

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I

Report No. 50-443/85-18

Docket No. 50-443

License No. CPPR-135

Licensee: Public Service of New Hampshire

P.O. Box 330

Manchester, New Hampshire 03105

Facility Name: New Hampshire Yankee-Seabrook Nuclear Station

Inspection At: Seabrook, New Hampshire

Inspection Conducted: June 10-14, 1985

Type of Inspection: Preoperational Security Program Review

Date of Last Physical Security Inspection: None

Inspectors:

R. J. Bailey
R. J. Bailey, Physical Security Inspector

11-21-85
date

J. M. Dunlap
J. M. Dunlap, Physical Security Inspector

11-21-85
date

Approved by:

R. R. Keimig
R. R. Keimig, Chief, Safeguards Section, DRSS

11-25-85
date

Inspection Summary: Preoperational Security Program Review on June 10-14, 1985, (Inspection Report No. 50-443/85-18).

Areas Reviewed: Status of program including: Security Program Audit; the Security Plan and Implementing Procedures; Management Effectiveness; and, Physical Barriers (Protected Area). The review involved 64 hours onsite by two NRC region-based inspectors.

Results: Development and implementation of the licensee's security program are progressing as scheduled.

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DETAILS

1. Key Persons Contacted

Public Service of New Hampshire

W. A. Difroio, Assistant Plant Manager
*J. T. Tuberty, Administrative Service Manager
*G. Kingston, Compliance Manager
*J. Warnock, Quality Assurance Manager
*C. Roberts, Security and Computer Systems Manager
*P. Upson, Audit and Evaluation Supervisor
*S. J. Ellis, Security Department Supervisor
*J. G. Newhall, Security Supervisor
*B. R. Seymour, Security Supervisor
*R. White, Security Supervisor
*C. R. House, Security Staff Assistant
*W. C. Howe, Chief of Security-Green Mountain Security
R. H. Messina, Assistant Chief of Security-Green Mountain Security
H. Van Pelt, Shift Commander-Green Mountain Security
J. LaCrosse, Training Supervisor-Green Mountain Security

Yankee Atomic Electric Company

*V. W. Sanchez, Licensing Engineer
*D. Maidrand, Assistant Project Manager

NRC

*A. C. Cerne, Senior Resident Inspector
*R. M. Gallo, Chief, Reactor Projects Section, 2A Region I (DRP)

The inspectors also interviewed other licensee employees and members of the security organization.

2. MC 30703-Exit Interview

The inspectors met with the licensee representatives (indicated by asterisks in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the review on June 14, 1985. At that time, the purpose and scope of the review were discussed and the findings were presented. The licensee acknowledged the inspectors' observations and findings (identified in Attachments 1 and 2 to this report) and stated that modifications, as appropriate, would be made.

At no time during this review was written material provided to the licensee by the inspector.

3. MC 81018 - Security Plan and Implementing Procedures

The inspectors reviewed the current Physical Security Plan. The results of this review were discussed with a representative of the licensee. The inspectors' findings are summarized in Attachment 1 to this report. During future security program reviews, the security plan will be reviewed further to determine the adequacy of the licensee's actions concerning the inspectors findings. (Inspector Followup Item 50-443/85-18-01).

Attachment 2 to this report contains a listing of the NRC-issued security related Bulletins, Circulars and Information Notices that have been sent by the Office of Inspection and Enforcement to licensees for their information and action, as necessary, in the past. The licensee's actions with respect to the information contained in these documents also will be included during future preoperational security program reviews. (Inspector Followup Item 50-443/85-18-02).

4. MC 81020 - Management Effectiveness

The inspectors observed that development of the security program is on schedule. Station administrative procedures pertaining to plant security and detailed security procedures have been prepared and approved for use. The station security organization is functionally divided and an experienced Security Program Manager, Site Security Supervisor and four functional supervisors have been engaged in providing guidance and coordination in development of the program.

5. MC 81052 - Physical Barrier (Protected Area)

The inspectors observed that the protected area barrier for the site is not completed; however, a portion of the barrier located inside the completed main guard house does not conform to paragraph 4.2.4 of the Physical Security Plan. The licensee acknowledged this and stated that the barrier would be modified to conform to commitments in the Security Plan. (Inspector Followup Item 50-443/85-18-03).

The inspectors discussed the physical protection that will be afforded to the Circulating Water Pump Building. The licensee advised the inspector that NRC's Offices of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards and Nuclear Reactor Regulation were currently analyzing the level of protection which should be afforded to this building. The licensee acknowledged that the physical security plan would have to be amended to reflect the outcome of NRC's analysis. (Inspector Followup Item 50-443/85-18-04).

Attachment 1

The New Hampshire Yankee - Seabrook Nuclear Generating Station Physical Security Plan, Revision 4, dated August 4, 1984 was reviewed by the NRC Region I Physical Security Inspectors. The inspectors' findings and observations were discussed with the licensee representatives who stated that they would be included during further development and implementation of the security program.

Paragraph 2.3

Page 6

Reference: 10 CFR

73.55(b)(3)

Finding:

The plan does not include a commitment for a management system to provide for the development, approval, revision, implementation and enforcement of station procedures that implement the Physical Security Plan, Security Contingency Plan and Training and Qualification Plan. The licensee agreed to include this commitment.

Paragraph 2.6.5

Page 8

Finding:

THIS PARAGRAPH CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS
INFORMATION AND IS NOT FOR PUBLIC
DISCLOSURE. IT IS INTENTIONALLY
LEFT BLANK.

Paragraph 2.6.8.5

Page 12

Reference: 10 CFR

73.55(c)(4)

Observation:

THIS PARAGRAPH CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS
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Paragraph 3.7.5

Finding: Page 22

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Paragraph 4.2.5
Page 25

Finding:

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PUBLIC DISCLOSURE. IT IS
INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK.

Paragraph 4.3
Page 26

Finding:

The security plan describes the type of intrusion detection systems that will be installed in the isolation zones. However, the inspectors determined that a different type of intrusion detection system is being purchased. The licensee stated that the plan would be revised accordingly.

Pararagraph-
6.10.2.2
Page 45

Finding:

THIS PARAGRAPH CONTAINS 2.790(d)
INFORMATION AND IS NOT FOR
PUBLIC DISCLOSURE. IT IS
INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK.

Paragraph 7.1.1
Page 46

Finding:

This paragraph discusses the types of intrusion detection systems and their installation. Since different systems are being purchased, this paragraph needs to be revised accordingly. The licensee stated that this would be done.

Paragraph 7.1.2
Reference: 10 CFR
73.55(d)(7),
(8) and 73.55(e)(3)

Finding:

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Paragraph 9.2

Page 54

Reference: 10 CFR
73.55(f)(1)

Finding:

The plan does not commit to the general communications requirements, contained in 10 CFR 73.55, for security personnel.

The plan does not include a commitment that each guard, watchman, or armed response individual on duty is capable of maintaining continuous communications with an individual in each continuously manned alarm station. The licensee will revise the plan accordingly.

Paragraph 11.5

Page 60

Finding:

The plan does not specifically describe which isolation zones have zone encroachments that require additional detection aids or patrols. The licensee will revise the plan to reflect this.

Paragraph 11.6

Page 60

Reference: 10 CFR
73.55(d)(1) and
Review Guideline
#18

Finding:

The plan states that the separation barrier between Units 1 and 2 contains approximately five vehicle gates providing access to the Unit 2 construction site and that traffic through any one of the five gates is estimated to be minimal. 10 CFR 73.55(d)(1) requires that the individual responsible for the last access control function (controlling admission to the protected area) shall be isolated within a bullet-resisting structure. The NRR staff position on vehicle gates states that vehicle gates and emergency exits, only used occasionally, may have access controlled by two guards at the gate/exit, provided:

- (a) Individuals are processed through the normal personnel access controls.
- (b) Vehicles are subjected to prior processing at the normal vehicle control station.
- (c) Material and packages on the vehicle have been checked for identification and authorization, and have been subjected to search requirements.

- (d) Keys used for unlocking the protected area portal are issued to a guard from within a bullet-resisting structure and are always returned to the bullet-resisting structure after locking the portal.

The licensee agreed to change the word "minimal" to "occasional" to conform to the wording of the NRR position. The inspector stated that if personnel and vehicular traffic increased beyond occasional use, those gates/exits would be considered as primary entry/exit portals and, therefore, would have to meet 10 CFR 73.55(d)(1).

Paragraph 13.3
Page 64

Finding:

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Paragraph 14.8
Page 66
Reference: 10 CFR
73.55(b)(1)

Finding:

The plan states that the records described in the plan are available for NRC review, unless precluded by applicable privacy laws. The licensee will revise the plan to conform to 10 CFR 73.55(b)(1).

Attachment 2
1977

<u>Item</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Date</u>
IE Circular 77-04,	Inadequate Lock Assemblies	March 18, 1977
IE Bulletin 77-08	Assurance of Safety & Safeguards During an Emergency - Locking Systems	December 28, 1977

1978

IE Circular 78-17	Inadequate Guard Training/Qualification and Falsified Training Records	October 13, 1978
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1979

IE Circular 79-03	Inadequate Guard Training/Qualification and Falsified Training Records	February 23, 1979
IE Bulletin 79-16	Vital Area Access Controls	July 30, 1979

1980

IE Circular 80-09	Problems with Plant Internal Communications Systems	March 28, 1980
IE Information Notice No. 80-18	Possible Weapons Smuggling Pouch	May 5, 1980

1982

IE Information Notice No. 82-05	Increasing Frequency of Drug-Related Incidents	March 10, 1982
IE Information Notice No. 82-07	Inadequate Security Screening Programs	March 16, 1982
IE Information Notice No. 82-46	Defective and Obsolete Combination Padlocks	November 26, 1982

1983

IE Information Notice No. 83-15	Falsified Pre-Employment Screening Records	March 23, 1983
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IE Information Notice No. 83-27	Operational Response to Events Concerning Deliberate Acts Directed Against Plant Equipment.	May 4, 1983
IE Information Notice No. 83-36	Impact of Security Practices on Safe Operations	June 9, 1983
IE Information Notice No. 83-68	Respirator User Warning: Defective Self Contained Breathing Apparatus Air Cylinders	October 11, 1983
IE Information Notice No. 83-	Use of Portable Radio Trans- mitters Inside Nuclear Power Plants	December 19, 1983

1984

IE Information Notice No. 84-07	Design Basis Threat and Review of Vehicular Access Controls	February 3, 1984
IE Information Notice No. 84-08	Employee Protection	March 14, 1984
IE Information Notice No. 84-69	Operation of Emergency Diesel Generators	August 29, 1984

1985

IE Information Notice No. 85-04	Inadequate Management of Security Response Drills	January 17, 1985
IE Information Notice No. 85-28	Partial Loss of AC Power and Diesel Generator Degradation	April 9, 1985