NORTHEAST UTILITIES

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November 18, 1985

Docket No. 50-423
B11879

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Mr. B. J. Youngblood, Chief
Licensing Branch No. 1
Division of Licensing
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Reference: (1) J. F. Opeka letter to B. J. Youngblood, "Seismic Interaction Program," dated October 31, 1985.

Dear Mr. Youngblood:

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3
Additional Information Concerning the
Hazards Review Program

In a November 13, 1985 telephone conference between the NRC Staff and representatives of Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO), the Staff requested information concerning the current status of the Millstone Unit No. 3 Hazards Review Program. The following provides written confirmation of the information provided verbally to the Staff during the November 13 telephone conference.

The Millstone Unit No. 3 Hazards Program is a multifaceted program which considers fire hazards, flooding, heavy load drop, fluid system interaction, and seismic interaction. The fire hazards, flooding and heavy load drop programs are complete. The fluid system and seismic interaction programs are still ongoing. In Reference (1), NNECO provided the Staff information regarding the seismic interaction program for Millstone Unit No. 3. The following summary provides a completion status of the fluid systems interaction hazards analysis.

1. The Hazards Program implementation document, NERM-69, is complete and complies with all of the applicable Final Safety Analysis Report commitments.

2. Approximately 45 percent of the total plant review and documentation is complete. This is represented below by specific building completion percentages:

Buildings	% of Total Packages Complete
a. Engineered Safety Features Building	100%
b. Diesel Generator Enclosure Building	100%

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Buildings		% of Total Packages Complete
c.	Service Water Pump Building	100%
d.	Main Steam Valve Building	50%
e.	Control Building	25%
f.	Auxiliary Building	40%
g.	Fuel Building	0%
h.	Containment Building	10%
i.	Hydrogen Recombiner Building	100%

3. While 45 percent of the total effort is complete as indicated above, approximately 65 percent of the physical interaction review and plant walkdown is complete. The walkdown is the final review to verify that any previously unidentified system interactions have been identified and a solution provided. This assessment is qualitatively enumerated below:

   a. Final break location documentation is complete for the Reactor Coolant, Main Steam and Feedwater piping systems, inside containment, including all essential equipment interactions.

   b. All preparatory documentation (annotated P&IDs, piping drawings and machine location drawings) is complete to support final walkdown of all containment areas and major piping areas in the Auxiliary Building.

   c. Completion of the Control Building, Containment and Main Steam Valve Building reviews will proceed more efficiently due to similarity to the areas previously completed in the structures.

To date, the following plant modifications have resulted from the fluid systems interaction hazards analysis portion of the Hazards Program. It should be noted that these modifications represent component level modifications rather than system level and are considered minor in scope.

1. A redundant electronic overspeed trip was provided on the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump to preclude a turbine missile interaction with service water piping.

2. The surge lines to the Component Cooling Water System surge tanks were rerouted to preclude a High Energy Line Break (HELB) interaction with Auxiliary Steam System piping.

3. The Component Cooling System, inside containment, was modified because of the potential for interaction with the pressurizer surge line. As such, it is no longer a closed system, as defined by General Design Criterion (GDC-57). The inside containment check valves are being modified to allow their use as containment isolation valves in accordance with GDC-56.

4. Local shielding is being added to several axial flow fans to preclude blade penetration through the flexible connections attached to the fans.

5. A solenoid valve associated with HELB mitigation was moved to preclude interaction with an adjacent Auxiliary Steam Line.

It is NNECO's intention to complete all area walkdowns prior to taking the plant into Mode 4. While all documentation required by NERM-69 will be complete before entering Mode 1, all plant modifications identified during these walkdowns will be included on the Project Completion Punchlist and will be completed before entering the mode of operation that they support.

If you have any questions regarding this information, please contact our licensing representative directly.

Very truly yours,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY
et. al.

BY NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY
Their Agent

J. F. Opeka
Senior Vice President

STATE OF CONNECTICUT)
) ss. Berlin
COUNTY OF HARTFORD)

Then personally appeared before me J. F. Opeka, who being duly sworn, did state that he is Senior Vice President of Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, an Applicant herein, that he is authorized to execute and file the foregoing information in the name and on behalf of the Applicants herein and that the statements contained in said information are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.

Notary Public

My Commission Expires March 31, 1988