


RETURN TO 396-SS PDR

70-3008



Nuclear Construction Division  
Robinson Plaza, Building 2, Suite 210  
Pittsburgh, PA 15205



2NRC-6-004  
(412) 787-5141  
(412) 923-1960  
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January 9, 1986

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555

ATTENTION: Mr. John G. Davies, Director  
Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

SUBJECT: Beaver Valley Power Station - Unit No. 2  
Docket No. 50-412  
Application for Special Nuclear Material License

REFERENCE: 2NRC-5-130, dated September 13, 1985

Gentlemen:

The above referenced letter transmitted Revision 1 to the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 (BVPS-2) Special Nuclear Material License application. Subsequent to this revision, an additional item of concern has been brought to the attention of Duquesne Light Company (DLC) by Mr. Norman Ketzlach, Uranium Fuel License Branch, via telephone conversation on December 9, 1985. This concern addressed the BVPS-2 Security Plan that would be in effect during new fuel receipt (10CFR70.64[f,g]).


Please find enclosed six copies (Attachment 1) of the proposed DLC plan to control the BVPS-2 Fuel Building for temporary storage of fuel from the date of receipt until fuel load.

DLC hereby requests authority to establish a temporary Controlled Access Area (CAA) at its BVPS-2 property in the Borough of Shippingport, Beaver County, Pennsylvania, under the provisions of 10CFR73.67(f). This temporary CAA will be established in the BVPS-2 Fuel Building, the location is as shown on FSAR Drawing No. 9.1-1 (Attachment 2).

If you should have any questions, please call T. J. Zoglmann at (412) 787-5141.

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY

By

  
J. C. Carey  
Vice President

TJZ/wjs  
Attachment

cc: Mr. N. Ketzlach (NRC) (w/a)  
Mr. J. Lukehart (NRC) (w/a)  
Mr. B. Manilli (NRC) (w/a)  
Mr. B. K. Singh, (NRC) (w/a)  
Mr. M. Smith (NRC) (w/a)  
Mr. G. Walton, (NRC/BVPS-2) (w/a)

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FEE EXEMPT

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PLAN TO CONTROL THE BVPS-2 FUEL BUILDING  
FOR TEMPORARY STORAGE OF FUEL

NOTE: Items not specifically discussed in this plan are discussed in the BVPS-1 (approved) Physical Security Plan.

1. USE AND STORAGE AT A FIXED SITE

1.1 Areas for Use and Temporary Storage

A Controlled Access Area (CAA) for the temporary storage of low strategic significance Special Nuclear Material (SNM) will be established in the BVPS-2 Fuel Building. This storage area will be in use commencing with the arrival of BVPS-2 new fuel on site and will end when the Operating License has been issued to load fuel into the BVPS-2 reactor.

1. Temporarily Established CAA's

The fuel building will be isolated from other plant areas using locked doors, walls, and similar barriers. Access control shall be effected using a member of the BVPS-1 security force who has been granted unescorted access to the temporary CAA. This member of the security force will be posted inside the Fuel Building, and thus will also provide surveillance of the stored fuel. The size of the CAA and the numbers of persons to be admitted at any one time shall be sufficiently small that this member of the security force shall be able to provide suitable surveillance.

2. Permanently Established CAA's

Not applicable.

1.2 Areas for Permanent Storage

Not applicable.

2. DETECTION DEVICES AND PROCEDURES AT A FIXED SITE

A member of the security force, as described in 1.1 above, will be provided to minimize the possibility for unauthorized removal of special nuclear material.

2.1 Earliness of Detection

The presence of a member of the security force will provide immediate detection of theft or diversion of special nuclear material.

## 2.2 Monitoring Controlled Access Areas

### 1. Early Detection of Gross Theft of LEU

Since the Fuel Building has been constructed as a Vital Area for BVPS-2 and its walls, doors, and other barriers meet the requirements of Vital Area barriers, the presence of a member of the security force will provide for early detection of theft of LEU.

### 2. Early Detection of Minor Theft of LEU

See (2.2) 1, above.

### 3. Early Detection of Theft of SSNM

Not applicable.

## 3. SECURITY RESPONSE AT A FIXED SITE

A member of the BVPS-1 security force will be on duty at the temporary CAA at all times and will be able to assess unauthorized activities. A minimum of one additional member of the BVPS-1 security force will respond to any unauthorized penetrations or security incidents at the temporary CAA.

## 4. RESPONSE PROCEDURES AT A FIXED SITE

Response procedures will be developed for the following types of incidents:

1. Situations that could possibly lead to theft or compromise of SNM (e.g., civil disturbance, direct attack). Response: Dispatch additional security force personnel to augment the manning at the CAA. Notify LLEA, FBI, NRC.
2. Discovery that the security system has been breached or compromised. Response: Search area, determine that the fuel is present and intact. Notify NRC.
3. Discovery that some SNM is missing. Response: Conduct search, check access logs. Notify NRC, LLEA, FBI.
4. Discovery that SNM has been vandalized or destroyed. Response: Conduct search, check access logs, augment security force. Notify NRC, LLEA, FBI.

Local Law Enforcement Agencies (LLEA) assistance is available. Their capabilities and agreements with them are documented on site and are committed to in the BVPS-1 Physical Security Plan, which has been approved by the NRC.

5. SHIPPING

- 5.1 DLC does not ship fuel to BVPS. New fuel is shipped to the site by Westinghouse under the provisions of their SNM License No. 1506. In the event that the new fuel is damaged prior to use, it will be returned to Westinghouse per their SNM License No. 1506 (shipping) and No. 1107 (receipt).
- 5.2 Upon receipt of the new fuel on site, the fuel will be off-loaded directly to the BVPS-2 Fuel Building, which will then become the temporary CAA established and authorized by this request.

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Attach-2




FIGURE 9 1-1  
ARRANGEMENT-FUEL 6  
DECONTAMINATION BUILDING  
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION-UNIT 2  
FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT

NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED