

Docket



GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY

RIVER BEND STATION

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
346-8651

November 22, 1985

RBG- 22669

File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.5

Mr. Robert D. Martin, Regional Administrator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region IV
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
Arlington, TX 76011



Dear Mr. Martin:

River Bend Station - Unit 1
Docket No. 50-458

Attached for your information is a report containing a brief description of a change to the River Bend Station (RBS) initial test program and a summary of the safety evaluation for that change. This report is provided with regard to the RBS Facility Operating License NPF-47, Section 2.C(12).

Sincerely,

William J. Bocker
for J. E. Bocker
Manager-Engineering,
Nuclear Fuels & Licensing
River Bend Nuclear Group

JEB
JEB/FRT/RJK/amg

Attachment

cc: Director of Inspection & Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

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ATTACHMENT

November 22, 1985
RSG-22669

Summary Description of Change

Section 14.2.12.3.32 of the River Bend Station Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) describes initial testing of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System (Test No. 71). This revision deletes testing of the RHR System in the steam condensing mode.

Summary of Safety Evaluation

DISCUSSION

The RHR system is designed to remove residual and decay heat generated by the core under normal and abnormal shutdown conditions. The suppression pool cooling function of the RHR system ensures that the temperature in the suppression pool immediately following blowdown does not exceed a predetermined limit. The shutdown cooling function of the RHR system removes residual and decay heat from the nuclear boiler system after reactor shutdown in preparation for refueling or nuclear system servicing. Testing of these two functions demonstrates compliance to Regulatory Guide 1.68, paragraphs C.1.a and C.1.b. During nuclear boiler system isolation, steam at reduced pressure and temperature can be directed from the main steam lines to the RHR heat removal system heat exchanger when the RHR system is operated in the steam condensing mode. This function of this mode of operation is to increase plant availability by maintaining hot standby conditions until a plant restart can be performed. This mode of operation is not safety related and therefore its testing can be deleted from the power ascension testing.

CONCLUSION

Testing of the suppression pool cooling and shutdown cooling mode of operation of the RHR system meets the objectives of Regulatory Guide 1.68, paragraphs C.1.a and C.1.b. Testing of the steam condensing mode (Regulatory Guide 1.68, Appendix A, paragraph 5.1) is not required since this mode is not safety related. In addition, the River Bend Station Facility Operating License NPF-47, Section 2.C(5) states that the RHR system shall not be used in the steam condensing mode without prior written approval of the staff. Deleting testing of the steam condensing mode does not affect any safety systems or the safe operation of the plant and does not involve an unreviewed safety question. Therefore, the steam condensing mode of the RHR system can be deleted.

ATTACHMENT - (Continued)

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Summary Description of Change

Section 14.2.12.3.14 of the River Bend Station Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) describes system expansion testing (Test No. 17) and provides evaluation criteria for movement tolerances. This revision corrects four (4) typographical errors which resolves differences between the actual test procedures and the tolerances provided in the FSAR Table 14.2-1.

Summary of Safety Evaluation

DISCUSSION

The objective of the thermal expansion test is to confirm that the pipe suspension system is working as designed and that the pipe is free of obstructions that could constrain free pipe movement. These revisions do not alter the test as described in the FSAR or performance of the tests to demonstrate the adequacy of the piping suspension system design. The tests are considered the same as before the revisions.

CONCLUSION

These revisions do not alter the safe operation of the plant or involve an unreviewed safety question. Therefore, these revisions can be implemented.

Controlled

Date: 12/2/85
(7/85)

DRSP AND DRSS ROUTE SLIP

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