NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3	0 5 0 0 0 2 4 9	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)

Exceeded Technical Specification Limit for Type "B" and "C" Leak Testing

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
									N/A	0 5 0 0 0
1 1	0 7	8 5	8 5	— 0 2 1	— 0 0	1 2	0 6	8 5		0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
N		20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 0 0	20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE
Brian McCabe (X-483)	8 1 5 9 4 2 - 2 9 2 0

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	
B				N							

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
X	YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	NO	1 0	0 1	8 6

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

During the Unit 3 refueling outage, while performing DTS 1600-1 (Local Leak Rate Testing of Primary Containment Valves), the nitrogen makeup isolation valves leaked in excess of 3026 SCFH. This leakage caused the total "as found" leakage for type "B" and "C" testing to exceed the Technical Specification limit of 493.116 SCFH. Investigation found that teflon tape, used on the threads of the pipe connected to RV-3-8526 had become unwrapped and lodged on the seat of the valve preventing RV-3-8526 from seating properly. This caused the excessive leakage by the valve. Safety significance is minimal since the other in-line isolation valves showed no significant leakage during the test. Furthermore, the reactor building ventilation system would have isolated if the relief valve discharges had reached the radiological limits established by Dresden Station. Prior to the startup of Unit 3 the nitrogen makeup primary containment isolation valves will be retested in accordance with DTS 1600-1. Furthermore, a Supplemental Report will be submitted following the current refueling outage giving the totals for "as found" and "as left" leakage for type "B" and "C" leak testing.

Previous occurrence was reported under Reportable Occurrence #84-23 under Docket #050237.

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Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3	0 5 0 0 0 2 4 9	8 5	— 0 1 2	— 0 0	0 2 OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

During the Unit 3 refueling outage, while performing DTS 1600-1 (Local Leak Rate Testing of Primary Containment Valves), the nitrogen makeup isolation valves leaked in excess of 3026 SCFH. This leakage caused the total "as found" leakage for type "B" and "C" testing to exceed the Technical Specification limit of 493.116 SCFH. Investigation found leakage coming through lifted relief valve, RV-3-8526, located between primary containment isolation valves MO-3-1601-57, AO-3-1601-58 and AO-3-1601-59. The relief valve discharges to the Unit 3 reactor building ventilation. It is not known exactly when RV-3-8526 lifted but the previous leak rate test, performed 10/21/83, showed no significant leakage by the valve.

The safety significance of this event is minimal since the other in-line isolation valves showed no significant leakage during the test. Furthermore, the reactor building ventilation system would have isolated if the relief valve discharges had reached the radiological limits established by Dresden Station.

Previous occurrence of a failure of type "B" and "C" leak testing was reported by Reportable Occurrence 84-23 on Docket #050237.

The cause of this event was teflon tape found on the seat of RV-3-8526 preventing the relief valve from seating properly. During the most recent installation of RV-3-8526, Mechanics wrapped the threads of the pipe on which the valve was installed with teflon tape to improve the seal between the valve and the pipe. The tape came loose during the installation of the valve and lodged on the seat of the valve. This prevented RV-3-8526 from seating properly. An investigation of Mechanical Maintenance files showed that RV-3-8526 was installed prior to the change in station maintenance practices which forbids the use of teflon tape as a sealant in the reactor building. The Mechanical Maintenance Department discovered the problem with RV-3-8526 and have informed its Mechanics of the importance of not using teflon tape as a sealant in the reactor building.

Prior to the startup of Unit 3, the nitrogen makeup primary containment isolation valves will be retested in accordance with DTS 1600-1. Furthermore, a Supplemental Report will be submitted following the current refueling outage giving the totals for "as found" and "as left" leakage for type "B" and "C" leak testing.

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December 6, 1985

DJS Ltr #85-1132

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Licensee Event Report #85-021-0, Docket #050249 is being submitted as required by Technical Specification 6.6, NUREG 1022 and 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B).

D.J. Scott
Station Manager
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

DJS/kjl

Enclosure

cc: J.G. Keppler, Regional Administrator, Region III
File/NRC
File/Numerical

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