

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) EDWIN I. HATCH, UNIT II										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 1 6 1 6										PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2	
TITLE (4) ELECTRICAL LINK CAUSES REACTOR WATER CLEANUP VALVE ISOLATION																					
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)											
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES			DOCKET NUMBER(S)									
0 1	1	0 8	6	8 6	0 1	0 0	0 2	0 7	8 6				0 5 0 0 0								
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)																			
1		20.402(b)				20.406(c)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)							
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.406(a)(1)(i)				50.36(e)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(e)							
0 8 5		20.406(a)(1)(ii)				50.36(e)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)							
20.406(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)													
20.406(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)													
20.406(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(ix)													
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																					
NAME Raymond D. Baker, Nuclear Licensing Manager - Hatch										TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 4 0 4 5 2 6 1 7 0 1 6											
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																					
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC											
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR							
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO											

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At approximately 1125 CST on 01/10/86 the Unit was operating at 2079 MWt (approximately 85% rated power) with Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) system loop "B" in service.

At that time plant technicians were performing procedure 57SV-G31-002-2. During performance of the final step of that procedure, a technician was verifying that electrical link ccc-2 in control room panel 2H11-P612 was closed and secure. When the technician placed a nut driver on the sliding disconnect nut on ccc-2, that electrical link suddenly opened. This unexpected movement caused the technician to inadvertently bump the jumper wire which had been placed across links ccc-1 and ccc-2, knocking it loose from link ccc-2. The loose end of the jumper wire touched ground and blew fuse 2A71-F18, which is in the power supply line to relay 2A71-K27. This caused RWCU system outboard primary containment isolation valve 2G31-F004 to isolate.

Subsequent to the RWCU isolation, plant technicians replaced the blown fuse. At approximately 1215 CST on 01/06/86 operations personnel restored RWCU to normal operation.

RWCU primary containment isolation valve 2G31-F004 isolated as expected on loss of power to relay 2G31-K27. Therefore the health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (5)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
EDWIN I. HATCH, UNIT II	0 5 0 0 0 3 6 6	8 6	- 0 0 1	- 0 0	0 2	OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

This 30 day LER is reportable per 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv) because an unplanned actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature (primary containment isolation valve 2G31-F004) occurred.

At approximately 1125 CST on 01/10/86 the Unit was operating at 2079 Mwt (approximately 85% rated power) with Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) system loop "B" in service. At that time plant technicians were performing the monthly "RWCU SYSTEM DIFFERENTIAL FLOW INSTRUMENT F.T.&C." procedure (57SV-G31-002-2). During performance of the final step of that procedure, one of those technicians was verifying that electrical link ccc-2 in control room panel 2H11-P612 was closed and secure. When the technician placed the nut driver on the sliding disconnect nut on ccc-2, that nut turned against stripped threads on the matching bolt, thus allowing the electrical link to suddenly open. This unexpected occurrence caused the technician to inadvertently bump the jumper wire which had been placed across links ccc-1 and ccc-2, knocking it loose from link ccc-2. The loose end of the jumper wire touched ground and blew fuse 2A71-F18 (in control room panel 2H11-P623) thus de-energizing RWCU outboard isolation valve logic actuation/loss of logic power failed safe relay 2A71-K27. When relay 2A71-K27 was de-energized, RWCU system outboard primary containment isolation valve 2G31-F004 isolated per design.

Subsequent to the RWCU isolation, plant technicians replaced fuse 2A71-F18 and retightened the sliding disconnect nut on electrical link ccc-2. At approximately 1215 CST on 01/10/86 operations personnel reset the RWCU isolation signal, reopened RWCU outboard suction isolation valve 2G31-F004 and restarted RWCU recirculation pump 2G31-C001B, thus returning the RWCU system to service.

The root cause of this event has been determined to be normal wear of the sliding disconnect bolt threads on electrical link ccc-2. That electrical link (ccc-2) along with its sliding disconnect is scheduled for replacement during the next outage of sufficient duration. Immediate replacement is not necessary because inadvertent opening of this electrical link in the future, would not inhibit completion of any subsequently required safety functions by the logic of which it is a component.

There have been no past similar events where RWCU outboard suction isolation valve 2G31-F004 has isolated because fuse 2G31-F18 was blown by unintentionally grounding a jumper wire.

The subject engineered safety feature (valve 2G31-F004) responded (isolated) as expected to the loss of power on relay 2G31-K27. Therefore this event did not affect the health and safety of the public.

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February 7, 1986

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Attached is Licensee Event Report 50-366/1986-001. This report meets the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).

Very truly yours,

ESh
for L. T. Gucwa

CBS/1c

Attachment

c: Mr. J. T. Beckham, Jr.
Mr. H. C. Nix, Jr.
NRC-Region II
GO-NORMS

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