

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Unit #1										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 2					PAGE (3) 1 OF 012				
TITLE (4) Diesel 101 Service Water Standpipe hinged cap wedged shut																			
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)									
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER-S:						
0	8	2	8	5	8	5	0	3	4	0	0	9	8	5	0	5	0	0	0
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5 (Check one or more of the following) (11)																	
4		20.402(b)				20.406(c)				80.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)					
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.406(a)(1)(i)				80.36(a)(1)				80.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)					
0		20.406(a)(1)(ii)				80.36(a)(2)				80.73(a)(2)(vi)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract Below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)					
		20.406(a)(1)(iii)				80.73(a)(2)(ii)				80.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)									
		20.406(a)(1)(iv)				80.73(a)(2)(iii)				80.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)									
		20.406(a)(1)(v)				80.73(a)(2)(iv)				80.73(a)(2)(ix)									
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																			
NAME Gary G. Rhoads, Operational Compliance Engineer										TELEPHONE NUMBER									
										AREA CODE 5 1 6 9 2 9 - 8 3 0 0									
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																			
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC									
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)			MONTH	DAY	YEAR				
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE: )										<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO									
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)																			
<p>On August 28, 1985 at 1330, the hinged cap on the Service Water Standpipe, located off the Service Water discharge line for Emergency Diesel 101, was found to be wedged shut. This cap provides a flow path for the service water to the EDG following a seismic event. Since portions of the Service Water system discharge line are not seismically qualified and must be considered lost during a seismic event, this hinged cap /standpipe arrangement provides an alternate flow path for service water in the event there is a seismic event which destroys the normal overboard discharge path. The plant was in Operational Condition 4 at the time. The 18 month surveillance requirement for this cap was met on April 16, 1984, so the wedge was assumed to be installed sometime after this date. In between this surveillance date and the discovery date, the plant was periodically in Operational Condition 2, requiring three EDGs to be operable (per Technical Specifications 3.8.1.). Since the hinged cap was wedged shut, there would have been no service water flowpath to the EDG 101 if there had been a seismic event during this period that resulted in loss of the normal discharge flow path. Plant Management was notified of the event and the NRC was notified per 10CFR50.72. To prevent recurrence, The wedge was removed and the temporary scaffolding was removed to prevent immediate access to the standpipes. Although the event occurred while the plant was in Operational Condition 4, the Licensee determined that a voluntary report was warranted.</p>																			

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1):  Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Unit#1	DOCKET NUMBER (2):  0500032285	LER NUMBER (6):			PAGE (3):	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
		0	3	4	0	0
		02		OF 02		

TEXT (IF MORE SPACE IS REQUIRED, USE ADDITIONAL NRC Form 366A's (17))

On August 28, 1985 at 1330, the hinged cap on the Service Water Standpipe, located off the Service Water discharge line for Emergency Diesel Generator 101, was found to be wedged shut. The plant was in Operational Condition 4 at the time of the discovery of the event, but the wedge may have been in place while the plant was in Operational Condition 2. A Standpipe Hinged Cap Operability Test was performed April 16, 1984, and in accordance with the surveillance requirements identified in Technical Specification 4.7.1.1.C.4, was not due to be performed again until October 18, 1985. Since there is no way of knowing when the wedge was placed in the standpipe hinged cap, the most conservative assumption would be that the wedge was in place some time since after the last surveillance (4/16/84).

The Diesel Generator Service Water Standpipe employs a hinged cap assembly, which includes a 100 pound weight welded on top of it. If the the discharge line was unavailable, the buildup of the discharge pressure above 100 pounds would lift the cap and keep a continuous flow of service water through the diesel generator heat exchangers. Each heat exchanger (three total - EDG 101, 102 & 103) has a separate independent service water discharge line (6"O.D.), and a standpipe (3"O.D.) with a hinged cap off this line. All three discharge lines then tie into a larger non-seismically qualified fiberglass line. If, during a seismic event, the non-seismic line were to be damaged, preventing service water flow through it, the discharge pressure in each line would increase. Once the pressure exceeds 100 pounds, the hinged cap on the standpipe would open, venting service water to the atmosphere, keeping a constant service water flow path. Since the hinged cap for EDG101 was wedged shut, there would be no flow path of service water through the heat exchanger. Technical Specification 3.8.1.2 requires two EDGs to be operable in Operational Condition 4 and 5 and Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 requires three EDGs to be operable in Operational Conditions 1, 2 and 3. Plant management was notified of the event and the NRC was notified per 10CFR50.72.

In accordance with FSAR chapter 3.3, "The capacity of any two emergency diesel generators is sufficient to meet the safety-related load required by a loss of coolant accident and loss of offsite AC power". Therefore, it is felt that no safety significance existed for operating during this time.

The wedge was removed from the standpipe and the temporary scaffolding was removed, preventing immediate access to the standpipe.

Although the event occurred while the plant was in Operational Condition 4, the Licensee determined that a voluntary report was warranted.



## LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY

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September 26, 1985


PM-85-210

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

In accordance with 10CFR50.73, enclosed is a copy of Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Unit 1's Licensee Event Report 85-034.

Sincerely yours,

  
William E. Steiger, Jr.  
Plant Manager

WES/gr

Enclosure

cc: Dr. Thomas E. Murley, Regional Administrator  
John Berry, Senior Resident Inspector  
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Records Center  
American Nuclear Insurers

SR.A21.0200