

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of  
digits/characters for each block)ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY  
INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS  
LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED  
BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN  
ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-  
6 P33), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC  
20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104),  
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 1

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

05000245

PAGE (3)

1 of 3

TITLE (4)

Failure To Meet Technical Specification 3.1.C "Reactor Protection System Power Monitoring"

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
02	22	97	97	017	00	03	24	97	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
OPERATING MODE (9)		N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)							
POWER LEVEL (10)		000	20.2201(b)		20.2203(a)(2)(v)		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)
			20.2203(a)(1)		20.2203(a)(3)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)
			20.2203(a)(2)(i)		20.2203(a)(3)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)	73.71
			20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		20.2203(a)(4)				50.73(a)(2)(iv)	OTHER
			20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		50.36(c)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A
			20.2203(a)(2)(iv)		50.36(c)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)	

## LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

Robert W. Walpole, MP1 Nuclear Licensing Manager

TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

(860)440-2191

## COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

## SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES	NO
(If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	

## EXPECTED SUBMISSION

MONTH DAY YEAR

364

## ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On February 22, 1997, with the plant in cold shutdown (85 degrees Fahrenheit and 0 psig) it was determined that Technical Specification 3.1.C, "Reactor Protection Power Monitoring," was not complied with during battery maintenance and discharge testing. Battery maintenance or battery discharge testing removes one battery bus from service which removes the DC control power to one channel of the Reactor Protection Power Monitoring Electric Protection Assemblies (EPA's). In order to maintain control power to the EPA's powered from the out of service battery, jumpers were installed from the inservice battery to the EPA's so that the DC control power would be maintained. While in this configuration the EPA's were incorrectly declared operable and the Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) requirements were not adhered to.

The cause of this event is that personnel involved in the Jumper Device, Safety Evaluation, Procedure and Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) review failed to recognize that the EPA's were not operable when DC control power was being received from the opposite battery bus with the normal DC control power out of service. No safety consequences resulted from this event, since both channels of the EPA's remained in service and would provide adequate protection of the RPS components. However, while in this configuration, the revised lineup was no longer single failure proof. OP 344A will be revised to delete the installation of the jumper and require that LCO 3.1.C.1 be entered if a battery is removed from service.

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## TEXT CONTINUATION

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

I. Description of Event

On February 22, 1997, with the plant in cold shutdown (85 degrees Fahrenheit and 0 psig) it was determined that Technical Specification 3.1.C, "Reactor Protection Power Monitoring," was not complied with while performing battery maintenance and discharge testing. Technical Specification 3.1.C requires that "Two RPS electric power monitoring channels for each inservice RPS MG set, or alternate power supply, shall be operable at all times." Battery maintenance or battery discharge testing removes one battery bus from service which removes the DC control power to one channel of the Reactor Protection Power Monitoring Electric Protection Assemblies (EPA's). As directed by OP 344A, DC control power was isolated from both EPA channels and LCO 3.1.C.2 was entered, which allows both channels of the EPA's to be inoperable for a period of 30 minutes or remove the RPS power source from service. In order to maintain control power to the EPA's powered from the out of service battery, OP 344A directed jumpers be installed from the inservice battery to the EPA's so that the DC control power would be maintained. After installation of the jumper DC control power is restored to both channels from the same DC source. While in this configuration the EPA's were declared operable and LCO 3.1.C.2 was exited as directed by OP 344A. A review of the Technical Specifications definition of operability determined that the EPA's were incorrectly declared operable with the jumper installed. This caused the EPA's to be inoperable for greater than 72 hours and the RPS power source was not removed from service as directed by LCO 3.1.C.1. The safety evaluation for the installation of the jumper was prepared on July 3, 1987, and approved by PORC on July 3, 1987.

II. Cause of Event

The cause of this event is that personnel involved in the Jumper Device, Safety Evaluation, Procedure and PORC review failed to recognize that the EPA's were not operable when DC control power was being received from the opposite battery bus with the normal DC control power out of service.

III. Analysis of Event

Since the EPA's were declared operable when DC control power was being received from the opposite battery bus with the normal DC control power out of service, this event has been determined to be reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications. When the EPA's were incorrectly declared operable, the LCO 3.1.C.1 and the associated action statement were not met.

The RPS EPA's provide protection for the RPS components from overvoltage, undervoltage and underfrequency. Each RPS power source has two EPA channels. Each channel will provide the needed protection. One EPA channel receives control power from the 'A' battery and one from the 'B' battery. The EPA's sense an abnormal voltage or frequency and isolate the RPS power source from the RPS bus to prevent RPS component degradation.

With both channels of the EPA's being supplied by the same DC source, the EPA's would provide the needed protection unless the DC source was lost. If this were to occur then degradation of the RPS components would occur over time if a failure of the RPS power source voltage regulator or speed control occurred as well.

No safety consequences resulted from this event, since both channels of the EPA's remained in service and would provide adequate protection of the RPS components. However, while in this configuration, the revised lineup was no longer single failure proof.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

IV. Corrective Action

OP 344A will be revised by March 31, 1997, to delete the installation of the jumper and require that Technical Specification LCO 3.1.C.1 be entered if a battery is removed from service.

It is the expectation of the new Station Qualified Reviewer Program to ensure that personnel designated to screen and review procedures are qualified and trained.

The safety evaluation process has been improved since the safety evaluation for this event was performed.

A review of this event will be included in the annual PORC training.

V. Additional Information

Similar Events

None

Manufacturer Data

Not Applicable