



Point Beach Nuclear Plant
6610 Nuclear Rd., Two Rivers, WI 54241
NPL 97-0159

(414) 755-2321

April 8, 1997

Document Control Desk
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Mail Station P1-137
Washington, DC 20555

Ladies/Gentlemen:

DOCKET 50-301
RESTART DOCUMENTATION
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2

Pursuant to discussions conducted at a January 31, 1997, NRC/Wisconsin Electric senior management meeting, we are enclosing documentation for review by your staff to support restart issues as identified on the Unit 2 Startup Commitment List. The items are:

#12: Review 20% of the surveillance procedures associated with safety significant non-pump and valve components (such as heat exchangers and fans) to ensure that the surveillance acceptance criteria satisfy the requirements of the plant design basis/accident analysis.

We are enclosing letter PBM 97-0197 dated March 14, 1997, that documents this review. Condition reports 97-0166, 97-0548, 97-0573, and 97-0574 document findings as a result of the review. Also enclosed is the independent review results.

Also enclosed is the Unit 2 Core Load Issues and Unit 2 Startup Commitment List dated April 7, 1997.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'Douglas F. Johnson'.

Douglas F. Johnson
Manager-
Regulatory Services & Licensing

MBK/hds
Enclosures

cc: NRC Regional Administrator

9704150223 970408
PDR ADOCK 05000301
P PDR

IE2611



***** Responsible Person:
* Trkid: U2R22 RESTART * Urgency: DONE
* Action Number: 12 * Work Priority: 99

Activity Pending is: DONE

ASSOCIATED WITH A COMMITMENT

-----TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION-----

Unit 2 Refueling 22 Startup Commitments

Prior to leaving cold shutdown, review 20% of the surveillance procedures associated with safety significant non-pump and valve components (such as heat exchangers and fans) to ensure that the surveillance acceptance criteria satisfy the requirements of the plant design basis/accident analysis. Make changes as necessary as a result of this review.

-----DATES-----

Source Record: 01/10/97	***** Evaluation *****	***** Correction *****
Commitment:	Eval Due:	Corr Act Due: 03/21/97
Action Create: 01/13/97	Orig Eval Due:	Orig CA Due: 02/11/97
Action Closed: 04/08/97	Eval Done:	Corr Act Done: 04/01/97

-----PEOPLE-----

Responsible for Overall Action: BMS
Responsible for Current Pending Activity:
Issue Manager:
Initiator:
Punchlist Administrator:

-----UPDATE-----

(02/10/97) Requested Due Date: 02/28/97

(02/11/97 ...) Changed the Due Date from: 02/11/97 to 02/28/97
The scope of the review was increased to include all of unit 2 and all common components. This will increase the amount of time to do the review.

(02/25/97 ...) Reviews completed 2/25/97 Draft copy of report given to
for comment. There were 61
procedures reviewed and 4 condition reports were generated. No major
deficiencies were found. All of unit 1, unit 2 and common were reviewed.

(02/26/97 Requested Due Date: 03/07/97

(02/28/97 Changed the Due Date from: 02/28/97 to 03/07/97
The responsible individual mis-interpreted one of the Tec Spec
requirements. More time is required to review procedures involved in the
requirement.

(03/07/97 Requested Due Date: 03/21/97

(03/10/97 Changed the Due Date from: 03/07/97 to 03/21/97
Resources were not available to work on the commitment.

(03/19/97 Passed to (for acceptance of work.

(04/01/97 Passed to for Verification.
The review of the surveillance procedures was completed. All of unit 1,
unit 2 and common procedures were reviewed. The report was issued on
March 14, 1997 as PBM 97-0197.

(04/01/97) Passed to for Final Close Out.
Reviewed the documentation associated with this review. This is ready for
closeout. Condition Reports 97-0166, 97-0548, 97-0573, and 97-0574 were
generated as a result of this activity.

(04/08/97 PLA Closure of Item.
PBM 97-0197 dated March 14, 1997 documents and addresses Commitment #12.

-----REFERENCES-----

PBM 97-0197	CR 97-0166
CR 97-0548	CR 97-0573
CR 97-0574	

-----MISCELLANEOUS-----

Originating Agency:	System: XX
NRC Open Item Number:	NRC Status:
Related Outages: U2R22	
Engineering Work Type: None Specified	
Person Hours: Original Estimate =	
Current Estimate =	
Actual Hours =	



INTERNAL
CORRESPONDENCE

PBM 97-0197

To:

From:

Date: March 14, 1997

Subject: RESTART COMMITMENT 12 REPORT

Copy To: -----

This report is the result of Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Restart Commitment #12 and NRC Commitment NRC 96EC #47. This review was conducted from November 21, 1996 through March 12, 1997. The original commitment was to review 20 percent of the surveillance procedures associated with safety significant non-pump and valve components (such as heat exchangers and fans) to ensure that the surveillance acceptance criteria satisfy the requirements of the plant design basis/accident analysis. Calibration, electrical, sampling, Appendix J, inservice inspection program and chemistry procedures were not part of this review. The requirements section does not include all specifications, only the specifications pertinent to this review are included. As a result of discrepancies found during the 20 percent review, the scope of the review was expanded to include all of the Unit 2 and common procedures. Unit 1 was also completed with this review.

The total number of procedures reviewed was 85 and a list of the procedures is included as Attachment 1.

The approach taken was, first, to identify all safety-related components. This was done using a custom printout from CHAMPS. The next step was to get lists of all testing procedures. The list of procedures was then compared with the list of safety-related components. This resulted in a list of procedures to review. Point Beach Technical Specifications surveillance requirements were also reviewed for any components or systems not listed in the CHAMPS printout.

There were no major changes made to any procedure, nor were there any new procedures created as a result of this review. There will be two tests canceled as a result of this review (see Condition Report 97-0166).

PBM 97-0197
March 14, 1997
Page 2

There were four condition reports initiated as a result of this review. CR 97-0166 relates to the Containment Accident Recirculation Heat Exchanger. CR 97-00548 relates to the Containment Accident Fan Backdraft Dampers. CR 97-0573 relates to the Emergency Diesel Generator Glycol Coolers. CR 97-0574 relates to the PAB Battery Room Vent Coolers.

There were two instances of procedures referencing the wrong Technical Specification. The responsible individuals were notified.

Attachment 2 contains the actual results of the review

Attachments

ATTACHMENT 1
TOTAL DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

85 documents

COMMON

CMP-10.1, Snubber Component Maintenance Program
HPIP 11.54, Control Room, F-16, Filter Testing
IT-11A, Performance Test for Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger, HX-13A/B.
IT-560, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of Chemical and Volume Control System Holdup Tanks (Refueling)
IT-570, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of Drain System
OI-92A, Fuel Oil Ordering, Receipt, Sampling and T-173 Fill Tank Draining
PC-56.4, HX-105B Performance Test Battery Room Cooler
PC-56.5, HX-105B Battery Room Cooler Performance Test Analysis
RMP-37, Diesel Fire Pump Engine Inspection
RMP-57, Fire Barrier Penetration Fire Seal Surveillance
RMP-58, Containment Fire Seal and Conduit Wrapping Inspection, Unit 1
RMP-59, Containment Fire Seal and Conduit Wrapping Inspection, Unit 2
RMP-61, Hydraulic Snubber Surveillance and Testing
RMP-63, Low Pressure Turbine Rotor Testing
RMP-9060, Safety Related Snubber Visual Inspection
RMP-9094, Diesel Fire Pump Battery Surveillance
TS-09, Control Room Heating and Ventilation Monthly Checks
TS-32, Safety Valve Position Verification - Subcooling Margin Computing System - Containment Purge Valve Position
TS-71, Monthly Electric Motor-Driven Fire Pump Functional Test
TS-72, Annual Fire Pump Capacity Test
TS-73, Monthly Fire Protection Control Valve Position Verification
TS-74, Annual Underground Fire Main Flow Test
TS-75, Biennial Service Testing of Fire Hose and Fire Hose Stations
TS-76, Quarterly Automatic Sprinkler and Water Spray System Surveillance Test
TS-77, Semi-Annual Smoke Detection System Integrity Test
TS-78, Semi-Annual Halon 1301 Fire Suppression System Surveillance Test
TS-79, Monthly Surveillance of Fire Hose Stations
TS-81, Emergency Diesel Generator G-01
TS-82, Emergency Diesel Generator G-02
TS-83, Emergency Diesel Generator G-03
TS-84, Emergency Diesel Generator G-04
TS-80, Sampling of Emergency Fuel Oil Tank, Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and EDG Day Tanks
Form PBF-2031, Auxiliary Building Shift Log
Form PBF-2033, Turbine Building Shift Log, Unit 2
Safe Load Path and Rigging Manual, SLP-4
Miscellaneous Heat Exchanger Cleaning and Inspection Program

GENERIC

EPIP-10.3, Post Accident Containment Ventilation System Operation
RESP-3.1, PPCS Feedwater Correction
RESP-4.1, Test Initial Criticality and ARO Physics
RESP-4.2, Control Rod Reactivity Worth Measurements
RESP-6.2, Precision RCS Flow Rate Measurement
RESP-6.5, Reactivity Anomalies

UNIT 1

IT-500, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of Post Accident Reactor Coolant Sampling System (Refueling) Unit 1
IT-510B, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of Safety Injection Test Line (Refueling) Unit 1
IT-520A, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of Safety Injection System (Refueling) Unit 1
IT-520B, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of ISI-896A&B, SI Pump Suction (Refueling) Unit 1
IT-530, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of Residual Heat Removal System (Refueling) Unit 1
IT-530A, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of Train A HHSI and RHR Systems (Refueling) Unit 1
IT-530B, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of Train B HHSI and RHR Systems (Refueling) Unit 1
IT-531, Containment Sump B Suction Line Test (Refueling) Unit 1
IT-550, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of Liquid Chemical and Volume Control System (Refueling) Unit 1
IT-580, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of Post Accident Containment Atmospheric Sampling System (Refueling) Unit 1
IT-590, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of Post Accident Containment Vent System (Refueling) Unit 1
ORT-3, Safety Injection Actuation with Loss of Engineered Safeguards AC, Unit 1
ORT-7, Operation of Backdraft Dampers, Unit 1
ORT-61, Sump A Drain to Auxiliary Building Drain, Unit 1
PBTP-040, Performance Test of IHX-15D Containment Fan Cooler, Unit 1
PC-9 Part 2, Unit 1 Safeguard Systems Valve and Lock Checklist (Monthly)
PC-56.1, Containment Accident Recirc Heat Exchanger Performance Monitoring Test, Unit 1.
TS-3, Main Turbine Stop and Governor Valves with Turbine Trip Test (Quarterly) Unit 1
TS-5, Bi-weekly Rod Exercise Test Unit 1
TS-33, Surveillance Testing: Containment Accident Recirculation Fan -Cooler Units (monthly), Unit 1
TS-37, Containment Spray Nozzles (Frequency of Less Than or Equal to Five Years), Unit 1
TS-41, Crossover Steam Dump (Quarterly) Unit 1

UNIT 2

IT-505, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of Post Accident Reactor Coolant Sampling System (Refueling) Unit 2
IT-515B, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of Safety Injection Test Line (Refueling) Unit 2
IT-525A, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of Safety Injection System (Refueling) Unit 2
IT-525B, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of 2SI-896A&B, SI Pump Suction (Refueling) Unit 2
IT-535, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of Residual Heat Removal System (Refueling) Unit 2
IT-535A, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of Train A HHSI and RHR Systems (Refueling) Unit 2
IT-535B, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of Train B HHSI and RHR Systems (Refueling) Unit 2
IT-536, Containment Sump B Suction Line Test (Refueling) Unit 2
IT-555, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of Liquid Chemical and Volume Control System (Refueling) Unit 2
IT-585, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of Post Accident Containment Atmospheric Sampling System (Refueling) Unit 2
IT-595, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of Post Accident Containment Vent System (Refueling) Unit 2
ORT-3, Safety Injection Actuation with Loss of Engineered Safeguards AC, Unit 2
ORT-7, Operation of Backdraft Dampers, Unit 2
ORT61, Containment Sump A Drain, Unit 2
PC-9 Part 3, Unit 2 Safeguard Systems Valve and Lock Checklist (Monthly)
PC-56.2, Containment Accident Recirc Heat Exchanger Performance Monitoring Test, Unit 2.
TS-4, Main Turbine Stop and Governor Valves with Turbine Trip Test (Quarterly) Unit 2
TS-6, Bi-weekly Rod Exercise Test Unit 2
TS-34, Surveillance Testing: Containment Accident Recirculation Fan -Cooler Units (monthly), Unit 2
TS-38, Containment Spray Nozzles (Frequency of Less Than or Equal to Five Years), Unit 2
TS-42, Crossover Steam Dump (Quarterly) Unit 2

ATTACHMENT 2
RESULTS OF REVIEW OF SAFETY SIGNIFICANT COMPONENT SURVEILLANCE TESTS AND INSPECTIONS

UNITS 1 AND 2 EQUIPMENT TESTS & INSPECTIONS

HX-015A1-A8/B8/C8/D8 - CONTAINMENT ACCIDENT RECIRC HEAT EXCHANGER

Requirements

1. Each fan cooler shall be tested at each refueling to verify proper operation of the backdraft dampers and the service water bypass valves.
2. Containment fan cooler accident fans shall be tested monthly to verify operability. Acceptable performance shall be that the accident fan starts and the running current is verified.
3. Performance testing will be done annually during normal plant operation.
4. The performance of the "D" cooler will be monitored at least once a year.

Design Basis

Per FSAR 5.3.2.2, each cooling coil will transfer 50.00 Mbtu/hr for design basis conditions when supplied with 1000 gpm cooling water @ 70°F. inlet temperature.

Wisconsin Electric Safety Evaluation Report 96-055 and Westinghouse Safety Evaluation Checklist 96-067 changed the design basis to allow for the heat transfer of 37.50 Mbtu/hr per cooling coil.

References

TS 15.3.3.B.2
TS 15.4.5.I.C.2
Generic Letter 89-13
PBM 92-0088

Test Procedure

ORT-7, Operation of Backdraft Dampers, Unit 1
ORT-7, Operation of Backdraft Dampers, Unit 2
TS-33, Surveillance Testing: Containment Accident Recirculation Fan -Cooler Units (monthly), Unit 1
TS-34, Surveillance Testing: Containment Accident Recirculation Fan -Cooler Units (monthly), Unit 2
PC-56.1, Containment Accident Recirc Heat Exchanger Performance Monitoring Test, Unit 1.
PC-56.2, Containment Accident Recirc Heat Exchanger Performance Monitoring Test, Unit 2.
PBTP-040, Performance Test of 1HX-15D Containment Fan Cooler, Unit 1
Unit 2 performance test to be written.

Design Basis Testing Achieved

TS-33/34 adequately tests for items 2 and part of 1 above (procedures do not test fan start if fan is already running, see Condition Report 97-0726). ORT-7 tests the backdraft dampers. The ORT-7 test method differs between unit 1 and unit 2 coolers. Unit 1 ORT-7 was revised in 1993 to more accurately simulate the fan operation during a real accident. Condition Report 97-0548 was initiated on 2/18/97 to address the condition.

For Item 3, PBTP-040 adequately tests the performance of the coolers for unit 1. PBTP-040 will be rewritten and re-numbered for use on unit 2. It will be performed in the spring of 1997. The tests will be classified as TS tests to insure that they will receive timely review and attention.

PC-56.1 and 2 should be canceled as they do not adequately test the cooling coils. Condition Report 97-0166 initiated.

SAFETY INJECTION AND CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEMS

Requirements

1. At least every refueling, verify by visual inspection each containment sump suction inlet is not restricted by debris and the debris strainers show no signs of structural stress or abnormal corrosion.
2. Verify each manual, power operated and automatic valve necessary to insure system operability in the emergency core cooling and containment spray systems that is not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position at least once every 31 days.

Design Basis

See Requirements.

Reference

TS 15.4.5.II.B

Test Procedure

ORT-61, Sump A Drain to Auxiliary Building Drain, Unit 1
ORT-61, Containment Sump A Drain, Unit 2
PC-9 Part 2, Unit 1 Safeguard Systems Valve and Lock Checklist (Monthly)
PC-9 Part 3, Unit 2 Safeguard Systems Valve and Lock Checklist (Monthly)

Design Basis Testing Achieved

1. Step 4.1 and 4.2 in both Unit 1 and 2 ORT-61 cleans the sump floor and cleans and inspects the sump screen.
2. The purpose of PC-9, Parts 2 and 3 is to verify valve positions in the emergency core cooling and containment spray systems.

CONTAINMENT SPRAY NOZZLES

Requirements

The spray nozzles shall be checked to verify that they are not obstructed at intervals not exceeding five years.

Design Basis

See Requirements.

Reference

TS 15.4.5.I.B.3

Test Procedure

TS-37, Containment Spray Nozzles (Frequency of Less Than or Equal to Five Years), Unit 1
TS-38, Containment Spray Nozzles (Frequency of Less Than or Equal to Five Years), Unit 2

Design Basis Testing Achieved

Service air is supplied to the spray header and streamers on a reach pole are verified to move by air flowing out of the nozzles.

CONTROL RODS

Requirements

Partial movement of all rods every two weeks

Design Basis

See Requirements

References

TS Table 15.4.1-2 Item 10

Test Procedure

TS-5, Bi-weekly Rod Exercise Test Unit 1

TS-6, Bi-weekly Rod Exercise Test Unit 2

Design Basis Testing Achieved

The purpose of TS-5 and TS-6 is to exercise all control rods

TURBINE STOP AND GOVERNOR VALVES

Requirements

Verify that the turbine stop and governor valves function annually

Design Basis

See Requirements.

Reference

TS Table 15.4.1-2 Item 18

Test Procedure

TS-3, Main Turbine Stop and Governor Valves with Turbine Trip Test (Quarterly) Unit 1

TS-4, Main Turbine Stop and Governor Valves with Turbine Trip Test (Quarterly) Unit 2

Design Basis Testing Achieved

Section 4 of TS-3 and TS-4 adequately test the smooth operation and alarm functions, position indication and lights of the main turbine stop and governor valves.

LOW PRESSURE TURBINE ROTORS

Requirements

Perform visual and magnetic particle or liquid penetrant tests on the low pressure turbine rotors every five years.

Design Basis

See Requirements.

Reference

TS Table 15.4.1-2 Item 19

Test Procedure

RMP-63, Low Pressure Turbine Rotor Testing

Design Basis Testing Achieved

RMP-63 provides direction on where to perform the visual, mag particle and liquid penetrant testing. The procedure also requires the performer to record the Westinghouse Process Specification used for the examination.

BORIC ACID SYSTEM

Requirements

Verify storage tank and piping temperatures \geq temperature required by Table 15.3.2-1.

Design Basis

Table 15.3.2-1

Reference

TS Table 15.4.1-2 Item 20

Test Procedure

PBF-2031, Auxiliary Building Shift Log

Design Basis Testing Achieved

PBF-2031 verifies that the boric acid heat tracing circuits are working and that the boric acid storage tanks are between 80-120°F. The Tech Spec required weight percent in the boric acid tanks is ≥ 3.5 and < 4.0 . NP 3.2.2, Primary Water Chemistry Monitoring Program, administratively controls the limits to ≥ 3.6 and < 3.9 . Tech Spec Table 15.3.2-1 requires a minimum temperature of 62.5°F for the percentage required.

POST ACCIDENT RECOVERY SYSTEMS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT

Requirements

Evaluate the integrity of the post accident recovery systems outside the containment each refueling outage.

Design Basis

See Requirements.

Reference

TS Table 15.4.1-2 Item 22

Test Procedure

EPIP-10.3, Post Accident Containment Ventilation System Operation

IT-500, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of Post Accident Reactor Coolant Sampling System (Refueling) Unit 1

IT-505, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of Post Accident Reactor Coolant Sampling System (Refueling) Unit 2

IT-510B, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of Safety Injection Test Line (Refueling) Unit 1

IT-515B, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of Safety Injection Test Line (Refueling) Unit 2

IT-520A, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of Safety Injection System (Refueling) Unit 1

IT-520B, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of 1SI-896A&B, SI Pump Suction (Refueling) Unit 1

IT-525A, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of Safety Injection System (Refueling) Unit 2

IT-525B, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of 2SI-896A&B, SI Pump Suction (Refueling) Unit 2

IT-530, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of Residual Heat Removal System (Refueling) Unit 1

IT-530A, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of Train A HHSI and RHR Systems (Refueling) Unit 1

IT-530B, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of Train B HHSI and RHR Systems (Refueling) Unit 1

IT-531, Containment Sump B Suction Line Test (Refueling) Unit 1

IT-535, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of Residual Heat Removal System (Refueling) Unit 2

IT-535A, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of Train A HHSI and RHR Systems (Refueling) Unit 2

IT-535B, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of Train B HHSI and RHR Systems (Refueling) Unit 2
IT-536, Containment Sump B Suction Line Test (Refueling) Unit 2
IT-545B, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of Containment Spray System with the Unit in CSD and Defueled Conditions, Unit 2
IT-550, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of Liquid Chemical and Volume Control System (Refueling) Unit 1
IT-555, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of Liquid Chemical and Volume Control System (Refueling) Unit 2
IT-560, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of Chemical and Volume Control System Holdup Tanks (Refueling)
IT-570, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of Drain System
IT-580, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of Post Accident Containment Atmospheric Sampling System (Refueling) Unit 1
IT-585, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of Post Accident Containment Atmospheric Sampling System (Refueling) Unit 1
IT-590, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of Post Accident Containment Vent System (Refueling) Unit 1
IT-595, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of Post Accident Containment Vent System (Refueling) Unit 2

Design Basis Testing Achieved

The procedures listed above satisfy the requirements to evaluate the integrity of the post accident recovery systems outside the containment. The tests are performed each refueling outage.

IT-545A, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program test of Containment Spray System with the Unit in CSD and Defueled Conditions, Unit 1, has not been prepared yet. The containment spray system is being added to the recirculation phase.

IT-580 and IT-585 provide instructions for pressure testing the post accident recovery systems outside the containment. There is no practical method of pressure testing the hydrogen recombiner which is located in Memphis, Tennessee. EPIP-10.3 performs a pressure test on the recombiner prior to use.

CONTAINMENT PURGE SUPPLY AND EXHAUST VALVES

Requirements

Verify that the containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves are locked closed monthly.

Design Basis

See Requirements.

Reference

TS Table 15.4.1-2 Item 23

Test Procedure

TS-32, Safety Valve Position Verification - Subcooling Margin Computing System - Containment Purge Valve Position (Monthly)

Design Basis Testing Achieved

Section 4.3 of TS-32 verifies that the control switches for the valves are red locked and notes the Red Lock Number.

CROSSOVER STEAM DUMP VALVES

Requirements

Verify the operability of each crossover steam dump valve quarterly.

Design Basis

Valves must open in less than 4 seconds.

Reference

TS Table 15.4.1-2 Item 29

Test Procedure

TS-41, Crossover Steam Dump (Quarterly) Unit 1

TS-42, Crossover Steam Dump (Quarterly) Unit 2

Design Basis Testing Achieved

The purpose of TS-41 and 42 are to test the operability of the crossover steam dump valves. All crossover steam dump valves are opened and timed.

COMMON EQUIPMENT TESTS & TESTS

F-016 - CONTROL ROOM CHARCOAL FILTER

Requirements

TS 15.4.11

1. At least once per year the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal absorber banks shall be demonstrated to be less than 6 inches of water at design flow rate.
2. The control room emergency filtration automatic initiation shall be demonstrated at least once per year.
3. The control room emergency filtration shall be operated at least 10 hours every month.

TS 15.3.12

1. The results of in-place cold DOP and halogenated hydrocarbon tests, per 15.4.11, shall show a minimum of 99% DOP removal and 99% halogenated hydrocarbon removal.
2. The results of laboratory charcoal adsorbent tests, conducted in accordance with Specification 15.4.11, shall show a minimum of 90% removal of methyl iodide. If laboratory analysis for in-place charcoal indicate less than 90% methyl iodide, this specification may be met by replacement with charcoal adsorbent which has been verified to achieve 90% minimum removal and which has been stored in sealed containers, and retesting the charcoal adsorber bank for halogenated hydrocarbon.
3. The results of fan testing, conducted in accordance with specification 15.4.11, shall show operation within $\pm 10\%$ design flow.

Design Basis

See Requirements.

Reference

TS 15.4.11

TS 15.3.12

Test Procedure

TS-9, Control Room Heating and Ventilation Monthly Checks

HPIP 11.54, Control Room, F-16, Filter Testing

Design Basis Testing Achieved
TS 15.4.11

1. Step 5.4 of HPIP 11.54 records the pressure drop across the HEPA and charcoal filters and notifies the DSS if the ΔP exceeds 6 inches of water.
2. TS-9 verifies that emergency filtration automatic initiation occurs for both of the radiation detectors monthly
3. Each of the cleanup fans are ran for five hours every month per TS-9

TS 15.3.12

1. Step 5.5 of HPIP 11.54 performs the DOP and Freon testing states that the tests must show > 99% DOP and Freon removal. The Step also states that testing must be done at design velocity $\pm 20\%$.
2. Step 5.2 of HPIP 11.54 removes charcoal samples and 3.2 states that if the methyl iodide efficiency falls below 95%, the charcoal absorbers will be replaced with fresh ones and be retested in accordance with Tech Specs.
3. Step 5.3 of HPIP 11.54 performs fan flow rate tests and verifies flow rates within $\pm 10\%$.

NOTE: HPIP 11.54 is a cover procedure which records the fan and charcoal parameters. The actual testing is done by a contractor (NUCON) using contractor procedures.

Refer to Condition Report 97-0766.

HX-013A/B - SPENT FUEL POOL HEAT EXCHANGERS

Requirements

The response of Wisconsin Electric to Generic Letter 89-13 states that the spent fuel pool HX will be instrumented to monitor the heat transfer capability. The performance will be monitored at least once a year.

Design Basis

Per FSAR table 9.3-3, the nominal design heat transfer is 15.5 MBtu/hr per heat exchanger.

Reference

Generic Letter 89-13
PBM 92-0088

Test Procedure

IT-11A, Performance Test for Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger, HX-13A/B.

Design Basis Testing Achieved

The heat exchanger transferred 20.4 MBtu/Hr at test conditions. A heat transfer of 18.9 MBtu/hr was calculated at design conditions although the calculation method was not reviewed or verified (See Condition Report 96-1201).

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March 14, 1997
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SFP - SPENT FUEL POOL STRUCTURE

Requirements

Water level verification weekly.

Design Basis

Low level alarm at 59'10".

Reference

TS Table 15.4.1-2, Item 7

Test Procedure

Form PBF 2031, Auxiliary Building Shift Log

Design Basis Testing Achieved

The water level is monitored every shift. The log states that the range is 63' to 64'. The log also states that monitoring the SFP level is a Technical Specification requirement.

HX-105A/B - PAB BATTERY ROOM VENT COOLERS

Requirements

HX-105B will be monitored at least yearly to check for reduction in performance.

Design Basis

Refer to Condition Report 97-0402.

Reference

Generic Letter 89-13

PBM 92-0088

Test Procedure

PC-56.4, HX-105B Performance Test Battery Room Cooler

PC-56.5, HX-105B Battery Room Cooler Performance Test Analysis.

Design Basis Testing Achieved

No. The instrument accuracy is not good enough for the small temperatures differences involved. The tube and fin material cannot be modeled accurately in the analysis software so approximations must be made. In response to Generic Letter 89-13, Wisconsin Electric committed to monitor the coolers. The testing method has been changed to clean and eddy current test. Condition Report 97-0575 has been initiated to address the condition.

FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM

Requirements

A. Fire suppression systems

1. Fire main loop water supply
 - a. Flow path valve position verification Monthly
 - b. Fire pump functional test Monthly
 - c. Fire pump capacity test Yearly
 - d. Diesel driven fire pump engine
 - (1) Fuel volume verification Monthly
 - (2) Diesel fuel sample analysis Quarterly
 - (3) Periodic inspection 18 months
 - e. Diesel driven fire pump battery and charger
 - (1) Battery voltage verification Weekly
 - (2) Electrolyte level Weekly
 - (3) Electrolyte specific gravity Quarterly
 - (4) Periodic inspection 18 months
2. Water sprinkler systems
 - a. Flow path valve position verification Monthly
 - b. Inspector's test Yearly
 - c. Visual header and nozzle inspection 18 months
3. Fire hose stations
 - a. Visual inspection Monthly
 - b. Hose hydrostatic test 2 years
 - c. Valve cycle test 3 years
4. Halon gaseous suppression systems
 - a. Halon quantity verification 6 months
 - b. Functional test Yearly
 - c. Visual header and nozzle inspection Yearly

B. Fire detection

1. Fire detection system
 - a. Channel functional test 6 months

C. Fire barriers

1. Fire barrier penetration seals
 - a. Visual inspection 18 months

Design Basis

See Requirements.

Reference

TS 15.3.14
TS 15.4.15

Test Procedure

PBF-2033, Turbine Building Shift Log, Unit 2
RMP-37, Diesel Fire Pump Engine Inspection
RMP-57, Fire Barrier Penetration Fire Seal Surveillance
RMP-58, Containment Fire Seal and Conduit Wrapping Inspection, Unit 1
RMP-59, Containment Fire Seal and Conduit Wrapping Inspection, Unit 2
RMP-9094, Diesel Fire Pump Battery Surveillance
TS-70, Monthly Diesel Engine-Driven Fire Pump Functional Test
TS-71, Monthly Electric Motor-Driven Fire Pump Functional Test
TS-72, Annual Fire Pump Capacity Test
TS-73, Monthly Fire Protection Control Valve Position Verification
TS-74, Annual Underground Fire Main Flow Test
TS-75, Biennial Service Testing of Fire Hoses and Fire Hose Stations
TS-76, Quarterly Automatic Sprinkler and Water Spray System Surveillance Test
TS-77, Semi-annual Smoke Detection System Integrity Test
TS-78, Semi-annual Halon 1301 Fire Suppression System Surveillance Test
TS-79, Monthly Surveillance of Fire Hoses
TS-80, Sampling of Emergency Fuel Oil Tank (T-72), Fuel Oil Storage Tanks (T-175A) and EDG Day Tanks(T31A,B & T-176A,B)(Quarterly)

Design Basis Testing Achieved

A.1.a & A.2.a - TS-73 verifies the position of the fire protection system header, section, isolation and sprinkler valves.

A.1.b - TS-70 and TS-71 adequately test the fire pumps for operability. Pump curves were developed during acceptance testing when the fire pumps were replaced in 1985 and 1986.

A.1.c - TS-72 tests for the capacity of both fire pumps. Flow speed, vibrations and hydraulic performance are measured and compared to acceptance criteria.

A.1.d(1) - PBF-2033 verifies that the diesel fire pump fuel oil tank is between 3/4 and 7/8 full. This is verified every shift. TS-70 verifies fuel oil level monthly after the functional test. TS-70 states to fill to a max of 3/4 full after a 30 minute run. PBF-2033 states that the level should be 3/4 to 7/8 full. Notified system engineer. He was aware of the confusion and is going to question operations.

A.1.d(2) - TS-80 provides direction to sample the safety related diesel fuel oil tanks. The procedure also provides the acceptance criteria for the fuel oil analysis.

A.1.d(3) - RMP-37 uses the manufacturer's manual to inspect the diesel engine.

A.1.e(1) - PBF-2033 verifies that the diesel fire pump A and B battery voltages are above 24 volts. This is verified each shift.

A.1.e(2) - PBF-2033 verifies that the battery electrolyte level is above the plates. This is verified each swing shift. PBF-2033 states that the level is above the plates but TS-70 states that it must be 3/8" above the plates. Notified the system engineer. He will question operations.

A.1.e(3) - RMP-9094 annually measures and records specific gravity for all cells of both diesel fire pump batteries.

A.1.e(4) - RMP-9094 annually inspects the diesel fire pump batteries for damage and connection tightness, cleanliness and corrosion free.

A.2.b - TS-76 verifies that when the test sprinkler valves are opened, the flow switch will alarm in the control room in less than 90 seconds.

A.2.c - TS-76 ensures that all sprinklers and spray nozzles are operable and that all other system components are free of damage or defect.

A.3 a, b & c - TS-79 verifies the operability, availability and accessibility of the Tech Spec fire hose stations. TS-75 cycles all Tech Spec fire hose reel control valves and hydro tests all fire hoses.

A.4 a, b & c - TS-78 tests the halon fire suppression system functions and directs the operator to inspect the nozzles and system components. The test also does an agent quantity surveillance. The quantity verification states to investigate if the measured quantity is less than 5 units of original but it does not state where to find where the original quantity can be found. Notified system engineer. He will question operations.

B.1.a - TS-77 verifies the integrity of the smoke detection system. The test is performed every April and October on all Tech Spec related smoke detectors. TS-78 tests the smoke detectors associated with the halon system every March and September.

C.1.a - RMP-57, 58 and 59 provide guidance for inspecting the fire barrier on both units and common. The unit 1 and 2 tests are presently done yearly to coincide with the outages.

G-01/02/03/04 - EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR

Requirements

TS 15.4.6

1. Manually start and load each EDG monthly. Load not to exceed 2850KW. Minimum run time of thirty minutes.
2. Auto start, load shed and specific equipment operation initiated by an actual interruption of AC power supplies to ESF busses and a simulated SI. After 5 minutes minimum, automatic load shedding and restoration of vital loads are tested again by manually tripping the EDG output breaker. Each refueling outage.
3. Proper operation of Emergency lighting, including automatic transfer switch for DC lights, will be demonstrated each refueling shutdown.
4. Each EDG shall be inspected following the manufacturer's recommendations for stand-by service.
5. Operability of the diesel fuel oil system shall be verified monthly.
6. A diesel fuel oil program shall be maintained to test both new fuel oil upon receipt and stored fuel oil on a quarterly frequency in accordance with ASTM standards.

TS Table 15.4.1-2 Item 17

Perform daily EDG fuel oil supply inventory

Design Basis

See Requirements.

Reference

TS 15.4.6

Test Procedure

Form PBF-2033, Turbine Building Shift Log, Unit 2

TS-81, Emergency Diesel Generator G-01

TS-82, Emergency Diesel Generator G-02

TS-83, Emergency Diesel Generator G-03

TS-84, Emergency Diesel Generator G-04

ORT-3, Safety Injection Actuation with Loss of Engineered Safeguards AC, Unit 1

ORT-3, Safety Injection Actuation with Loss of Engineered Safeguards AC, Unit 2

TS-80, Sampling of Emergency Fuel Oil Tank (T-72), Fuel Oil Storage Tanks (T-175A) and EDG Day Tanks(T31A,B & T-176A,B) (Quarterly)

OI-92A, Fuel Oil Ordering, Receipt, Sampling and T-173 Fill Tank Draining

Manufacturer's Recommendations

RMP 9043 series, Diesel Generator Preventative Maintenance Procedures
RMP 93xx series, Air Start Equipment Overhaul Procedures
ICP 13.007A-1/2, G-01/02 I&C Diesel Outage Calib
ICP 13.007B-1/2, G-03/04 I&C Diesel Outage Calib
ICP 06.069/070, G-03/04 I&C Non-outage Calib

Design Basis Testing Achieved

15.4.6

1. TS-81, 82, 83 and 84 starts and loads the diesels to 2500 to 2700 kW. The procedures run the diesels for one hour.
2. The NRC reviewed ORT-3 during the OSTI inspection in December, 1996. The following is an excerpt from the exit meeting report. "During a review of surveillance testing, which primarily focused upon the EDGs, NRC identified that ORT-3 does not sequence all loads onto an EDG. NRC position is that we lacked understanding of the surveillance; and during discussions we rejected the OSTI position. NRC questions how we hope to foster a questioning attitude among our staff if we reject a large group such as the OSTI team."
3. Attachment A of ORT-3 is titled "Test of Emergency DC Lighting" and tests that the control room emergency DC lighting energizes when AC power is lost. ORT-3 for unit 1 Section 1.7 references the wrong Tech Spec section. references 15.4.6-a.2, should be 15.4.6-a.3. Notified the system engineer.
4. The procedures listed under Manufacturer's Recommendations have been or will be prepared specifically to satisfy the manufacturer's recommendations. Many of the procedures are not written yet.
5. The NRC reviewed TS-81, 82, 83 and 84 during the OSTI inspection in December, 1996. The following is an excerpt from the exit meeting report. "POTENTIAL VIOLATION (TS 15.4.6.A.5): Monthly testing of the fuel oil transfer system only verifies operability of the pumps, not the entire system. We were testing the entire system annually. This is contrary to TS requirements."
6. TS-80 provides direction to sample the safety related diesel fuel oil tanks. The procedure also provides the acceptance criteria for the fuel oil analysis. OI-92A provides instruction for sampling fuel oil upon receipt. Section 1.5 references the wrong Tech Spec. It references TS-15.3.7-5,5 basis, should be 15.3.7-8 basis. Notified DSS responsible for system.

TS Table 15.4.1-2

PBF-2033 checks fuel oil in day tank and storage tank every shift.

HX-055A/B-1/2 - G-01/02 EDG GLYCOL COOLERS

Requirements

The heat transfer characteristics of the diesel generator glycol coolers will be monitored during functional testing. Data taken will be SW HX outlet temperature, differential pressure, lube oil temperature and glycol temperature. The data will be trended to provide an early indication of fouling.

Design Basis

See Requirements.

Reference

Generic Letter 89-13
PBM 92-0088

Test Procedure

Miscellaneous Heat Exchanger Cleaning and Inspection Program

TS-81, Emergency Diesel Generator G-01

TS-82, Emergency Diesel Generator G-02

Design Basis Testing Achieved

During the performance of TS-81 or 82, the parameters in Requirement 2 above are recorded on PBF-2067a or b. The forms are routed to maintenance where the data is entered into the trending program. The data is not extrapolated out to the design condition. Worse case conditions like low flow or high lake temperature are not taken into account. Condition Report 97-0573 was initiated to address the condition.

The diesel coolant heat exchangers are in the Miscellaneous Heat Exchanger Cleaning and Inspection Program and are scheduled for cleaning and inspection yearly every two years.

HX-012A/B/C/D - COMPONENT COOLING WATER HEAT EXCHANGERS

Requirements

The CCW heat exchangers will be cleaned yearly with a visual inspection and an alternating year eddy current inspection schedule (100% tube cleaning and 20% inspection)

Design Basis

See Requirements.

Reference

Generic Letter 89-13.

Test Procedure

Miscellaneous Heat Exchanger Cleaning and Inspection Program

Design Basis Testing Achieved

The component cooling water heat exchangers are in the Miscellaneous Heat Exchanger Cleaning and Inspection Program and are scheduled for cleaning yearly and inspection every two years.

Z-015 - PRIMARY AUXILIARY BLDG CRANE

Requirements

All slings and special devices which will be used in supporting heavy loads from either the main or auxiliary hoist of the auxiliary building crane shall be inspected immediately prior to use.

Design Basis

See Requirements.

Reference

TS 15.4.14

Test Procedure

Safe Load Path and Rigging Manual, SLP-4

Design Basis Testing Achieved

SLP-4 requires form PBF-9082 to be used. The purpose of PBF-9082 is to document the inspection of the auxiliary building crane lifting devices.

GENERIC TESTS

SNUBBERS

Requirements

1. During each refueling shutdown, a representative sample of approximately 10% of the snubbers shall be functionally tested for operability. The hydraulic snubber functional test shall verify:
 - a. Activation (restraining action) is achieved within the specified range of velocity or acceleration in both tension and compression.
 - b. Snubber bleed, or release rate, where required, is within the specified range in compression or tension. For snubbers specifically required not to displace under continuous load, the ability of the snubber to withstand load without displacement shall be verified.
 - c. For each snubber found to be inoperable, an additional 10% of that type snubber shall be tested until no more failures are found or all units have been tested.
2. A record of service life of each snubber, the date at which the designated service life commences and the installation and maintenance records on which the designated service life is based shall be maintained. Concurrent with the next inservice visual inspection is at least once per 18 months thereafter, the installation and maintenance records for all safety related snubbers shall be reviewed to verify that the indicated service life has not been exceeded or will not be exceeded prior to the next scheduled prior to the next schedule service life review. If the indicated service life will be exceeded prior to the next scheduled service life review, the snubber service life will be re-evaluated or the snubber shall be replaced or reconditioned so as to extend its service life beyond that date of the next scheduled service life review. This re-evaluation replacement or reconditioning shall be indicated in the records.

Design Basis

See Requirements

Reference

TS 15.4.13

Test Procedure

Snubber Component Maintenance Program
RMP-61, Hydraulic Snubber Surveillance and Testing
RMP-9060, Safety Related Snubber Visual Inspection

Design Basis Testing Achieved

1. Section 4.1 of CMP 10.1 states that approximately 10% of the Tech Spec snubbers will be tested each refueling cycle. The requirements are functional testing (activation, bleed or release rate, service life) and overall integrity (proper orientation, hydraulic fluid level check, proper attachment to piping and structures).
2. Section 4.1.3 of CMP 10.1 discusses a callup which requires that the component engineer reviews the history files for the 51 snubbers listed in FSAR table 6.2-13 to verify service life has not exceeded or will not be exceeded before the next scheduled inspection.

PRIMARY SYSTEM TESTS

Requirements

1. TS Table 15.4.1-2 Item 9a. Rod drop times of all full length rods
2. TS 15.3.1 A.6 and TS Table 15.4.1-2 Item 30. The pressurizer shall have 100kW of pressurizer heaters available.

Design Basis

1. The drop times of each RCCA shall be no greater than 2.2 seconds from the loss of stationary gripper coil voltage to dashpot entry (TS 15.3.10.E).
2. Pressurizer has 100 kW of heaters available (TS 15.3.1.A.6).

Reference

TS 15.3.10.E
TS Table 15.4.1-2 Item 9a
TS 15.3.1.A.6

Test Procedure

RESP-3.1, PPCS Feedwater Correction

Design Basis Testing Achieved

1. RESP 3.1 states that the rod drop times cannot exceed 2.1 seconds.
2. RESP 3.1 states to check that the energy input is greater than 100 kW.

MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT

Requirements

Except during low-power physic tests, the reactor shall not be made critical when the moderator temperature coefficient is more positive than 5 pcm/F.

Reactor power shall not exceed 70% of Rated Power if the moderator temperature coefficient is positive.

Design Basis

See Requirements

Reference

TS 15.3.1.F.1
TS 15.3.1.F.2

Test Procedure

RESP-4.1, Test Initial Criticality and ARO Physics
RESP-5.2, Reactor Engineering Tests During Escalation to Full Power

Design Basis Testing Achieved

The acceptance criteria of RESP-4.1 states: "Administratively limit the Bank D withdrawal position to that determined from the temperature coefficient measurement until RCS temperature is raised to a value that is shown to lower moderator temperature coefficient to below +5 pcm/F."

Step 5.5.6 of RESP-5.2 states: "DO not exceed 70% power level if T_{error} is not stable enough to ensure compliance with Tech. Spec 15.3.1.F.2 requiring a negative MTC."

ROD WORTH MEASUREMENT

Requirements

Following each refueling shutdown prior to commencing power operation, perform rod worth measurements.

Design Basis

Design worth received from Westinghouse prior to every outage as a WCAP. "The Nuclear Design and Core Management of the Point Beach Unit x Nuclear Reactor, Cycle xx."

Reference

TS Table 15.4.1-2 Item 9b

Test Procedure

RESP-4.2, Control Rod Reactivity Worth Measurements

Design Basis Testing Achieved

The acceptance criteria of RESP 4.2 states that the measured worth must be greater than 90% of the design worth.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM TOTAL FLOW RATE

Requirements

The DNB related parameters shall be maintained within the limits during Rated Power operation.

Design Basis

Unit 1 $\geq 181,800$ gpm

Unit 2 $\geq 174,000$ gpm. If the Reactor Coolant System raw measured flow rate is $< 174,000$ gpm but $\geq 169,500$ gpm, Unit 2 shall be limited to $\leq 98\%$ rated power.

Reference

TS 15.3.1 G.3 Basis

Test Procedure

RESP-6.2, Precision RCS Flow Rate Measurement

Design Basis Testing Achieved

The acceptance criteria stated in RESP 6.2 is $\geq 181,800$ gpm for Unit 1 and $\geq 174,000$ gpm for Unit 2.

REACTIVITY ANOMALIES

Requirements

Following a normalization of the computed boron concentration as a function of burnup, the actual boron concentration of the coolant shall be periodically compared with the predicted value.

Design Basis

If the difference between the observed and predicted steady-state concentration reaches the equivalent of one percent in reactivity, an evaluation as to the cause of the discrepancy shall be made and reported to the NRC.

Reference

TS 15.4.9

Test Procedure

RESP-6.5, Reactivity Anomalies

Design Basis Testing Achieved

The acceptance criteria states that the normalized measured boron concentrations shall be within an equivalent of 1000 pcm reactivity of predicted boron concentrations. 1000pcm is equivalent to one percent.

CONDITION REPORT
CR 97-0166

STATUS: OPEN UNIT: 0 SYSTEM: VNCC INITIATED: 01/20/97 CLOSED:
MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR:
INITIATOR: ISSUE MANAGER:
NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 2 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 0

Containment Accident Recirculation Heat Exchanger Testing No Longer Valid

DESCRIPTION:

The data acquired using PC-56, Parts 1 and 2, "Containment Accident Recirculation Heat Exchanger Performance Monitoring, Units 1 and 2" is no longer valid and is not used any more. The instruments used in the test do not have the accuracy necessary to determine the heat exchanger performance. PBTP-040, "Performance Test of 1HX-15D" was developed and performed to test the Unit 1 Accident Fan Coolers. This PBTP was successful and will be re-written to become a routine callup.

Significance: PC-56, Parts 1 and 2 are no longer valid.

STATUS UPDATE:

SCREENED BY :	DATE: 01/21/97
REGULATORY REPORTABLE..... (Y/N) : N	TS VIOLATION..... (Y/N) : N
10 CFR 21..... (Y/N) : N	TS LCO..... (Y/N) : N
OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. (Y/N) : N	JCO REQUIRED..... (Y/N) : N
MSS REVIEW..... (Y/N) : N	SCAO..... (Y/N) : N
OPERABILITY DETERMINATION. (Y/N) : N	COMMITMENT..... (Y/N) : N

SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS:

This condition was not a violation of any PBNP Technical Specification and is not reportable. This CR documents that PC-56, Parts 1+2 is no longer valid (previously questioned under CR 95-459) and its use has been discontinued. A new testing procedure will be established based upon the PBTP-040 test procedure and will be applied to both Units for future testing of the containment accident recirc HXs.

REFERENCES:

CR 95-459	CR 96-008
PC-56, PARTS 1 & 2	PBTP-040
PC-56, PARTS 1&2	

TRENDING INFORMATION:

WHEN : NON-OUTAGE
FIRST QUARTER OF 1997
WHO : NSSS MECHANICAL SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
WHY : DATA OR COMPUTATIONS WERE WRONG OR INCOMPLETE
WHAT : PROCEDURAL PROBLEM
MECHANICAL HEAT EXCHANGER RELATED
SYSTEM: SERVICE WATER
CONTAINMENT COOLING H AND V

ACTIONS	PRI	ACTION STATUS	RESPONSIBLE PERSON	DUE DATE
1	41	ACTION NEEDED		
2	-100	ACTION NEEDED		04/25/97

***** Responsible Person:
* Trkid: CR 97-0166 * Urgency: NO DUE DATE ASSIGNED
* Action Number: 1 * Work Priority: 41

Activity Pending is: ACTION NEEDED

-----TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION-----

Containment Accident Recirculation Heat Exchanger Testing No Longer Valid

The data acquired using PC-56, Parts 1 and 2, "Containment Accident Recirculation Heat Exchanger Performance Monitoring, Units 1 and 2" is no longer valid and is not used any more. The instruments used in the test do not have the accuracy necessary to determine the heat exchanger performance. PBTP-040, "Performance Test of 1HX-15D" was developed and performed to test the Unit 1 Accident Fan Coolers.

Develop a new routine testing procedure for the containment accident recirc heat exchangers based upon the successful testing conducted under PBTP-040. This new test procedure should be developed for both units and will replace PC-56, Parts 1 + 2. (PC-56 will be cancelled).

-----DATES-----

Source Record: 01/20/97	***** Evaluation *****	***** Correction *****
Commitment:	Eval Due:	Corr Act Due:
Action Create: 01/21/97	Orig Eval Due:	Orig CA Due:
Action Closed:	Eval Done:	Corr Act Done:

-----PEOPLE-----

Responsible for Overall Action: BMS
Responsible for Current Pending Activity: BMS
Issue Manager:
Initiator:
Punchlist Administrator:

-----UPDATE-----

(01/22/97 Received Action into Group: BMS
Responsible Person:

(01/22/97) Set Work Priority to 41. Priority required based on need to do a test to ensure operability testing commitments of GL 89-13 for safety related heat exchangers is met.

-----REFERENCES-----

CR 95-459	CR 96-008
PC-56, PARTS 1&2	PBTP-040

-----MISCELLANEOUS-----

Originating Agency:	System: VNCC
NRC Open Item Number:	NRC Status:
Related Outages:	
Engineering Work Type: None Specified	
Person Hours: Original Estimate =	
Current Estimate =	
Actual Hours =	

ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT

PAGE 1
02/25/97

***** Responsible Person: *****
* Trkid: CR 97-0166 * Urgency: DUE IN 31-60 DAYS
* Action Number: 2 * Work Priority: -100

Activity Pending is: ACTION NEEDED

-----TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION-----

Containment Accident Recirculation Heat Exchanger Testing No Longer Valid

The data acquired using PC-56, Parts 1 and 2, "Containment Accident Recirculation Heat Exchanger Performance Monitoring, Units 1 and 2" is no longer valid and is not used any more. The instruments used in the test do not have the accuracy necessary to determine the heat exchanger performance. PBTP-040, "Performance Test of 1HX-15D" was developed and performed to test the Unit 1 Accident Fan Coolers.

Site Engineering is developing a replacement procedure to perform this testing based upon PBTP-040. PC-56, Parts 1 and 2 need to be cancelled.

-----DATES-----

Source Record: 01/20/97	***** Evaluation *****	***** Correction *****
Commitment:	Eval Due:	Corr Act Due: 04/25/97
Action Create: 01/21/97	Orig Eval Due:	Orig CA Due: 04/25/97
Action Closed:	Eval Done:	Corr Act Done:

-----PEOPLE-----

Responsible for Overall Action: OPS
Responsible for Current Pending Activity: OPS
Issue Manager:
Initiator:
Punchlist Administrator:

-----UPDATE-----

(01/22/97 Received Action into Group: OPS
Responsible person: Due Date: 04/25/97

-----REFERENCES-----

-----MISCELLANEOUS-----

Originating Agency:	System: VNCC
NRC Open Item Number:	NRC Status:
Related Outages:	
Engineering Work Type: None Specified	
Person Hours: Original Estimate =	
Current Estimate =	
Actual Hours =	

CONDITION REPORT
CR 97-0548

STATUS: OPEN UNIT: 2 SYSTEM: VNCF INITIATED: 02/18/97 CLOSED:
MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR:
INITIATOR: ISSUE MANAGER:
NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 1 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 0

ORT-7 Testing Method Differs Between Unit 1 And Unit 2

DESCRIPTION:

The testing method of ORT-7, Operation of Backdraft Dampers, differs between Unit 1 and Unit 2. The ORT-7 for Unit 1 was revised in 1995 as a result of the evaluation of INPO SER 92-12. The procedure was revised to more accurately simulate fan operation during a real accident. It was noted that the ORT-7 for Unit 2 does not contain these revisions. Also, ORT-7 for Unit 1 is classified as a minor procedure and ORT-7 for Unit 2 is classified as a major procedure.

Significance: Unit 2 backdraft dampers are not being tested to accurately simulate fan operation during an accident.

STATUS UPDATE:

SCREENED BY :	DATE: 02/20/97
REGULATORY REPORTABLE..... (Y/N): N	TS VIOLATION..... (Y/N): N
10 CFR 21..... (Y/N): N	TS LCO..... (Y/N): N
OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. (Y/N): N	JCO REQUIRED..... (Y/N): N
MSS REVIEW..... (Y/N): N	SCAQ..... (Y/N): N
OPERABILITY DETERMINATION. (Y/N): N	COMMITMENT..... (Y/N): N

SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS:

This appears to be a procedural deficiency that was never revised for one of the Units. The 50.59 performed for this change supports the revision that should have been performed. It does not appear that this has rendered any component inoperable, or caused any components to be improperly tested at this time, but the Unit 2 procedure needs updating to ensure it meets the same requirements as the procedure for Unit 1. Therefore, no immediate operability or reportability issue exists for this CR.

REFERENCES:

ORT-7

TRENDING INFORMATION:

WHEN : FIRST QUARTER OF 1997
NON-OUTAGE
WHO : OPERATIONS
WHY : STEPS IN PROCEDURE CONTAINED INCORRECT FACTS
WHAT : OPERATIONS PROCEDURE
MECHANICAL FAN RELATED
SYSTEM: CONTAINMENT CLEANUP SYSTEM H and V

ACTIONS	PRI	ACTION STATUS	RESPONSIBLE PERSON	DUE DATE
1	-100	ACTION NEEDED		10/31/97

ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT

PAGE 1
03/25/97

***** Responsible Person: *****
* Trkid: CR 97-0548 * Urgency: DUE IN > 180 DAYS
* Action Number: 1 * Work Priority: -100

Activity Pending is: ACTION NEEDED

-----TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION-----

ORT-7 Testing Method Differs Between Unit 1 And Unit 2

Revise ORT-7 for Unit 2 to reflect the same changes made to the Unit 1
ORT-7 as a result of the evaluation of SER 92-12. In addition, ensure
that the classification of the Unit 2 ORT-7 is changed from major to minor.

-----DATES-----

***** Evaluation *****		***** Correction *****	
Source Record: 02/18/97	*****	*****	*****
Commitment:	Eval Due:	Corr Act Due:	10/31/97
Action Create: 02/20/97	Orig Eval Due:	Orig CA Due:	10/31/97
Action Closed:	Eval Done:	Corr Act Done:	

-----PEOPLE-----

Responsible for Overall Action: OPS
Responsible for Current Pending Activity: OPS
Issue Manager:
Initiator:
Punchlist Administrator:

-----UPDATE-----

(03/10/97 Received Action into Group: OPS
Responsible Person: Due Date: 10/31/97

-----REFERENCES-----

ORT-7

-----MISCELLANEOUS-----

Originating Agency:	System:	VNCF
NRC Open Item Number:	NRC Status:	
Related Outages:		
Engineering Work Type:	None Specified	
Person Hours:	Original Estimate =	
	Current Estimate =	
	Actual Hours =	

CONDITION REPORT
CR 97-0573

STATUS: OPEN UNIT: 0 SYSTEM: VNDG INITIATED: 02/20/97 --- CLOSED:
MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR:
INITIATOR: ISSUE MANAGER:
NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 1 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 0

Diesel Generator Glycol Coolers Monitoring Per Generic Letter 89-13

DESCRIPTION:

In response to Generic Letter 89-13, Wisconsin Electric committed to continually monitor Diesel Generator Glycol Coolers during biweekly operability testing of the diesel generators. The way that this is accomplished is that data for SW HX outlet temperature, differential pressure, lube oil temperature and glycol temperature is taken and trended. This would only detect gross degradation. The data is not extrapolated out to the design condition. Worse case conditions like low flow or high lake temperature are not taken into account. The coolers are cleaned and eddy current tested every two years coinciding with diesel outages.

The operability testing of the diesel generator is performed monthly.

Significance: Failure to meet NRC commitments.

STATUS UPDATE:

SCREENED BY :	DATE: 02/21/97
REGULATORY REPORTABLE..... (Y/N) : N	TS VIOLATION..... (Y/N) : N
10 CFR 21..... (Y/N) : N	TS LCO..... (Y/N) : N
OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS..... (Y/N) : N	JCO REQUIRED..... (Y/N) : N
MSS REVIEW..... (Y/N) : N	SCAQ..... (Y/N) : N
OPERABILITY DETERMINATION..... (Y/N) : N	COMMITMENT..... (Y/N) : N

SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS:

The operability of the EDG is tested monthly. The general operability of the coolers is verified monthly. This safety related equipment is considered operable. The concern is not considered reportable per our TSS.

REFERENCES:

GENERIC LETTER 89-13 VPNPD-90-027
VPNPD-092-091

TRENDING INFORMATION:

WHEN : 1990 - 1999
NON-OUTAGE

WHO :
WHY : INADEQUATE ENFORCEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS (SPAC)
WHAT : MECHANICAL HEAT EXCHANGER RELATED
CALIBRATION RELATED

SYSTEM: DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM H and V

This CR calls for more accurate measuring of the performance of the EDG Glycol Coolers.

ACTIONS	PRI	ACTION STATUS	RESPONSIBLE PERSON	DUE DATE
1	-100	ACTION NEEDED		

ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT

PAGE 1
03/25/97

***** Responsible Person:
* Trkid: CR 97-0513 * Urgency: NO DUE DATE ASSIGNED
* Action Number: 1 * Work Priority: -100

Activity Pending is: ACTION NEEDED

-----TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION-----

Diesel Generator Glycol Coolers Monitoring Per Generic Letter 89-13

Notify the NRC of the frequency change of monitoring the Diesel Generator Glycol Coolers. Purchase the equipment/services to accurately monitor the performance of the coolers.

-----DATES-----

Source Record: 02/20/97	***** Evaluation *****	***** Correction *****
Commitment:	Eval Due:	Corr Act Due:
Action Create: 02/21/97	Orig Eval Due:	Orig CA Due:
Action Closed:	Eval Done:	Corr Act Done:

-----PEOPLE-----

Responsible for Overall Action: BMS
Responsible for Current Pending Activity: BMS
Issue Manager:
Initiator:
Punchlist Administrator:

-----UPDATE-----

(02/24/97 Received Action into Group: BMS
Responsible Person:

-----REFERENCES-----

GENERIC LETTER 89-13 VPMPD-90-027
VPMPD-092-091

-----MISCELLANEOUS-----

Originating Agency:	System: VNDG
NRC Open Item Number:	NRC Status:
Related Outages:	
Engineering Work Type: None Specified	
Person Hours: Original Estimate =	
Current Estimate =	
Actual Hours =	

CONDITION REPORT
CR 97-0574

STATUS: OPEN UNIT: 0 SYSTEM: VNBI INITIATED: 02/20/97 CLOSED:
MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR:
INITIATOR: ISSUE MANAGER:
NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 1 NUMBER OF CLOSED ACTIONS: 0

PAB Battery Room Coolers Monitoring Per Generic Letter 89-13

DESCRIPTION:

DescriptionIn response to Generic Letter 89-13, Wisconsin Electric committed to continually monitor the PAB Battery Room Vent Coolers, HX 105A/B. The accuracy of the instruments to monitor performance of HX-105A/B is not good enough for the small temperatures differences involved. The tube and fin material cannot be modeled accurately in the analysis software so approximations must be used. The testing method has been changed to periodic cleaning and eddy current examination which meets the intent of Generic Letter 89-13.
//Significance: Failure to meet NRC commitment.

STATUS UPDATE:

SCREENED BY : DON PETERSON	DATE: 02/21/97
REGULATORY REPORTABLE..... (Y/N) : N	TS VIOLATION..... (Y/N) : N
10 CFR 21..... (Y/N) : N	TS LCO..... (Y/N) : N
OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. (Y/N) : N	JCO REQUIRED..... (Y/N) : N
MSS REVIEW..... (Y/N) : N	SCAQ..... (Y/N) : N
OPERABILITY DETERMINATION. (Y/N) : N	COMMITMENT..... (Y/N) : N

SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS:

The testing method has been changed to periodic cleaning and eddy current examination, this meets the intent of the GL 89-13. The CR address the concern to more accurately measure the effectiveness of the Heat Exchanger. The change in measuring technique did not affect the operability of any safety related equipment. A change to update this commitment is not considered to be a violation of the previous commitment.

REFERENCES:

GENERIC LETTER 89-13
13, VPMPD-90-027

RESPONSE TO GENERIC LETTER 89-

TRENDING INFORMATION:

WHEN : 1990 - 1999
NON-OUTAGE

WHO :
WHY : INADEQUATE ENFORCEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS (SPAC)
WHAT : MECHANICAL HEAT EXCHANGER RELATED
TOOLS/TEST EQUIPMENT RELATED

SYSTEM: PAB BATTERY and INVERTER ROOM H and V

A more accurate measurement of heat exchanger performance is being requested. To run a test when the lake temperature is 40-50 degrees compared to a possible 75 degree lake temp would at present give different outcomes. At present we are measuring the in and outs not the direct heat transfer/efficiency of the Heat exchanger.

ACTIONS	PRI	ACTION STATUS	RESPONSIBLE PERSON	DUE DATE
1	-100	ACTION NEEDED		

ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT

PAGE 1
03/25/97

***** Responsible Person:
* Trkid: CR 97-0574 * Urgency: NO DUE DATE ASSIGNED
* Action Number: 1 * Work Priority: -100

Activity Pending is: ACTION NEEDED

-----TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION-----

PAB Battery Room Coolers Monitoring Per Generic Letter 89-13

Purchase the equipment/services to accurately monitor the performance of the coolers or notify the NRC of the change in PAB Battery Room Coolers testing method.

-----DATES-----

Source Record: 02/20/97	***** Evaluation *****	***** Correction *****
Commitment:	Eval Due:	Corr Act Due:
Action Create: 02/21/97	Orig Eval Due:	Orig CA Due:
Action Closed:	Eval Done:	Corr Act Done:

-----PEOPLE-----

Responsible for Overall Action: BMS
Responsible for Current Pending Activity: BMS
Issue Manager:
Initiator:
Punchlist Administrator:

-----UPDATE-----

(02/24/97 PM Received Action into Group: BMS
Responsible Person:

-----REFERENCES-----

-----MISCELLANEOUS-----

Originating Agency:	System: VNBI
NRC Open Item Number:	NRC Status:
Related Outages:	
Engineering Work Type: None Specified	
Person Hours: Original Estimate =	
Current Estimate =	
Actual Hours =	

POINT BEACH UNIT 2 COMMITMENT
INDEPENDENT REVIEW RESULTS

Commitment ID Number 12

Commitment Description

Review 20% of the surveillance procedures associated with safety significant non-pump and valve components (such as heat exchangers and fans) to ensure that the surveillance acceptance criteria satisfy the requirements of the plant design basis/accident analysis. Make changes as necessary as a result of this review.

This commitment is also Enforcement Conference Commitment # 47

Review Methodology

Identify the population of surveillance procedures associated with safety significant non-pump and non-valve components.

Verify that at least 20% have been selected and reviewed and that the selection process was not biased in a non-conservative manner. Note that PBNP staff already performed 100% review. This was not known at the time of development of this methodology.

Verify that the acceptance criteria for those reviewed satisfy the requirements of the plant design basis/accident analysis.

As necessary, expand the review sample by 10% to provide additional assurance that this population of surveillance procedures adequately reflect the accident analysis/design basis in their acceptance criteria. Note that PBNP staff already performed 100% review. This was not known at the time of development of this methodology.

Review Results

From discussions with the responsible person and as evidenced by the work performed to date on this commitment, safety significant non-pump and valve components were reviewed to ensure that their surveillance acceptance criteria satisfy the requirements of the plant design basis/accident analysis. The PBNP staff approach for this review was to take a list of safety related components generated from the Champs data base and compare it to a list of surveillance procedures. Calibration, electrical, sampling or chemistry procedures were not part of this review. The non-pump and non-valve component surveillance procedures identified by this comparison was then the list of procedures to review for the proper acceptance criteria. While at first a 20% sample review was initiated, it was expanded by the PBNP staff to a 100% review of the identified surveillance procedures.

POINT BEACH UNIT 2 COMMITMENT
INDEPENDENT REVIEW RESULTS

Commitment ID Number 12

The listing of the procedures reviewed by the PBNP staff are as follows:

PBNP Common

CMP-10.1	Snubber component Maintenance Program
HPIP 11.54	Control Room, F-16, Filter Testing
IT-11A	Performance Test for Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger, HX-13A/B
IT- 560	Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program Test of Chemical and Volume Control System Holdup Tanks (Refueling)
IT- 570	Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program Test of Drain System
PC-56 Part 4	HX-105B Performance Test Battery Room Cooler
PC-56 Part 5	HX-105B Performance Test Battery Room Coolers Analysis
Form PBF-2033, Turbine Building Shift Log, Unit 2	
RMP-37	Diesel Fire Pump Engine Inspection
RMP-57	Fire Barrier Penetration Fire Seal Surveillance
RMP-58	Containment Fire Seal and Conduit Wrapping Inspection, Unit 1
RMP-59	Containment Fire Seal and Conduit Wrapping Inspection, Unit 2
RMP-61	Hydraulic Snubber Surveillance and Testing
RMP-63	Low Pressure Turbine Rotor Testing
RMP-9060	Safety Related Snubber Visual Inspection
RMP-9094	Diesel Fire Pump Battery Surveillance
TS-09	Control Room Heating and Ventilation Monthly Checks
TS-32	Safety Valve Position Verification-Subcooling Margin Computing System-Containment Purge Valve Position
TS-70	Monthly Diesel Engine-Driven Fire Pump Functional Test
TS-71	Monthly Electric Motor-Driven Fire Pump Functional Test
TS-72	Annual Fire Pump Capacity Test
TS-73	Monthly Fire Protection Control Valve Position Verification
TS-74	Annual Underground Fire Main Flow Test
TS-75	Biennial Service Testing of Fire Hose and Fire Hose Stations
TS-76	Quarterly Automatic Sprinkler and Water Spray System Surveillance Test
TS-77	Semi-Annual Smoke Detection System Integrity Test
TS-78	Semi-Annual Halon 1301 Fire Suppression System surveillance Test
TS-79	Monthly Surveillance of Fire Hose Stations
TS-80	Sampling of Emergency Fuel Oil Tank, Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and EDG Day Tanks
TS-81	Emergency Diesel Generator G-01 Monthly
TS-82	Emergency Diesel Generator G-02 Monthly
TS-83	Emergency Diesel Generator G-03 Monthly
TS-84	Emergency Diesel Generator G-04 Monthly
OI-92A	Fuel Oil Ordering, Receipt, Sampling and T-173 Fill Tank Draining
RMP 9043 Series, Diesel Generator Preventative Maintenance Procedures	
Form PBF 2031, Auxiliary Building Shift Log	

POINT BEACH UNIT 2 COMMITMENT
INDEPENDENT REVIEW RESULTS

Commitment ID Number 12

Form PBF-2033, Turbine Building Shift Log, Unit 2
Safe Load Path and Rigging Manual, SLP-4
Miscellaneous Heat Exchanger Cleaning and Inspection Program

GENERIC

EPIP-10.3	Post Accident Containment Ventilation System Operation
RESP 3.1	PPCS Feedwater Correction
RESP 4.1	Initial Criticality and ARO Physics Test
RESP 4.2	Control Rod Reactivity Worth Measurements
RESP 6.2	Precision RCS Flow Rate Measurement
RESP 6.5	Reactivity Anomalies

PBNP Unit 1

ORT-3	Safety Injection Actuation with Loss of Engineered Safeguards AC, Unit 1
ORT-7	Operation of Backdraft Dampers, Unit 1
ORT-61	Sump A Drain to Auxiliary Building Drain, Unit 1
PBTP-040	Performance Test of 1HX-15D, Containment Fan Cooler
PC-56 Part 1	Containment Accident Recirc Heat Exchanger Hanger Performance Monitoring Test-U1
TS-33	Surveillance Testing, Containment Accident Recirc Fan Cooler Units (monthly) U1
TS-37	Surveillance Testing: Containment Accident Recirc Fan-Cooler Units U-1
PC-09 Part 2	Unit 1 Safeguard Systems Valve and Lock Checklist (Monthly)

PBNP Unit 2

ORT-3	Safety Injection Actuation with Loss of Engineered Safeguards AC, Unit 2
ORT-7	Operation of Backdraft Dampers, Unit 2
ORT-61	Containment Sump A Drain, Unit 2
PC-56 Part 2	Containment Accident Recirc Heat Exchanger Performance Monitoring Test-U-2
TS-34	Surveillance Testing: Containment Accident Recirc Fan-Cooler Units- U2
TS-38	Containment Spray Nozzles Check, Unit 2
PC-9 Part 3	Unit 2 Safeguard Systems Valve and Lock Checklist (monthly)

**** Others Procedures as identified in memo PBM 97-0197, dated 3/14/97, "RESTART COMMITMENT 12 REPORT"

POINT BEACH UNIT 2 COMMITMENT
INDEPENDENT REVIEW RESULTS

Commitment ID Number 12

It is recognized that some of the above procedures include fire service pump and valve testing, which was not part of this commitment but were included because the responsible person believed they needed review since they are not part of the IST Program.

This reviewer read through the procedure indexes for Operations Refueling Tests (ORT's), Technical Surveillance Tests (TS's), Periodic Checks (PC's), Inservice Tests (IT's), and Reactor Engineering Surveillance Procedures (RESP's). While some procedure titles caused concern that they may be in scope for this commitment, review of the procedure and discussions with the responsible person resolved these concerns.

Of the above listing of in-scope procedures, the following procedures were independently reviewed and found to have acceptance criteria that supported the PBNP design basis/accident analysis: TS-33, TS-34, TS-09, RESP-4.1, RESP-3.2, RESP 4.2, and RESP 6.2.

Recommendations

Based on this independent review there are no items associated with this Commitment # 12 which would impede Unit 2 Restart.

As a program enhancement, it is recommended that the PBNP staff evaluate the need to periodically verify that the Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchangers (2HX-11A/B) can perform at its design heat duty of 24.15 E6 BTU/HR (FSAR Table 6.2-7).

Reviewed by: _____

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 STARTUP COMMITMENT LIST

April 7, 1997 Status Update

IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION OF ISSUES PERTINENT TO REACTOR SAFETY

The following actions will be taken prior to Unit 2 criticality, except as specifically noted. The scope of reviews will be examining the identified documents or items for accuracy and compliance with requirements. Should any reviews identify either generic issues or significant discrepancies which could negatively impact reactor safety, the scope of those reviews will be expanded. Where discrepancies are identified, appropriate corrective and preventive actions will be taken commensurate with their safety significance.

Commitment ID Number	Description	Status
1	Complete a detailed Unit 2 Containment Materiel Condition Assessment, addressing housekeeping, system walkdowns, materiel condition, and instrumentation. Extensive work inside Containment was conducted this outage due to the Steam Generator replacement project.	In progress.
2	Walkdown all accessible Unit 2 and common Maintenance Rule systems for adequate visual material condition.	In progress.
3	Walkdown all accessible Unit 2 and common systems for outstanding work order tags. Note: The scope was expanded to include all accessible Unit 1 systems.	All work and verification completed. Documentation sent to NRC.
4	Conduct as-built inspections of the electrical and I&C components on the Unit 2 CVCS and CCW systems (Work Orders 9607322, 9611140, 9606548, and 9611139).	All work and verification completed. Documentation sent to NRC.
5	Complete Work Orders 9513222 through 9513225 to conduct inspections of Appendix R alternate power transfer switches.	All work and verification completed. Documentation sent to NRC.
6	Complete Work Order 9604151 to perform foreign material exclusion inspections on the Unit 2 4160V safeguards bus 2A-06 and breakers.	All work and verification completed. Documentation sent to NRC.
7	Complete a review of Unit 2 administrative controls implementing or referencing Technical Specifications to ensure Technical Specification requirements are appropriately reflected in the administrative controls.	All work and verification completed. Documentation sent to NRC.

8	Review 20% of the Operations Technical Specification, Inservice Test, and Operations Refueling Test related surveillance procedures, with concentration on those involving major equipment. Upgrade as necessary to include appropriate initial conditions, return to service lineups, properly specified independent verification, reviewing acceptance criteria, and Technical Specification implementation.	In progress.
9	Review the In Service Testing (IST) acceptance criteria for the remaining IST pumps to ensure that the IST acceptance criteria meets the design basis/accident analysis requirements. Make any changes necessary as a result of this review.	All work and verification completed. Documentation sent to NRC.
10	Review the In Service Testing acceptance criteria for all IST valves to ensure that the IST acceptance criteria meets the design basis/accident analysis requirements. Complete necessary operability evaluations, revise procedures, and resolve Unit 2 equipment discrepancies.	All work and verification completed. Documentation sent to NRC.
11	<p>Complete the following regarding installed instrumentation used in the IST program:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identify the Unit 2 installed instruments used in the IST program. • Review the performance of the identified instruments over the last 3 years. • Review the suitability of the instrumentation for use in the IST program. • Review all IST pump hydraulic data over the past year for adverse trends. <p>As necessary, make changes as a result of these actions.</p>	All work and verification completed. Documentation sent to NRC.
12	<p>Review 20% of the surveillance procedures associated with safety significant non-pump and valve components (such as heat exchangers and fans) to ensure that the surveillance acceptance criteria satisfy the requirements of the plant design basis/accident analysis. Make changes as necessary as a result of this review.</p> <p>Note: This has been expanded to a 100% review.</p>	All work and verification completed. Documentation in route to NRC.
13	Review other operating procedures that contain maintenance activities and revise as necessary to ensure PMT and QC are properly addressed by those procedures.	In closeout verification process.
14	Review equipment return to service testing requirements prior to the following U2R22 mode change readiness reviews to ensure the required equipment is operable prior to changing modes: core reload, leaving cold shutdown, and the approach to criticality.	Will occur approximately one week prior to each of the mode changes.
15	Review 20% of the work orders performed since January 1, 1995 on Unit 2 or common PSA safety significant systems (AFW, SW, EDG, IA, 4.16 kv, gas turbine, and CCW) to verify adequate PMT was performed to ensure system/component safety function.	All work and verification completed. Documentation sent to NRC.
16	Complete all Unit 2 Maintenance Rule related work order post-work, pre-PMT reviews prior to the approach to criticality.	All work and verification completed. Documentation sent to NRC.

17	Review 50.59 screenings conducted in 1996. Upgrade those determined to require a 50.59 evaluation.	Review completed. Upgrading in progress.
18	Review outstanding JCO's. Perform operability determinations and 50.59 evaluations needed to address the issues.	In progress.
19	Conduct a review of 50.59 evaluations from this outage. Ensure all conditions of the evaluations have been completed.	Initial review completed. Reviews of emergent 50.59 evaluations in progress. Tracking completion of conditions through the outage.
20	Review items from existing open item lists (e.g., NUTRK) to identify potentially degraded equipment.	In progress.
21	Review open items from the Design Basis Document development program.	In progress.
22	All open operability evaluations for Unit 2 and common equipment will be reviewed for acceptable closure of the degraded equipment issue. Disposition outstanding issues in accordance with 10CFR50.59 and Generic Letter 91-18.	In progress. This will continue through the outage.
23	Review 20% of the Condition Reports closed since January 1, 1995 which are associated with PSA safety significant systems for degraded equipment operability issues to ensure that we have adequately identified and dispositioned operability issues. This has been expanded to a 100% review of PSA safety significant systems.	In closeout verification process.
24	Complete an additional Outage Safety Review for the startup phase of the outage.	In progress.
25	Conduct an integrated review of all outage licensing commitments (50.59's, enforcement conference items, Technical Specification Change Requests, and Reload Safety Analysis). Ensure all requirements are met.	In progress.
26	Revise ORT-3 and DCS 3.1.11 to ensure Technical Specification 15.4.6.A.2 testing includes dynamic loading of the EDG with sequenced loads.	All work and verification completed. Documentation sent to NRC.
27	Test all EDGs in accordance with revised ORT-3 and DCS-3.1.11. Return the electrical systems to normal alignment prior to leaving cold shutdown.	Re-opened. QA will be reviewing the ORT-3 documentation.
28	Resolve the containment penetration commitments, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CP-32 (Containment penetration for Auxiliary Charging line). • Penetration thermal relief issue. 	In progress.

29	Complete a 50.59 evaluation for the existing CCW supply to the RCP seals as a safety function.	Re-opened. Does not appear that a 50.59 is an appropriate vehicle to do this. Considering alternatives.
30	Update the diesel generator loading calculation N-91-016 to properly reflect the loading of the Containment Fan Coolers.	In progress.
31	Evaluate the adequacy of coordination on the 120 VAC instrument bus system through a 50.59 or operability review.	In progress.
32	Implement interim improvements for the Condition Reporting process, based on a review of assessments and identified recommendations for improving that process.	In progress.
33	Implement interim improvements for the 50.59 process to require that all screenings be either authored or reviewed by a member of the multi-disciplinary review team.	All work and verification completed. Documentation sent to NRC.
34	Upgrade Unit 2 operations checklists to include requirements for initials, time, and date. During the review, verify that the checklists are technically correct.	Re-opened.
35	Revise applicable IST program documents to prevent equipment from being returned to service (declared operable) with vibrations in the alert range.	All work and verification completed. Documentation sent to NRC.
36	Revise NP 8.1.1, Work Order Processing, and NP 8.1.3, Post-Maintenance Testing to ensure post-maintenance testing, operability testing, and surveillance test requirements are properly addressed.	Re-opened.
37	Include return to service testing in the plant schedule, both outage and nonoutage.	All work and verification completed. Documentation sent to NRC.

COMPLETE PHYSICAL WORK WHICH SUPPORTS SAFE STARTUP AND POWER OPERATIONS

Modifications which Point Beach Nuclear Plant has identified as being significant to safety and scheduled for completion in U2R22 will be in an accepted status (i.e., the applicable physical work completed, post-maintenance testing completed satisfactorily, and the associated component/system being declared operable) prior to being required to be operable per Technical Specifications. These modifications are:

Commitment ID Number	Description	Status
38	Modification 96-033 - replace control power transformers on Motor Control Centers 2B32 and 2B42.	In progress. One remains to be installed.
39	Modification 90-048 - replace Boric Acid and Reactor Makeup Water totalizers, replace the CVCS control switch, replace flow indicators, and refurbish flow controllers. This resolves an Operator workaround issue.	Awaiting PMT.
40	Modification 94-097 - remove six RCS loop drain valves.	Awaiting PMT.
41	Modification 92-141 - relocate the RHR flow control valve controllers on 2CO3 for human factoring.	All work and verification completed. Documentation sent to NRC.
42	Modification 96-073 - seismically upgrade CCW, SI, RHR, and RHR/letdown piping supports and remove an AFW snubber.	All work and verification completed. Documentation sent to NRC.
43	Modification 94-066 - install a soft seat in containment isolation valve 2SI-834D, and add a relief valve and pressure regulator in the nitrogen supply line to the SI accumulators. This resolves an Operator workaround issue.	In closeout verification process.
44	Modification 96-065B - seismically upgrade the Refueling Water Storage Tank recirculation line.	In closeout verification process.
45	Modification 96-054 - install pressure gauges in the service water return header from the Emergency Diesel Generator GO1 and GO2 glycol coolers, and reset the throttle valves in that line.	On hold. Waiting for plant condition changes.
46	Modification 96-022 - install a new 125 VDC feed to 480V safeguards bus 2B03.	All work and verification completed. Documentation sent to NRC.
47	Modification 94-055 - add seismic supports to the raceway between risers 56 and 62 on C04 (Reactor and Primary Plant Control Board).	All work and verification completed. Documentation sent to NRC.

48	Modification 96-068B - eliminate containment heating steam and condensate return containment isolation valves.	In progress.
49	Modification 96-053 - replace an elbow in the west service water header.	In progress.
50	Modification 95-070 - seismically upgrade the containment cooling fans and filters.	In closeout verification process.
51	Modification 96-026 - install, delete, and modify supports for feedwater, main steam, and SI system piping for the 79-14 project.	All work and verification completed. Documentation sent to NRC.
52	Modification 96-058 - move Power Plant Computer System alarms to the exterior of C-20 panels.	All work and verification completed. Documentation sent to NRC.
53	Modification 94-095 - replace 8 Main Steam Condenser steam dump valves with improved design.	Awaiting PMT (PMT will be completed following reactor startup).
54	Modification 95-029 - replace SI accumulator level transmitters.	Awaiting PMT.
55	Modification 95-035 - modify Containment Spray additive tank controller circuit.	In closeout verification process.
56	Modification 96-063 - replace 345 KV breakers (3-4, 4-5, and 142).	Awaiting PMT (PMT will not be completed until Unit 2 is on-line).
57	Modification 96-069 - replace four breakers (1Y-06-01, 1Y-06-03, 1Y-06-05, and 1Y-06-11) associated with instrument bus 1Y-06.	In closeout verification process.
58	Modification 95-058*O - repair Steam Generator intermediate leg supports. This may be resolved through analysis.	Awaiting PMT (will not be completed until the unit is heated-up).
59	Modification 96-070 - replace molded case circuit breakers associated with instrument buses 2Y-05 and 2Y-06.	In closeout verification process.

The work and testing associated with these Work Orders will be completed prior to the associated component/system being declared operable. Emergent Work Orders associated with Maintenance Rule Risk Significant Systems which Point Beach Nuclear Plant defines as priority level 1 to 4 will be completed prior to Unit 2 criticality.

Commitment ID Number	Description	Status
60	Work Orders 9601506, 9602502, 9603921, 9611267, 9611278, and 9611755 - replace proximity switches and targets with an improved design and overhaul the Fuel Transfer Cart to enhance control system operation. This resolves an Operator workaround issue.	In closeout verification process.
61	Work Orders 9613568 and 9613569 - provide bonnet pressure locking relief for the SI-857A and SI-857B valves (interface valves between RHR and High Head SI) on Unit 2.	Work complete. PMT scheduled for week of April 7, 1997.
62	Work Order 9611757 - correct the leakage which leads to boric acid buildup in the cylinder blocks of "B" Charging Pump.	Awaiting PMT.
63	Work Order 9603532 - repair the handswitch for 2P-2A, the "A" Charging Pump.	Awaiting PMT.
64	Work Orders 9611624 through 9611626 - replace existing pneumatic turbine generator circuitry time delay relays with plug-in, electronic time delay relays.	Work is scheduled.
65	Work Order 9606626 - reinstall switches on the Unit 2 Containment hatch third door to allow monitoring of door status.	All work and verification completed. Documentation sent to NRC.
66	Work Order 9611052 - replace the 2P-10B switch, the "B" RHR Pump control switch.	All work and verification completed. Documentation sent to NRC.
67	Work Orders 9611198 and 9611199 - repair the body-to-bonnet boric acid leak on CV-307 B (lowside tap for "B" RCP #1 seal d/p) and CV-308B (lap seal d/p for "B" RCP).	Awaiting PMT.

The following actions will be completed to correct Operator workarounds prior to Unit 2 criticality, except as specifically noted:

Commitment ID Number	Description	Status
68	Repair valve AR-3511 per Work Order 9513340. The Unit 2 priming air ejector is blank flanged due to air in-leakage through the condenser air removal isolation valve, AR-3511.	Awaiting PMT.
69	Repair the drain valve for the heating steam moisture separator per Work Order 9613451. The Unit 2 heating steam moisture separator level has been difficult to maintain during normal operations, and frequent alarms were received due to low level. This will be tested following Unit 2 startup.	Work is scheduled.
70	Install a new level control system for the brine tank (T-118) per Modification 92-008*Q. The tank overflows because the installed automatic level control system is not effective, and there is no high level alarm for the tank.	All work and verification completed. Documentation sent to NRC.
71	Repair MS-249, the Unit 2 steam line sample valve, per Work Order 9603128. The valve had a packing leak which required steam header sampling to be shifted to the B steam header.	Awaiting PMT.
72	Repair alarm switch 2LS-2511 per Work Order 9605711. The Unit 2 D MSR level was being maintained low in the band due to level oscillations and a steam leak from the alarm switch.	Awaiting PMT.
73	Repair 2P116, the Unit 2 Boric Acid Recirculation Pump, per Work Order 9603130. It has a significant seal leak.	Work is scheduled.

PERSONNEL AND LICENSING READINESS

The following actions will be completed prior to Unit 2 criticality:

Commitment ID Number	Description	Status
74	Each operating crew will receive simulator training to gain proficiency in casualty response, the expected response of the newly installed steam generators and reactor core, and placing the turbine on-line.	All work and verification completed. Documentation sent to NRC.
75	Revise the initial and requalification operator training plans to include a review of the administrative procedures identified as significant to daily operation of the plant during each two year operations training plan.	Re-opened. Need to better define the administrative controls.

76	Conduct roundtable discussions with all MSS\SS\DTA personnel regarding conservative decisionmaking, Technical Specification interpretations, and lessons learned from recent regulatory communications and perspectives. Review outlier Technical Specification interpretations for interim applications.	In progress. Three people remain to receive the training.
77	Complete the procedure changes and training associated with the new Technical Specification on ECCS regarding the new Containment Integrity Analysis.	In progress.
78	Communicate specific expectations regarding AFW and EDG status control to Operators.	In progress.
79	Restore a proceduralized capability to operate the Containment Spray Pumps in the recirculation mode of the ECCS.	In progress.
80	Obtain amendments requested by Change Requests 188 and 189 related to Steam Generator replacement; 192 related to Service Water operability; and 194 related to Low Temperature Overpressurization limits. This will include resolution of issues related to Control Room and offsite dose evaluations for the analyzed events.	In progress.
81	<p>Submit the following requests for license amendments resulting from the review of existing Technical Specification interpretations:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Revise the maximum acceptable power level when crossover steam dumps are inoperable (TS 15.3.4.E). • Revise requirements for offsite power lines availability to address adequacy (TS 15.3.7.A.1.a). • Remove allowances in TS 15.3.1.A.1.a for single reactor coolant pump operation. • Appropriately modify the minimum required boron concentration in the Refueling Water Storage Tanks. 	In progress.

Status Explanation:

In closeout verification process - work and PMT, as applicable, have been reported as complete. The independent review by Duke Engineering is either in progress or issues from that review are being addressed.

PBNP UNIT 2 CORE LOAD ISSUES

As of April 7, 1997

BOLDED INDICATES READY FOR CORE LOADING.

Where discrepancies are identified during conduct of each of these commitments, appropriate corrective and preventive actions will be taken prior to core load commensurate with their safety significance.

ID #	Description	What Must Be Done Prior to Core Load	Work Status	Independent Verification Status
1	Complete a detailed Unit 2 Containment Materiel Condition Assessment, addressing housekeeping, system walkdowns, materiel condition, and instrumentation. Extensive work inside Containment was conducted this outage due to the Steam Generator replacement project.	Complete the assessment for systems and components needed for core load.	In progress.	Draft independent verification supports core load.
2	Walkdown all accessible Unit 2 and common Maintenance Rule systems for adequate visual material condition.	Complete the walkdown of those systems and components needed for core load.	In progress.	Independent verification drafted.
3	Walkdown all accessible Unit 2 and common systems for outstanding work order tags. Note: The scope was expanded to include all accessible Unit 1 systems.	Complete walkdowns for those systems and components needed for core load.	COMPLETE.	FINAL INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION SUPPORTS CORE LOAD.
6	Complete Work Order 9604151 to perform foreign material exclusion inspections on the Unit 2 4160V safeguards bus 2A-06 and breakers.	Complete prior to core load.	COMPLETE.	FINAL INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION SUPPORTS CORE LOAD.
7	Complete a review of Unit 2 administrative controls implementing or referencing Technical Specifications to ensure Technical Specification requirements are appropriately reflected in the administrative controls.	Complete the review of Refueling Procedures RP-1A and RP-1B, and Technical Specification Section 15.3.8.	COMPLETE	FINAL INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION SUPPORTS CORE LOAD.

9	Review the In Service Testing (IST) acceptance criteria for the remaining IST pumps to ensure that the IST acceptance criteria meets the design basis/accident analysis requirements. Make any changes necessary as a result of this review.	Complete the review for those IST pumps needed to support core load.	COMPLETE.	FINAL INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION SUPPORTS CORE LOAD.
10	Review the In Service Testing acceptance criteria for all IST valves to ensure that the IST acceptance criteria meets the design basis/accident analysis requirements. Complete necessary operability evaluations, revise procedures, and resolve Unit 2 equipment discrepancies.	Complete the review for those IST valves needed to support core load.	COMPLETE.	FINAL INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION SUPPORTS CORE LOAD.
11	<p>Complete the following regarding installed instrumentation used in the IST program:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identify the Unit 2 installed instruments used in the IST program. Review the performance of the identified instruments over the last 3 years. Review the suitability of the instrumentation for use in the IST program. <p>Review all IST pump hydraulic data over the past year for adverse trends.</p> <p>As necessary, make changes as a result of these actions.</p>	Complete for IST program instrumentation needed to support core load.	COMPLETE.	FINAL INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION SUPPORTS CORE LOAD.
12	Review 20% of the surveillance procedures associated with safety significant non-pump and valve components (such as heat exchangers and fans) to ensure that the surveillance acceptance criteria satisfy the requirements of the plant design basis/accident analysis. Make changes as necessary as a result of this review. Note: This has been expanded to a 100% review.	Complete the review for those surveillance procedures needed to support core load (TS-09 and HPIP 11.54).	COMPLETE.	FINAL INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION SUPPORTS CORE LOAD.
13	Review other operating procedures that contain maintenance activities and revise as necessary to ensure PMT and QC are properly addressed by those procedures.	Complete the review for those operating procedures needed to support core load.	In progress.	Draft independent verification supports core load.

14	Review equipment return to service testing requirements prior to the following U2R22 mode change readiness reviews to ensure the required equipment is operable prior to changing modes: core reload, leaving cold shutdown, and the approach to criticality.	Complete a Readiness Review prior to core load.	Will be conducted approximately one week prior to core load.	Independent verification drafted.
15	Review 20% of the work orders performed since January 1, 1995 on Unit 2 or common PSA safety significant systems (AFW, SW, EDG, IA, 4.16 kv, gas turbine, and CCW) to verify adequate PMT was performed to ensure system/component safety function.	Complete the review for those systems/components needed to support core load.	COMPLETE.	FINAL INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION SUPPORTS CORE LOAD.
17	Review 50.59 screenings conducted in 1996. Upgrade those determined to require a 50.59 evaluation.	Complete the review. Prior to core load, upgrade those screenings needed to support core load.	Review reported complete. Four upgrades need to be done prior to core load.	Independent verification drafted.
19	Conduct a review of 50.59 evaluations from this outage. Ensure all conditions of the evaluations have been completed.	Complete the review. Ensure conditions needed to support core load are completed prior to core loading.	In progress.	Draft independent verification supports core load.
20	Review items from existing open item lists (e.g., NUTRK) to identify potentially degraded equipment.	Complete the review prior to core load.	In progress.	Independent verification drafted.
22	All open operability evaluations for Unit 2 and common equipment will be reviewed for acceptable closure of the degraded equipment issue. Disposition outstanding issues in accordance with 10CFR50.59 and Generic Letter 91-18.	Complete the review for those Condition Reports needed to support core load.	In progress.	Independent verification drafted.
23	Review 20% of the Condition Reports closed since January 1, 1995 which are associated with PSA safety significant systems for degraded equipment operability issues to ensure that we have adequately identified and dispositioned operability issues. Note: This has been expanded to a 100% review of PSA safety significant systems.	Complete the review prior to core load.	In closeout verification.	Independent verification drafted.

24	Complete an additional Outage Safety Review for the startup phase of the outage.	Complete the review prior to core load.	In progress.	Draft independent verification supports core load.
26	Revise ORT-3 and DCS 3.1.11 to ensure Technical Specification 15.4.6.A.2 testing includes dynamic loading of the EDG with sequenced loads.	Complete the revisions prior to core load.	COMPLETE.	FINAL INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION SUPPORTS CORE LOAD.
27	Test all EDGs in accordance with revised ORT-3 and DCS-3.1.11. Return the electrical systems to normal alignment prior to leaving cold shutdown.	Complete the testing of EDGs iaw revised ORT-3 and DCS-3.1.11 prior to core load.	In progress.	Independent verification drafted.
34	Upgrade Unit 2 operations checklists to include requirements for initials, time, and date. During the review, verify that the checklists are technically accurate.	Complete the upgrade for checklists CL-7A and CL-1E.	One checklist complete.	Independent verification drafted.
37	Include return to service testing in the plant schedule, both outage and nonoutage.	Complete prior to core load.	COMPLETE.	FINAL INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION SUPPORTS CORE LOAD.
38	Modification 96-033 - replace control power transformers on Motor Control Centers 2B32 and 2B42.	Prior to core load, complete the 67 control power transformers identified in the Safety Evaluation Report dtd 9/25/96 to be done during U2R22.	In progress.	Independent verification drafted.
39	Modification 90-048 - replace Boric Acid and Reactor Makeup Water totalizers, replace the CVCS control switch, replace flow indicators, and refurbish flow controllers. This resolves an Operator workaround issue.	Conditionally accept prior to core load (needs PMT after core load).	Conditionally accepted.	FINAL INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION SUPPORTS CORE LOAD.

40	Modification 94-097 - remove six RCS loop drain valves.	Complete the installation prior to core load (awaiting RCS leak test as PMT).	Installation complete (awaiting RCS leak test as PMT).	FINAL INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION SUPPORTS CORE LOAD.
41	Modification 92-141 - relocate the RHR flow control valve controllers on 2CO3 for human factoring.	Accept prior to core load.	COMPLETE.	FINAL INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION SUPPORTS CORE LOAD.
42	Modification 96-073 - seismically upgrade CCW, SI, RHR, and RHR/letdown piping supports and remove an AFW snubber.	Accept prior to core load.	COMPLETE.	FINAL INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION SUPPORTS CORE LOAD.
46	Modification 96-022 - install a new 125 VDC feed to 480V safeguards bus 2B03.	Accept prior to core load.	COMPLETE.	FINAL INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION SUPPORTS CORE LOAD.
60	Work Orders 9601506, 9602502, 9603921, 9611267, 9611278, and 9611755 - replace proximity switches and targets with an improved design and overhaul the Fuel Transfer Cart to enhance control system operation. This resolves an Operator workaround issue.	Complete prior to core load.	In closeout verification.	FINAL INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION SUPPORTS CORE LOAD.
61	Work Orders 9613568 and 9613569 - provide bonnet pressure locking relief for the SI-857A and SI-857B valves (interface valves between RHR and High Head SI) on Unit 2.	Complete prior to core load.	Awaiting PMT (scheduled week of April 7, 1997).	Independent verification drafted.
65	Work Order 9606626 - reinstall switches on the Unit 2 Containment hatch third door to allow monitoring of door status.	Complete prior to core load.	COMPLETE.	FINAL INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION SUPPORTS CORE LOAD.

66	Work order 9611052 - replace the 2P-10B switch, the "B" RHR Pump control switch.	Complete prior to core load.	COMPLETE.	FINAL INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION SUPPORTS CORE LOAD.
76	Conduct roundtable discussions with all MSS/SS/DTA personnel regarding conservative decisionmaking, Technical Specification interpretations, and lessons learned from recent regulatory communications and perspectives. Review outlier Technical Specification interpretations for interim applications.	Complete prior to core load.	In progress.	Draft independent verification supports core load.