NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Sequoyah, Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 3 2 7	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)

Diesel Generator Inoperability

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)					REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR		SEQUENTIAL NUMBER		REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 8	2 7	8 5	8 5	–	0 3 4	–	0 0	0 9	2 6	8 5	Sequoyah, Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 2 8
												0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	5	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 0 0	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	XX OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	Information Only
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE
Glenn Duggin, Compliance Section Engineer	6 1 5 8 7 0 – 6 5 4 8

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
	YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	XX NO			

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

This LER is for information only, and it is not reportable per 10 CFR 50.73.

While performing Surveillance Instruction (SI)-26, "Unit 2 Diesel Generator Testing for Unit 1 Surveillance Requirements," the 2B-B diesel generator (D/G) did not perform correctly. Investigation revealed that the electrical connector between the control panel and the hydraulic actuator on the engine governor of D/G 2B-1 was loose. The connector was checked, reconnected, and tightened. D/G 2B-B was started, and the governor operated correctly.

The condulet that holds the Amphenol connector to the governor has a thread mismatched with the governor. During previous maintenance on this connector, the threads have become worn and have made it difficult to make a tight connection. This has been discussed with the vendor, and the vendor has issued a 10 CFR Part 21 on the connector. The vendor is now supplying a new condulet with matching threads which TVA is procuring. The new condulet will prevent future problems of this type.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Sequoyah, Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 3 2 7	8 5	— 0 3 4	— 0 0	0 2 OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

This LER is for information only, and it is not reportable per 10 CFR 50.73.

Unit 1 was in mode 5 (0 percent power, 300 psig, 162 degrees F), and unit 2 was in mode 5 (0 percent power, 300 psig, 141 degrees F).

While performing Surveillance Instruction (SI)-26, "Unit 2 Diesel Generator Testing for Unit 1 Surveillance Requirements," the 2B-B diesel generator (D/G) did not perform correctly. Since SI-26 was being performed in mode 5 and limiting condition for operation (LCO) 3.8.1.1 is only applicable in modes 1 through 4, no action statements were entered for this event. LCO 3.8.1.2 requires one train of D/Gs operable in modes 5 and 6 which was met by 'A' train D/Gs being operable.

Investigation revealed that the electrical connector between the control panel and the hydraulic actuator on the engine governor of D/G 2B-1 was loose. The condulet that holds the Amphenol connector to the governor has a thread mismatched with the governor. During previous maintenance on this connector, the threads have become worn and have made it difficult to ensure a tight connection. The connector was checked, reconnected, and tightened. D/G 2B-B was started, and the governors operated correctly. The generators are driven by two engines each, and only one engine was affected.

Conversations were conducted with the manufacturer concerning the condulet connection on September 4 and 6, 1985 (Power Systems Division of Morrison-Knudsen). The Power Systems Division (PSD) determined that the condulet was a defect in their equipment and is reportable as required by 10 CFR Part 21. PSD is going to file a notice with NRC. The opinion of PSD is that the defect does not render the D/G inoperative as long as the connection is tight. PSD does recommend surveillance of the connector be initiated and the new condulet installed as soon as possible. While repairing D/G 2B-B, all the other D/G connections were verified for tightness. All of the D/Gs are run at least once per month to verify operability. New condulets that are threaded correctly are on order and will be installed when they arrive.

This event had no effect on public health or safety, and no safety margins were exceeded. No technical specification actions were entered or exceeded.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant
Post Office Box 2000
Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379

September 26, 1985

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Gentlemen:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET NO. 50-327 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT SQRO-50-327/85034

The enclosed licensee event report provides details concerning an inoperable diesel generator discovered during normal surveillance. This event is reported for information only.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

P.R. Wallace

P. R. Wallace
Plant Manager

Enclosure
cc (Enclosure):

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Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Records Center
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
Suite 1500
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

NRC Inspector, NUC PR, Sequoyah

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