

APPENDIX

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-445/85-12
50-446/85-08

Construction Permits: CPPR-126
CPPR-127

Dockets: 50-445
50-446

Licensee: Texas Utilities Generating Company
Skyway Tower
400 N. Olive Street
Dallas, Texas 75201

Facility Name: Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station

Inspection At: Comanche Peak Site, Glen Rose, Texas

Inspection Conducted: August 26-29, 1985

Inspectors:

A. Vietti-Cook

A. Vietti-Cook, Project Manager
Comanche Peak Project
Division of Licensing
Nuclear Reactor Regulation

1/14/86
Date

C. Early

C. Early, Project Manager
Comanche Peak Project
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Nuclear Reactor Regulation

1/15/86
Date

W. P. Haass

W. P. Haass, Vendor Program Branch
Office of Inspection and Enforcement

1/16/86
Date

G. L. Madsen

G. L. Madsen, Reactor Inspector
Comanche Peak RIV Group

1/16/86
Date

Approved:


T. F. Westerman, Chief
Comanche Peak RIV Group

2-3-86
Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection conducted August 26-29, 1985 (Report 50-445/85-12 and 50-446/85-08)

Areas Inspected: Reactive, announced inspection of the applicant's policies, procedures, and implementation relating to the CPSES site Ombudsman and SAFETEM programs in identifying and resolving site personnel concerns resulting from exit, scheduled, and walk-in interviews with applicant and contractor employees. The inspection involved 72 inspector hours on-site and 18 inspector hours at the applicant's corporate offices by two inspectors and two project managers.

Results: Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Principal Licensee Personnel

- *W. G. Council, Executive Vice President
- *J. C. Kuykendahl, Manager, Nuclear Operations
- *R. A. Werner, Manager, SAFETEAM
- R. G. Spangler, Supervisor, Quality Assurance Services
- G. R. Rand, Quality Assurance Engineer
- *R. A. Woodridge, Attorney
- *A. B. Scott, Vice President, Nuclear

NRC Personnel

- *T. F. Westerman, Chief, Comanche Peak Task Group, RIV
- *R. F. Heishman, Chief, Reactor Construction Program Branch, IE-HQ

*Attended exit interview.

2. Exit Interview

An exit interview was conducted on November 5, 1985, with personnel as indicated in paragraph 1 of this report.

3. TUEC's Employee Concern Programs Prior to January 14, 1985

Beginning in October 1983, TUEC initiated a Hot-Line program and programs which required all personnel departing from QA/QC to complete a questionnaire and all Brown and Root construction employees terminating employment to be interviewed. The purpose of this program was to identify concerns related to the quality of plant design and construction. Persons who had been released from QA/QC since October 1983 and had not filled out an exit questionnaire were located, if possible, and were invited to fill out an exit questionnaire. In November 1983, an Ombudsman from an outside organization was assigned to the site to participate in the programs.

These TUEC programs were administered by TUEC Quality Assurance by administrative memorandum until October 29, 1984, at which time a formalized procedure was issued.

The TUEC files resulting from the program are composed of 53 individual files. Each file consists of allegations made by an individual, as well as, documents related to the allegations. At the time of the inspection, 51 of the 53 files indicated completion of investigative followup and close-out of the concerns. Two files remained open.

During the NRC inspection, 22 of the 51 closed files were reviewed. The following observations were identified:

- a. Employee responses to the questionnaires was somewhat sketchy. The applicant did recontact some of the concerned individuals.
- b. The program was administered by TUEC QA. This is a poor practice especially for concerns relating to QA management, supervisory confidence, and supervisory involvement, since the individuals responsible for investigating and correcting the concerns could be the same individuals who could be the subject of, or be responsible for, the concern expressed by the employee.
- c. Some concerns were not fully addressed during the course of the investigation.
- d. There was only limited contact of concerned individuals to inform them of the resolution of their concerns.

In response to the NRC Technical Review Team finding AQ-133 identified in Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report No. 11, TUEC's Comanche Peak Response Plan Item VII.a.6 commits to additional evaluations of the Comanche Peak employee concern reporting systems.

4. TUEC's Employee Concerns Program After January 14, 1985 - SAFETEA Program

a. Program Description

SAFETEA is a program to identify and investigate safety concerns of workers at a nuclear power plant site. It provides an opportunity for all site workers to report concerns they might have as they leave the project. All quality assurance and quality control employees plus others involved in the safety, security or operation of the site are given such opportunities, in the form of scheduled interviews, during their employment. In addition, plant wall posters are used to make a "mail in" form available to all workers at any time.

On the last day of site employment, workers are invited, by the owner, to the Appreciation Center which is located in a trailer near the main gate. At that time, they are asked if they would share any concerns they have about the project in an interview conducted by an independent firm. If no concerns are identified, the worker is given a postage paid "mail in" form should one be later remembered. A toll free telephone number is given for the same purpose.

All of these interviews are recorded if the worker agrees. In addition, an interview report form is completed and retained for further review. All records of concerns from this point forward are "nameless" to help protect the anonymity of the worker.

All concerns are then classified by the SAFETEAM into categories for followup investigation. The categories include nuclear safety, security, industrial safety, site management, and miscellaneous.

The manager then assigns an investigator and an investigation is conducted. Following this investigation, a report is prepared and subsequently reviewed by an owner management team. This team consists of a legal representative familiar with the plant license, a public affairs representative and the quality assurance manager. Once the team has been satisfied that the investigation is complete and any required corrective actions planned, a response letter is prepared by the independent firm, to the concerned party, indicating what was found and what was done. This letter will be reviewed by the same owner management team that reviewed the investigation report before it is sent. Included in this mailing is the toll free telephone number and they are invited to submit any other concerns as they may be recalled.

b. Organizational Structure

The TUEC SAFETEAM program is implemented under the direction of R. A. Werner, Manager - SAFETEAM, who reports to W. G. Council, Executive Vice-President. The latter reports to M. D. Spence, President. The SAFETEAM organization is adequately separated from QA/QC and other organizational elements involved in the design and construction of Comanche Peak and therefore is acceptably located within the TUEC organization to assure independence and to minimize the potential for conflicts of interest.

c. Formality of Program as Reflected in Instructions

The SAFETEAM concept was developed by Utilities Technical Services, now SYNDICO, a subsidiary of the Detroit Edison Company and initially utilized at Comanche Peak on January 14, 1985. The SAFETEAM handbook and manual were utilized for the design and implementation of the Comanche Peak SAFETEAM program. The NRC found that TUEC generally followed the manual with minor modifications. In two significant areas, however, the Comanche Peak SAFETEAM is not implementing the manual as written:

- (1) The SAFETEAM manual states that "interviewers should have a knowledge of nuclear principles." A review of resumes of one interview coordinator and seven part-time interviewers employed by the Comanche Peak SAFETEAM do not indicate that these personnel have any education, training or experience in a technical area related to the design, construction or operation of a nuclear plant. This is a potential weakness which can preclude obtaining adequate specificity of the concern.

- (2) The SAFETEM manual prescribes that when an investigation reveals that the concern stated in the interview may be reportable to the NRC, a transmittal should be forwarded to the Director/Manager of Quality Assurance. The transmittal should include the statement of concern and the information gathered in the investigation that supports the conclusion that the concern may be reportable and should request feedback when the item is closed by Quality Assurance. The Comanche SAFETEM does not operate to this guidance with any formality. The SAFETEM has internally sent concerns to the QA organization for a 10 CFR 50.55(e) reportability determination before the investigation by the SAFETEM was complete. In addition, the QA organization is assigned the responsibility to review all SAFETEM investigation reports and, also, perform 10 CFR 50.55(e) evaluations in conjunction with the various corrective action programs such as nonconformance reports initiated by SAFETEM. However, because of the informality of the process, it is not clear that the SAFETEM investigators consider making the initial determination of reportability. This is a potential weakness in that prompt utilization of the investigators observations may not be acted upon. Additionally, the Comanche SAFETEM does not request feedback when corrective actions for 10 CFR 50.55(e) reportable items have been completed.

d. Numbers and Qualification of Personnel

The SAFETEM organization is comprised of the Director and one secretary (TUEC employees), and the following, who are all available under a contract with National Inspection and Consultants, Inc.

- (1) One interview coordinator
- (2) Seven part-time interviewers
- (3) One investigator coordinator
- (4) Four investigators

A review of resumes indicated that the investigators appear to be adequately qualified to conduct the technical review of concerns. However, the interviewers lack a knowledge of general nuclear power plant systems, deficiency reporting systems, and an understanding of the investigative process which can preclude obtaining adequate specificity of the concern from the interviewee.

Comanche Peak SAFETEM had no formal documentation of personnel qualification requirements other than the brief statement in the SAFETEM manual.

e. Information Flow

Publicizing the SAFETEM program to employees is accomplished through company literature, posters and stickers. The SAFETEM building is conspicuously located at the plant site and is readily

accessible. Concerns come to the attention of the SAFETEM through termination exit interviews, scheduled interviews, hot line telephone calls, letters, and walk-in interviews. Interviews are conducted with one interviewer in a closed office in the SAFETEM building. The interviewer summarizes the individual's concerns on a SAFETEM reporting form and if the concerned individual agrees, interviews are also taped. The SAFETEM manager reviews and classifies the concerns into one of five classifications (plant safety, security, management, industrial safety, and miscellaneous). The SAFETEM manager then assigns an investigator. The investigator may conduct the investigation or refer the concern to an ad hoc group. (Concerns associated with criminal activity are referred to security for investigation and response.) If a concern is substantiated, the SAFETEM follows up on a concern until action to resolve the concern is identified. The SAFETEM does not verify that the resolution of the concern is implemented. When an investigation is completed, an investigative report is prepared, reviewed by the Manager SAFETEM, and referred to a three-person steering committee (composed of legal, QA, and public affairs representatives). The report is finalized and then sent to a technical editor who prepares a response letter to be sent to the concerned individual. The letter is reviewed by the steering committee and signed by the SAFETEM manager, at which point the concern is considered closed by the SAFETEM.

f. Implementation of the SAFETEM Program

As of August 16, 1985, the SAFETEM had received 641 concerns from 506 individuals. An analysis of the subject matter during the NRC inspection, revealed that 200 of the concerns were related to industrial safety, personnel practices, etc. Another 59 concerns involving potential wrongdoing issues were referred for review to the NRC Office of Investigations. Of the remaining 382 technical concerns, the SAFETEM statistical printouts indicated the following status: (1) 125 concerns closed, (2) 170 concerns for which the investigative activities were complete but the concerned individual had not been contacted regarding the resolution of the concern, and (3) 87 concerns being investigated.

The NRC inspection team selected 62 of the 295 technical concerns that had been investigated for file review. The file review revealed the following:

- (1) The SAFETEM program is generally being implemented in accordance with the SAFETEM manual with the two exceptions discussed previously.
- (2) The classification of the concerns into five categories (plant safety, security, management, industrial safety, and miscellaneous) was performed in a conservative manner.

- (3) The confidentiality of the concerned individuals was appropriately protected and did not appear to distract from the investigator's ability to evaluate concerns.
- (4) Areas for improvement included:
 - (a) Interviews lacked specifics. With experience, recontacting the concerned individuals for additional details had increased.
 - (b) Some files revealed that the investigator did not attempt to obtain adequate information sufficient to establish the specificity of the concern.
 - (c) The program does not call for follow-up resolutions to work completion. In one case, a concern regarding the disposition of the NCR raised by an individual was not addressed by SAFETEM.
 - (d) Resolutions provided corrective actions for the present and future; however, the impact on the past was not always clearly addressed.
 - (e) The SAFETEM does not comply with the manual with regard to formally reporting conditions discovered by the SAFETEM investigators that may be reportable to the NRC in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e).

g. Documentation

The technical files reviewed were organized and appeared adequate to facilitate auditing of the records. The files included references to various drawings, procedures, and other documentation which were not included in the files but would be traceable. In some cases, the file did not contain a clear discussion of what the investigator did to evaluate the concern, and it was difficult to infer what the investigator did from the contents of the file. The general control of the files and the protection of the individual's confidentiality was found to be acceptable.

h. Management Notification

Management is provided statistical reports relating to the SAFETEM activities on a biweekly basis. Additionally, telephone conversations and meetings are used to further advise upper management of needed assistance and program status.

i. Trending and Assessment of Trends

Concerns are assigned to a classification (plant safety, security, management, industrial safety, and miscellaneous) and also to applicable subclassifications. The information is computerized and can be utilized for obtaining statistical data or determination of the existence of similar concerns already within the SAFETeam system. This capability has been used to a limited degree by the CPSES SAFETeam.

5. SAFETeam Review by Office of Investigations

During the week of August 26, 1985, the Office of Investigations (OI), Region IV Field Office, conducted a review of the 43 closed SAFETeam concern files that were considered as possible wrongdoings. The OI assessment of the SAFETeam program is documented in OI report A4-85-020. The OI findings are as follows: "In summary, the majority of SAFETeam investigations reviewed and evaluated were found to have sufficiently addressed the issues posed. This included the efforts demonstrated in explaining a concern in its subsequent investigation. For the most part, the investigative reports adequately supported the conclusions. However, the investigative findings in some instances were inconclusive. This can generally be attributed to two primary factors: (1) Certain reports had not accurately described the SAFETeam rationale for pursuing or concluding an investigation; and (2) some reports had left the original allegation unanswered."