

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)
EDWIN I HATCH, UNIT IDOCKET NUMBER (2)
0 5 0 0 0 3 2 1 1 1 OF 0 3TITLE (4)
GRID FLUCTUATIONS CAUSE UNPLANNED ESF ACTUATIONS DURING REFUELING OUTAGEEVENT DATE (5)
MONTH DAY YEAR
1 2 2 6 8 5 8 5
LER NUMBER (6)
SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER
0 5 0 0 1 0 2
REPORT DATE (7)
MONTH DAY YEAR
1 0 8 6
OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)
FACILITY NAMES DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0OPERATING MODE (9) 5
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 10 0
THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)
20.402(b) 20.406(e) X 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 73.71(b)
20.406(a)(1)(i) 50.36(e)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.71(c)
20.406(a)(1)(ii) 50.36(e)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vi) OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 355A)
20.406(a)(1)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
20.406(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
20.406(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER
Raymond D. Baker, Nuclear Licensing Manager - Hatch 4 0 4 5 2 6 - 7 0 1 6
AREA CODECOMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPDOS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPDOSSUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO
EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)
MONTH DAY YEARABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)
During the current Unit 1 refueling outage with no fuel in the vessel, the Reactor Protection System (RPS) Alternate Power Supply Bus Breakers tripped, on five separate occasions, while feeding the "B" RPS bus. Each event resulted in multiple Engineered Safety Features (ESF) actuations on the following dates and times: 12/26/85 at approximately 0549 CST, 12/30/85 at approximately 0030 CST, 01/02/86 at approximately 0042 CST, 01/07/86 at approximately 0735 CST, and 01/11/86 at approximately 0650 CST.

The RPS Alternate Power Supply Bus Breakers tripped when the RPS Alternate Power Supply Bus voltage sensing circuitry responded to voltage fluctuations on the bus. The RPS Alternate Power Supply Bus was being fed from the system grid (normal supply for this bus) which at the time of these events was experiencing voltage fluctuations due to normal system demands.

To preclude recurrence of this type of event a voltage regulator will be installed during a future refueling outage to supply relatively constant voltage to the RPS Alternate Power Supply Bus.

This event did not adversely affect plant safety or the health and safety of the public.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1) EDWIN I. HATCH, UNIT 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 1 8 5 - 0 5 0 - 0 1 0 2 OF 0 3	LER NUMBER (8)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

This report is required by 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv) because the loss of "B" Reactor Protection System (RPS) supply bus power resulted in multiple Engineered Safety Features (ESF) actuations.

During the current Unit 1 refueling outage, with no fuel in the reactor vessel, the Reactor Protection System (RPS) Alternate Power Supply Bus Breakers tripped on five separate occasions while feeding the "B" RPS bus (the normal supply for the "B" RPS bus, the "B" RPS motor/generator set, was out-of-service for pre-planned maintenance). These events occurred at the following dates and times: 12/26/85 at approximately 0549 CST, 12/30/85 at approximately 0030 CST, 01/02/86 at approximately 0042 CST, 01/07/86 at approximately 0735 CST, and 01/11/86 at approximately 0650 CST. Each of these events resulted in occurrence of the following multiple ESF actuations when the "B" channel scram logic activated on loss of "B" RPS power.

- a. A reactor half-scam occurred.
- b. A half-group isolation signal was received for certain primary containment isolation valves in valve groups 1, 2, and 5. The following valves isolated as required:
 - 1) Reactor water sample line outboard isolation valve B31-F020 (group 1)
 - 2) Drywell equipment drain sump discharge outboard isolation valve G11-F020 (group 2)
 - 3) Drywell floor drain sump discharge outboard isolation valve G11-F004 (group 2).
 - 4) Reactor water cleanup system outboard suction isolation valve G31-F004 (group 5).
- c. Main steam line radiation monitors D11-K603B and D11-K603D went to their fail safe condition (tripped) on loss of supply voltage.
- d. The "B" Train of Standby Gas Treatment automatically started.

The RPS Alternate Power Supply Bus Breakers (RPS E11S System Code: JC) tripped when the Alternate Power Supply bus voltage sensing circuitry responded to voltage fluctuations on that bus. The RPS Alternate Power Supply Bus was being fed from the system grid (normal supply for this bus) which at the time of these events was experiencing voltage fluctuations due to the normal system demands.

The RPS Alternate Power Supply Bus Breakers were returned to service resuming normal power supply to the "B" RPS Bus, and the respective ESF systems were returned to normal status by the following dates and times for each of the events, respectively: 12/26/85 at approximately 1657 CST, 12/30/85 at approximately 0051 CST, 01/02/86 at approximately 0059 CST, 01/07/86 at approximately 0900 CST, and 01/11/86 at approximately 0855 CST.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

To preclude recurrence of this type of event, a voltage regulator will be installed during a future refueling outage to supply relatively constant voltage to the RPS Alternate Power Supply Bus. This type of voltage regulator is presently in service on Unit 2's RPS Alternate Power Supply Bus and has prevented the grid voltage fluctuations from resulting in similar unplanned ESF actuations on Unit 2.

The ESF actuations occurred, by design, for loss of power to the "B" channel scram logic while the unit was in a refueling outage with no fuel in reactor. This event did not adversely affect plant safety or the health and safety of the public.

There have been no similar events where grid voltage fluctuations resulted in multiple ESF actuations since 10CFR 50.73 took effect.

Georgia Power Company
333 Piedmont Avenue
Atlanta, Georgia 30308
Telephone 404 526-6526

Mailing Address:
Post Office Box 4545
Atlanta, Georgia 30302

L. T. Gucwa
Manager Nuclear Safety and
Licensing Department



SL-339
0166C

February 10, 1986

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Attached is Licensee Event Report 50-321/1985-050, Rev. 1. This report meets the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).

Very truly yours,

L. T. Gucwa

CBS/1c

Attachment

c: Mr. J. T. Beckham, Jr.
Mr. H. C. Nix, Jr.
NRC-Region II
GO-NORMS

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