pressure and bought it off as is. In my opinion,
that is lack of craftsmanship or experience or just downright sabotage. Personally,
I think some of these people should go to prison for this, and I told Mr. Feehan
that.

I also gave Mr. Feehan a letter with some things I knew about and that other
people had told me about. He said he would send an investigation crew to investi-
gate the Comanche Peak charges, and he did. I know of much more that I did not
tell him or the investigative crew and have not in the past reported to the local
NRC office because I feel the NRC is not interested in protecting the people's
welfare and it will be covered up. I have been told by CASE (Citizens Association
for Sound Energy), the intervenor in the Comanche Peak operating license hearings,
that I am required by law to report any problems which might affect the health
and safety of the public to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. I am therefore
asking CASE to send this affidavit to the NRC as my method of reporting it, in
the hope that by doing so it will force the NRC to really look at the problems
I've identified. I would like to get this information to Congress or someone
who's really interested in the safety and welfare of the people of Texas.

FOIA-85-59

(C224)

Some of the stuff that goes on, for instance: My superintendent had us install some light poles. These poles are underwater lights inside the stainless steel liner around the reactor cavity. They are used when unloading the reactor underwater so the people can see what they are doing. They are nothing but stainless steel pipes with one end capped off and holes drilled in them. As we were drilling the holes, drill shavings fell inside the pipe. We also used some cutting oil. My superintendent came out to the shop where we had the holes drilled and said "You don't have those poles in the hole yet?" And I said; "No, we're going to take a pencil grinder and deburr them, and take a steam hose and steam all the oil and shavings out." He said, "That's bull. Get those poles on down to the hole so the electricians can install the lights on the poles." By our not taking about 15 minutes a pole to clean them right, the poles are now installed in the proper location. They pose a serious safety problem. When they're refueling, the shavings can be washed out of the pipe by the current when removing the reactor head underwater, and also, removing the old fuel cells causes a current. The shavings can be washed inside the reactor, which can jam the fuel cells, could even fuse to the control rods and possibly cause a meltdown. I feel that their doing that is lack of sense, lack of experience, or sabotage. Maybe Brown & Root's got an explanation for it, but I'd like to hear it.

17
AC-16
AP-7

I also have information which indicates that during the early stages of construction around the time when the reactor cavity was being poured, concrete aggregate material from a reject pile was used. My concern is that if the 700 ton reactor is sitting on rejected concrete, it could result in the weight shifting to the loop pipe, causing it to crack or shear off, which could result in a meltdown.

AC-16
AC-2-

I am convinced that because I went to the Brown & Root Houston office with my concerns about the safety of the Comanche Peak plant and also the one in North Carolina, I am no longer employed with Brown & Root. They already had my name pulled off the board as [REDACTED] when I got back from Houston before the investigation group ever got to the plant. My future was already decided before I ever got back and before the investigation was ever started. Later I was confined to one area of the shop for five weeks. I called Mr. Rice in Houston and asked him how long I was going to be confined and told him that if I was going to be confined, the people I had made the charges against should also be confined because they were still violating procedures. I had called TUGCO before I called Houston and they removed me from standing in the shop and put me in a little tool room in the shop. Mr. Rice said, "As far as I'm concerned, the investigation has been over with and furthermore, you called TUGCO. If I worked for Brown & Root, I'd call Brown & Root. If I worked for TUGCO, I'd call TUGCO. If I worked for the federal government, I'd call the federal government. But you called TUGCO." I said, "I tried to call you guys first, but you weren't there." He replied, "You think we're going to sit by this G.D. phone and wait for you to call?" I said, "Well, maybe they're trying to discourage me here until I quit." He said, "Maybe you're finally getting the idea." I said, "As long as you guys can pay me [REDACTED] wages, I'll sit in this little tool room forever." And he said, "We'll see about that."

Then the next Monday morning, I was given the choice of either working as a pipe journeyman, which would have greatly reduced my salary and relieved me of all my responsibility as a supervisor. So they ROF'd me (laid off as part of reduction of force). But they were increasing my department at the same time and after I left.

The information preceding was given to CASE in the form of an affidavit on December 18, 1982. However, I did not want them to turn it in in the hearings or to turn it over to the NRC or the utility. I gave the information to some newspaper reporters, and an article ran in the [REDACTED]. A copy of that article is attached. After that interview, I was shot at and have been on the run ever since and have been in touch with CASE a few times by phone from different states. One night when I came home, I found my cat; its head had been cut off smooth and its body was missing. Since the article appeared in the paper, I have had a front-end problem with three different vehicles (one truck and two cars); they all appear to have the same problem -- the nuts were just about to fall off the tie-rod ends. I've been scared to go back and sign up every six weeks for my unemployment because I'm scared someone may shoot me.

Some of the reasons I'm scared is because of the things I know about at Comanche Peak and another nuclear plant where I've worked, the South Port, North Carolina, Brunswick Project Nuclear Plant. As I mentioned before, there are weld seams around the Reactor Core and new spent fuel pools which we were told were not supposed to lose 1/2 ounce of contaminated liquid per year per seam. These seams were approximately 100 feet long; when we tested these seams, some of them were losing approximately 65 lbs. a minute. Instead of repairing some of these seams, the gauge was blocked off and pressure was put on the gauge only. When the inspector passed the weld seam, he thought the whole 100 feet was under pressure, not just a few inches. Also, some of the stainless liner walls broke loose from embedded plates that are in concrete walls which some of these plates were improperly welded. By these walls breaking loose they sprang out several inches from concrete wall; therefore, when refueling the reactors, the stainless steel liners were flooded with water. Of course, the weight of the water will push the liner walls back to the concrete. After the refueling process is over, and water is drained out of the liner, the walls will spring back out, which could result in welds cracking or walls splitting. When I reported these violations to Brown & Root's Vice President, he told me he was not that concerned about the gauges being blocked off but he was concerned about the walls breaking loose. If I had told him of improper welding on these walls, I wonder if he would have been concerned at all? I feel these problems should be repaired.

Regarding Comanche Peak nuclear plant, there are safety violations such as torquing. For instance, quality control is supposed to verify the torquing of piping support that should be torqued at 130 lbs. The hanger is on a 20 foot ceiling with a scaffold built to them. Quality control is on the floor; the torque wrench is sent down to get QC to verify the number and setting of the torque wrench and carried back up and placed on the nut before torquing. QC hears a torque wrench click twice on each nut and buys off (approves) the hanger. What QC did not know was that the construction personnel had a second torque wrench and also had a nut welded on the scaffold. The second torque wrench was set at a low torque poundage such as 3 lbs. and they clicked it twice. Therefore, the nut on the hanger was never torqued; only the nut on the scaffold was torqued. -AH-

There were also violations such as pipe supports around the pipe. For instance, 3/16" clearance is supposed to be maintained on each side and on top and the pipe is supposed to be resting gently on the bottom of the support. For instance, a 2" pipe: a construction supervisor will climb on the pipe and get some of his crewmen so when QC comes to inspect the support, the weight will push the pipe to the bottom. In some cases, the pipe was binding so tight they would use a timber to jack the pipe down from the ceiling while QC bought off the pipe. AH-

In some cases, when they can't get the right clearance on each side of the pipe, they take a grinder and grind between the pipe and tube steel, which in some cases results in a reduction of wall thickness of pipe. I believe this could result in a rupture of the pipe. Construction has also tried to straighten a pipe support by using a sledge hammer; this is done quite often.) An employee told me that while hitting on the hanger he also hit the pipe and caved in the side of the 2" pipe 1/2 inch or more. He reported it to his supervisor who said not to tell anyone and covered it up with I.D. tags. (AH- we

Another incident is improper personnel designing and engineering pipe supports. For instance, one helper told me while he was employed at the plant he designed many pipe supports for engineers. One day he wondered if they were using his engineering and if they were then checking his work, so he decided that he would design a hanger improperly and send it to engineering. The engineer passed it on to construction which built the hanger and it is presently installed improperly. The helper said that he did not want to go to any NRC hearing but he would love to have a showing and he could show many things if he was allowed to take investigators and actually show them the supports in the plant. Other helpers have also been involved in making major decisions for which they are not qualified. AH-5

Another violation is a sensor in a dam was run over and broken by a bulldozer. I understand that these sensors are placed in the dam in a vertical position in order to tell whether the dam moves or not. This sensor was not removed or repaired. It was held up and dirt packed around it while being embedded in the dam.

The construction company, Brown & Root, lost a \$3 million contract at Crystal River Power Company in Florida, by a dam breaking, I was told by one of the Vice Presidents of Brown & Root. What concerns me is that if this dam breaks, they will lose more than a \$3 million contract; it will endanger many lives.

There is also a violation that concerns me regarding the use of rejected concrete material in the early stages of the plant when the reactor core was poured. A friend of mine told Brown & Root's Vice President's investigating crew that he was a front end loader operator at the concrete plant and one day a QC inspector told him that the concrete should be thrown away because it was hard and dried. The inspector walked away and my friend started throwing it away and a supervisor told him to put it back in and use it and they did. AC-16 AC-27

My friend also told the investigating crew of some type of sampling machine that tells whether there are good samples or bad samples in the concrete. It had a wire run to it while QC watched the machine to verify the use of good samples. Personnel would pull the wire to make it read good when it was not. My friend also told of other people that know of these violations and as far as I know, Brown & Root did not contact any of these people, but talked with one of their supervisors and his brother that worked at the batch plant; they, of course, told them that they knew nothing of this incident and since the superintendent is deceased, they did not see any further investigation of this incident. I am sure that the NRC is aware of this statement, because it was in the [REDACTED] article (attached). Undoubtedly, they are not concerned about the situation. I have not been contacted and neither has my friend. (B AC- we

If indeed a 700 ton reactor is setting on rejected concrete, you have a very serious problem as the reactor gets hot and begins to move around, the concrete can give putting stress on the reactor piping, which could cause it to shear or crack, which could even result in a meltdown. This could also be a problem in case of an earthquake.

I know of many, many more problems and violations than I can remember right now. What is funny to me is the big deal everyone made of Russia's 300 lb. nuclear satellite falling back into earth's atmosphere, when we have a possibility of a 700 ton reactor setting on rejected concrete and no one is concerned. If all nuclear power plants in the U. S. are built the way the ones that I have worked at are, we are in trouble. We'd better make friends with Russia so we will have somewhere to go.

But speaking seriously, I think this should be investigated by someone with a little construction experience or common sense. It has been drawn to my attention that I am not a civil or a mechanical engineer and that it is not up to me to decide whether these plants are safe or not. But I feel it does not take a civil or mechanical engineer. Even a 6-year-old would know these violations should be corrected.

I have read the foregoing 5-page affidavit, which was prepared under my personal direction, and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. The thoughts and words expressed therein are my own thoughts and words (with the exception of minor grammatical changes, either to correct spelling or to clarify what I meant, which did not change the intent of my thoughts).

[REDACTED]

Date: March 31, 1983

STATE OF TEXAS

On this, the 31st day of March, 1983, personally appeared [REDACTED], known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me that he executed the same for the purposes therein expressed.


Subscribed and sworn before me on the 31st day of March, 1983.

Larrie Rayner
Notary Public in and for the State of Texas

My Commission Expires: 2/28/85

7D

DO NOT DISCLOSE



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
U.S. NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS FIELD OFFICE REGION IV

1003 SEP 12 AM 11:11
611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 1000
ARLINGTON TEXAS 76011

OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS ASSISTANCE TO INSPECTION REPORT
HEADQUARTERS "SUPPLEMENTAL"

September 7, 1983

SUBJECT: COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION:
ALLEGED IMPROPER CONSTRUCTION PRACTICES

REPORT NUMBER: A4-83-005

AQC-15

1. During the course of an unrelated investigation, information was received, from an individual who requested confidentiality, that a former Brown & Root, Inc., millwright had drilled holes through rebar without the required engineering authorization.
2. On September 1, 1983, this millwright was interviewed and provided information where he stated he possibly drilled holes through rebar in a concrete floor without a Component Modification Card (CMC) or a Design Change Authorization (DCA). He explained that he drilled about 10 holes in January 1983 while installing 22 metal plates using a core drill. He said these metal plates were used to secure the trolley tracks located in the Fuel Handling Building as part of the Waste Monitor System. He stated that he and his crew used a core drill borrowed from the Core Drilling Crew. The millwright said that the holes made with the core drill were located on the southwest corner of the trolley tracks. He explained that the blueprints he used authorized the cutting of one piece of rebar on each hole, and he added that it is his belief the holes were drilled properly.
3. The Results of Interview with the former Brown & Root millwright is maintained in OI Field Office, Region IV.

10/12
then
info
cc

Attachment (1) - Results of Interview with millwright, dated September 1, 1983.

REPORTED BY: H. Brooks Griffin
H. Brooks Griffin, Investigator
OI Field Office
Region IV

APPROVED BY: Richard K. Herr
Richard K. Herr, Director
OI Field Office
Region IV

cc: ✓ W. J. Ward, OI:DFO (w/attachment)
P. C. Baci, OI:DFO (w/attachment)
J. T. Collins, RIV (w/attachment)
T. F. Westerman, RIV (w/c attachment)

FOIA-85-59
(C 226)

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DO NOT DISCLOSE

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DO NOT DISCLOSE

RESULTS OF INTERVIEW WITH [REDACTED]
AS RECORDED BY NRC INVESTIGATORS H. Brooks GRIFFIN and Wendel E. FROST
ON SEPTEMBER 1, 1983

On September 1, 1983, [REDACTED], a former Brown & Root [REDACTED] at Comanche Peak, was interviewed in Bay City, Texas, by NRC Investigators H. Brooks GRIFFIN and Wendel E. FROST. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] had been employed at Comanche Peak from [REDACTED] [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] had been his foreman, [REDACTED] had been his general foreman, and [REDACTED] had been his superintendent.

[REDACTED] stated that in January 1983, his crew was installing metal plates to secure the waste monitor trolley in the Fuel Handling Building. [REDACTED] said that his crew initially used hand drills to make holes in the concrete, but in some cases, they hit rebar and had to use a floor-mounted diamond bit drill. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] made arrangements with the core drill crew to have the rebar cut. [REDACTED] stated he remembered that a member of the drill crew (not further identified) brought a floor-mounted core drill to the work area and made the cuts through the rebar. [REDACTED] said that the following day the drill crew employee did not come to the work area, so he [REDACTED] sent his helper (not further identified) to inform [REDACTED] [REDACTED] stated the helper returned with one of the core drills and that he [REDACTED] presumed the helper got the drill on instructions from [REDACTED] [REDACTED] said that when the core drill arrived, he used it to finish drilling the holes in which he had hit rebar. [REDACTED] remarked he then used the core drill to drill six or seven additional holes needed to complete the remaining holes required for the track. [REDACTED] said he did not remember whether he hit rebar on the additional holes. [REDACTED] said this use of the core drill was an isolated incident, and that it was the only time he used a core drill or cut rebar at Comanche Peak.

[REDACTED] said he remembered the blueprints used by the crew to install the metal plates contained an authorization for the cutting of one piece of rebar on each hole. [REDACTED] said he did not know whether CMCs or DCAs were obtained authorizing the cuts that he performed. [REDACTED] said the holes they drilled were about 9 inches deep and were later signed off by a QC inspector (not further identified). [REDACTED] said the tracks for the trolley were located on elevation 810 (ground level), and that the tracks were about 20 feet long.

[REDACTED] stated that on one occasion, he had a disagreement with [REDACTED] over helping a welder "run his lines." [REDACTED] said he told [REDACTED] that he was a [REDACTED] and that helping a [REDACTED] was not his job. [REDACTED] said that nobody ever intimidated, threatened, or attempted to intimidate him while he worked at Comanche Peak. [REDACTED] declined to execute a signed statement, saying he did not want to sign anything.

END OF RESULTS OF INTERVIEW WITH [REDACTED] ON September 1, 1983.

SIGNATURES:

Wendel E. Frost
Wendel E. FROST, Investigator
OI Field Office
Region IV

H. Brooks Griffin
H. Brooks GRIFFIN, Investigator
OI Field Office
Region IV

Civil/Structural Allegation Review Categories

10, TC AUG 17 1984

ALLEGED 8/27/84
NAME [redacted]
Est. Handaya
to Complete

Category No.	Subject	Allegation Nos.	Package Prepared	Assigned to	Schedule Open Close	Remarks
✓ 1	Inadequate materials used in concrete	AC-16, AC-19, AC-20, AC-21, AC-27		Philleo/Devers	8/17/84	
✓ 2	Concrete placements	AC-22, AC-23, AC-50		Philleo/Devers	8/17/84	
✓ 3	Poor weather conditions placement of concrete	AC-24, AC-35		Philleo/Devers	8/17/84	
✓ 4	Concrete voids/cracked/crumbled	AC-25, AC-32, AC-34, DC-008, DC-009, AC-33		Philleo/Devers	8/31/84	
✓ 5	Miscellaneous concrete	AC-26, AC-31, AC-36, AC-43		Philleo/Devers	8/23/84	
6	Rebar improperly installed/or omitted	AC-30, AC-37, AC-38, DC-003, AC-39, DC-004, DC-005		Hofmayer/Tapia/Langowski	8/31/84	
✓ 7	Concrete - Undocumented activity/rework	AQC-10		Hofmayer/Tapia/Langowski	8/17/84	18E11C-31-12
✓ 8	False/wrong documents	AQC-1, AQC-2, AQC-3, AQC-7		Hofmayer/Tapia/Langowski	8/17/84	draft comp. review by th
✓ 9	QC Inspector training and qualifications	AQC-9		Hofmayer/Tapia/Langowski	8/23/84	
✓ 10	Improper testing	AQC-4, AQC-5, AQC-6, AQC-8, AQC-11, AQC-48		Philleo/Devers	8/17/84	

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(C229)

7C, 7D

Category No.	Subject	Est. Mandays to Complete	Allegation Nos.	Package Prepared	Assigned to	Schedule		Remarks
						Open	Close	
V 11	Seismic designs/ construction	** UNKNOWN	AC-41		Hofmayer/ Tapia/ Langowski		8/23/84	
(12) 12	Concrete construction and deficiencies/tolerances	* [REDACTED]	AC-29		Philleo/ Devers		8/17/84	
V 13	Cracks in concrete pack beneath the reactor vessel	* [REDACTED]	AC-44		Philleo/ Devers		8/17/84	
14	Seismic Design Control room area deficiencies Control Room Carls	** UNKNOWN	AE-17		Hofmayer/ Tapia/ Langowski		8/31/84	
(15) 15	Rebars improperly drilled	4/0 8/30 * [REDACTED] ** UNKNOWN	AC-40, AQC-13, AQC-14, AQC-15, AC-18		Hofmayer/ Tapia/ Langowski		8/17/84	
V 16	Excavation/backfill	* [REDACTED]	AQ-64		Hofmayer/ Tapia/ Langowski		8/17/84	
V 17	Concrete sampling	* [REDACTED]	AQC-45					

CROSSMAY


1/76 -

ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN FORT WORTH STAR TELEGRAM, APRIL 4, 1979


1. [REDACTED] alleges that aggregate tests were falsified in January 1976, by [REDACTED]. He further states that [REDACTED] told him to do what [REDACTED] ordered him to do after he filed a complaint.
2. [REDACTED] alleges that the equipment used to run potential reactivity tests on aggregates was not used during three months in early 1976. Na₂SO₄
ASTM C3
3. Several QC inspectors (unidentified) allege that shortcuts were taken on tests involving sizing of the aggregate and its moisture content.
4. Unidentified sources allege that truck drivers added excess water to the concrete in transit from the batch plant.
5. [REDACTED] alleges that (sometime between August 1976, to March 1977) he flunked some concrete for the T-G Bldg., but it was still placed.
6. Three different persons (unidentified) allege that, during the placement of 6,600 cy on February 21, 1976, some concrete was placed without testing.
7. [REDACTED] alleges that during a placement in mid-1977 in the containment wall, he failed a load with a slump of 4-1/4" (4" max. specified) and that [REDACTED] directed the lab technician to record a value of 4" on the card.
8. [REDACTED] allege that cylinder compression test results were falsified by directions from [REDACTED].
9. Sources (unidentified) have alleged that tests on cylinders were run purposely faster than allowed by NRC regulations. (regulations not defined)
10. [REDACTED] allege that recertification of inspectors after 77-02 was done "open book" and with answers given.

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C231

4-16-79	Taylor's office	1505 to ^{approx} 1520 (15 min)
4-16-79		1730 to ^{approx} 1845 (1 hr. 15 min)
4-19-79	Taylor's office	1100 to ^{11¹⁵} 1120 (¹⁵ 20 min)
4-19-79	Taylor's office	1120 to ^{approx} 1220 (1 hr.)
4-19-79	Taylor's office	1245 to ^{approx} 1315 (30 min)

75

<u>INDIVIDUAL</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TIME</u>
	4-5-79	Denny's Restaurant. Arlington - 303	1400 to 1545 (1 hr. 45 min)
	4-9-79	Jose's Restaurant Granbury, Tx	1835 to 2000 hrs (2 hr 25 min)
	4-11-79	Aquilla Dam Site Testing Lab	1130 to <u>approx</u> 1300 (1 1/2 hr)
	4-12-79	Taylor's office	1420 to 1520 (1 hr)
	4-12-79	Taylor's office	1535 to <u>approx</u> 1620 (45 min.)
	4-12-79	Taylor's office	1310 to <u>approx</u> 1355 (45 min.)
	4-16-79	Taylor's office	1545 to 1600 (15 min.)
	4-16-79	Taylor's office	1430 to <u>approx</u> 1500 (30 min.)
	4-16-79	Taylor's office	1530 to <u>approx</u> 1550 (20 min)

RESULTS OF INTERVIEWS BY STEWART AND TAPIA

People implicated in drug usage at CPSES

[REDACTED] : "[REDACTED] told me that he once went out in the pickup with [REDACTED] and he saw them smoking pot"

{ [REDACTED] was lead-man }

[REDACTED] : "[REDACTED] would do dope"
"Rumor has it that when [REDACTED] went to get his physical, the doctor told him to stay off the pot because it was giving him high blood pressure."

[REDACTED] : "there was talk about pot being passed around in the lab."

[REDACTED] : "there is pot all over the job site"

[REDACTED] : [REDACTED] were 'high' 90% of the time. They were the main suppliers for the job site. It was well known on site that if you wanted anything, you went to [REDACTED] was also involved."

PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION

APR 11 5, 1979

PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE--PNO-79-74

This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of event of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance. The information presented is as initially received without verification or evaluation and is basically all that is known by IE staff on this date.

FACILITY: Comanche Peak Units 1 & 2
Texas Utilities Generating Company
Glen Rose, Texas (DN 50-445; 50-446)

SUBJECT: NEWS ARTICLES REPORTING FAILURE TO PERFORM SELECTED
QUALITY CONTROL TESTING FOR CONCRETE

The FORT WORTH STAR TELEGRAM, Fort Worth, Texas, reported in their April 4, 1979, evening edition, that their investigations had identified problems in the quality control testing program for the Comanche Peak construction project. The newspaper investigations covered the same subjects and times as two NRC, Region IV, investigations conducted during 1977, and 1978, of alleged deficiencies in the QC Laboratory activities during the placement of concrete. In 1978, the laboratory contractor was replaced and no further problems have been identified. The prior investigations conducted by Region IV resulted in corrective action for those identified allegations which were substantiated.

Region IV is conducting a review of the substance of the reported allegations relative to prior investigations, and is attempting to contact the quoted news article sources. Any newly identified allegations will be resolved.

In the news article, several individuals were quoted regarding failures to perform testing, and falsification of test records based on past test results. Since three of the quoted individuals were not contacted during previous investigations, the Region IV office will attempt to contact them to determine if their allegations have specific substance. If so, the matters of the prior investigations will be re-examined.

The April 5, 1979, morning edition of the FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM contains a follow-up article which includes comments of concern by the Governor and local and state officials. The article also reports the Region IV commitment to pursue the reported new allegations.

News media interest as a result of the news articles, and other items relating to the Three Mile Island incident has been high. Region IV management was interviewed by TV and newspaper reporters on April 4. No specific news release has been made by the region or the utility; however, TV and newspaper coverage has reflected both NRC and Licensee positions.

Contact: JBPenderson, IE x27551 GWRainmuth, IE x27551

Distribution: Transmitted H St *4/4/79*

Chairman Bendrie
Commissioner Kennedy
Commissioner Gilinsky

Transmitted: *MMDD 8/4/79*

L. V. Gossick, EDO
H. L. Ornstein, EDO
J. J. Fouchard, PA
N. M. Haller, MPA
R. G. Ryan, OSP
H. K. Sheper, ELD

Commissioner Bradford
Commissioner Ahearne

P. Bldg *4/4/79*
H. R. Denton, NRR
R. C. DeYoung, NRR
R. J. Mattson, NRR
V. Stello, NRR
R. S. Boyd, NRR
SS Bldg *4/4/79*
W. J. Dircks, NMSS
S. Levine, RES

S. J. Chalk, SECY
C. C. Kammerer, CA
(For Distribution)
J. G. Davis, IE
Region *4/4/79*

(MAIL)
J. J. Cummings, OIA
R. Ninogue, SC

Dupe 7pp

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7807

TO: R. E. SHEWMAKER

FROM: W. C. SEIDLE

PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE

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Region IV is conducting a review of the substance of the reported allegations relative to prior investigations, and is attempting to contact the quoted news article sources. Any newly identified allegations will be resolved.

Sent via mag card on 4/5/79 at 12:50 by DLF

ALLEGATIONS

1. [REDACTED] alleges that aggregate tests were falsified in January '76 by [REDACTED]. He further states that [REDACTED] told him to do what [REDACTED] ordered him to do after he filed a complaint.
2. [REDACTED] alleges that the equipment used to run potential reactivity tests on aggregates was not used during three months in early 1976.
3. Several QC inspectors (unidentified) allege that shortcuts were taken on tests involving sizing of the aggregate and its moisture content.
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9. Sources (unidentified) have alleged that tests on cylinders were run purposely faster than allowed by NRC regulations. (regulations not defined)
10. [REDACTED] allege that recertification of inspectors after 77-02 was done "open book" and with answers given.

April 10, 1979

0845 hrs

Subject: Interview With [REDACTED]

Place & Time:

Jose's Restuarant-Granbury, Texas

1835 hrs to 2000 hrs.

April 9, 1979

Interviewers:

W.A. Crossman

R.C. Stewart

R.G. Taylor

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(C233)

Preliminary Statement By Interviewee.

1. The reporter from the Star-Telegram had visited him in Nashville, Tenn. and has called several times since on specific points. The reporter promised not to use his name in print in any article growing out of the interviews. The interviewee stated that he has been ~~threatened~~ with bodily harm by unidentified persons.

2. The interviewee stated that he had ~~worked~~ ^{worked} for the R.W. Hunt Lab. at CPSES for [REDACTED]

Summary of Allegations:

1. The interviewee stated that equipment used to perform sodium sulfate test of aggregate was unused for several months but stated he had seen equipment used. He remembered the bad odor made by the test. He stated the he asked the "chemist" about not running the test and was told that he, the chemist, didn't often run the test because the results always came out the same. The interviewee stated that the records would make it appear that the test had been performed when it had not. Chemist was identified as [REDACTED]

THE INTERVIEWEE MARKED THE EQUIPMENT SO THAT HE COULD DETERMINE IF THE EQUIPMENT HAD BEEN USED. (HE USED WAX AND STATED THAT IT WAS NOT USED FOR SEVERAL MONTHS (STAR ITEM #2 STATES 3 MONTHS IN EARLY 1976). HE ALSO STATED THAT HE DID THIS TO "GET SOMETHING ON R.W. HUNT" TO GET THEM TO INCREASE THE PAY SCALE.

7C

2. In regard to a placement of concrete in the Circulating Water Intake Structure, the interviewee stated that he and others had rejected concrete trucks for being over specification limit on time to discharge. [REDACTED] the then and present B & R concrete superintendent) ordered his people to dump the concrete on the ground and shovel it into the formwork, which was done. Interviewee was aware the structure was not safety related.

3. The Hunt Lab cylinder curing ^{room} ~~run~~ was poorly run in late 1976 through early 1977, primarily due to poor maintenance. The cylinders were allowed to dry out.

4. A building area near the unit two containment structure was initially installed upside down due to the inability of the craft personnel to read the blueprints. He stated that there was a "master carpenter" hired who did not know which end of a hammer to use.

5. The unit one basemat was placed so fast that all of the required concrete test were not performed. (Start item #6)

Additional Information Not Obtained From the Interviewee:

1. The on file records indicated that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] No cause for termination is stated in records examined. He was certified as a [REDACTED]

2. The unit 1 containment basement was placed on Feb. 21, 1976 and did consist of approximately 6,600 yrd³ of concrete.

4 cont) FURTHER QUESTIONING REVEALED THAT HE WAS REFERRING TO REINFORCING STEEL INSTALLED IN WALLS UPSIDE DOWN, WHEN ASKED, HE STATED THAT THE PROBLEM WAS CORRECTED,

6. THE INTERVIEWEE WAS QUESTIONED REGARDING HIS EXPERIENCE WITH TESTING OF CONCRETE CYLINDERS. HE STATED THAT HE KNEW OF NO PROBLEMS IN THE CYLINDER TESTING ACTIVITIES. HE STATED HE HAD PERFORMED CYLINDER CAPPING OPERATIONS.

7C

The following interviewees have been contacted as of April 16, 1979,
in regard to allegations:

April 5

April 9

April 11

April 12

April 12

April 12

April 16 ✓

April 16 ✓

April 16 ✓

April 16 ✓

April 16 ✓

FOIA-85-59

C234