

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket Nos: 50-413, 50-414

License Nos: NPF-35, NPF-52

Report Nos.: 50-413/97-06, 50-414/97-06

Licensee: Duke Power Company

Facility: Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2

Location: 4800 Concord Road  
York, SC 29745-9635

Dates: March 17 - 20, 1997

Inspectors: W. W. Stansberry, Safeguards Specialist

Approved by: P. E. Fredrickson, Chief, Special Inspection Branch  
Division of Reactor Safety

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2  
NRC Inspection Report 50-413/97-06, 50-414/97-06

This safeguards inspection included aspects of licensee plant support. The report covers a week period of an announced routine inspection by a regional safeguards inspector.

### Plant Support

- Compensatory measures implemented for degraded security equipment and conditions were within the commitments of Physical Security and Contingency Plan (PSCP). Section S1
- The licensee used programs that will ensure the reliability of security related equipment and devices. The testing and maintenance program was a strength in the security program. Section 2.4
- The licensee was complying with the weapons storage criteria in the PSCP and the Security Guidelines. Section 2.8
- The security force was being trained in accordance with the T&QP and regulatory requirements. This area was a strength in the security program. Section 5.1

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## REPORT DETAILS

### IV. Plant Support

#### **S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities**

##### **S1.1 Compensatory Measures**

###### **a. Inspection Scope (81700)**

The inspector evaluated the licensee's program for compensatory measures for degraded security equipment. This was to ensure the reliability of the physical protection of vital equipment and security-related devices; and licensee's compliance with the criteria in the Physical Security and Contingency Plan (PSCP), Revision 4, dated April 18, 1996.

###### **b. Observations and Findings**

Compensatory measures, which are to equal the failed or damaged component of the security system, were reviewed. These measures consisted of equipment, additional security force personnel and specific procedures to assure that the effectiveness of the security system was not reduced. At the beginning of this inspection, there were five non-outage regulatory compensatory measures (NRCM) in effect. By the end of the inspections there were four NRCMs in effect. The oldest NRCM pertained to the video capture system (PIC), dated August 29, 1995. The PIC was waiting for a software upgrade. None of the NRCMs required security force compensatory posts.

###### **c. Conclusions**

Through observations, interviews, and documentation review, the inspector concluded that compensatory measures implemented for degraded security equipment and conditions were within the commitments of PSCP. There were no violations of regulatory requirements found in this area.

#### **S2 STATUS OF SECURITY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT**

##### **S2.4 Testing and Maintenance**

###### **a. Inspection Scope (81700)**

The inspector evaluated the licensee's program for testing and maintenance of security equipment. This was to ensure the reliability of physical protection-related equipment and security-related devices; and licensee's compliance with the criteria in Chapters 9 and 16 of the PSCP and 14 Security Procedures.

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b. Observations and Findings

The licensee's program for testing and maintenance was established to ensure that physical protection-related equipment met the general performance requirements. Each intrusion alarm was tested for performance at the beginning and end of any period in which it was used but at least every seven days during continuous use. Alarm station operators tested the communication equipment required for onsite communication for performance at least at the beginning of each security work shift. Communication equipment required for offsite communication was tested at least once a day.

The inspector reviewed 15 records documenting tests and maintenance on security-related equipment from April 2, 1994 to February 28, 1997. All documents were readily available and properly maintained. Noteworthy, was the Equipment Specialist's Consolidated Repair/Maintenance and Performance Test Task List, used to track and document the Workorder Requests and annual performance tests to each security related equipment item. This list was part of a security equipment data base to control this information.

Also noteworthy, was the Security Weapons Maintenance and Repair data base maintained by the Security Armorer. This data base recorded the weapons serial number, date and name of the individual the weapons to whom were issued, reason for maintenance, date of test firing, repairs performed, by whom, and date of repair.

c. Conclusion

Through observations, interviews, and documentation review, the inspector concluded that the licensee used programs that will ensure the reliability of security related equipment and devices. The testing and maintenance program was a strength in the security program. There were no violations of regulatory requirements found in this area.

S2.8 Security Equipment Storage/Armory

a. Inspection Scope (817C0)

The inspector evaluated the licensee's weapons storage facility to ensure application of the criteria in the PSCP and Security Guideline No. 3, Revision 13, dated December 23, 1996, "Firearms Control Guidelines".

b. Observations and Findings

The inspector verified that weapons were secured in locked containers within a locked room with no exterior entry other than through the metal fire doors securing the weapons vault and the security officers locker room. Access to the weapons vault

was limited to the armorer and the designated alternate. Individually issued weapons were either with the security officer or secured in the locked locker room inside an individual's locked cabinet. Only the armorer and the individual had access to the individual's cabinet. Response weapons other than sidearms were secured in secure cabinets that were in facilities continuously manned 24 hours a day.

c. Conclusions

Based on this evaluation, the inspector concluded that the licensee was complying with the weapons storage criteria in the PSCP and the Security Guidelines. There were no violations of regulatory requirements found in this area.

## **S5 SECURITY SAFEGUARDS STAFF TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION**

### **S5.1 Security Training and Qualification**

a. Inspection Scope (81700)

The inspector reviewed the security training and qualification program to ensure that the licensee was complying with the criteria in the Security Personnel Training and Qualification Plan (T&QP), Revision 2, dated April 18, 1996 and Security Guideline No. 8, Revision 6, dated March 1, 1993, "Physical and Qualification Training Requirements".

b. Observation and Findings

The inspector interviewed security non-supervisory personnel, supervisors, and witnessed approximately 20 other security personnel in the performance of their duties. Members of the security force were knowledgeable in their responsibilities, plan commitments and procedures. Documentation and equipment inspected were found as committed to in the approved T&QP.

The inspector found that armed response personnel had been instructed in the use of deadly force as required by 10 CFR Part 73. Members of the security organization were requalified at least every twelve months in the performance of their assigned tasks, both normal and contingency. This included the conduct of physical exercise requirements and the completion of the firearms course. The licensee had an onsite security organization, including adequately trained and qualified security force members in accordance with the licensee's T&QP and the Safeguards Contingency Plan.

The inspector observed 10 response exercises that were conducted during the back shifts. These exercises were part of a continuing exercise program to ensure all responders are exercised/drilled in each of the designated response positions several times a year. The inspector also observed response personnel perform the Stress

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Firing Course at the firing range. Security force personnel fired rifle and handgun targets from numerous heights and positions in adverse weather conditions. All personnel performed in a more than adequate manner during this stress exercise. The strong emphasis on safety during this training session was noted by the inspector.

c. Conclusion

The inspector concluded through observation and interviews of security force personnel, and observations of training exercises/drills that the security force was being trained in accordance with the T&QP and regulatory requirements. This area was a strength in the security program. There were no violations of regulatory requirements identified in this area.

### V. MANAGEMENT MEETING

X1 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspector presented the inspection results to licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on March 20, 1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. Although reviewed during this inspection, proprietary information is not contained in this report. Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.

### PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

Emmons, B., Organizational Effectiveness Manager  
Nicholson, K., Technical Specialist  
Peterson, G., Station Manager

NRC

Balmain, P., Resident Inspector

### INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

IP 81700: Physical Security Program for Power Reactors

### ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

NONE

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