



NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION / 300 ERIE BOULEVARD WEST, SYRACUSE, N.Y. 13202 / TELEPHONE (315) 474-1511

January 31, 1986
(NMP2L 0601)

Mr. R. W. Starostecki, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
Division of Reactor Projects
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Re: Nine Mile Point - Unit 2
Docket No. 50-410

Dear Mr. Starostecki:

Enclosed is a final report, in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e), for the problem concerning the failure of containment purge system isolation valves to close under loss of coolant accident condition. This problem was reported via tel-con to S. Collins of your staff on September 25, 1984.

Very truly yours,

C. V. Mangan
Senior Vice President

CVM/GG/c1a
(1409H)

xc: Director of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

R. A. Gramm, NRC Senior Resident Inspector

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NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION
NINE MILE POINT - UNIT 2
DOCKET NO. 50-410

Final Report For a Problem
Concerning Failure of Containment Purge System Isolation
Valve To Close Under Loss of Coolant Accident Condition
(55(e)-84-42)

Description of the Problem

The problem pertains to containment purge system isolation valves. The original application of these valves stipulated that the valves will remain closed during normal plant operations and will serve the containment purge system only. However, system design changes implemented due to NUREG-0660, Task II.B.8 resulted in the subject valves serving both the containment purge system and nitrogen inerting system. These system changes required the valves to be open during certain normal operational modes. As a result, these valves are required to close within 5 seconds in the event of a Loss of Coolant Accident. At our request, the valve vendor, Posi-Seal International Incorporated, performed an analysis which indicated that during Loss of Coolant Accident blowdown valves 2CPS*AOV104, 105, 110 and 111 will not meet the requirement to close within 5 seconds without being in the preferred orientation.

Analysis of Safety Implications

Since the subject valves were called on to service an additional system, (nitrogen inerting system) their design criteria changed. The failure of these valves to initially meet the new criteria is a result of a design change, not the result of a design error or deficiency. Therefore, the above problem does not represent a reportable deficiency under 10CFR50.55(e). It should be noted that closure time of the subject valves is being considered under an open item covered in SER section 3.10.2.