

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Palo Verde Unit 1						DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 5 2 8								PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2																					
TITLE (4) Inoperable Charging Flow Paths																																			
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (3)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)																									
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)																						
1	0	2	3	8	5	8	5	-	0	5	1	-	0	0	1	1	2	2	8	5					0	5	0	0	0						
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OPERATING MODE (9)			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																																
1			20.402(b)				20.405(c)				50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)																				
POWER LEVEL (10)			0 7 7				20.405(a)(1)(i)				50.36(c)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)																
			20.405(a)(1)(ii)				50.36(c)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)																				
			20.405(a)(1)(iii)				X 50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)																								
			20.405(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)																								
			20.405(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(ix)																								
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																																			
NAME												TELEPHONE NUMBER																							
W. F. Quinn, Manager of Nuclear Licensing (ext. 4087)												AREA CODE		6 0 2 9 4 3 - 7 2 0 0																					
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																																			
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUF. TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUF. TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS																									
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR																			
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)												<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO																							
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)																																			

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On October 23, 1985, Palo Verde Unit 1 was in Mode 1 at 77 percent power when, at approximately 1324, charging to the reactor coolant system (RCS)(AB) was lost. Flow to the RCS was lost due to the inadvertent opening of an unisolated reactor coolant pump seal injection (CB) filter housing by maintenance personnel. This resulted in a loss of pressure in the charging header (CB), and required stopping the charging pumps to allow restoration of system integrity. The termination of the charging flow to the reactor coolant system placed the unit outside the ACTION statement associated with Technical Specification 3.1.2.2 for Boron Injection Flowpaths. The plant entered and complied with the requirements of Technical Specification 3.0.3, and flow was reestablished approximately five minutes later.

To prevent recurrence, the individuals involved with the incident have been counseled and made aware of the potential safety concerns for both plant and personnel. In addition, appropriate mechanical maintenance procedures will have a step added requiring the performer to identify the equipment he/she will be working on and sign off prior to starting any work.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/86

FACILITY NAME (1) Palo Verde Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 5 2 8	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		8 5	— 0 5 1	— 0 0	0 2	OF	0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 306A's) (17)

On October 23, 1985, at 1324 hours, Palo Verde Unit 1 was in Mode 1 at 77 percent reactor power when the "Seal Injection Header Flow-Low" (IB) alarm annunciated. Control room personnel noticed charging header (CB) pressure at approximately 1300 psig when they were notified by maintenance personnel that the wrong seal injection (CB) filter housing was opened. The operators then shut off all charging pumps to reduce the leakage. The unit complied with Technical Specification 3.0.3 when the Action of Technical Specification 3.1.2.2 for boron injection flow paths could not be met. The seal injection filters were isolated and charging reestablished. Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited within 5 minutes of initial declaration.

The cause of the incident was personnel error when three plant mechanics inadvertently opened the wrong seal injection filter housing to perform a filter changeout. Investigation after the incident showed that all procedural controls were adequate to perform the work safely. The work order identified the proper equipment to be worked on. A clearance was hung on the proper equipment and was walked down by maintenance before being accepted. A tailboard meeting was held before the start of work.

When the mechanics realized what had occurred, they evacuated the area immediately and notified the control room. They then returned to the changeout room to draw the proper equipment for reentry to the filter room. They then tightened the filter housing. After tightening the filter housing, they went to the control room to explain the incident and then notified their foreman.

There was no major equipment out of service at the time of the incident. All safety equipment was operable and could have performed its design function had it been called for, therefore there were no safety concerns during the incident.

To prevent recurrence, the individuals involved with the incident have been counseled and made aware of the potential safety concerns for both the plant and personnel. In addition, appropriate mechanical maintenance procedures will have a step added requiring the performer to identify the equipment he/she will be working on and sign off prior to starting any work.

No similar events have occurred.



Arizona Nuclear Power Project

P.O. BOX 52034 • PHOENIX, ARIZONA 85072-2034

November 22, 1985
ANPP 34084 EEVB/GEC

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Unit 1
Docket No. STN 50-528, License No. NPF-41
Licensee Event Report - Inoperable Charging
Flow Path
File: 85-020-404

Dear Sirs:

Attached please find Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 85-051-00 prepared and submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73. This LER addresses an inoperable charging flow path resulting in the plant being in a condition prohibited by the Technical Specifications. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(d), we are herewith forwarding a copy of the LER to the Regional Administrator of the Region V Office.

If you have any questions, please contact me.

Very truly yours,

E. E. Van Brunt
DBK

E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.
Executive Vice President
Project Director

EEVB/GEC/dk
Attachment

cc: J. B. Martin (all w/a)
R. P. Zimmerman
A. L. Hon
E. A. Licitra
A. C. Gehr
INPO Records Center

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