



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

July 18, 1985

DOCKETED

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Dr. Richard E. Webb
Studies of Nuclear Hazards
and Constitutional Law
4821 New England Lane, Suite 29
Sylvania, Ohio 43560

DOCKET NUMBER
PROD. & UTIL. FAC. 50-346
SERVED JUL 18 1985

Dear Dr. Webb:

I have been asked to respond to your July 8, 1985 letter to the Commission in which you requested that a hearing be held on the June 9, 1985 incident at the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant and on whether the facility should be permitted to resume operation. You noted a newspaper report which indicated that the NRC staff had issued an order to the Toledo Edison Company not to startup the facility without prior NRC approval.

Under Section 189a. of the Atomic Energy Act and the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR Part 2, members of the public who have an interest which may be affected may request a hearing in certain proceedings for the granting, amending or revoking of a license. However, there is currently no such proceeding regarding the Davis-Besse plant. The NRC has not issued an enforcement order. Toledo Edison volunteered to keep the plant down until it had taken certain actions and obtained NRC staff approval for restart, and the NRC merely confirmed licensee's proposed course of action in an informal confirmatory action letter dated June 10, 1985. Pertinent correspondence between the NRC staff and Toledo Edison Company is enclosed. Accordingly, there is currently no pending proceeding in which to request a hearing.

You are correct that the NRC staff is conducting an extensive evaluation of the June 9, 1985 incident. In this light, we are referring your letter to the staff for a further response as to your substantive safety concerns.

Sincerely,

Herzel H. E. Plaine

Herzel H. E. Plaine
General Counsel

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H PDR

Enclosure: As stated
cc: Davis-Besse Service List

CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER

June 10, 1985

Docket No. 50-346

Toledo Edison Company
ATTN: Mr. Richard P. Crouse
Vice President
Nuclear
Edison Plaza
300 Madison Avenue
Toledo, OH 43652

Gentlemen:

This letter confirms the conversations on June 10, 1985, between you and Charles E. Norelius of my staff related to the reactor trip at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Plant on June 9, 1985. While operating initially at 90% power, a reactor trip and other subsequent problems with the main and auxiliary feedwater systems resulted in a situation where no feedwater-flow was available for 10-12 minutes causing low level in the steam generators.

With regard to the matters discussed, we understand you have taken or will take the following actions:

1. Hold in abeyance any work in progress (electrical or mechanical) and/or any work planned on equipment that malfunctioned during the incident, such as dismantling or disturbing existing evidence, until the NRC Investigative Team has had an opportunity to evaluate this event and concur on your proposed corrective action(s).
2. Review main steam isolation valve actuation.
 - a. Establish the cause(s) of the ~~un~~explained closure of both MSIVs.
 - b. Determine and implement the corrective action(s) necessary to prevent recurrence.
 - c. Perform additional testing to ensure the MSIVs operate as required.
3. Review the auxiliary feed system actuation.
 - a. Establish the cause(s) of the inadvertent trip of both auxiliary feedwater pumps (AFP).
 - b. Determine and implement the corrective action(s) necessary to prevent recurrence.

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CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER

Toledo Edison Company

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June 10, 1985

4. Review the main feed system operation.
 - a. Establish the cause(s) of the inadvertent trip of the No. 1 main feed pump (MFP).
 - b. Determine and implement corrective action(s) to prevent recurrence for both main feed pumps.
5. Complete and submit to NRC Region III the results of your investigation of this event including your safety evaluation, an evaluation of thermal shock considerations for both Steam Generators (SG), the maximum S/G shell differential temperature, and possible general mechanical damage to any affected system(s). Also report your basis for event classification and the adequacy of information as originally reported to the NRC on June 9, 1985.
6. Complete the actions required by items 1-5 and obtain verbal concurrence from the NRC Region III Regional Administrator or his designee prior to authorizing restart (Mode 2) of the reactor.
7. Main and Auxiliary Feed System Testing
 - a. Perform testing which can be performed below 5% power, of the MFP's to demonstrate all pumps operate as required.
 - b. Perform testing of the AFP's to assure all pumps operate as required.
 - c. Appropriate test results, your conclusions, and a summary of corrective actions taken will be provided to the NRC resident office upon completion.
8. After all actions required above are completed obtain verbal concurrence from the NRC Region III Regional Administrator or his designee prior to exceeding 5% reactor power.

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Toledo Edison Company

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June 10, 1988

Please let us know immediately if your understanding differs from that set forth above.

Sincerely,

Original signed by
James G. Keppler

James G. Keppler
Regional Administrator

cc w/enclosure:
S. Quennoz, Station
Superintendent
DMB/Document Control Desk (RIDS)
Resident Inspector, R111
Harold W. Kohn, Ohio EPA
James W. Harris, State of Ohio
Robert H. Quillin, Ohio
Department of Health

CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER

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Greenier

R111
Harrison
Ohio

R111
Giles

R111
Burgess
Keppler

R111
Fournier
Keppler

Packet No. 50-346

License No. NTH-2

Serial No. 1-541

July 1, 1985



Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Administrator
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region III
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Dear Mr. Keppler:

On June 9, 1985, the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 (DBNPS) experienced a plant trip resulting in the loss of auxiliary feedwater flow to the steam generators and other equipment anomalies. A Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL-85-06) dated June 10, 1985 (Log 1-1153), was issued to Toledo Edison.

It is Toledo Edison's understanding, based upon discussions with your Mr. Wayne Shafer, NRC Region III Branch Chief, that the NRC Fact Finding Team concurrence on our proposed corrective action(s) is not required. Our understanding of Item 1 of the CAL is as follows:

Toledo Edison is to hold in abeyance any work in progress (electrical or mechanical) and/or any work planned on equipment that malfunctioned during the event, such as dismantling or disturbing existing evidence, until the NRC Fact Finding Team has had an opportunity to evaluate the event.

In addition, prior to the start of any work activities, Toledo Edison will:

- a. Provide the NRC with plans to investigate each failure prior to troubleshooting activities.
- b. Upon completion of the investigation, the NRC shall be notified as soon as practical when the determination of the root cause of the malfunction/failure has been identified.

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- c. Notify the NRC as soon as practical of plans and schedule for corrective action work, prior to the work being performed.

Work on the below listed equipment has been held in abeyance per the Confirmatory Action Letter until the NRC Fact Finding Team's review of Toledo Edison generated Action Plans for investigation of malfunctions/failures.

Prior to the NRC Fact Finding Team review, Toledo Edison held in abeyance all work on the following equipment:

- Main Feed Pump Turbines and Controls
- Steam & Feed Rupture Control System and Associated Instrument Channels
- Auxiliary Feed Pump Turbines and Controls
- Main Steam Isolation Valves, Controls, Actuating Circuits and Pneumatic Supplies
- Startup Feedwater Valve SP 7A and Controls
- Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation Channels
- Turbine Bypass Valve (TBV) SP-13A2, and any other components for which there is found an indication of water hammer damage. Traps and drains associated with #2 TBV header: MS 2575, MS 737, MS 739, ST 3, ST 2A.
- Power Operated Relief Valve, Controls and Actuation System
- Main Steam Safety Valves and Atmospheric Vent Valves
- Auxiliary Feedwater Valves AF 599 and AF 605, Actuators, and Controls
- Main Steam Valve MS 105 and Controls
- Service Water Valve and Controls on Auxiliary Feedwater Alternate Supply


Toledo Edison has agreed to limit other work activities in the proximity of this equipment so as not to affect this equipment. This is as requested by the NRC Fact Finding Team for the June 9, 1985 Event at the La-Is-Besse Nuclear Power Station.

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In a June 12, 1985, meeting with the NRC Fact Finding Team and Region III representatives, Toledo Edison was requested to walk down the Main Steam System (outside of containment) and if additional damage was found to equipment, that this equipment be held in abeyance. Toledo Edison completed a walkdown of the Main Steam System and the results are documented in procedure QCLF-037. No additional damage to equipment was identified.

Toledo Edison is striving to meet all the requirements of the NRC Fact Finding Team in a timely manner. We are prepared to fully support the NRC in the fact finding investigation.

Very truly yours,



Joe Williams, Jr.
Senior Vice President, Nuclear

JW/SCW/bjs

cc: DE-1 NRC Resident Inspector
Dr. E. Rossi, NRC Fact Finding Team Leader